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Since   the   Justice   and   Development   Party’s   (AKP)   victory   and  
government  in  2002,  Turkey  entered  a  new  phase  in  its  history  and  witnessed  
major   changes   in  all   social,   economic,   and  political   aspects.  Turkish   foreign  
policy  went  through  huge  transformations  and  the  new  AKP  government  was  
able  to  revolutionise  Turkey’s  international  position.  In  particular,  relations  with  
Middle  Eastern  countries  have   tremendously   improved  and  Turkish   interests  
and  role  have  been  growing  ever  since.    
This  thesis  investigates  the  sources  of  change  in  Turkish  foreign  policy  
since  2002  towards  the  Middle  East,  focusing  on  the  role  of  the  AKP  (Justice  
and  Development  Party)  as  a  ruling  party  in  particular  on  the  changes  it  went  
through  in  the  first  ten  years  from  2002  to  early  2012.  The  significant  changes  
in  Turkish  foreign  policy  appeared  under  the  AKP  government  became  one  of  
the  most  debated  issues  in  this  field  and  created  a  puzzle  that  many  scholars  
attempted  to  explain.  Therefore,  the  thesis  engages  in  recent  debates  between  
the  different  scholars  and  analysts  in  the  literature  and  argues  that  there  is  a  
need   for   a   more   inclusive   approach   that   can   recognize   the   complex   and  
multilateral  nature  of  the  Turkish  case.  The  aim  is  to  assess  and  evaluate  the  
plausibility  of  the  available  competing  explanations  in  the  literature  in  explaining  
such  foreign  policy  outcomes.    
Therefore,   the   thesis   borrows   and   builds   on   the   works   of   Alexander  
George   &   Andrew   Bennet   (2005),   and   Derek   Beach   &   Rasmus   Pedersen  
(2013)  by  adopting  the  Process  Tracing  Methodology,  which  helps  to  facilitate  
a  better  critical  analysis  and  systematic  evaluation  of  the  selected  explanations.  
The   results   of   this   thesis   demonstrate   that   single   factor   based   explanations  
actually  drive  researchers  away  from  achieving  a  comprehensive  explanation  
and  only  help  provide  a  partial  picture.  Therefore,  the  best  way  to  go  forward  is  
by   adopting   a   much   more   inclusive   and   multiple   factors   based   approach  
recognising  the  important  opportunity  that  foreign  policy  theories  offer  in  looking  
at   the   Turkish   case   from   different   perspectives.   The   results   of   this   thesis  
suggest  that  the  best  way  for  understanding  Turkish  foreign  policy  change  is  by  
recognizing  the  multiple  roles  of  domestic  and  international  economic,  political,  
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and  ideational  sources,  as  well  as  the  role  of  policy  makers,  particularly  that  of  
Recep  Tayyip  Erdogan  and  Ahmet  Davutoglu.        
The  contribution  of   this  thesis   lies  within   its  analysis  bringing  the  wide  
range  of  explanations  in  the  literature  together,  exploring  and  summarizing  the  
vast  number  of  data  in  a  more  simplified  manner,  and  examining  the  value  and  
plausibility   of   the   competing   explanation   to   try   and   arrive   at   the   most  
comprehensive  explanation,  all  under  one  piece  of  work.  Therefore,  this  thesis  
establishes  a  useful   foundation   for   researchers   to  adopt  and   take   forward   in  
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1.	  Background	  of	  the	  study	  	  
  
The  aim  of   this   thesis   is   to  examine  the  main  causes  behind  Turkish  foreign  
policy   change   towards   the   Middle   East   since   2002   under   the   Justice   and  
Development  Party  government.  The   thesis  main   research  question   is;;  what  
are  the  main  sources  behind  Turkish  foreign  policy  change  towards  the  Middle  
East   under   the   rule   of   the   AKP   government   since   2002?   There   have   been  
several  attempts  by  many  scholars  and  analysts  to  answer  such  question  who  
offered  a  number   of   different   and   competing  explanations.  The  existence  of  
multiple  competing  explanations   represents   the  gap   in   the   literature   that   this  
thesis   aims   to   fill.   Therefore,   in   answering   the  main   research   question,   the  
researcher  will  offer  an  assessment  that  can  help  identify  which  of  the  multiple  
competing  explanations  offered   in   the   literature   in  explaining  Turkish   foreign  
policy   change   and   transformation   represent   the   most   plausible   and  
comprehensive  answer.  The  existence  of  multiple  explanations  in  the  literature  
that  need  to  be  closely  assessed  and  examined  in  order  to   identify   the  most  
valuable  one,  highly  contribute   to   the  necessity  of   this   thesis.  Therefore,   the  
thesis  will  offer  an  analysis  of  the  literature  on  Turkish  foreign  policy,  testing  the  
plausibility   of   the  wide   range   of   theoretical   hypotheses   offered.   This   will   be  
carried  out  through  the  use  of  Process  Tracing  methodology,  which  enables  the  
researcher   to   evaluate   and   assess   the   value   and   validity   of   the   competing  
explanations   through   specific   examination   tools   and   tests.   Furthermore,   the  
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thesis  goal  is  to  identify  the  most  comprehensive  explanation  in  the  literature  
so   far   and   to   establish   a   foundation   for   future   researchers   to   build   on   and  
develop.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  important  to  clarify  that  the  thesis  does  not  aim  
to  establish  and  represent  a  new  explanation  as  opposed  to  the  already  existing  
ones.  Instead,  its  main  goal  is  to  assess  and  evaluate  the  significance  of  the  
current  competing  theoretical  explanations  in  an  attempt  to  arrive  at  the  most  
comprehensive  one.    
Turkish  politics  and  foreign  policy  have  witnessed  critical  changes  over  
time   facing  a  number  of  challenges  as  well  as  opportunities   through  history.  
Since   the  creation  of   the  Turkish   republic  by  Kemal  Ataturk   in  1923,  Turkey  
substantially  moved  away  from  its  previous  Ottoman  lands.  The  new  Turkish  
leader  was  concerned  with  building  the  new  republic  and  its  national  identity1.  
The  aim  was  to  build  a  Western-­oriented  identity  that  would  be  closer  to  Europe  
and  the  West  in  general  than  it  is  to  the  East.  In  foreign  policy  terms,  Ataturk  
adopted  a  very  Western-­oriented  foreign  policy  and  paid  very  little  attention  to  
its  Arab  and  Middle  Eastern  neighbours2.  The  new  Kemalist  establishment  and  
elites  in  Turkey  became  the  most  powerful  and  exclusivist  foreign  policy  makers  
for   a   long   time.   Turkey   went   through   a   number   of   coups   and   domestic  
instabilities  as  well  as  increasing  regional  conflicts.  Turkish  foreign  policy  was  
mainly  based  on  military  security  and  hard  power  approach  leading  to  a  more  
intense  region3.  Since  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  end  of  the  Cold  
                                                                                                              
1  Dov  Waxman,  “Islam  and  Turkish  National  Identity:  A  Reappraisal,”  The  Turkish  Year  Book  
of  International  Relations  30,  no.  1,  (2000):  1-­22.    
2  Oguz  Unal,  Turkiye’de  Democrasinin  Dogusu,  Tek  parti  Yonetiminden  Cok  Partili  Rejime  
Gecis  Sureci,  (The  Emergence  of  Democracy  in  Turkey,  the  Transformation  Process  from  
One  Party  to  Multi-­Party  Regime).  (Istanbul,  Milliyet  Yayin  A.S.,  1994),  117.  Cited  in  Hakan  
Yilmaz,  “Democratization  from  Above  in  Response  to  the  International  Context,”  New  
Perspectives  on  Turkey,  no.  17  (1997):    1-­38.    
3  Kemal  Kiriþci,  “Turkey’s  Foreign  Policy  in  Turbulent  Times,”  Institute  for  Security  Studies,  
no.  92  (2006):  11.    
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War,  Turkey  had  to  adapt  to  a  changing  new  international  system.  Since  then,  
a   number   of   scholars   and   researchers   paid   attention   and   illustrated   that  
Turkey’s  foreign  policy  witnessed  immense  changes4.  Turkey  had  to  face  the  
challenge  of  dealing  and  coping  with  the  new  multi-­polar  international  system  
after   a   long   bi-­polar   system.   Such   change   in   the   international   system   gave  
Turkey  the  opportunity  to  expand  its  role,  while  maintaining  “coercive  power”5.  
However,  Turkey  faced  very  tough  challenges  after  the  Cold  War,  such  as  the  
ethno-­national  conflicts  in  the  Balkans  and  the  Caucasus  as  well  as  an  increase  
of  the  Kurdish  problem.  As  a  result,  Turkey  reassessed  its  international  position  
and   was   described   as   a   state   undertaking   “new   activism”6.   Turkey   had   to  
engage  in  a  much  more  active  foreign  policy  due  to  the  consequences  of  this  
new  international  system  transformation.    
   Therefore,  Turkey’s  regional  position  became  much  more  positive  and  
showed  some  proactive  policies.  This  was  mainly  evident  since  the  1990  Gulf  
War   showing   some   signs   of   interest   in   the  Middle   East   towards   the   end   of  
1990s7.  Another  crucial  event  that  had  a  significant  impact  on  Turkish  foreign  
policy  and  position  was  the  tragic  1999  Izmit  earthquake8.  Turkey  witnessed  a  
strong  level  earthquake  that  resulted  in  major  loss  of  lives  and  high  casualties.  
This  incident  represented  a  black  mark  in  the  history  of  Turkey  and  affected  the  
                                                                                                              
4  See,  Alan  Makovsky  and  Sabri  Sayari.,  eds.,  Turkey’s  New  World  –  Changing  Dynamics  in  
Turkish  Foreign  Policy  (The  Washington  Institute  for  Near  East  Policy,  2000);;  Sule  Kut,  “The  
Contours  of  Turkish  Foreign  Policy  in  the  1990s,”  In  Turkey  in  World  Politics:  An  Emerging  
Multiregional  Power,  eds.,  Barry  Rubin  and  Kemal  Kirisci  (London:  Lynne  Rienner  Publishers,  
2001).    
5  Ziya  Onis,  “Turkey  and  the  Middle  East  after  September  11:  The  Importance  of  the  EU  
Dimension”,  Turkish  Policy  Quarterly,  2,  no.  4  (2003):  84.    
6  Sabri  Sayari,  “Turkish  foreign  policy  in  the  post-­Cold  War  era:  The  challenges  of  multi-­
regionalism”,  Journal  of  International  Affairs  54,  no.1  (2000):  169-­182.    
7  Sharon  Otterman,  “IRAQ:  U.S.-­Turkey  Relations”,  Council  on  Foreign  Relations,  (March  21,  
2003),  accessed  January  12,  2016,  http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-­us-­turkey-­relations/p7795.    
8  BBC,  News,  “Turkey  hit  by  huge  earthquake,”  August  17,  1999,  accessed  January  12,  2016,  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/17/newsid_2534000/2534245.stm.    
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life   of   many   of   its   citizens.   Turkey   received   aid   and   support   from   many  
countries.  Greece  a  neighbour  with  whom  it  had  experienced  major  historical  
conflicts   and   poor   relations,   was   one   of   the   first   countries   to   offer   aid   and  
support9.  Turkey  was  highly  appreciative  of  Greece’s  position  in  this  event.  On  
the  other  hand,  during  the  same  summer,  only  a  month  later,  Athens  was  also  
hit  by  a  powerful  earthquake  that  was  one  of  the  most  costly  and  devastating  
events  in  the  history  of  Greece10.  This  time  Turkey  was  one  of  the  first  to  help  
and  offered  necessary  assistance.  The  Turkish  aid  was  one  of  the  first  to  arrive  
and   there   was   continues   governmental   communication   and   cooperation  
between  the  two.  Such  events  have  resulted  in  mutual  sympathies  and  created  
an  atmosphere  of  friendship.  Therefore,  at  Helsinki  Greece  withdrew  its  long-­
standing   opposition   for   Turkey’s   membership   in   the   European   Union11.  
Moreover,  Turkish-­Greek  earthquake  diplomacy  was  taking  place  between  the  
two,   which   highlights   a   growing   concentration   of   both   countries   on   mutual  
interests.  These  events  and  developing  relations  between  Turkey  and  Greece  
influenced  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  especially  regarding  its  troubled  neighbours.  
This  is  important  for  us  to  take  into  account  because  such  events  represented  
a  major  breakthrough  in  the  relations  between  Turkey  and  Greece.  Therefore,  
it  can  be  argued  that  this  represented  another  major  turning  point  in  the  history  
of  Turkish  foreign  policy.    
Another  major  development  in  Turkish  foreign  policy  approach  was  after  
the   9/11   attacks.   The   post   9/11   environment   created  more   opportunities   for  
                                                                                                              
9  Dimitris  Keridis,  “Political  Culture  and  Foreign  Policy:  Greek-­Turkish  relations  in  the  era  of  
European  integration  and  Globalization,”  (NATO  Fellowship  Final  Report,  1999),  accessed  
March  12,  2016,  http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/97-­99/keridis.pdf/.    
10  Mark  Tran,  The  Guardian,  “Death  toll  rises  in  Athens  earthquake,”  September  8,1999,  
accessed  March  12,  2016,  http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1999/sep/08/marktran.    
11  Keridis,  “Political  Culture  and  Foreign  Policy”.    
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Turkey   to   play   a   positive   role   in   the  Middle   East12.   This   was   demonstrated  
through  Turkey’s  efforts   in  hosting   the   “Dialogue  of  Civilization”  between   the  
European  Union  and  the  Organization  of  Islamic  Conference13.  However,  such  
transforming  Turkish  foreign  policy  and  outlook  was  still  not  significant  until  the  
AKP  came  to  power  in  2002.  The  new  AKP  government  showed  both  political  
and  economic  commitment  in  helping  Turkey  become  a  key  global  player.  AKP  
officials,   most   notably   Ahmet   Davutolgu,   believed   that   Turkey   has   a   great  
history  and  geo-­strategic  location  contributing  to  its  significance  and  therefore  
should  be  an  important  political  and  economic  international  player14.      
   However,  most   of   the   academic   and   scholarly   attention  was   given   to  
Turkey  after   the  American  invasion  of   Iraq   in  200315.  The  Turkish  parliament  
refused   to   give   US   troops   access   through   Turkish   lands   in   its   war   against  
Saddam’s   regime16.   This   was   quite   unexpected   and   raised  many   questions  
among   academics.   The   period   since   2002  marked   a   new   phase   in   Turkish  
foreign  policy.  Turkey   showed  a  much  more  assertive  and  proactive   foreign  
policy  compared  to  the  past.  AKP  government  managed  to  change  the  image  
of  Turkey’s  traditional  hard  power  foreign  policy  and  pursued  a  soft  power  policy  
instead.   Turkey   improved   its   relations   with   its   neighbouring   Middle   Eastern  
states  and  became  heavily   involved   in  Middle  Eastern  affairs.  Economically,  
Turkey  was  able  to  develop  its  economic  cooperation  and  integration  with  the  
                                                                                                              
12  Kanat,  224.    
13  Ibid.  
14  Ahmet  Davutoglu,  The  Strategic  Depth:  Turkey’s  international  position  (2001),  illustrated  
that  Turkey  is  a  product  of  the  Ottoman  history  and  empire,  and  that  Turkey  needs  to  
recognise  its  history  and  significant  strategic  location  to  help  overcome  conflicts  in  the  region.    
15  Kanat,  “Understanding  Changes  in  the  Foreign  Policy  of  Nations”,  220.    
16  Otterman,  “IRAQ:  U.S.-­Turkey  Relations”.    
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Middle  East.  A  high  number  of  economic  agreements  and  treaties  were  signed,  
and  the  list  goes  on.    
   Turkey   growingly   adopted   a   very   pro-­active   international   role   and  
participated   in  many  different   international  organizations.  Turkey  has  been  a  
member  of  NATO,  United  Nation’s  Security  Council,  the  G20  Industrial  Nations,  
Alliance   of   Civilizations,   Organization   of   Islamic   Cooperation,   Economic  
Cooperation   Organization,   World   Trade   Organization,   Black   Sea   Economic  
Cooperation  Business  Council,  European  Free  Trade  Association,  Association  
of   Caribbean   States,   and   the   Organization   for   Security   and   Cooperation   in  
Europe,   and   many   more17.   It   is   also   important   to   note   that   Turkey   has  
negotiated  accession  to  the  European  Union  and  is  still  fighting  for  it  because  
the  current  Turkish  government  believes   that  Turkey   is  part  of   the  European  
family18.    
   On  the  other  hand,  Turkey  was  able  to  play  a  crucial  role  in  mediation  
efforts  in  different  international  conflicts  and  events.  She  was  able  to  play  as  a  
crucial  mediator  between  Afghanistan  and  Pakistan,  Sunnis  and  Shiites  in  Iraq,  
Syria   and   Israel,   and   between   Iran   and   the  U.S19.   Turkey  was   also   able   to  
develop   the   so-­called   “zero   problems   with   neighbours’   policy”20.   This   new  
approach  by  the  AKP  government  has  been  crucial  to  its  foreign  policy  for  the  
last  decade.  Turkey  has  had  different  historical  conflicts  with  its  neighbours  and  
was  able  to  develop  a  policy  that  can  allow  them  to  overcome  such  conflicts.  
                                                                                                              
17  Balkanalysis,  Turkey,  “International  Organizations”,  accessed  March  22,  2016,  
http://www.balkanalysis.com/turkey/international-­organizations/.    
18  Republic  of  Turkey  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  “Turkey-­EU  relations,”  accessed  March  22,  
2016,  http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-­between-­turkey-­and-­the-­european-­union.en.mfa.    
19  The  Finnish  Institute  of  International  Affairs,  Contemporary  Turkey  in  the  World  -­  New  role,  
new  resources?,”  2012,  accessed  March  22,  2016,  http://www.fiia.fi/fi/event/456/c/.    
20  Richard  Falk,  “Turkey’s  Foreign  Policy:  Zero  Problems  with  Neighbours  Revisited,”  2012,  
accessed  March  22,  2016,  http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2012/02/09/turkeys-­foreign-­
policy-­zero-­.problems-­with-­neighbors-­revisited/.    
15	  	  
Those  conflicts  were  with  Armenia,  Cyprus,  Caucasia,  Kurds,  and  others.  This  
foreign   policy   approach   has   been   at   the   centre   peace   of   Turkey’s   foreign  
minister  Ahmet  Davutoglu’s  foreign  policy  agenda  and  was  able  to  push  Turkey  
forward  in  terms  of   its  historical  conflicts.  Such  important  Turkish  role  makes  
Turkey  a  more   interested  actor   to  consider   in  many  events  and  at   the  same  
time  highlights  its  growing  influence.    
Another   critical   moment   in   Turkey’s   history   was   when   relations   with  
Israel   reached   its   lowest  point.   In  December  2008  and  January  2009,   Israel  
launched  an  offensive  in  the  Gaza  Strip  killing  and  injuring  many  civilians21.  As  
a  result,   the  Turkish  government  reacted  in  an  unprecedentedly  way.  Turkey  
announced  its  dismissal  of  mediation  efforts  between  Israel  and  Syria22.  This  
high  tension  between  Turkey  and  Israel  was  not  witnessed  before.  Turkey  has  
had  very  good  relations  with  Israel  since  1948  and  was  able  to  develop  relations  
in  different  levels  of  cooperation23.  However,  the  deterioration  of  relations  went  
further   after   the   Israeli   attack   on  Gaza   aid   flotilla,   which  made   Turkey   very  
disappointed  and  Prime  Minister  Recep  Tayyip  Erdogan  demanded  that  Israel  
should  be  punished  for  its  bloodshed24.    
   Such  Turkish   foreign  policy  changes  and  the  opening  up  to   its  Middle  
Eastern   neighbours   raised  more   interests   in   exploring   the   nature   of   Turkish  
foreign  policy  and  its  determinants  for  the  last  decade.  Therefore,  undertaking  
                                                                                                              
21  BBC  News,  “Gaza  crisis:  key  maps  and  timeline,”  January  18,  2009,  accessed  March  12,  
2016,  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7812290.stm.    
22  Nicholas  Kimbrell,  “Turkey  shelves  mediation  between  Syria,  Israel  over  Gaza,”  2009,  
accessed  March  13,  2016,  http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/Jan/01/Turkey-­shelves-­
mediation-­between-­Syria-­Israel-­over-­Gaza.ashx#axzz28EN9BMip.    
23  Hasan  Kosebalaban,  “The  crisis  in  Turish-­Israeli  relations:  What  is  its  strategic  
significance?,”  XVII,  no.  3,  (2010),  accessed  March  13,  2016,  http://mepc.org/journal/middle-­
east-­policy-­archives/crisis-­turkish-­israeli-­relations-­what-­its-­strategic-­significance.    
24  Ian  Traynor,  “Gaza  flotilla  raid  draws  furious  response  from  Turkey's  prime  minister,”  2010,  
accessed  March  13,  2016,  http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/01/gaza-­flotilla-­raid-­
turkey-­prime-­minister-­israel.    
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such  case  for  a  PhD  thesis  will  indeed  enhance  our  experience  and  knowledge  
of  such  research  topic  and  area  of  study.    
   In   addition,   the   Turkish   role   in   most   recent   and   biggest   issue   in   the  
Middle  East  and  the  Arab  World  known  as  the  “Arab  Spring”  was  another  critical  
point  in  the  history  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  since  2011.  During  the  Arab  spring,  
the  Turkish  role  became  even  more  interesting  because  Turkey  was  able  to  re-­
adjust   its   foreign   policy   in   order   to   deal   with   such   situation.   It   is   interesting  
because   prior   to   the   Arab   revolutions,   Turkey   was   able   to   build   a   more  
cooperative  relation  with  many  of  the  governments  who  recently  face  popular  
uprisings   and  were   overthrown.   This,   at   the   beginning,   created   a   significant  
challenge  to  the  Turkish  efforts  with  its  Arab  neighbours25.  However,  the  AKP  
government  was  able  to  clarify  its  position  in  support  of  people’s  demands  and  
urged  for  genuine  reforms26.    
Turkey  insisted  that  security,  prosperity,  and  freedom  were  needed  for  
all  Arabs  and  was  able  to  represent  itself  as  a  successful  democratic  model  in  
the   region27.   This   indeed   helps   develop   Turkey’s   regional   soft   power   and  
influence.  On  the  other  hand,  some  argue  that  Turkey  was  in  fact  reluctant  at  
the  beginning  and  dealt  with  different  countries  facing  revolutions  differently28.  
For  example,  Turkey  had  a  great  amount  of  investments  in  both  Libya  and  Syria  
and  was  supporting  more  peaceful  reforms  to  avoid  instability  that  could  affect  
their  interests  heavily.  Whereas,  in  Tunisia  and  Egypt  Turkey  had  relatively  low  
                                                                                                              
25  Adam  Balcer,  “Turkey  as  a  Source  of  Inspiration  for  the  Arab  Spring:  Opportunities  and  
Challenges”,  in  Change  and  Opportunities  in  the  Emerging  Mediterranean,  eds.,  Stephen  
Calleya  and  Monika  Wohlfeld  (Mediterranean  Academy  of  Diplomatic  Studies,  2012),  Ch  19.    
26  Ibrahim  Kalin,  “Turkey  and  the  Arab  Spring,”  2011,  accessed  March  22,  2016,  
http://www.mei.edu/content/turkey-­and-­arab-­spring.    
27  Balcer,  Op  cit.    
28  Ziya  Onis,  “Turkey  and  the  Arab  Spring:  Between  Ethics  and  Self  Interest,”  Insight  Turkey  
14,  no.3  (2012):  45-­63.    
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investment  levels,  and  was  more  flexible  in  supporting  the  people’s  demands  
from  the  beginning29.  The  Arab  spring  is  a  highly  critical  period  of  time  for  the  
Middle  East  and  particularly  will  reshape  the  nature  of  the  region  in  the  coming  
future.   The   debate   on   Turkish   role   in   the   Arab   spring   is   very   interesting   to  
consider  in  this  thesis.  
However,   it   is   important  to  clarify  that  this  research  does  not  intend  to  
cover   the   very   latest   developments   in   the   Arab   Spring   due   to   a   number   of  
reasons.  First  of  all,  the  initial  goal  of  the  thesis  was  to  explain  the  “causes”  of  
foreign  policy  changes  that  occurred  during  the  AKP  government  since  2002.  
The  researcher  aims  to  analyse  the  first  ten  years  of  the  AKP  government  from  
2002-­2010,  where  most  foreign  policy  changes  took  place  and  highly  covered  
in  the  literature.  Secondly,  due  to  the  length  and  word  limits  for  this  PhD  thesis  
highlighted  in  the  university  guidelines  and  regulations,  it  would  be  very  difficult  
to  include  and  fairly  analyse  the  recent  regional  developments  beyond  2012.  In  
addition,  currently,  the  events  in  the  Middle  East  are  very  frequently  changing  
and   this   could   affect   the   research   and   keeping   track   of   up   to   date   data.  
Therefore,  the  Arab  Spring  and  Turkish  role  in  the  Middle  East  needs  a  PhD  on  
its   own   as   many   events   and   issues   have   emerged   since   2012.   The   thesis  
however  can  be  a  good  starting  point   for   future  studies  to  take  this  research  
further  and  investigate  the  most  recent  developments.  
2.	  Understanding	  foreign	  policy	  analysis:	  a	  theoretical	  introduction	  	  
  
  
It   is   important   to  understand  what   is   foreign  policy  and   its  main  sources  that  
derive  states  behaviour  and   relations.  Before  going   into   the  main  discussion  
                                                                                                              
29  Sebnem  Gumuscu,  “Turkey’s  reactions  to  the  Arab  spring,”  2012,  accessed  March  22,  
2016,  http://yalejournal.org/2012/05/turkeys-­reactions-­to-­the-­arab-­spring/.    
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chapters  of  this  thesis,   it   is  very  useful  to  build  a  theoretical  background  that  
can  help  explore  the  different  sources  that  shape  states'  foreign  policy,  which  
can   give   us   useful   insights   to   understanding   the   sources   of   Turkish   foreign  
policy  in  this  case  that  will  be  critically  examined  throughout  this  thesis.  This  will  
be  re-­visited  in  chapter  nine  in  an  attempt  to  explore  the  way  in  which  different  
foreign  policy  theoretical  readings  help  us  understand  the  value  of  the  different  
domestic,  international,  material,  and  ideational  sources  of  foreign  policy,  and  
particularly  their  role  in  shaping  Turkish  foreign  policy  towards  the  Middle  East.        
Foreign  policy  analysis  is  an  important  field  of  study  that  is  also  related  
to  the  field  of  international  relations’  (IR).  Foreign  policy  analysis  examines  the  
strategies  put  forward  by  states  in  order  to  accomplish  their  foreign  policy  goals  
and   objectives.   A   proper   study   of   the   different   sources   related   to   the  
construction  of   foreign  policy   instruments  should  pay  attention   to   the  way   in  
which  the  preferences  adopted  by  states  influence  their  interaction  with  other  
units  of   the   international  political   system.30  The  purpose  of   this   section   is   to  
present  an  introduction  of  foreign  policy  analysis  theory  to  help  understand  its  
development  and  main  theoretical  interpretations.  The  aim  is  to  acknowledge  
the  significance  of  the  different  sources  that  affect  foreign  policy  making,  and  
particularly  that  of  Turkey,  which  will  be  reflected  throughout  this  thesis  in  the  
coming  chapters.  The  aim  is  to  analyse  the  different  sources  of  foreign  policy,  
giving  special  attention   to   the  external,  domestic  and   ideational  aspects   that  
influence   the   decision-­making   process,   considering   the   different   theoretical  
schools   and   their   interpretations   of  what   shapes   states'   foreign   policies   and  
behaviours.   There   are   several   theories   in   this   field   of   study,   however   the  
                                                                                                              
30  Valerie,  Hudson.  Foreign  policy  analysis:  classic  and  contemporary  theory.  (Lanham:  MD:  
Rowman  &  Littlefield,  2013):  43.  
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researcher  will  focus  on  few  of  the  main  and  influential  theories.  This  includes  
an   analysis   of   some   works   in   the   literature   on   foreign   policy   analysis   and  
international  relations  in  order  to  build  a  clear  picture.    
There  are  a  number  of  sources  that  inform  the  decision-­making  process  
in   the   field  of   foreign  policy.  The  domestic  sources  of   foreign  policy  may  be  
regarded   as   the   organisational   structure   composed   of   the   different   actors  
involved  in  the  decision-­making  process.  It  has  been  argued  that  the  different  
agencies  that  are  involved  in  setting  preferences  in  the  field  of  foreign  policy  
follow  certain  procedures  in  order  to  identify  the  relevant  issues  and  propose  
possible  options  to  be  implemented  by  those  in  charge  of  making  decisions.31  
Decision  makers  are  usually  presented  with  a  set  of  options  already  articulated  
by   the  multiple   different   agencies   and   actors   involved   in   the   field   of   foreign  
policy  analysis.32  On  the  other  hand,  Foreign  policy  is  also  subject  to  significant  
external  constraints.  The  changes  that  take  place  in  the  international  political  
system  are  powerful  sources  in  which  states  set  the  preferences  that  guide  their  
interstate  relations.  Furthermore,  important  historical  events  may  bring  about  a  
recalibration  of  the  set  of  priorities  that  guide  the  scheme  of  foreign  policy  of  
any   given   state.33   Moreover,   Foreign   policy   is   also   subject   to   material   and  
ideational   factors.   To   begin   with,   the   size   of   the   territory   and   the   level   of  
economic  development  and  technological  advancement  indicate  the  extent  of  
the  capabilities  possessed  by  any  given  state   in  order   to  project   its  national  
interest.34  At   the  same  time,   the   ideational  perspective   is  an   important   factor  
                                                                                                              
31  Hudson,  61.  
32  Hudson,  64.  
33  Hudson,  77. 
34  Hudson,  90.  
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that  determines  the  manner   in  which  national  states  build  their   foreign  policy  
strategies.    
One   of   the   important   aspects   highlighted   in   the   literature   on   foreign  
policy   is   the  role  of  human  agency  as  the  most  significant  unit  of  analysis  of  
foreign  policy.  This  is  because  the  relations  that  take  place  between  states  are  
suggested  to  be  rooted  in  the  behaviour  displayed  by  the  agents  in  charge  of  
deploying   foreign   policy   mechanisms.   Hudson   (2005)   argued   that   this   is   of  
crucial  importance  in  order  to  understand  the  patterns  of  change  and  continuity  
that   unfold   in   the   international   political   system.35   Moreover,   Schuett   (2010)  
highlighted   the   importance   of   considering   the   human   nature   argument   that  
originated  in  Thucydides  work  The  Peloponnesian  war.  Schuett  argued  that  the  
notion  of  human  nature  in  international  relations  is  not  dead.  He  added  that  in  
fact  post-­classical-­realism  “rely  on  hidden  assumptions  about  human  nature”.36  
It  is  worthwhile  to  highlight  that  the  decision-­making  process  could  be  impacted  
by  irrational    behaviour  as  well  that  emerge  from  the  emotional  response  that  
policy-­makers  have  in  relation  to  the  variables  that  affect  the  strategic  thinking  
related   to   the   issue   that   is  being  discussed.  For   instance,  during   the  Cuban  
Missile  Crisis  of  1962,  some  of  President  John  F.  Kennedy’s  advisers  (such  as  
General  Curtis  LeMay  and  General  Maxwell  Taylor)  wanted  to  make  a  decisive  
response   to   the  acts  of   provocation  set   in  motion  by   the  Soviet  Union.  This  
emotional  response  can  be  understood  by  the  deep  anti-­Communist  sentiment  
of  the  advisers.37    
                                                                                                              
35  Valerie,  Hudson.  "Foreign  Policy  Analysis:  Actor-­Specific  Theory  and  the  Ground  of  
International  Relations,"  Foreign  Policy  Analysis  1,  no.  1  (2005):  1.  
36  Robert,  Schuett.  Political  realism,  Freud,  and  human  nature  in  international  relations:  the  
resurrection  of  the  realist  man.  (New  York;;  Basingstoke:  Palgrave  Macmillan,  2010).  
37  Steve,  Smith.  Amelia,  Hadfield.  and  Tim,  Dunne.  Foreign  policy:  theories,  actors,  cases,  2nd  
edition  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2012):  201.  
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Gideon   Rose   (1998)   highlighted   four   main   theories   of   foreign   policy.  
First,  there  is  the  Innenpolitik  theory;;  which  states  that  there  is  a  link  between  
the   domestic   and   ideological   environment   and   the  way   that   foreign   political  
mechanisms   are   enacted.38   However,   Rose   maintains   that   Innenpolitik  
theorists   do   not   explain  why   countries   that   have   similar   values   behave   in   a  
different  manner.  For   instance,   the  United  States,  which   is   a   country   that   is  
ruled  by  a  democratic  system  of  government,  has  adopted  a  more  militaristic  
attitude  than  Western  European  countries.39  
Second,   the   Offensive   Realist   perspective,   built   by   scholars   such   as  
John  Mearsheimer,  suggests  that  national  states  maximise  power  in  order  to  
enhance   their   security   within   the   context   of   the   security   dilemma   under   the  
anarchic   condition   of   the   international   order.  Nevertheless,   it   is   important   to  
point   out   that   offensive   realists   do   not   explain   in   clear   terms   why   certain  
countries   respond   to   the  security  dilemma   in  an  offensive  way,  whilst  others  
choose  not  to  react  aggressively  to  the  uncertainties  that  exist  in  the  system  of  
states.40  Third,  Rose  highlights  the  defensive  realist  perspective,  advocated  by  
scholars   such   as   Kenneth   Waltz,   who   called   for   new   thinking   and   revised  
theories  as  a  result  of  the  changing  conditions  of  international  politics  especially  
after  the  end  of  the  Cold  War41.  Waltz’s  theory  suggests  that  whilst  the  system  
of  states  is  anarchic,  the  incidence  of  the  outbreak  of  violence  is  relatively  rare.  
Most  of   the   time,   the  state  of  anarchy  encourages  states   to  adopt  moderate  
policies  and  restraint  to  ensure  security.  Rose  stated,  “In  the  defensive  realist  
                                                                                                              
38  Gideon,  Rose.  "Neoclassical  Realism  and  Theories  of  Foreign  Policy,"  World  Pol.  World  
Politics  51,  no.  1  (1998):  145.  
39  Rose,  147.  
40  Rose,  149. 
41  Kenneth,  Waltz.  “Structural  Realism  After  the  Cold  War,”  International  Security  25,  no.  1  
(2000):  5-­41.  
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world   rational   states   pursuing   security   can   often   be   relaxed,   bestirring  
themselves  only  to  respond  to  external  threats,  which  are  rare”.42  
Fourth,  Rose  also  highlighted  the  increase  of  a  neoclassicist  persuasion  
within  the  Realist  tradition  in  the  realm  of  foreign  policy.  This  school  of  thought  
states  that  the  ultimate  aim  of  national  states  is  not  to  enhance  their  security,  
but  to  ensure  that  the  composition  of  the  international  order  responds  to  their  
aims  and  preferences.43   In  order   to  do  so,  states  will  pursue  comprehensive  
action  geared  towards  recreating  the  international  environment  in  their  image.  
At  the  same  time,  in  order  to  fully  appreciate  the  implications  of  the  neoclassicist  
approach  there  needs  to  be  an  examination  of  the  historical  circumstances  that  
motivate  the  deployment  of  foreign  policy  mechanisms  as  well  as  the  cultural  
elements   that   lead   certain   states   to   configure   the   regional/international  
environment  in  their  own  image.44  
The   rationalist   approach   to   the   study   of   foreign   policy   is   another  
significant  element  highlighted  in  the  literature.  The  rationalist  perspective  that  
informs  the  decision-­making  process  in  the  field  of  foreign  policy  is  based  on  
the   idea   that   the   state   is   the   most   important   unit   of   analysis   in   order   to  
understand   the   manner   in   which   countries   position   themselves   in   the  
international  political  system.  45  The  basic  idea  posited  by  the  rationalist  camp  
is  that  the  state  has  certain  geopolitical  objectives  that  need  to  be  maximised  
in  order  to  preserve  the  national  interest.  In  this  context,  there  is  a  persistent  
link  between  the  rationalist   thinking  on  foreign  policy  analysis  and  the  realist  
                                                                                                              
42  Rose,  149.    
43  Rose,  152.  
44  Smith,  Hadfield  and  Dunne,  148.  
45  Smith,  Hadfield  and  Dunne,  151.  
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interpretation  of  interstate  relations.46  According  to  Mintz  and  DeRouen  (2010),  
the   rationalist   model   is   shaped   by   the   assumption   that   the   foreign   policy  
apparatus  of  a  national  state  outlines  certain  preferences  in  accordance  with  
the   optimal   value   derived   from   their   application.47   The   rationalist   approach  
applied   to   the  decision  making  process   is  enacted  by   identifying   the  specific  
issue  to  be  resolved.  There  is  also  a  process  of  information  gathering  on  this  
issue  that  permits  the  policy-­maker  to  make  the  necessary  recommendations  
on  the  course  of  action  to  be  taken.48  Therefore,  it  is  possible  to  argue  that  the  
decision-­making  process  is  described  by  the  rationalist  camp  as  a  set  of  choices  
that   need   to   be   evaluated   for   the   purposes   of   selecting   the   most   optimal  
alternative  in  the  context  of  the  resources  and  the  knowledge  that  is  available  
on  the  issue  that  is  being  tackled.49    
The  Realist  school  of  international  relations  regards  the  state  as  the  main  
unit  of  analysis  of  the  international  order.  According  to  classical  realists  such  as  
Morgenthau,   the   ultimate   objective   of   national   states   is   to   ensure   their   own  
survival   by   adopting   a   self-­help   attitude   in   security  matters.50      Furthermore,  
Richard   Ned   Lebow   (2007)   argued   that   “Classical   realists   have   holistic  
understandings   of   politics   that   stress   the   similarities,   not   the   differences,  
between   domestic   and   international   politics,   and   the   role   of   ethics   and  
                                                                                                              
46  Jack,  Levy,  "Learning  and  Foreign  Policy:  Sweeping  a  Conceptual  Minefield,"  International  
Organization  Int.  Org.  48,  no.  02  (1994):  279.  
47  Alex,  Mintz.  and  Karl,  DeRouen.  Understanding  foreign  policy  decision  making.  
(Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2010):  69. 
48  Steven,  Walker.  Akan,  Malici.  and  Mark,  Schafer.  Rethinking  Foreign  Policy  Analysis:  
States,  Leaders,  and  the  Microfoundations  of  Behavioral  International  Relations.  (London:  
Routledge,  2011):  11.  
49  Herbert,  Simon.  Models  of  Man,  (New  York,  NY:  John  Wiley,  1957):  63.  
50  Hans,  Morgenthau.  Politics  Among  Nations:  The  Struggle  for  Power  and  Peace.  (New  York  
NY:  Alfred  A.  Knopf,  1948):  78. 
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community  in  promoting  stability  in  both  domains”.51  Dunne  and  Schmidt  (2005)  
were  able  to  combine  both  classical  and  contemporary  realism  and  presented  
their  main  pillars  of   thought.  The  authors  presented  three  main   ideas  that  all  
realists  share:  1-­  Statism,  which  means   that  states  are   recognised   to  be   the  
main  actors  in  the  international  system;;  2-­  Survival,  that  states  main  aim  and  
concern  is  to  always  survive  and  will  take  necessary  actions  to  ensure  it;;  and  
3-­  Self-­help,  which  means  that  states  will  act  independently  due  to  the  absence  
of  a  higher  authority  at  the  international  level  that  would  ensure  the  security  of  
states.52  Similarly,  Wohlforth  (2008)  in  his  work  on  “Realism  and  Foreign  policy”  
illustrated   the   importance   of   self-­interest   behaviour   in  world   politics   and   the  
importance  of  power-­centrism.  He  argued,  “Power  is  the  fundamental  feature  
of   politics.   Once   past   the   hunter-­gatherer   stage,   human   affairs   are   always  
marked  by  great  inequalities  of  power”.53  
In  addition,  Liberalism   is  another  key  and   influential  school  of   thought  
that  represent  important  ideas  in  the  field  of  international  relations.  Prominent  
Liberal  scholars,  such  as  Immanuel  Kant,  Michael  Doyle,  Francis  Fukuyama,  
and   Robert   Keohane,   highlight   the   importance   of   democracy,   individual  
freedom,  civil  society,  and  free  market  economy54.  Furthermore,  neo-­liberalism  
or  neo-­liberal  institutionalism  contributed  through  the  emphasis  on  the  role  of  
international   institutions   in  shaping   international  relations.  Unlike  realism  that  
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regards  the  state  as  the  main  actor  in  international  politics,  liberalism  suggests  
that  international  institutions,  such  as  the  United  Nations  play  an  important  role  
that   cannot   be   ignored   in   affecting   states'   behaviour   and   relations55.   This  
includes  the  European  Union  as  one  of  the  most  important  international  actors  
that   tend   to  play  a  major   role   in  European  states'   foreign  policy  and  Turkish  
foreign  policy  as  well,  which  will  be  discussed  further  in  the  following  chapters.  
In  addition,  free  trade  is  seen  as  an  important  element  in  international  relations  
that   helps   develop   cooperation   between   states.   The   Liberal   theoretical  
interpretation  highlights  the  role  of  economic  interests  and  free  trade  in  shaping  
states  behaviours  and  encouraging  more  cooperation  on  common  interests56.  
Therefore,  Liberalism  is  key  to  our  understanding  of  states  relations  and  is  an  
influential  theory  that  highlights  important  ideas  in  the  literature  that  researchers  
need  to  take  into  account.    
On   the  other   hand,   constructivism  has  been  an   influential   theory   that  
helped  develop  the  literature  on  international  relations  and  analysis  of  states'  
behaviour.  Constructivism  is  a  theory  that  provides  key   ideas   in   international  
relations  theories.  Hopf  (1998)  illustrated  that  constructivism  is  a  challenger  to  
the  continuing  dominance  of  international  relations  in  the  United  States.57  He  
argued  that  such  theory  provides  an  alternative  understanding  of  international  
politics.   Hopf   added,   “Constructivism   offers   alternative   understandings   of   a  
number  of   the  central   themes   in   international   relations   theory,   including:   the  
meaning   of   anarchy   and   balance   of   power,   the   relationship   between   state  
                                                                                                              
55  Robert,  Keohane.  “Twenty  Years  of  Institutional  Liberalism,”  International  Relations  26,  No.  
2,  (2012):  125-­138.  
56  Burchill,  63.    
57  Ted,  Hopf.  “The  Promise  of  Constructivism  in  International  Relations  Theory,”  International  
Security  23,  No.  1.  (1998):  171-­200.    
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identity  and  interest,  an  elaboration  of  power,  and  the  prospects  for  change  in  
world  politics”.58  All  of  which  are  necessary  to  the  analysis  of  states'  relations  
and  foreign  policy.    
Alexander  Wendt   (1992)   is   one   of   the  main   influential   thinkers   in   the  
constructivist   school   of   thought.   His   work   responded   to   the   neo-­realist  
interpretation  that  the  anarchic  international  system  is  fixed,  Wendt  suggested  
that  the  international  system  can  change  with  the  change  of  shared  knowledge,  
norms,   and   ideas.   He   stated   that   it   is  more   about   interaction   that   generate  
structure   and   that   “structure   has   no   existence   or   causal   powers   apart   from  
process”.59   Constructivism   aims   to   integrate   the   norms   that   regulate  
intrasocietal  relations  into  the  scheme  of  foreign  policy.60  For  example,  this  can  
be  seen  in  a  distinctive  manner  in  the  case  of  Germany  after  the  reunification  
of  the  country  in  1990.  The  liberal  social  norms  that  regulated  the  social  and  
political  life  of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  were  influential   in  creating  a  
scheme  of  foreign  policy  centred  around  European  and  Atlanticist  tenets.  This  
state  of  affairs  indicates  the  importance  of  ideational  factors  in  the  formulation  
of  foreign  policy  strategies.  61  Another  example  illustrated  by  Khong  (2008)  in  
his  work  on  “Neoconservatism  and  the  domestic  sources  of  American  foreign  
policy:  the  role  of  ideas  in  operation  Iraqi  freedom”.  Khong  looked  at  the  causes  
of   the   2003   Iraq   war   and   was   able   to   use   a   constructivist   analysis   in   his  
investigation.   He   argued   that   the   neoconservative   ideas   under   the   Bush  
                                                                                                              
58  Hopf,  172.    
59  Alexander,  Wendt.  “Anarchy  is  what  States  Make  of  it:  The  Social  Construction  of  Power  
Politics,”  International  Organization,  Vol.  46,  No.  2.  (1992):  394.    
60  Henning,  Boekle.  Volker,  Rittberger.  and  Wolfgang,  Wagner.  (ed.)  “Constructivist  foreign  
policy  theory”  in  Volker,  Rittberger.  German  Foreign  Policy  Since  Unification-­Theories  and  
Case  Studies  (Manchester:  Manchester  University  Press,  2001):  106  and  121.  
61  Smith,  Hadfield  and  Dunne,  25. 
27	  	  
administration   played   an   important   role   in   the   American   decision   to   invade  
Iraq62.  In  addition,  Schonberg  (2007)  argued  that  we  should  not  only  look  at  the  
relative  power  relationship  between  states,  but  also  their  ideational  framework  
to   be   able   to   understand   their   foreign   policy63.   Although   the   author   used  
American  foreign  policy  in  his  case  study,  it  is  still  important  as  it  represent  a  
valid  tool  of  analysis  for  any  other  state  and  particularly  that  of  Turkey  in  this  
case  study.    
Theories  analysed  above  are  very  helpful  in  this  thesis  as  they  enable  
the   researcher   to   take   into   account   the   role   of   the   different   external   and  
domestic,   material   and   ideational   sources.   Understanding   the   sources   of  
Turkish  foreign  policy  transformation  towards  the  Middle  East  through  different  
theoretical   viewpoints   is   very   important   in   this   case.   Such   theories   help   the  
researcher  examine  the  role  of  a  number  of  different  foreign  policy  sources  and  
pave  way  for  an  inclusive  approach.  Therefore,  building  a  multilevel  analysis  of  
Turkish   foreign   policy   is   valuable,   particularly   in   understanding   the  
transformation  of  relations  with  its  neighbouring  Middle  East.      
3.	  Research	  Problem	  	  
  
The  significant  changes   in  Turkish   foreign  policy  under   the  AKP  government  
towards  the  Middle  East  became  one  of  the  most  debated  issues  in  this  field.  
The  literature  demonstrated  a  high  number  of  different  competing  explanations  
and  hypotheses.  There  were  increasing  different  interpretations  attempting  to  
explain   such   foreign   policy   changes.   However,   there   was   a   noticeable  
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disagreement  over  what  caused  such  changes.  Some  scholars  saw  that  as  a  
turn  away  from  the  West  (shift  of  axis)  as  a  result  of  AKP’s  Islamist   ideology  
and  preference  of  developing  closer  ties  with  the  Middle  East.  Others  regarded  
this  change  as  an  AKP  attempt  to  revive  the  Ottoman  past  and  is  pursuing  a  
neo-­Ottoman  foreign  policy.  Others  gave  more  attention  to  the  role  of  economic  
and  security  interests.  The  European  Union  was  another  major  element  of  this  
debate  and  a  number  of  scholars  have  agreed  to  the  important  influencing  role  
of   the   EU   over   Turkish   foreign   policy.   Therefore,   the   problem   is   that   the  
literature   has   demonstrated   a   large   number   of   different   and   conflicting  
hypotheses  explaining  the  causes  of  this  Turkish  foreign  policy  change.  There  
is  a  major  lack  of  consensus  and  an  intense  debate  over  the  reasons  behind  
this  foreign  policy  change.  The  existence  of  such  multiple  explanations  can  lead  
observers  to  different  directions  away  from  arriving  at  a  comprehensive  answer.  
This  spells  out  the  current  gap  in  the  literature  and  adds  to  the  justification  of  
the  researcher’s  choice  of  this  research  topic.    
   This  research  problem  highly  motivates  the  rise  of  a  number  of  questions  
that  need  to  be  addressed   in   this   thesis.  First  of  all,   the   initial  questions  that  
come  to  researchers’  mind  are;;  1-­  what  are  the  real  sources  behind  the  change  
of  Turkish  foreign  policy  towards  the  Middle  East  that  was  clearly  taking  place  
since  2002?  2-­Why  is  Turkey  promoting  a  pro-­active  foreign  policy  approach  
towards  the  Middle  East,  despite  Turkey’s  long  history  of  disengagement?  3-­  Is  
Turkey  really  moving  itself  away  from  its  traditional  European  and  the  Western  
allies?   4-­   Has   foreign   policy   change   really   been   influenced   by   the   rise   of  
“Islamism”,  “neo-­Ottomanism”  in  Turkish  foreign  policy,  as  many  have  argued?  
5-­  What   is   the  most  comprehensive  explanation  provided   in   the   literature  so  
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far?   And   6-­   How   do   we   analyse   this   debate   and   assess   the   value   of   the  
competing  explanations  in  the  literature?  These  are  the  initial  questions  of  the  
research  and  ones  that  need  to  be  explored  throughout  this  thesis,  which  were  
also   highlighted   by   some   scholars   in   this   field.      Secondly,   another   critical  
question   to  consider   in   this  study  would  be;;  why  are   there  a  high  number  of  
conflicting   theoretical   explanations   in   the   literature?   The   fact   that   different  
scholars  and  analysts  have  arrived  at  different  conclusions  highly  contributes  
to  the  puzzle.  This  in  return  raises  another  question  to  whether  if  single  factor  
explanations  can  really  say  much?  The  Turkish  case  study  is  a  highly  complex  
one   due   to   its   geo-­strategic   location,   great   history,   and   complex   identity.  
Moreover,  another   important  question   that  needs   to  be  addressed  here   is   to  
what  extent  has  the  different  regional  and  international  events  played  a  role  in  
Turkish  foreign  policy  change?  Or  was  it  a  change  from  within?  An  analysis  of  
the  role  of  both  external  and  domestic  factors  need  to  be  looked  at  as  well  as  
measuring   the   extent   to   which   both  might   have   affected   each   other.   These  
critical   questions   along   with   many   others   highlight   the   significance   of  
developing  a  more  critical  approach  that  can  discuss  a  wide  range  of  factors  
and  assess  their  role  behind  Turkish  foreign  policy  change.  
     In  addition  to  the  noticeable  descriptive  works  in  the  literature64,  several  
scholars  were   not   able   to   investigate   all   possible   variables   and   factors   that  
could   give   better   understanding   of   the   Turkish   foreign   policy   regarding   the  
Middle  East.  Instead,  they  were  only  investigating  around  one  or  two  variables  
at   a   time.   Therefore,   this   motivates   this   thesis   further   to   undertake   a  
multidimensional  research  approach  of  investigation.    
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4.	  Research	  Design	  	  
  
This  thesis  aims  at  investigating  the  sources  of  change  in  Turkish  foreign  policy  
since  2002.  It  focuses  on  the  role  of  the  AKP  (Justice  and  Development  Party)  
as  a  ruling  party  and  the  changes  that  came  about  since  the  party  took  power  
in  the  first  ten  years  from  2002  to  early  2012.  The  reason  for  choosing  to  focus  
on  the  period  between  those  two  dates   is  because  2002   is   the  year   that   the  
AKP  won   its   first  elections  and   took  government.  Since   then  Turkish   foreign  
policy  witnessed   immense   foreign  policy  changes  particularly  during   the   first  
two  terms  of  AKP  government.  The  choice  to  stop  at  2012  is  due  to  the  recent  
regional  developments   led  by   the  Arab  Spring   that  entered  Turkey   into  new  
foreign  policy  environments,  which  does  not   link  directly   to   the  thesis’s   initial  
research  question.  Therefore,  as  mentioned  above,  Turkish  foreign  policy  since  
the  eruption  and  development  of  the  Arab  Spring  deserves  further  studies,  in  
particular   an   analysis   of   whether   or   not   there   is   a   “continuation”   or  
“discontinuation”  of  AKP  foreign  policy  directions.    
What  this  thesis  aims  to  find  out  is  the  possible  necessary  and  sufficient  
causes  of  change   in  Turkey’s   relations  with   the  Middle  East  and   its  growing  
role.  Furthermore,  the  thesis  aims  to  assess  and  evaluate  the  plausibility  and  
credibility   of   the   available   explanations   in   the   literature   in   explaining   such  
foreign   policy   outcomes.   This   will   be   done   through   the   use   of   the   Process  
Tracing  methodology,  which  will  be  analysed  in  greater  details  below.  A  major  
contribution  of  this  study  is  that  the  methodological  tool  helps  facilitate  a  better  
critical  analysis  and  examination  of  available  hypotheses.  The  aim  is  to  offer  
the  most  plausible  and  comprehensive  explanation  that  can  help  us  understand  
this   particular   case   better.   One   of   the   major   advantages   of   using   Process  
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Tracing  in  this  situation  is  that  it  helps  researchers  to  establish  a  solid  ground  
that  would  allow  them  to  go  forward  in  future  studies.  Overall,  the  thesis  aims  
to  analyse  and  bring  the  wide  range  of  explanations  in  the  literature  together,  
explore  and  summarize  the  vast  number  of  data  in  an  understandable  manner,  
and  examine  their  value  and  plausibility,  all  under  one  piece  of  work.    
The  results  of  this  thesis  will  demonstrate  that  relying  on  a  single  based  
explanation  actually  further  the  gap  in  the  literature  and  that  the  only  way  to  go  
forward  is  by  adopting  a  much  more  inclusive  and  multiple  factors  approach.  
Furthermore,  due  to  the  complexity  of  the  Turkish  case,  one  must  “cast  the  net  
wider”   to   try   and   achieve   a   comprehensive   explanation.   Furthermore,   the  
results  will  suggest  that  each  of  the  explanations  chosen  in  this  study  do  have  
some  explanatory  value  as  they  contribute  to  providing  partial  explanation  each  
on  its  own.  In  addition,  the  results  of  this  thesis  contribute  to  the  argument  that  
Turkish  foreign  policy  change  took  place  as  a  result  of  multiple  economic  and  
political   international,   domestic,   and   individual   factors.   The   goal   is   to   re-­
organize  and  rearrange  the  wide  range  of  data  and  explanations  in  the  literature  
in  a  more  logical  manner  and  develop  a  systematic  evaluation  assessing  the  
explanatory  value  of  the  theoretical  hypotheses  provided  in  the  literature  that  
would  allow  researchers  to  build  a  better  understanding  of  this  case  study.    
5.	  Thesis	  Structure	  
  
The  structure  of  this  thesis  will  be  divided  thematically  into  ten  chapters.  The  
researcher   aims   to   structure   the   thesis   in   a   manner   that   can   simplify   the  
complex  nature  of  this  research  topic.    
  Chapter  One   is   the   introduction   that  will  provide  a  background  of   the  
research  and  introduce  the  topic  for  the  reader,  while  at  the  same  time  raise  
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critical  research  questions  and  demonstrate  the  findings  of  the  research  to  the  
reader.  This  includes  an  illustration  of  the  research  problem  and  the  possible  
ways  that  this  thesis  aims  to  solve  it  and  eventually  fill  in  the  gap.  In  addition,  
this  chapter  aims  to  analyse  the  nature  of  foreign  policy  analysis  and  its  main  
theoretical  interpretations  as  well  as  in  the  field  of  international  relations  mainly  
building  on  the  work  of  Steve  Smith,  Amelia  Hadfield,  and  Tim  Dunne,  in  their  
book  Foreign  policy:  theories,  actors,  cases  (2012),  and  Christopher  Hill,  in  his  
book  The  Changing  Politics  of  Foreign  Policy  (2003).  Introducing  foreign  policy  
analysis   and   its   main   theoretical   interpretations   is   important   to   build   an  
understanding   of   the   way   in   which   foreign   policies   are   constructed   and  
particularly   that   of   Turkey’s   foreign   policy   during   the  AKP  government.   This  
includes  considering  important  questions  that  are  key  to  the  research,  such  as  
what   is   foreign  policy  analysis?  What  are   the  sources  of   foreign  policy?  And  
what  does  foreign  policy  analysis  theories  tell  us  about  understanding  states’  
foreign  policy  making?      
Chapter  Two  illustrates  the  research  methodology  applied  in  this  thesis  
and   the   way   in   which   the   researcher   is   going   to   go   about   collecting   and  
analysing  available  data.  Furthermore,  this  chapter  aims  at  introducing  what  is  
Process   Tracing   methodology   and   how   it   will   be   developed   throughout   the  
thesis.  This  includes  critically  analysing  this  methodology  as  well  as  assessing  
its  strengths  and  analysing  its  limits.    
Chapter   Three   is   the   literature   review,   which   critically   discusses   the  
literature  and  its  developments,  paying  attention  to  the  most  influential  scholars  
in  this  field  and  the  significance  of  their  works.  The  aim  is  to  illustrate  the  nature  
of  the  literature  and  explore  the  growing  theoretical  debate  over  the  research  
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topic.  Furthermore,  it  will  identify  the  gap  in  the  literature  and  the  way  in  which  
this  thesis  aims  to  cover  this  gap  and  contribute  to  knowledge.  
Chapter  Four  will  illustrate  the  nature  of  Turkish  Foreign  Policy  prior  and  
after  2002  when  the  AKP  government  took  control.  The  aim  is  to  help  the  reader  
understand  the  difference  in  Turkish  foreign  policy  before  and  after  2002  and  
what  we  mean  by  Turkish  foreign  policy  change.  The  main  question  that  this  
chapter   aims   to   answer   in   order   to   know   that   it   has   actually   changed.   is:   If  
Turkish   foreign  policy  changed  since  2002,  what  did   it   look   like  before   that?  
Therefore,  this  chapter  discusses  the  historical  development  of  the  Republic’s  
foreign  policy.  Looking  at  main  events  i.e.  WWII,  The  Cold  War,  and  after  the  
collapse  of  the  USSR  and  the  emergence  of  the  new  world  order,  the  Gulf  War  
of  1991,  September  11,  and  many  others.  The  chapter  also  includes  an  analysis  
of   the  development  of   Islamism  in  Turkey,   Islamist  political  parties,  and  their  
role  in  affecting  foreign  policy  making.  Furthermore,  the  chapter  focuses  on  the  
formation  of  the  AKP  and  its  policy  agendas  as  well  as  the  way  Turkish  foreign  
policy  operated   since   their   victory   in   2002  and   the  development  of   relations  
between  Turkey  and   its  Middle  Eastern  neighbours  as  well  as   its  deepening  
involvement  and  role  in  regional  issues  providing  sufficient  examples.    
Chapter  Five  critically  analyses  and  examines  the  notion  of  "Islamism"  
and   "Islamist   ideology"   as   a   cause   behind   Turkish   foreign   policy   change  
towards  the  Middle  East  since  2002.  The  goal  is  to  evaluate  its  plausibility  in  
understanding  Turkish  foreign  policy  change.  This  includes  an  illustration  of  the  
different  works  supporting  such  explanation  and  exploring  their  significance.    
Chapter  Six  will  focus  on  and  examine  the  so  called  "ideational"  or  "non-­
material"  theoretical  explanations  that  are  based  on  the  roles  of  Turkish  identity  
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politics  and  the  notion  of  neo-­Ottomanism  as  causes  behind  such  foreign  policy  
change.  The  aim  is  to  critically  analyse  those  different  arguments  and  how  they  
might  have  played  a  role  in  changing  the  course  of  Turkish  foreign  policy.    
Chapter   Seven   on   the   other   hand   will   look   at   the   “pragmatic”   and  
“materialist”  based  explanations  presented  in  the   literature  as  causes  behind  
Turkish  foreign  policy  change  towards  the  Middle  East.  The  first  examines  the  
role  of  economic  interests  and  the  most  influential  scholars  who  supported  such  
claim  as  the  cause  behind  Turkish  foreign  policy.  The  second  section  focuses  
on  the  role  of  national  security  and  security  interests'  explanations  presented  in  
the   literature,  particularly   in  dealing  with   the  Kurdish   issue  and   its  effects  on  
Turkish-­Middle  East  relations  most  notably  with  Iran,  Iraq,  and  Syria.    
Chapter  Eight  will  offer  a  critical  analysis  and  examination  of  the  role  of  
the  European  Union  as  one  of  the  most  important  external  actor  that  affected  
Turkish   politics   and   foreign  policy   for   a   long   time.   It   examines   the  extent   of  
which  the  EU  played  a  role  in  changing  the  relations  between  Turkey  and  its  
Middle  Eastern  neighbours  and  whether  it  has  been  the  main  source  of  change  
or   not.   The   issue   of   the   EU   will   be   given   a   whole   chapter   due   to   its   high  
importance   and   the   "very   great   attention"   given   to   it   by  many   scholars   and  
analysts  in  the  literature.    
Chapter   Nine   aims   to   re-­visit   the   foreign   policy   analysis   section   in  
chapter   one   in   order   to   help   assess   how   different   foreign   policy   theoretical  
interpretations   have   helped   advance   our   understanding   of   Turkish   foreign  
policy   and   its   recent   developments.   Chapter   ten   summarises   the   overall  
research   test   results   and   argument   highlighting   the   necessity   of   applying   a  
wider   approach   in   this   field   of   study   while   taking   into   account   the   different  
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foreign  policy  theories  that  help  analyse  the  multiple  sources  of  Turkish  foreign  
policy   in   order   to   achieve   a   comprehensive   explanation.   This   includes   the  
importance   of   recognising   the   effective   roles   of   international   and   domestic  
political,   economic,   and   ideational   sources   as   well   as   individual   decision  
makers.    
Chapter  Ten  is  the  concluding  chapter  that  will  summarize  the  findings  
and  results  of   the  thesis.  This   includes  a  demonstration  of   the  strengths  and  
weaknesses   of   the   thesis   and   the   difficulties   that   the   researcher   faced   in  
conducting  this  work.  The  conclusion  will  also  analyse  the  implications  of  this  































1.	  Research	  Strategy	  
  
The  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  illustrate  the  research  data  collection  methods  
and  sources  that  it  will  use  in  the  analysis  of  this  case  study.  This  will  include  
the   explanation   and   justification   of   the   sources   used.   A   discussion   on   the  
significance  of  this  case  study  and  researcher’s  justification  of  choice  will  bring  
the  section  to  a  close.    
1.1.	  Choice	  of	  Sources	  
  
As   the  Turkish  case   is  a  widely  discussed   topic  both  academically,  officially,  
and  through  media,  it  would  be  inaccurate  to  rely  on  a  single  data  set.  The  use  
of  mixed  method  data  collection  strategies  is  very  common  in  social  sciences  
as  it  allows  researchers  to  make  a  “comprehensive  empirical  description  of  the  
subject   being   studied,   with   an   emphasis   on   accumulating   the   information  
needed   to   understand   the   causes   and   consequences   with   a   minimum   of  
error”65.  Therefore,   the  methods  of  data  collection  will  comprise  a  mixture  of  
both  primary  and  secondary  sources.  This  will  include  the  use  of  books,  as  will  
be  included  in  the  literature  review  chapter,  written  by  prominent  Turkish  and  
international  scholars,  which  gives  the  necessary  academic  foundation  of  the  
thesis.  The  books  in  this  thesis  were  written  by  both  Turkish  and  non-­Turkish  
scholars,  in  both  Turkish  and  English  languages.  Books  in  Turkish  languages  
however   are   mostly   used   as   secondary   references   cited   in   English   written  
books   and   works   by   Turkish   scholars   and   analysts.   Books   were   mainly  
                                                                                                              
65  See  William  Axinn  and  Lisa  Pearce,  Mixed  method  data  collection  strategies  (Cambridge  
University  Press,  2006).    
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collected   from   Exeter   University   libraries,   electronic   library   and   J-­Store   (e-­
books),  and  from  different  Turkish  think  tanks  and  institutions  in  Ankara  both  in  
digital/electronic  and  print  copies.    
Furthermore,  Journal  articles   represent  another  significant  side  of   this  
thesis’  analysis  as  they  help  bring  about  the  latest  critical  analyses  and  recent  
hot  topics.  There  are  a  number  of  critical   journals   involved  in  Turkish  politics  
and   foreign   policy   such   as   the   Turkish   Journal   of   Politics,   Turkish   Policy  
Quarterly,  European  Journal  of  Turkish  Studies,  Turkish  Journal  of  International  
Relations,   Middle   East   Policy   Quarterly,   Foreign   Policy   Journal,   and   many  
more.  Moreover,  there  are  a  large  number  of  journal  articles  also  published  by  
different  institutions,  such  as  The  Foundation  for  Political,  Economic,  and  Social  
Research  (SETA),  Institute  of  Strategic  Thinking  (SDE),  International  Strategic  
Research  Organization  (USAK),  Turkish  Centre  for  International  Relations  and  
Strategic   Analysis   (TURKSAM),   and   Centre   For   Turkey’s   Economic   and  
Strategic  Studies  (TESAM).    
   Another   important   sources   for   this   thesis   are   data   collected   from   the  
large  number  of  Turkish  and  international  newspapers  and  other  news  sources  
from   the   Internet.   These   include   Hurriyet,   Turkey   Zaman,   Milliyet,   Radikal,  
Cumhuriyet,   BBC,   CNN,   Aljazeera,   Alarabiyah,   and   many   more.   Although  
newspapers  can  be  sometimes  bias  and  support  certain  agendas  and  political  
groups,  either  with   the  AKP  government,  or  against   it   supporting  opposition,  
they  highly  contribute  to  the  value  of  data  in  this  thesis.    
   Other   Internet   sources   include   archives;;   interviews   (interview  
transcripts);;   speeches   published   on   YouTube   and   other   places   (by   Turkish  
leaders  and   important  decision  makers);;  government  papers  and  documents  
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(published  by  their  departments  i.e.  the  official  website  of  the  Turkish  Ministry  
of  Foreign  Affairs,  official  European  Union,  and  European  Council  on  Foreign  
Relations);;  and  J  Store  which  have  been  very  helpful  in  giving  access  to  many  




Apart  from  secondary  sources,  important  primary  evidence  is  collected  through  
the  use  of  interviews.  Using  interviews  is  an  important  tool  for  collecting  primary  
data   from   subjects   who   lay   within   the   heart   of   this   thesis’s   analysis66.   It   is  
important   to   highlight   here   that   interview   data   play   a   central   role   in   the  
researcher’s  analysis  and  highly  contribute  to  the  analysis  and  particularly   in  
the  Process  Tracing  tests  method  of  the  different  hypotheses  and  explanations  
included   in   this   thesis67.   Interview   data   will   help   examine   the   value   of   the  
different   explanations   and   assess   their   demanding   standards   to   establish  
causation   in   this   case   study.   The   researcher   conducted   a   number   of   semi-­
structured  interviews  in  Turkey  as  well  as  Saudi  Arabia.  Interviewing  officials  
from  Saudi   Arabia   helps,   to   some   extent,   understand   some   views   from   the  
Middle  Eastern  side.  The  fact  that  the  researcher  is  from  Saudi  Arabia,  it  is  a  
good  opportunity  to  analyse  such  official  views  from  one  of  the  most  important  
countries  in  the  Middle  East  as  an  example.  The  individuals  interviewed  from  
Saudi  Arabia  contribute  to  the  thesis  because  they  have  long  experiences  in  
this  field.  They  have  also  had  the  opportunity  to  directly  deal  with  their  Turkish  
                                                                                                              
66  See  Nigel  King  and  Christine  Horrocks,  Interviews  in  qualitative  research,  (Sage,  2010).    
67  Oisin  Tansey,  “Process  Tracing  and  Elite  Interviewing:  A  Case  for  Non-­Probability  
Sampling.”  PS:  Political  Science  and  Politics  40,  no.4  (2007):  765-­772.    
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counterparts  in  a  number  of  events  and  occasions  and  exploring  their  views  on  
how  they  see  Turkey’s  approach  towards  Saudi  Arabia  and  the  key  elements  
of  their  relations.  This  helps  the  researcher  to  identify  whether  such  interviews’  
data  support  or  devalue  some  of  the  explanations  examined  in  this  thesis.    
Furthermore,   the   great   advantage   for   using   interviews   is   that   it   gives  
more   flexibility   of   questions   and   enables   the   researcher   to   go   further   and  
engage   in   a   discussion.   Interviews   provide   the   opportunity   to   have   a   closer  
study  to  the  language  officials  are  using  in  their  answers,  where  they  are  coming  
from,  and  the  different  terminology  they  use,  which  help  draw  important  insights  
to  the  analysis68.    
Those   interviews  were  conducted  with  Turkish  and  Saudi  officials   i.e.  
Professor  Yasin  Aktay  (AK  Party  Deputy  Chairman),  Professor  Mesut  Ozcan  
(Chairman  of   the  Foreign  Ministry’s  Diplomacy  Academy  and   advisor   to   the  
Minister   of   Foreign   Affairs),   Dr.Fayez   Al-­Shehri   (President   of   Saudi-­Turkish  
Parliamentary  Friendship  at  Shoura  Council  of  Saudi  Arabia),  and  Prof.  Yahya  
Mahmoud   ibn  Junaid  (Secretary-­General  of  King  Faisal  Centre   for  Research  
and  Islamic  Studies  in  Riyadh).  On  the  other  hand,  academics  and  experts  from  
Turkish   and  Saudi   universities   and   think   tanks   are   highly   beneficial   as   they  
contribute   to   the   critical   analysis   of   this   research   away   from   diplomacy   and  
formal  answers.  These  experts  also  included,  Professor  Birol  Akgun  (Chairman  
of  SDE  ‘Institute  of  Strategic  Thinking’),  Professor  Ersel  Aydinili  (Professor  of  
IR  at  Bilkent  University  and  executive  director  of  the  Fulbright  Commission),  Dr.  
Saban  Kardas  (President  of  ORSAM  ‘Middle  East  Strategic  Research  Centre’  
and   faculty   member   at   the   department   of   International   Relations   at   TOBB  
                                                                                                              
68  Ibid,  1-­25.    
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University  of  Economics  and  Technology  in  Ankara),  Professor  Murat  Yesiltas  
(Director  of  Security  Studies  at  SETA,  a  member  of  ORMER  ‘Centre  for  Middle  
Eastern  Studies  at  Sakarya  University,  and  a  faculty  member  in  the  department  
of  International  Relations  at  Sakarya  University),  Professor  Selcuk  Colakoglu  
(Vice  President   at  USAK   the   ‘International  Strategic  Research  Organization’  
and  the  director  of  the  USAK  centre  for  Asia-­Pacific  Studies),  Professor  Suheyl  
Sapan  (Professor  of  history  specialized  in  Ottoman  and  Turkish  modern  history,    
at   the  department  of  history   in  King  Saudi  University,  Riyadh,  Saudi  Arabia),  
and  others.    
The   above   interviewees   were   chosen   after   investigating   the   most  
suitable   individuals   who   can   contribute   to   the   analysis   of   this   thesis   and  
research  topic.  Some  officials  were  chosen  due  to  their  direct  involvement  and  
long   experience   with   the   Turkish   government‘s   foreign   policy   including  
individuals  who  are  senior  advisors  in  the  Turkish  ministry  of  foreign  affairs  and  
other   government   institutions.   However,   most   of   the   interviewees   are  
academics   and   experts   specialized   in   Turkish   foreign   policy   studies   and  
international   relations.   They   were   heads   of   key   think   tanks   and   research  
institutions  and  organisations.  The  purpose  of   choosing  such  experts   is   that  
they  contribute  to  a  large  extent  to  the  evaluation  of  the  competing  explanations  
this  study  focus  on  and  investigate.  They  add  to  important  critical  perspectives  
away  from  formal  and  diplomatic  answers  that  are  usually  given  by  government  
officials.  The  questions  and  discussion  in  those  interviews  are  mainly  based  on  
interviewees  views  and  position  towards  the  current  theoretical  debates  in  the  
literature  and  which  of  those  they  believe  is  more  useful,  as  well  as  the  best  
way  to  go  forward  to  achieving  a  comprehensive  explanation  to  understanding  
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the  causes  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  change  towards  the  Middle  East  since  2002  
under  the  AKP  government.    
The  choice  of  using  semi-­structured  interviews  lies  within  the  advantage  
that   interview   style   allows   more   flexibility   for   both   the   interviewee   and   the  
researcher   to   elaborate   further   on   the   topics   and   questions   covered   in   this  
thesis69.  Moreover,  a  semi-­structured  interview  helps  ensure  that  participants  
do  not  go  out  of  line  and  drift  away  from  the  initial  topic70.  The  questions  were  
mainly  prepared  beforehand,  but  due  to  the  nature  of  this  topic  other  smaller  
questions  came  up  from  interactions  during  interviews.  Interviews  were  usually  
asked   to   elaborate   further   in   order   to   fully   understand   their   positions.   The  
questions  were  set  up  in  the  most  appropriate  style  suitable  for  this  research  
and  its  methodology  (Process  Tracing).  For  example,  interviewees  were  asked  
for  their  reply  and  position  towards  certain  theoretical  explanations  and  debate  
in   the   literature,  using  specific  case  studies  and  examples.  This  significantly  
contributes  to  the  assessment  and  evaluation  process  in  the  thesis.    
In  addition,   interviews  were  audio  recorded  with   the  permission  of   the  
interviewees  and  full  understanding  of  the  nature  of  the  interview.  They  were  
notified  that  they  have  the  right  to  stop  the  interview  and  withdraw  at  any  time.  
Audio   recording   helped   keeping   a   complete   accurate   record   of   what   each  
individual  have  said71.  It  also  gave  the  researcher  more  freedom  to  listen  and  
                                                                                                              
69  See  Joanne  Horton,  Richard  Macve,  and  Geert  Struyven,  "Qualitative  research:  
experiences  in  using  semi-­structured  interviews,"  in  The  real  life  guide  to  accounting  
research,  eds.,  Christopher  Humphrey  and  Bill  Lee  (Elsevier  Science,  Amsterdam,  2004),  
339-­357.  
70  Ibid.    
71  See  Paul  Gill,  Kate  Stewart,  E.  Treasure,  and  B.  Chadwick,  "Methods  of  data  collection  in  
qualitative  research:  interviews  and  focus  groups,"  British  dental  journal  204,  no.  6  (2008):  
291-­295.    
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respond   without   being   busy   taking   notes,   allowing   better   eye   contact   and  
communication  with  interviewees.    
Before  the  interviews  took  place,  the  researcher  explained,  once  again,  
the  nature  of  the  research  and  its  aims  to  the  interviewees.  The  reason  this  was  
done  so  that  the  interviewees  can  understand  the  nature  of  this  research  and  
the  questions  asked,  which  enables  them  to  engage  in  a  more  suitable  manner.  
The  main  interview  topics  discussed  are  central  to  the  research  analysis.  Those  
topics   include,   the   role   of   Turkish   national   identity   and   changes   in   the   elite  
structures  as  domestic  sources  behind  Turkish  foreign  policy  change,  Islamism  
and  the  development  of  Political  Islam  in  Turkish  politics  and  its  influence  over  
foreign  policy  making,  the  concept  of  neo-­Ottomanism  and  the  Ottoman  revival  
by  the  AKP  government,  the  role  of  national  security  and  the  Kurdish  problem  
behind   Turkish   regional   engagements   and   relations   with   bordering   Middle  
Eastern   states,   the   role   of   economic   interests   and   the   growing   global  
competitive   market   driving   Turkey   to   search   for   new   regional   economic  
opportunities,  Turkish-­EU  relations  and  the  membership  process’s  influence  on  
Turkish  foreign  Policy  and  relations  with  the  Middle  East,  and  the  change  in  the  
balance  of  civil-­military  relations  and  democratization  process.    
The  interviewees  were  asked  for  their  views  and  assessments  of  such  
themes  and  their  role  as  causes  behind  recent  Turkish  foreign  policy  change.  
They   were   also   asked   about   their   position   towards   the   current   theoretical  
debates,  how  such  single  based  approach  explanations  have  been  useful  so  
far,  and  whether   they  agree   that   there   is  a  growing  need   for   researchers   to  
develop  multilevel/multiple  factors  approaches  in  this  filed  to  try  and  arrive  at  
more   convincing  explanations.  The  questions  were   set   in   a  way   to   help   the  
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evaluation  of  those  themes  and  explanations  in  a  way  to  support  the  Process  
Tracing  methodology  employed  in  this  thesis.    
   The  method  of  interview  data  analysis  went  through  a  process  of  coding,  
decoding,  and  categorization  in  order  to  apply  them  more  accurately  and  within  
the  relevant  themes  discussed  in  the  chapters.  First  of  all,   the  interview  data  
were   highlighted   and   coded   distinctively   (others   might   call   it   indexing   or  
thematic   coding)72.   The   codes   and   their   related   data  were   then   divided   into  
groups  or  sections.  Some  of  them  represented  main  topics,  while  others  were  
listed   under   other   topics.   This   paved   way   for   the   researcher   to   move   from  
having  a  big  list  of  codes  into  lists  of  categories,  with  related  codes  and  divisions  
of  categories.  They  were  again  revised  a  number  of  times  and  went  through  a  
process  of  modification.  The  final  categories  included  were  then  labelled.  This  
included   analysing   the   connections   between   those   categories.      Finally,   the  
researcher  identified  central  concepts  that  reflect  the  meaning  attached  to  the  
data.   Overall,   this   enabled   the   researcher   to   interpret   results   and   identify  
stronger  meanings  that  are  central  to  the  research  analysis.      
   It  is  important  to  highlight  here  that  interview  data  will  be  applied  in  this  
thesis’s  chapters  as  necessary  and  appropriate  depending  on  the  theme  of  the  
chapters   and   choosing   suitable   interview   data   accordingly.   The   researcher  
does  not   intend   to  apply  all   interview  data   in  each  chapter  or  use  statistical  
measurements.  Instead,  the  researcher  will  apply  interview  data  depending  on  
topics  and  themes  discussed  in  each  of  the  coming  chapters  and  data  will  be  
chosen  depending  on   their   relevance  and  contribution.  Appropriate   interview  
data  will  be  applied  depending  on  the  interviewees’  answers  as  answers  may  
                                                                                                              
72  See  Amanda  Coffey  and  Paul  Atkinson,  Making  sense  of  qualitative  data:  complementary  
research  strategies  (Sage  Publications,  Inc,  1996).  
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vary.  In  other  words,  some  interviewees  did  not  give  much  emphasis  and  gave  
a   very   simple   answer  while   other   elaborated  more  and  gave   very   important  
examples  to  be  included  in  this  thesis.  The  aim  is  not  to  assess  the  quantity;;  it  
is  more  about  assessing   the  quality  and  value  of  each   interview  data   to   this  
research.    
1.3.	  	  Justification	  for	  the	  Choice	  of	  Research	  Topic	  
  
Since  the  war  on  Iraq  in  2003,  much  of  the  academic  and  media  attention  was  
given  to  Turkey.  Many  analysts  and  journalists  expressed  their  surprise  after  
Turkey’s   decision   refusing   to   allow   the   American   troops   to   use   Turkish  
territories  in  their  war  against  Saddam’s  regime.  Turkey  was  famously  known  
for  its  close  alliance  with  the  West  and  most  notably  the  United  States  for  a  very  
long  time.  As  a  politics  and  international  relations  student  from  the  Middle  East,  
this   topic   became   increasingly   interesting.   Through   studying   a   couple   of  
modules   that   looked   at   the   Turkish   Ottoman   history   and   the   politics   of   the  
modern  Republic,  the  question  that  kept  emerging  was;;  why  did  Turkey  improve  
its  relations  with  the  Middle  East,  despite  its  long  history  of  disengagement?    
The   thesis   therefore   comes   as   a   response   to   what   have   been  
represented  in  the  literature.  Although  the  literature  has  been  influenced  by  a  
number  of  descriptive  analyses73,  there  have  been  a  number  of  investigations  
made  that  aimed  at  explaining  the  sources  of  change  in  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  
since  the  early  2000s.  However,  as  mentioned  above,  different  scholars  and  
authors  came   to  different  conclusions  and   represented  arguments   that  have  
even  pointed  at  opposite  directions  some  times.  These  are  all  beneficial  and  
                                                                                                              
73  Kanat,  220.    
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misleading  at  the  same  time.  It   is  beneficial  to  take  into  account  the  different  
possible  explanations  to  such  change  in  Turkey’s  foreign  relations  with  the  Arab  
world.  However,  it  is  misleading  because  it  creates  confusion  to  observers  who  
seek  a  solid  explanation.  Such  unclear  picture   in   the   literature  has  been   the  
source  of  motivation  to  take  further  investigation  that  seeks  to  cover  such  gap  
in  the  literature  and  contribute  to  knowledge.    
2.	  Process	  Tracing	  method	  of	  analysis	  	  
  
In  order   to  better  understand  what  we  mean  by  Process  Tracing  and  how   it  
functions,  it  is  important  to  explore  its  definition  first.    One  of  the  most  famous  
definitions   by   Collier   (2011)   define   it   as   “the   systematic   examination   of  
diagnostic  evidence  selected  and  analysed  in  light  of  research  questions  and  
hypotheses   posed   by   the   investigator”74.   Process   Tracing   has   been   an  
important   tool   for  both  quantitative  and  qualitative  analyses.  There  has  been  
more  attention  given  to  it   in  recent  studies  than  ever  before.  However,   it  has  
been   argued   that   many   scholars,   who   have   claimed   to   be   using   Process  
Tracing,  did  not   fully  understand   it  and   therefore  were  not  able   to   rigorously  
apply  it75.  However,  it  is  important  to  understand  that  it  is  a  method  that  allows  
us   to   review   and   evaluate   causal   claims.   In   other   words,   we   can   trace  
backwards  the  causal  process  that  has  produced  the  case’s  outcome.  It  allows  
us  to  unfold  the  case  to  be  able  to  trace  back  the  original  cause.    
                                                                                                              
74  David  Collier,  “The  Teacher:  Understanding  Process  Tracing,”  Political  Science  and  Politics  
44,  no.  4.  (2011):  823-­30.    
75  Ibid,  823.  
46	  	  
   Process  Tracing  was  derived  from  the  field  of  Cognitive  Psychology  in  
America  around  the  1960s  and  1970s76.  It  was  used  in  Psychology  as  a  way  of  
investigating   intermediate   steps   in   cognitive   mental   processes   to   try   and  
understand  the  way  in  which  humans  make  decisions.    However,  this  was  later  
used  by  Alexander  L.  George  (1979)  and  appropriated  Process  Tracing  as  a  
way   to   explain   the   use   of   evidence   from   different   case   studies   to   make  
assumptions   about   historical   explanation77.   Although   Process   Tracing   was  
largely  viewed  as  a  way  to  explain  individual  decision-­making,  George  was  able  
to  develop  this  method  in  his  work  to  be  used  also  for  making  inferences  from  
both  macro-­level  and  structural  explanations  of  different  historical  cases78.    
George  and  Bennet  (2005)  offered  a  very  useful  definition  for  Process  
Tracing  and  stated  that  it  is  the  use  of  “histories,  archival  documents,  interview  
transcripts,   and   other   sources   to   see   whether   the   causal   process   a   theory  
hypothesizes  or  implies  in  a  case  is  in  fact  evident  in  the  sequence  and  values  
of  the  intervening  variables  in  that  case”79.  In  the  same  volume,  they  later  added  
“   the   Process   Tracing   method   attempts   to   identify   the   intervening   causal  
process  –  the  causal  chain  and  causal  mechanism  –  between  an  independent  
variable   (or   variables)   and   the   outcome   of   the   dependent   variable”80.  
Furthermore,  David  Collier   (2011)   in   his  works  The  Teacher:  Understanding  
Process  Tracing,  he  stated  “process  tracing  can  make  decisive  contributions  to  
                                                                                                              
76  Andrew  Bennet  and  Jeffrey  Checkel,  “Process  Tracing:  From  Philosophical  roots  to  best  
practices,”  Simons  Papers  in  Security  and  Development,  School  for  International  Studies,  
Vancouver;;  Simon  Fraser  University,  no.  21,  (2012).    
77  Alexander  George,  “Case  Studies  and  Theory  Development:  The  Method  of  Structured,  
Focused  Comparison,”  in  Paul  Gordon  Lauren  (ed.),  Diplomatic  History:  New  Approaches,  
(New  York:  Free  Press,  1979).      
78  Alexander  George  and  Andrew  Bennett,  Case  Studies  and  Theory  Development  in  the  
Social  Sciences.  (Cambridge,  MA:  MIT  Press,  2005),  142.    
79  Ibid,  6.    
80  Ibid,  206.    
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diverse  research  objectives,  including:  (a)  identifying  novel  political  and  social  
phenomena   and   systematically   describing   them;;   (b)   evaluating   prior  
explanatory   hypotheses,   discovering   new   hypotheses,   and   assessing   these  
new   causal   claims;;   (c)   gaining   insight   into   causal   mechanisms;;   and   (d)  
providing  an  alternative  means”81.  These  are  very  influential  definitions  to  this  
thesis   because   they   help   clarify   the   way   the   researcher   can   find   and   use  
available  evidence  and  eventually  trace  back  to  the  original  cause  or  causes  to  
the  change  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  in  the  Middle  East.    
2.1.	  Why	  is	  Process	  Tracing	  Methodology	  necessary	  for	  this	  research?	  	  
  
The  necessity  of  Process  Tracing  in  this  thesis  lies  in  its  ability  to  enable  the  
researcher  to  test  the  different  competing  theoretical  explanations  and  assess  
their   evidences’   sufficiency   and   necessity   to   establish   causation   that   can  
explain  Turkish  foreign  policy  change  towards  the  Middle  East  since  2002.  This  
means  that  Process  Tracing  helps  minimize  confusion  as  a  result  of  the  different  
competing   explanations   offered   in   this   case   and   helps   identify   the   most  
plausible  explanation  that  can  better  clarify  our  understanding.    
Process  Tracing  raises  the  question  of  how  “X”  generate  a  sequence  of  
conditions  that  come  together  one  way  or  another  to  produce  “Y”?82  Therefore,  
Process   Tracing   allows   the   researcher   to   validate   the   different   theoretical  
hypotheses   and   explanations   that   attempted   to   explain   the   causes   behind  
Turkish  foreign  policy  change.  Regarding  this  particular  case  study,  there  are  a  
number  of  different  and  competing  explanations  to  the  research  question  and  
                                                                                                              
81  Collier,  824.    82	  George and Bennet, Case Studies and Theory Development; Kevin Ford, et al. “Process 
tracing methods: Contributions, problems, and neglected research questions,” Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes 43, no.1, (1989): 75-117. 	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therefore  Process  Tracing  will  enable  this  research  to  narrow  down  the  wide  
range  of  hypotheses  offered  in  the  literature  to  an  eventually  much  clearer  and  
simplified   manner.   Process   Tracing   is   very   distinct   and   has   been   a   very  
growingly   influential   qualitative   research   method.   However,   it   has   not   been  
used  in  this  field  of  study  and  literature  on  Turkish  foreign  policy  change,  which  
further  adds  to  this  thesis’s  both  originality  and  contribution.      
Process  Tracing  also  enables  us  to  better  understand  the  role  of  causal  
mechanisms  that  comes  between  the  independent  and  dependent  variables  to  
make  well-­built  inferences  about  how  outcomes  come  about.  Therefore,  using  
Process  Tracing  in  this  thesis   is  necessary  as  it   is  the  best  tool  that  enables  
researchers   to   examine   and   evaluate   the   value   of   the   different   existing  
explanations  presented  in  the  literature.  As  this  thesis  aims  to  explain  Turkish  
foreign   policy   outcome,   Process   Tracing   develops   a   useful   method   for  
establishing  causal  mechanisms  as  well  as  testing  existing  ones,  which    
empowers  the  researcher  to  arrive  at  the  most  plausible  explanation  so  far.    
2.2.	  	  Process	  Tracing	  literature	  review	  
  
The   literature   on   Process   Tracing   has   been   increasingly   influential   and  
prominent,   particularly   in   Political   Science.   This   field   of   study   has   been  
developed   rapidly  over  nearly  half   a   century.  There  have  been  a  number  of  
influential   thinkers   in   this   literature   who   have   had   major   influence   to   the  
development   of   Process   Tracing  method.   However,   I   only   intend   to   include  
thinkers  who  have  applied  this  method  to  Political  and  Social  Sciences.  In  1979,  
Alexander   L.   George   a   Political   Scientist   in   Stanford   University   was   able  
develop  the  term  Process  Tracing  as  a  way  to  explain  historical  explanations  
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through  the  use  of  evidence  from  within  case  studies  in  his  book  Case  Studies  
and  Theory  Development:  The  Method  of  Structured,  Focused  Comparison  83.  
Alexander’s  work  can  be  seen  as  one  of   the  most   influential  Process  tracing  
texts  in  social  science.  Moreover,  Stephen  Van  Evera  (1997)  is  another  scholar  
worth  mentioning  who  initially  formulated  four  types  of  Process  Tracing  tests84.  
Those  tests  include;;  Straw  in  the  Wind  Test;;  Smoking  Gun  Test;;  Hoop  test;;  and  
Doubly  Decisive  test.  These  tests  are  developed  for  the  purpose  of  being  able  
to  either  take  on  board  or  eliminate  different  evidence  collected  to  make  it  easier  
for  researches  to  trace  back  the  initial  cause  and  how  such  tests  affect  other  
proposed  theories  in  the  field.  The  researcher  will  however  go  in  more  details  
with  those  tests  in  the  coming  sections.  Stephen’s  work  plays  an  important  role  
in  the  development  of  Process  Tracing  in  the  literature,  and  represent  a  useful  
guide  for  researchers  like  myself.    
   Since   then,   the   work   on   Process   Tracing   witnessed   increasing  
recognition   by   different   scholars.   For   example,   Alexander   L.   George   and  
Andrew  Bennett  (2005)85,   from  my  research,  I  have  found  that  this  has  been  
one   of   the  main   texts   referred   to  when   explaining  Process   tracing   by  many  
researchers.  George  and  Bennett  were  able  to  explain  ways  to  develop  case  
study   research   that   should   generate   results   valuable   for   policy   makers.  
Furthermore,   they   offered   a   comprehensive   discussion   of   Process   Tracing,  
highlighted   the   significance   of  within-­case   analysis,   and   emphasized   on   the  
concept   of   typological   theories.   The   importance   of   this   book   lies   in   its  
comprehensive  outline  and  development  of  Process  Tracing.      
                                                                                                              
83  George,  “Case  Studies  and  Theory  Development”.    
84  Stephen  Van  Evera,  Guide  to  Methods  for  Students  of  Political  Science.  (United  States;;  
Cornell  University  Press,  1997).    
85  George  and  Bennett,  Case  Studies  and  Theory  Development.   
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   What  is  more,  there  have  been  a  number  of  researchers  who  wrote  about  
this   particular  method  of   analysis.  These   include   the  works  of  Oisin  Tansey  
(2007)86,  who  focused  on  explaining  the  relationship  between  Process  Tracing  
and  Elite  Interviewing.  This  work  illustrated  the  importance  of  Elite  interviewing  
as   a   way   for   collecting   data   and   its   benefits   for   Process   Tracing.   This   is  
interesting  for  my  thesis   to  consider  as  the  researcher   intends  to   interview  a  
number   of   key   figures   in   the  Turkish  government   and   influential   academics.  
Therefore,   such   work   enlightens   me   to   using   those   interviews   as   critical  
evidence  for  better  conclusions.  
Moreover,  there  have  been  major  developments  in  the  work  on  Process  
Tracing.  Scholars  were  able  to   link  such  method  to  the  study  of   international  
politics  and   international   relations.  This  development  adds  great   influence   to  
my  thesis  because  it  brings  it  closer  to  the  field  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  and  
highly  contributes  to  my  understanding  of  Process  Tracing.    Jeffery  T.  Checkel  
(2005)   in   his   work   It’s   the   Process   Stupid!   Process   Tracing   in   the   study   of  
European  and  International  Politics  was  able  to  illustrate  the  importance  of  the  
use  of  Process  Tracing87.  His  work  is  influential  because  it  focuses  on  the  role  
of  understanding  causal  mechanisms  in  international  relations  and  particularly  
in   cases   of   European   and   international   politics.   Such   work   presents   a   very  
useful  guidance  to  understanding  the  role  of  Process  Tracing.  Jeffery  used  an  
example  worth  noting;;  he   looked  at   the  theory  of  democratic  peace  from  the  
field   of   international   relations   and   tried   to   show   how   such   assumption   was  
                                                                                                              
86  Tansey,  Oisín,  “Process  Tracing  and  Elite  Interviewing:  A  Case  for  non-­probability  
Sampling,”  PS:  political  science  &  Politics  40,  no  4,  (2007):  765-­772.  
87  Checkel,  Jeffrey  T.,  “It’s  the  Process  Stupid!  Process  Tracing  in  the  study  of  European  and  




reached   through   tracing  causal  mechanisms.  Although  Checkel  stressed   the  
importance  of  Process  Tracing,  he  was  able  to  criticize  some  aspects  of  this  
method.  Such  criticism  contributes  to  our  understanding  of  Process  Tracing  and  
its   limits.   Therefore,   Checkel’s   work   holds   a   great   value   to   my   thesis   and  
particularly   with   providing   very   useful   examples   that   helps   me   and   other  
researchers  in  this  field  to  use.      
Furthermore,  Jeffery  T.  Checkel  and  Andrew  Bennet  (2012)  were  able  
to   produce   another   important   piece   of   work   titled   Process   Tracing:   From  
Philosophical  Roots   to  Best  Practices88.   I  believe   that   this  particular  piece  of  
work  is  both  critical  and  central  to  the  study  of  Process  Tracing  because  it  was  
able  to  successfully  identify  the  philosophical  foundations  of  Process  Tracing  
and  how  researchers  should  carry  it  out.  This  is  crucial  because  there  has  been  
some  confusion  over  the  way  to  apply  process  tracing.  Therefore,  this  works  
present  clear  steps  on  how  to  employ  Process  Tracing  as  a  way  for  researchers  
to  avoid   inferential  errors.  Moreover,   the  authors  have   included  some  useful  
examples  for  us  to  consider,  such  as  the  puzzle  over  the  reason  why  “the  Cold  
War   ended   without   a   shot   being   fired”.   Such   engagement   with   cases   in  
international  politics  motivates  readers  to  engage  and  think  critically  about  the  
advantages  of  using  Process  Tracing.    
What’s  more,  useful  international  relations  examples  used  in  the  study  
of  Process  Tracing,  can  also  be  found  in  another  work  by  Andrew  Bennet  (2010)  
“Process  Tracing  and  Causal   Inference”   in  Rethinking  Social   inquiry:  diverse  
tools,  shared  standards89.  Bennet  looked  at  three  main  important  examples  in  
                                                                                                              
88  Bennet  and  Checkel,  “Process  Tracing:  From  Philosophical  roots”.    
89  Andrew  Bennett,  “Process  Tracing  and  Causal  Inference,”  In  Henry  E.  Brady  and  David  
Collier,  ed.  Rethinking  Social  Inquiry:  Diverse  Tools,  Shared  Standards,  2nd  edition,  (Lanham,  
MD.  Rowman  and  Littlefield,  2010),  207–2019.    
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the  field  of  international  relations.  These  examples  include,  questioning  why  the  
Soviet  Union  did  not   involve  militarily   in   the   revolutions  of  Central  Europe   in  
1989,  compared  to  its  military  intervention  in  the  case  of  Hungary  in  1956;;  Why  
the  United  Kingdom  and  France  did  not  use  their  force  in  dealing  with  the  crisis  
of   Fashoda   in   1898;;   and   why   in   the   middle   of   World   War   One,   Germany  
expanded   her   military   activities   regardless   of   her   likelihood   to   be   defeated.  
Bennet  usefully  investigated  those  examples  in  his  chapter  and  engaged  with  
the   roles  of  Process  Tracing.  This   is  another   influential  piece  of  work   to  my  
thesis  because  although  the  examples  presented  here  are  not  relevant  to  my  
case  study,  they  are  in  fact  parallel  to  my  study  and  can  be  of  useful  guidance  
for  me  and  other  international  relations  scholars  and  researchers.    
   Scholars  have  divided  process  Tracing   into   three  main  variants   in   the  
literature.  For  example,  Derek  Beach  and  Rasmus  Brun  Pedersen   (2011)   in  
What  Process  Tracing  is  actually  tracing?  The  three  variants  of  Process  Tracing  
methods   and   their   uses   and   limitations   illustrated   the   importance   for  
researchers  to  understand  that  PT  should  not  be  seen  as  a  single  method90.  
Therefore,  they  divided  PT  into  three  main  variants  and  explained  each  with  in-­
depth   details   including   when   and   how   to   use   them.   The   three   variants  
incorporate  theory  building,  theory  testing,  and  explaining  outcome,  which  I  will  
go   into   greater   details   in   the   following   sections.   This   particular  work   is   very  
critical  to  my  thesis,  as  it  is  going  to  help  direct  my  work  to  successfully  conduct  
this  method  of  analysis.  This  work  is  particularly  useful  because  it  provides  very  
                                                                                                              
90  Beach,  D.  &  Pedersen,  R.  B.,  “What  is  Process  Tracing  is  actually  tracing?  The  three  
variants  of  process  tracing  methods  and  their  uses  and  limitations,”  Paper  prepared  for  
presentation  at  the  American  Political  Science  Association  annual  meeting,  The  University  of  
Aarhus,  1-­4  September,  2011,  accessed  24/  03/  2016,  
http://pure.au.dk/portal/files/40422940/APSA_paper_Beach_and_Pedersen_final.pdf.    
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important  and  useful  graphs  that  help  clarify  this  method  in  a  simple  way.    What  
is  more,  it  is  very  important  for  us  as  researchers  to  understand  Process  Tracing  
and   its   different   tests   that   researchers   need   to   go   through  when   evaluating  
evidence.  Without   testing   the   plausibility   of   the   data   we   collect,   we   cannot  
acknowledge   their   importance   and   validity   to   the   case   study   we   are  
investigating.   Therefore,   David   Collier   (2011)   in   his   article   Understanding  
Process   Tracing   highlighted   the   most   important   tests   that   Process   Tracing  
uses-­formerly   introduced  by  Van  Evera  (1997)-­to  test   its  causal   inferences91.    
These  included  Straw  in  the  Wind  Test,  Hoop  test,  smoking  gun  test,  and  doubly  
decisive   test.  Collier   was   also   able   to   present   a   useful   example   “the   Silver  
Blaze”  for  us  to  take  into  account.  This  article  is  critical  to  my  thesis  because  
we  can  apply  the  tests  offered  by  the  author  and  follow  its  steps  to  try  and  reach  
a  solid  explanation.    
On   the   other   hand,   there   are   some   critics   that   were   raised   by   some  
scholars  regarding  Process  Tracing.  Those  critics  mainly  focused  on  two  major  
problems:  the  “degree  of  freedom”  problem  and  the  “infinite  regress”  problem.  
Gary   King,   Robert   O.   Keohane,   and   Sidney   Verba   (1994)   in   their   work   on  
Designing   Social   Inquiry:   Scientific   Inference   in   Qualitative   Research  
suggested   that   the  great   level  of  detail   in  Process  Tracing  could  result   in  an  
Infinite  regress  of  studying  causes  connecting  any  two  links  in  the  sequence  of  
causal  mechanisms92.  Furthermore,  other  scholars  like  Andrew  Bennet  (2010)  
in   his   chapter   “Process   Tracing   and  Causal   Inference”   in  Rethinking   Social  
inquiry:  diverse  tools,  shared  standards  also  argued  that  when  facing  few  cases  
                                                                                                              
91  Collier,  Op  cit.    
92  King,  Keohane,  and  Verba.,  Designing  Social  Inquiry:  Scientific  Inference  in  Qualitative  
Research.  (United  Kingdom:  Princeton  University  Press,  1994),  86.      
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with  great  numbers  of  variables  in  qualitative  research,  the  problem  of  degrees  
of  freedom  can  arise93.    
Another  possible  setback  looked  at  in  the  work  of  Andrew  Bennet  and  
Alexander   L.   George   (1997)   on   Process   Tracing   in   Case   Study   Research  
suggesting  that  there  could  be  more  than  one  hypothesized  causal  mechanism  
coherent   with   any   particular   set   of   Process   Tracing   evidence.   They   stated,  
“When  this  problem  of  indeterminacy  arises,  there  is  no  absolute  standard  for  
excluding  alternative  hypotheses  that  may  be  spurious”94.  Therefore,  avoiding  
such  problems  is  important  to  be  able  to  arrive  to  a  plausible  conclusion.  The  
critics  available  in  the  literature  on  Process  Tracing  are  very  helpful  because  it  
helps  us  understand  the  possible  obstacles  that  we  could  face  in  this  type  of  
analysis  and  therefore  avoid  them.      
2.3.	  Putting	  Process	  Tracing	  into	  practice	  	  
  
Beach  and  Pedersen  (2011,  2013)  argued  that  there  are  three  main  types  of  
Process   Tracing   that   an   investigator   needs   to   recognize   and   adopt   before  
analyzing   the   data.   They   include   A)   Theory-­building   Process   Tracing,   B)  
Theory-­testing  Process  Tracing,  and  C)  Explaining  outcome  Process  Tracing95.  
However,  they  all  share  the  aim  to  study  causal  mechanisms.    
  
A.  Theory-­building  Process  Tracing  
                                                                                                              
93  Bennet,  “Process	  Tracing	  and	  Causal	  Inference”.	    
94  Bennet  and  George,  “Process  Tracing  in  Case  Study  Research,”  MacArthur  Foundation  
Workshop  on  Case  Study  Methods,  1997,  accessed  24/03/2016,  
http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/kritzer/teaching/ps816/ProcessTracing.htm.    
95  Beach  and  Pedersen,  “What  is  Process  Tracing  is  actually  tracing?,”  and  Beach  and  
Pedersen,  Process-­Tracing  Methods:  Foundations  and  Guidelines,  (University  of  Michigan  
Press,  2013).    
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Theory-­building  Process  Tracing  is  a  method  to  build  a  theory  that  attempts  to  
propose  a  valid  explanation  that  can  also  be  applicable  to  other  multiple  cases.  
Therefore,  this  method  should  be  used  in  Process  Tracing  when  the  researcher  
is   unsure   of   the   possible   mechanisms   that   links   X   to   Y.   Furthermore,   this  
method   is  useful   if   there  have  been  no  attempts  by  previous   researchers   to  
explain,  in  a  given  case,  the  causes  of  the  outcome.  Doyle  (1892)  in  his  work  
The  Adventures  of  Sherlock  Holmes  argued  that  it  is  a  mistake  that  we  theorize  
before  we  have  data.  It  is  common  for  researchers  to  build  a  theory  first  in  their  
work   and   then   find   possible   evidence   and   materials   that   support   their  
hypothesis  or  theories96.  He  added  “Insensibly  one  begins  to  twist  facts  to  suit  
theories,  instead  of  theories  to  suit  facts”97.  In  Process  Tracing,  researchers  are  
expected  to  look  and  search  for  evidence  in  a  case  that  would  potentially  allow  
them  to  build  a  theory.  This  sounds  very  convincing  because  it  will   lead  to  a  
much  more  plausible  theory  at  the  end,  but  this  would  mean  that  a  researcher  
would  not  know  what   to  expect  at   the  end  of  his   investigation.  This   in  other  
words  would  save  the  researcher  from  proposing  a  weak  theory  that  does  not  
have  a  valid  explanation.  The   following  diagram   in   figure  1  can  give  a  good  






                                                                                                              
96  Doyle,  A.  Conan,  The  Adventures  of  Sherlock  Holmes  (London:  George  Newnes,  1892).    
97  Ibid,  14.    
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Figure1.  Theory-­building  Process  Tracing98  
  
Please  note  (CM=  Causal  Mechanisms,  bold  lines  =  primary  inferences,  shaded  
lines  =  secondary  inferences,  area  with  shaded  lines  =  what  is  being  traced).  
Step  one  of   theory  building  Process  Tracing   involves   the  collection  of  
evidence    available  for  the  specific  case  investigated.  The  researcher  can  then  
build  a  general   sense  of   her/his   hypothesis   from  observable  manifestations.  
Although  theory  building  is  an  inductive  method,  there  is  a  deductive  side  to  it.  
Researchers  most  likely  look  for  inspiration  from  previous  theoretical  work  that  
offers   some   kind   of   guidance.   Step   three;;   represent   the   second   level   of   a  
researcher’s  building  of  inferences  from  causal  mechanisms  that  he  or  she  find  
on  their  own  after  observing  manifestations  represented  in  previous  studies.    
   According   to   Beach,   D.   &   Pedersen,   R.   B.   (2011),   theory-­   building  
Process   Tracing,   consists   of   materials   that   are   used   to   put   together   a  
                                                                                                              
98  Beach  and  Pedersen.  Process-­Tracing  Methods,  18.    
  
57	  	  
hypothesized  theory,  infer  from  evidences  that  are  found  mirrors  to  the  apparent  
implications   of   underlying   causal  mechanism99   .   Therefore,   we   can   say   that  
theory-­building  Process   Tracing   allows   researchers   to   present   a   theory   that  
explains  a  given  case  and  can  also  be  of  use  beyond  a  single  case.    
   This  method  will  not  be  suitable  for  this  research  because  the  aim  of  this  
study  is  to  evaluate  and  examine  the  already  established  explanations  in  the  
literature  in  an  attempt  to  arrive  at  the  most  plausible  one  that  can  help  solve  
this  puzzle.  Such  Process  Tracing  method  would  be  suitable  for  establishing  
new  theories  in  explaining  certain  outcomes,  not  testing  existing  ones.  Theory-­
building  method  is  best  used  when  researchers  know  (Y)  the  outcome  and  have  
not  yet  known  (X)  the  cause  and  are  also  unaware  of  how  X  led  to  Y100.    
B.  Theory-­testing  Process  Tracing  
On  the  other  hand,   theory-­testing  Process  Tracing   is  a  very   influential  
method  in  recent  Process  Tracing  case  studies.  This  is  because  researchers  
who  attempt  to  use  Process  Tracing  are  usually  looking  to  test  different  theories  
in   a   case   and   examine   their   value   them   as   a   way   to   assess   and   provide  
explanation  to  the  case  study  that  would  benefit  the  literature  they  are  involved  
in.  Theory  testing  is  a  deductive  method,  which  means  that  it  tests  if  proposed  
hypothesized  causal  mechanisms  exist   in  a  case.  This  method  is  used  when  
there  are  previous  theories  presented  to  a  case,  but  a  researcher  is  uncertain  
whether  there  is  a  causal  mechanism  that  links  X  and  Y101.  
                                                                                                              
99  Ibid,  16.    
100  CDI,  “Applying  Process  Tracing  in  Five  Steps”,  Centre  for  Developing  Impact  (CDI)  
Practice  Paper  Annex  10,  2015,  p.  2,  accessed  March  24,  2016,  
http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/5997/CDIPracticePaper_10
_Annex.pdf;;jsessionid=DCEC4E165BDD65569C79A01EDDE154AC?sequence=2.  	  
101  Beach  and  Pedersen,  “What  is  Process  Tracing  is  actually  tracing?,”  7.    
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It   is   theory   centric,  which  means   that   it   can   be   of   help   to   other   case  
studies.  It  helps  researchers  eliminate  and  take  on  board  the  different  variables  
proposed  by  previous  studies  as  well  as  finding  new  alternative  explanations.  
This  variant  of  Process  Tracing  allows  us  to  test  the  validity  of  previous  theories  
made   on   the   case   study   and   have   the   opportunity   to   challenge   them   and  
produce  new  explanations  that  might  not  have  been  considered  yet.  One  of  the  
advantages  of  theory  testing  is  that  it  allows  us  to  use  a  mixed  method.  Mixed  
method  analysis  is  good  for  researchers  who  use  a  mix  of  both  case  specific  
and   general   causal  mechanisms   to   help   explain   the   case.   This   is   important  
because   it   makes   a   researcher’s   theory   applicable   for   multiple   cases   and  
beyond   a   single   case.   This   method   implies   a   structured   empirical   test   that  
identifies   if   there   is   a   hypothesized   causal   mechanism   exists   in   a   case’s  
evidence.   The   predicted  manifestations   are   then   checked   whether   they   are  
present  or  not  after  gathering  different  empirical  materials.    Depending  on  the  
evidence   gathered   (strong   or   weak),   a   researcher   can   then   infer   that   the  
hypothesized  causal  mechanism  is  present  or  not102.    
   The  difference  between  theory  building  and  testing  here  is  that,  in  theory  
testing,  theory  comes  first  before  the  gathering  of  evidence.  Researchers  make  
their   hypothesized   theories  and   then  an   in  depth   investigation   is   carried  out  
through   the   collection   and   analysis   of   empirical   data   and   evidence   to   test  
whether   the   theories   presented   are   actually   valid.   Theory-­testing  method   is  
mainly  used  when  researchers  are  aware  of  X  (the  cause)  and  know  (Y)  the  
outcome,  but  need  to   identify   the  causal   link  between  them  and  explain  why  
                                                                                                              
102  Andrew  Bennet,  “The  mother  of  all  “isms”:  Organizing  political  science  around  causal  
mechanisms,”  in  Ruth  Groff,  ed.  Revitalizing  causality:  realism  about  causality  in  philosophy  
and  social  science  (London:  Rutledge,  2008),  205-­219.    
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and  how  X  led  to  Y103.  Figure  2  bellow  illustrates  the  steps  that  a  researcher  
should  take  when  using  theory  testing  Process  Tracing.    
Figure  2.  Theory-­testing  Process  Tracing  104  
  
Note:  The  bold  lines=  the  inferences  made  in  theory-­testing  PT.    
Step  one  involves  the  conceptualization  of  causal  mechanisms  between  
X  and  Y  based  on  previous  theories.  This  is  done  to  test  that  if  hypothesized  
causal  mechanisms  were  present.  Step  two  then  involves  the  operationalization  
of   the   theorized   causal   mechanism.   This   means   translating   theoretical  
probabilities  into  case-­specific  predictions.  Step  three  is  completed  through  the  
collection  of  evidence  to  show  if  a)  the  hypothesized  mechanism  was  present  
b)   whether   if   it   went   as   expected   or   there   were   only   some   parts   of   the  
mechanisms  that  were  present.      
  
C.  Explaining  Outcome  Process  Tracing  
                                                                                                              
103  CDI,  “Applying  Process  Tracing  in  Five  Steps,”  2.  	  
104  Beach  and  Pedersen.  “What  is  Process  Tracing  is  actually  tracing?,”  10.    
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Explaining  outcome  Process  Tracing   is  a  method   that  aims   to  explain  
causes  of  a  particular  outcome105.  Unlike  theory  building  and  testing,  explaining  
outcome  is  used  mostly  for  case  specific  studies.  Although  explaining  outcome  
is  usually  used  in  history  studies,  it  is  believed  that  a  good  explaining  outcome  
Process  Tracing  will  have,  one  way  or  another,  theoretical  aims  that  allows  it  to  
be  useful  for  multiple  cases  outside  the  single  case106.    
Explaining   outcome   is   a   method   that   aims   at   establishing   causal  
mechanisms  to  try  and  build  a  plausible  explanation  of  an  outcome.  Another  
factor   that   distinguishes   this   variant   from   the   other   two   methods   is   that   a  
researcher  has  the  opportunity  to  choose  either  a  deductive  or  inductive  path.  
This  means   that   the   researcher   can   test   the   existing  mechanisms   from   the  
literature  and  establish  new  mechanisms  that  may  have  not  been  looked  at  to  
build   a   better   explanation.   However,   it   is   important   to   clarify   here   that   the  
researcher  is  following  a  ‘deductive’  method  where  he  aims  to  test  the  already  
existing  hypotheses  in  the  literature  to  better  explain  the  outcome  and  does  not  
attempt  to  establish  a  new  explanation  at  this  stage.  The  graph  below  is  very  
useful   for   readers   because   it   shows   the   steps   that   a   researcher   should   go  






                                                                                                              
105  Gerring,  John,  “Single-­Outcome  Studies:  A  Methodological  Primer,”  International  Sociology  
21,  no.  5  (2006):  707-­734.  
106  Beach  and  Pedersen.  “What  is  Process  Tracing  is  actually  tracing?,”  22.  
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Figure  3.  Explaining  Outcome  Process  Tracing107  
  
  
Explaining   Outcome   Process   Tracing   is   the  most   suitable  method   of  
Process   Tracing   for   this   research   case   study.   Unlike   Theory-­Building   and  
Theory-­Testing,  Explaining  Outcome  is  commonly  used  when  Y  (the  outcome)  
is  known  and  not  sure  what  X  (the  cause)   is  and  we  are  not  confirmed  what  
caused  Y108.  In  this  case,  we  know  the  outcome  (Turkish  openness  and  foreign  
policy   interests  towards  the  Middle  East  and  increasing  role),  but  we  are  not  
sure  yet  about  the  causes  of  such  outcome.  This  is  because  there  have  been  a  
number  of  attempts  to  explain  the  causes  that  led  to  this  outcome,  but  these  
were   highly   competitive   suggesting   different   answers.   Therefore,   the   thesis  
aims  to  examine  those  competing  explanations  and  assess  their  plausibility  in  
establishing  a  valid  causal  mechanism  that  effectively  explains  X  and  the  link  
between  X  and  Y  in  order  to  achieve  a  “minimally  sufficient  explanation”.  What’s  
                                                                                                              
107  Ibid,  25.    
  
108  CDI,  “Applying  Process  Tracing  in  Five  Steps,”  2.    
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more,   this  method  allows   the   researcher   to  eliminate  and   take  on  board   the  
different   hypotheses   in   an   attempt   to   arrive   at   the   most   comprehensive  
explanation.  The  Turkish   foreign  policy  case  study  can  be   regarded  as  both  
case-­specific  or  centric  and  also  suitable  for  establishing  causal  mechanisms  
that  can  be  useful  for  other  cases.    
Overall,  the  three  variants  presented  by  Beach  and  Pedersen  are  vital  to  
Process   Tracing   method   and   provide   useful   guidance   for   researchers  
depending  on  the  nature  of  the  case  they  are  focusing  on.  However,  this  is  not  
all  there  is  in  Process  Tracing.  After  locating  which  method  is  most  suitable,  the  
researcher  will  then  need  to  test  the  different  explanations  and  their  evidences  
in   his   analysis.   Testing   evidence   is   necessary   for   this   thesis   because   it  
minimizes  the  risk  of  having  too  many  confusing  data  that  may  or  may  not  be  
important   to   explain   the   outcome.   Therefore,   by   testing   the   validity   of   the  
different  explanations  presented  in  the  literature  on  Turkish  foreign  policy,  the  
researcher  will  eventually  reach  a  more  solid  conclusion.  While  using  Process  
Tracing,  the  researcher  will  test  the  proposed  explanations  using  a  number  of  
Process  Tracing  tests  of  inferences  designed  to  examine  the  validity  of  those  
explanations.   In  other  words,  Process  Tracing   tests  allows   the  researcher   to  
identify  the  most  convincing  theoretical  hypothesis  in  the  literature  that  present  
a  sufficient  explanation  of  the  causal  mechanism  that  can  also  clearly  explain  
link  between  X  (independent  variable)  and  Y  (Dependant  variable  or  outcome).  
Therefore,  the  following  section  will  analyse  in  greater  details  the  different  tests  
that  the  researcher  will  use  in  this  study.    
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2.3.1.	  Process	  Tracing	  Tests	  of	  Inferences	  	  	  
  
The  main  aim  of  Process  Tracing  is  to  evaluate  evidence  to  be  able  to  arrive  at  
a  valid  explanation.  Therefore,  at  the  heart  of  Process  Tracing  lays  the  empirical  
tests   presented   by   Stephen   Van   Evera   (1997)109.   Evera   presented   four  
important  tests  that  allow  researchers  to  deduct  and  add  evidence  to  reach  a  
conclusion.  Those  tests  consist  of  a  Straw   in   the  Wind  Test,  a  Hoop  Test,  a  
Smoking-­Gun   Test,   and   a  Doubly   Decisive   Test.   They   help   researchers   to  
confirm  and  eliminate  the  different  theories  that  attempt  to  give  answers  to  their  
cases.  Figure  4  below  shows  the  way  in  which  the  different  tests  are  carried  
out.    
Figure  4.  Originally  formulated  by  Stephen  Van  Evera  (1997)110
  
Bennet  (2010)  provided  an  interesting  table  that  showed  clearly  the  four  
different  tests  including  their  effects  on  other  rival  hypotheses.    This  table  was  
                                                                                                              
109  Van  Evera,  Guide  to  Methods  for  Students  of  Political  Science.    
110  Ibid,  31-­32.    
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however   built   on   categories   formulated   by   Van   Evera   (1997)   that   is   shown  
above.   However,   the   choice   of   which   test   a   researcher   should   use   for   a  
particular  piece  of  evidence  has  been  debated  in  this  field111.  The  decision  of  
choosing   a   test   depends   mainly   on   the   pieces   of   evidence   collected.   For  
example,   if   there   is   weak,   both   unnecessary   and   insufficient   evidence   for  
establishing  causation,  a  researcher  should  use  the  straw  in  the  wind  test,  while  
if  there  is  a  piece  of  evidence  that  is  both  necessary  and  sufficient  a  researcher  
should  then  be  using  the  doubly  decisive  test.  This  will  however  be  explained  
in  greater  details  in  the  below  sections.          




                                                                                                              
111  See  Freedman,  David  A.  Statistical  Models  and  Causal  Inference:  A  Dialogue  with  the  
Social  Sciences  (New  York:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2010).    
112  Bennett,  “Process  Tracing  and  Causal  Inference”,  207–2019.    
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1.  Straw  in  the  Wind  Test  involves  evidences  that  are  neither  sufficient  
nor  necessary   to  establish  causation.  This   test   represents  evidence  with   the  
least  demanding  standard  compared   to  other   tests,  where  evidence   is  much  
weaker  in  explaining  a  certain  case.  Therefore,  this  type  of  test  is  used  when  
there  are  weak  explanations  or  ones  that  do  not  explain  much  on  their  own.  If  
passed,  however  it  can  raise  the  validity  of  a  given  hypothesis,  but  at  the  same  
time,   failing  will   raise   considerable   doubts   about   it.   Passing   this   test   affirms  
relevance,  but  does  not  confirm  it.  On  the  other  hand,  failing  this  test  reduces  
the   level  of   relevance   to  a  given  hypothesis,  but  at   the  same  time,  does  not  
eliminate  it.  However,  we  have  to  acknowledge  that  passing  a  number  of  Straw  
in  the  Wind  tests  adds  up  to  the  importance  or  affirmative  evidence113.  As  we  
can  see  from  figure  5  in  the  table  above,  a  hypothesis  passing  this  test  will  only  
slightly  weaken  other  rival  explanations.  Furthermore,  failing  this  test  will  also  
only  slightly  strengthen  other  explanations.    
2.  Hoop  Test  includes  evidence  that  is  necessary,  but  not  sufficient  to  
establish   causation.   Evidence   for   this   test   set   a   more   demanding   standard  
compared   to  Straw   in   the  Wind.  Furthermore,   the  advantage  here   is   that  by  
failing   this   test   a   researcher   can   eliminate   an   explanation.   In   order   for   an  
explanation   to   remain  under  consideration,   it  must   “jump   through   the  hoop”.  
However,  passing  it  does  not  by  itself  add  much  importance  or  confidence  in  
that  explanation.  Passing  this  test  affirms  relevance  of  the  hypothesis,  but  does  
not  confirm  it.  The  implication  of  passing  this  test  will  somewhat  weakens  rival  
explanations.  On  the  other  hand,  if  an  explanation  fails  this  test,  it  will  somewhat  
strengthen  other  competing  explanations.  Therefore,  this  type  of  test  is  usually  
                                                                                                              
113  Collier,  “The  Teacher:  Understanding  Process  Tracing”,  826.  
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used  to  disqualify  other  rival  explanations114.  However,  we  can  still  draw  strong  
evidence  if  we  have  multiple  explanations  passing  this  test115.  This  test  is  best  
used  when  we  have  evidence  that  set  a  more  demanding  standard  compared  
to  the  evidence  used  in  the  straw  in  the  wind  test.    
3.   Smoking-­Gun   Test   is   best   used   when   an   explanation’s   evidence  
show  to  be  sufficient  but  not  necessary  to  establish  causation.    In  other  words,  
evidence  that  makes  great  sense,  but   is  not  necessary  at  all   times.  Smoking  
gun   test   involve   evidence   that   are   much   more   significant   and   set   a   more  
demanding  standard  than  the  ones  used  in  both  Straw  in  the  Wind  and  Hoop  
Tests.  As  shown  in  figure  4  and  5,  passing  this  test  confirms  a  given  hypothesis,  
while  failing  does  not  eliminate  it,  but  is  somewhat  weakened.  Therefore,  this  
test  is  mostly  used  to  confirm  a  hypothesis.  Moreover,  the  implication  of  passing  
this  test  is  that  it  will  substantially  weaken  alternative  ones,  and  if  it  fails,  it  will  
in  fact  somewhat  strengthen  rival  explanations.  Therefore,  the  smoking  gun  test  
plays   a   crucial   role   in   qualitative   research,   if   passed;;   it   will   confirm   a   given  
hypothesis  that  enables  researchers  to  reach  a  strong  conclusion.    
4.  Doubly  Decisive  Test   tends   to   involve  evidence   that  set   the  most  
demanding  standard  out  of  all.   It   involves  evidences  that  are  both  necessary  
and  sufficient.  This  type  of  test  is  very  important  because  it  allows  researchers  
to  confirm  their  hypotheses  and  totally  eliminate  others.  On  the  other  hand,  if  a  
hypothesis  fails  this  test,  it  will  be  eliminated  and  will  substantially  strengthen  
rival   ones.   Stephen   Van   Evera   (1997)   used   a   useful   example   of   a   camera  
recorder   in   a   bank,   which  makes   it   necessary   and   sufficient   to   show   if   the  
                                                                                                              
114  Bennet  and  Checkel,  “Process  Tracing:  From  Philosophical  roots”,  19.    
115  Mahoney,  James,  “The  Logic  of  Process  Tracing  Tests  in  the  Social  Sciences”,  
Sociological  Methods  and  Research  41,  no.  4  (2012)  7.    
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person  in  hand  matches  the  features  that  are  cached  in  the  camera  in  a  robbery  
situation116.  Therefore,  this  type  of  test  is  the  most  important  test  because  if  a  
hypothesized  theory  passes  this  test,  it  will  be  confirmed.  However,  it  is  argued  
that  passing  a  Doubly  Decisive  Test  is  highly  difficult  to  achieve  in  qualitative  
research  and  particularly  in  social  sciences117.    
Overall,  those  four  causal  inferences  tests  have  played  an  important  role  
in  the  field  of  Process  Tracing  and  have  been  increasingly  used.  In  this  thesis,  
the  researcher  will  use  those  four  tests  depending  on  the  evidence  available  to  
help  reach  a  solid  explanation.  The  choice  of  tests  for  the  different  explanations  
will  be  based  on  the  value  of  their  evidences  and  their  demanding  standards  as  
illustrated   above.   It   is   important   to   remind   the   reader   that   one   of   the   most  
important  methods  of  analysis  that  this  study  will  rely  on  in  testing  the  validity  
and  plausibility  of  existing  explanations  is  interview  data.  As  mentioned  above,  
interviews  are  conducted  with  both  professionals  and  experts  as  well  as  officials  
and  academics  highly  experienced  and  involved  in  this  field  of  study.  This  highly  
contributes  to  the  researcher’s  assessment  and  ease’s  the  process  of  using  the  
above  Process  Tracing  tests.  Therefore,  it  is  vital  to  highlight  that  it  is  not  about  
the  number  of  pieces  of  evidence  the  researcher  can  get,  but   it   is   in  fact  the  
value  of  the  evidence  found  as  well  in  relation  to  competing  explanations.    
Finally,   the  explanations   selected   in   this   thesis  will   be   tested   through  
Process  Tracing  tests  of  inferences.  However,  the  strategy  in  Process  Tracing  
is  not  to  make  each  explanation  go  through  all  four  tests  each  time,  but  instead  
select  the  right  test  for  each  explanation.  The  selection  of  tests  will  be  based  
on  the  value  and  significance  of  evidence  each  explanation  provide.  In  other  
                                                                                                              
116  Van  Evera,  Guide  to  Methods  for  Students  of  Political  Science,  31-­32.    
117  Collier,  “The  Teacher:  Understanding  Process  Tracing”,  827.  
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words,   the   researcher   must   first   analyse   the   significance   of   evidence,   their  
demanding   standards,   and   assess   their   necessity   and   sufficiency   in  
establishing  causation  and  affirming  causal  inference,  as  explained  in  figure  5.  
The  researcher  will  examine  the  different  data  collected  in  order  to  see  whether  
the  causal  process  each  explanation  represents  is  in  fact  evident  and  explains  
the  case  study.    
2.3.2.	  The	  4	  steps	  strategy	  in	  measuring	  and	  testing	  the	  value	  of	  
explanations	  chosen	  in	  this	  study	  
  
It   is   important   here   to   stress   that   through   analysing   the   explanations  
discussed  in  each  chapter,  the  researcher  develops  a  four  steps  strategy  in  the  
examination   of   each   explanation   to   complement   and   make   easier   the  
development  of  Process  Tracing  tests.    
1-­   The  first  step  will  be  an  illustration  and  exploration  of  the  nature  of  each  
explanation   (containing   several   studies).   This   includes   looking   at   the  
work   of   different   scholars   and   their   arguments   that   support   such  
explanation   and   analyzing   their   evidence   to   identify   their   possible  
strengths.  In  other  words,  the  aim  of  this  step  is  to  give  a  clear  idea  of  
the  nature  of  each  explanation,  who  the  main  scholars  are,  and  based  
on  what  evidence  they  defended  such  arguments.    
2-­   The   second   step   is   to   examine   available   empirical   data,   archival  
documents,  and  others   to  be  able   to   raise  critical  questions   that  such  
explanations   might   not   have   considered   or   looked   at.      Here   the  
researcher   will   develop   a   critical   engagement,   where   a   number   of  
questions  are  posed,  which  enables  the  researcher  to  identify  possible  
limitations  of  those  explanations.        
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3-­   The   third   step   will   analyse   possible   critics   of   those   explanations   and  
other  opposite  arguments  that  might  contest  them  to  highlight  possible  
weaknesses.   As   the   research   topic   engages   with   a   highly   debated  
literature,   it   would   be   crucial   to   identify   and   analyse   the   critics   other  
studies   have   made   against   others.   This   will   significantly   enable   the  
researcher   to   identify  possible   flaws  and  errors,  which  help  determine  
their  contributing  value.    
4-­   The   fourth  and   final   step  will   be  applying   interview  data  collected   (as  
illustrated  above).   Interviews   represent   one  of   the   central  methods  of  
data  collection  in  this  thesis,  from  the  fieldwork  of  this  study,  which  highly  
contribute   to   the   value   of   theoretical   assessment.   Interview   data   will  
enable  the  researcher  to  further  assess  the  sufficiency  and  necessity  of  
the   explanations   under   examination.   This   will   be   carried   out   through  
exploring  interviewees’  views  and  ideas  towards  such  explanations  and  
which  they  think  is  most  plausible.    
It  is  through  these  steps  that  the  researcher  will  be  able  to  assess  the  value  
of  each  explanation  and  both   its  necessity  and  sufficiency   in  establishing  
causation  that  can  completely  explain  the  causes  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  
change.  This  will  then  allow  the  researcher  to  appropriately  locate  the  type  
of  Process  Tracing  test  of  inferences,  as  illustrated  above,  for  each  of  the  












Since   the   AK   Party   (Justice   and   Development   Party)   took   power   in   2002,  
Turkey  had  witnessed  an  important  turning  point  in  its  history  and  foreign  policy.  
A   country   that   has   been   characterised   by   its   secular   system   and   Western  
values,  is  now  ruled  by  a  party  that  is  seen  as  an  Islamic  oriented  one  that  does  
not  fear  to  identify  itself  as  an  Islamic  and  Middle  Eastern  one.  Since  the  refusal  
to  allow  US  troops  to  use  Turkish  territories  in  its  war  against  Iraq  in  2003,  the  
adoption  of  pro-­active  foreign  policy  towards  the  Middle  East,  with  increasing  
mediation   role,   its   leadership   role   and   participation   in   international  
organisations  and  particularly   in  the  Organisation  of  Islamic  Conference,  and  
its   intense  democratic  efforts  and   improved   relations  with   its  Middle  Eastern  
neighbours,  more  increasing  attention  was  given  to  Turkish  politics  and  foreign  
policy118.   As   a   result,   Turkish   politics   and   foreign   policy   became   a   highly  
debated  topic  in  this  field119  and  one  that  brought  the  attention  of  many  Turkish  
and  non-­Turkish  scholars  and  analysts.  The  debate  brought  up  a  large  number  
of  works  that  attempted  to  explain  the  causes  of  such  foreign  policy  change  in  
attempts  to  provide  adequate  explanations.  Along  with  the  increasing  academic  
works,  a  number  of  questions  were  arising,  such  as  “Who  lost  Turkey?”120,  “Is  
                                                                                                              118  Kilic  Bugra  Kanat,  “Continuity  of  Change  in  Turkish  Foreign  Policy  Under  the  JDP  
Government:  The  Cases  of  Bilateral  Relations  with  Israel  and  Syria,”  Arab  Studies  Quarterly  
34,  no.  4  (2012):  230.    119  Kanat,  “Understanding  Changes  in  the  Foreign  Policy  of  Nations,”  219-­220.    120  Ibid.    
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Turkey   Turning   away   from   the   West?”121,   including   questions   over   AKP’s  
hidden  political  agendas122.    
   Furthermore,  the  debate  has,  to  an  extent,  divided  the  literature  into  two  
main  theoretical  debates,  Ideational  vs  Pragmatic  theoretical  interpretations  of  
Turkish  foreign  policy  change.  A  number  of  scholars  have  highlighted  this  divide  
and  illustrated  the  current  debate  in  the  literature123.  Other  events  that  caught  
the  attention  of   the  researcher  and  motivated  him  for  choosing   this  research  
topic,  which  also  brought   the  attention  of  many  more  analysts  and  scholars,  
was   after  witnessing   Turkey’s   relations  with   Israel   reach   its   lowest   point.   In  
December  2008  and  January  2009,  Israel  launched  an  offensive  in  the  Gaza  
Strip  killing  and  injuring  many  civilians124.  As  a  result,  the  Turkish  government  
reacted   in   an   unprecedentedly   way.   Turkey   announced   its   dismissal   of  
mediation  efforts  between  Israel  and  Syria125.  This  high  tension  between  Turkey  
and  Israel  was  not  witnessed  before.  Turkey  has  had  very  good  relations  with  
Israel   since   1948   and   was   able   to   develop   relations   in   different   levels   of  
cooperation126.  However,   the   deterioration   of   relations  went   further   after   the  
                                                                                                              121  Kilic  Bugra  Kanat,  “AK  Party’s  Foreign  Policy:  Is  Turkey  Turning  away  from  the  West?,”  
Insight  Turkey  12,  no.  1  (2010):  205-­225,  Cited  in  Kanat,  “Understabding  changes  in  Foreign  
Policy  of  nations,”  220.    122  Kanat,  “Understabding  Changes  in  Foreign  Policy  of  Nations,”  220.    123  Examples  of  Scholars  who  highlighted  those  theoretical  debates,  see  Ibrahim  Kalin,  
“Turkish  Foreign  Policy  between  Ideology  and  Realpolitik,”  Middle  East  Institute,  accessed  
April  9,  2016,  http://www.mei.edu/transcripts/turkish-­foreign-­policy-­between-­ideology-­and-­
realpolitik.  ;;  Bulent  Aras  Aylin  Gorener,  “National  role  Conceptions  and  Foreign  Policy  
Orientation:  The  Ideational  Bases  of  the  Justice  and  Development  Party’s  Foreign  Policy  
Activism  in  the  Middle  East,”  Journal  of  Balkan  and  Near  Eastern  Studies  12,  no.  1  (2010):  
73-­92;;  and  Nick  Danforth,  “Ideology  and  Pragmatism  in  Turkish  Foreign  Policy:  From  Ataturk  
to  the  AKP”,  Turkish  Policy  Quarterly,  7,  no.3  (2008):  83-­95.    124  BBC  News,  “Gaza  crisis:  key  maps  and  timeline,”  January  8,  2009,  accessed  October  2,  
2012,  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7812290.stm.    125  Nicholas  Kimbrell,  “Turkey  shelves  mediation  between  Syria,  Israel  over  Gaza,”  January  1,  
2009,  accessed  September  30,  2012,  
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/Jan/01/Turkey-­shelves-­mediation-­between-­Syria-­
Israel-­over-­Gaza.ashx#axzz28EN9BMip.    
126   Hasan   Kosebalaban,   “The   crisis   in   Turish-­Israeli   relations:   What   is   its   strategic  
significance?,”   accessed   October   10,   2012,   http://mepc.org/journal/middle-­east-­policy-­
archives/crisis-­turkish-­israeli-­relations-­what-­its-­strategic-­significance.    
72	  	  
Israeli  attack  on  Gaza  aid   flotilla,  which  made  Turkey  very  disappointed  and  
Prime   Minister   Recep   Tayyip   Erdogan   demanded   that   Israel   should   be  
punished  for  its  bloodshed127.  Such  deterioration  in  the  Turkish-­Israeli  relations  
raised   the   interests   of   many   in   exploring   transformations   in   Turkish   foreign  
policy.    
Moreover,  Turkish  foreign  policy  and  role  in  the  most  recent  and  biggest  
issue   in   the  Middle  East  and   the  Arab  World  known  as   the   “Arab  Spring”   is  
another  source  of  interest.  During  the  Arab  spring,  the  Turkish  role  was  of  great  
interest  because  Turkey  was  able  to  re-­adjust   its   foreign  policy  to  be  able  to  
deal  with  such  situation.  It  is  interesting  because  prior  to  the  Arab  revolutions,  
Turkey   was   able   to   build   a   more   cooperative   relation   with   many   of   the  
governments  who  recently  faced  popular  uprisings.  This  created  a  challenge  to  
the   Turkish   foreign   policy   approach   of   “Zero   Problems   with   Neighbours”  
because   all   efforts  made   could   go  wasted.  However,  most   interestingly,   the  
AKP  government  was  able  to  clarify  its  position  in  support  of  people’s  demands  
and  urged  for  genuine  reforms128.  Turkey  insisted  that  security,  prosperity,  and  
freedom   are   needed   for   all   Arabs   and   was   able   to   represent   itself   as   a  
successful   democratic   model   in   the   region129.   This   indeed   helps   develop  
Turkey’s  soft  power  and  influence.  On  the  other  hand,  some  argued  that  Turkey  
was  in  fact  reluctant  at  the  beginning  and  dealt  with  different  countries  facing  
                                                                                                              127  Ian  Traynor,  “Gaza  flotilla  raid  draws  furious  response  from  Turkey's  prime  minister,”  
accessed  October  8,  2012.  http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/01/gaza-­flotilla-­raid-­
turkey-­prime-­minister-­israel.    
128  Ibrahim  Kalin,  “Turkey  and  the  Arab  Spring,”  accessed  October  4,  2012,  
http://www.mei.edu/content/turkey-­and-­arab-­spring.    129  Adam  Balcer,  “Turkey  as  a  Source  of  Inspiration  for  the  Arab  Spring:  Opportunities  and  
Challenges,”  in  Stephen  Calleya  and  Monika  Wohlfeld,  eds.  Change  and  Opportunities  in  the  
Emerging  Mediterranean  (Mediterranean  Academy  of  Diplomatic  Studies,  2012).    
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revolutions   differently130.   For   example,   Turkey   had   a   great   amount   of  
investments  in  both  Libya  and  Syria  and  was  supporting  more  peaceful  reforms  
to   avoid   instability   that   could   affect   their   interests   heavily131.   Whereas,   in  
Tunisia  and  Egypt  Turkey  had  relatively  low  investment  levels,  she  was  able  to  
support  people’s  demands  from  the  start132.  The  Arab  spring  is  a  highly  critical  
period  of  time  for  the  Middle  East  and  particularly  will  reshape  the  nature  of  the  
region  in  the  coming  future.  However,  the  debate  on  Turkish  role  in  the  Arab  
spring  is  very  interesting  to  consider  in  this  thesis.  
In   addition,   the   Turkish   previous   Foreign   Minister   and   current   Prime  
Minister,  Professor  Ahmet  Davutoglu  is  another  source  of  interest  to  this  thesis  
because  he  has  been  an  important  driving  force  to  the  development  of  Turkey’s  
foreign   policy.   He   has   a   strong   presence   and   an   interesting   character,  
increasingly  recognized  as  the  “Architect  of  Turkish  foreign  policy”  for  the  last  
decade133.  He  published  a  number  of  articles  and  books  in  English  and  Turkish  
languages  and  was  also  able  to  translate  them  into  many  other  languages.  One  
of   his   most   inspiring   books   was   the  Strategic   Depth,   Turkey’s   international  
position,  (2000)134.  This  book  is  particularly  valuable  to  this  thesis  because  it  
explains  how  Turkey  has  a  multidimensional  value  in  world  politics  due  to  its  
                                                                                                              130  Ziya  Onis,  “Turkey  and  the  Arab  Spring:  Between  Ethics  and  Self  Interest,”  Insight  Turkey  
14,  no.3  (2012):  45-­63;;  and  Yasar  Yakis,  “Turkey  after  the  Arab  Spring:  Policy  Dilemmas,”  
Middle  East  Policy  Council  XXI,  no.  1  (2014),  accessed  March  24,  2016,  
http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-­east-­policy-­archives/turkey-­after-­arab-­spring-­policy-­
dilemmas.    131  Sebnem  Gumuscu,  “Turkey’s  reactions  to  the  Arab  spring,”  Yale  Journal,  accessed  
October  8,  2012.http://yalejournal.org/2012/05/turkeys-­reactions-­to-­the-­arab-­spring/.    132  Ibid.    
133  Eduard  Soler  i  Lecha,  “The  Conceptual  Architecture  of  Turkish  Foreign  Policy:  An  update  
in  light  of  regional  turbulence,”  CIDOB,  no.  18  (2011),  accessed  April  9,  2016  
http://www.cidob.org/content/download/32360/522105/file/DOCUMENTOS_WEB_MEDITERR
ANEO_18.pdf  ;;  and  MEE,  “Davutoglu:  architect  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  to  be  new  PM,”  
Middle  East  Eye,  accessed  April  9,  2016,  http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/davutoglu-­
architect-­turkish-­foreign-­policy-­be-­new-­pm-­2142298220.    134  Ahmet  Davutoglu,  Strategic  Depth:  Turkey's  International  Position  (Kure  Yayinlari,  2000).    
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historical  depth  and  geo-­strategic  location,  as  will  be  explained  further  in  bellow  
sections.   Furthermore,   Davutoglu   gave   several   lectures   and   talks   in   many  
different   international   institutions   and   universities   regarding   his   vision   of   the  
Turkish  foreign  policy  and  how  he  saw  the  future  success  of  Turkey  regionally  
and   globally.   Davutoglu  was   also   able   to   redirect   the   Turkish   foreign   policy  
through  the  introduction  of  the  so-­called  “Zero  Problems  with  Neighbours”  since  
he  was  appointed  as  Foreign  Minister  in  2009135.    
The  AKP  government  was  able  to  rethink  about  its  neighbours  and  the  
way  it  can  overcome  the  problems  that  were  left  by  previous  governments.  As  
a  result,  Turkey  was  able  to  confront  and  solve  many  of  her  problems  with  some  
of  her  neighbours  and  was  able  to  build  new  relations136.  One  interesting  talk  
that  Davutoglu  gave  on  Turkish  foreign  policy  and  relations  with  Europe,  in  the  
Institute   of   International   and   European   Affairs   on   11th   of   March   2010,   was  
particularly  useful.  He  was  able  to  articulate  his  vision  of  the  Turkish  role  in  the  
international  arena.  This  particular  talk  was  in  itself  very  motivating  for  me  to  try  
and  understand  the  source  of  influence  in  Turkey’s  foreign  policy.    He  stated,  
“The  new  image  of  Turkey  will  be  an  image  of  soft  power,  culturally  inclusive,  
economically  prosperous,  and  security  and  military  stability  providing”137.  As  a  
political   scientist   and   a   researcher,   such   critical   statement   by   the   foreign  
minister  enables  me  to  raise  questions  to  why  and  how  the  AKP  government  is  
behaving   in   such   a   pro-­active   attitude   in   the   Middle   Eastern   region   after  
                                                                                                              
135  Richard  Falk,  “Zero  problems  with  neighbors  revisited,”  accessed  October  7,  2012,  
http://www.sundayszaman.com/sunday/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=270478.  136  Turkey  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  “Policy  of  Zero  Problems  with  Neighbours,”  accessed  
October  4,  2012.    




Turkey’s  long  history  of  disengagement?  Therefore,  such  puzzle  is  the  source  
of   interest   to   this   thesis   as  well   as   a   justification   of   choosing   this   particular  
subject  of  analysis.      
In  the  search  for  understanding  about  Turkish  foreign  policy,  particularly  
its  recent  shift  towards  the  Middle  East,  this  thesis  pulls  from  and  builds  on  the  
work  from  two  major  sources  of  arenas;;  studies  on  Middle  East  Politics  and  its  
relations  with  Ottoman  and  post-­Ottoman  Turkey,  and  the  literature  on  Turkish  
politics  and  foreign  policy.    
This  thesis  aims  at  investigating  the  reasons  behind  the  recent  shift  of  
Turkish  foreign  policy  towards  the  Middle  East,  knowing  that  this  region  was  not  
of   high   interest   to   Turkey   since   its   post-­Ottoman   formation.   This   literature  
review  aims  at  identifying  key  authors  and  texts  that  focused  on  this  particular  
case  study  and  to  discuss  the  relevant  theoretical  framework  to  this  research  
question.  Moreover,  the  literature  review  will  engage  with  the  ongoing  debates  
and   extract   information   that   can   help   answer   the   research   question.   The  
materials   are   going   to   be   organised   thematically   in   order   to   simplify   the  
concepts  and  ideas  that  are  covered  in  this  dissertation.  The  materials  chosen  
in  this  review  were  selected  through  relevance  and  potential  contribution  to  this  
thesis.  Although   they  vary   in   terms  of   their  contribution   in  different  chapters,  
they  are  all  relevant  and  important  because  together  they  help  form  an  overall  
understanding  of  the  study  area.  The  thesis  and  literature  review  focus  on  six  
main  themes;;  1-­  Islamism  and  AKP  as  a  party  with  Islamist  roots;;  2-­  the  role  of  
identity   politics   and   change   of   elite   structures   as   domestic   sources;;   3-­   the  
concept  of  neo-­Ottomanism  and  its  influence  over  AKP’s  foreign  policy  agenda;;  
4-­  the  role  of  economic  interests  and  AKP’s  project  of  building  up  a  powerful  
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global  economy;;  5-­  the  role  of  security  concerns  and  national  security  interests  
particularly  regarding  the  Kurdish  problem  and  the  PKK;;  and  6-­  the  influence  of  
external   actors   mainly   the   European   Union,   and   the   effects   of   Turkish-­
European  integration  process  on  Turkish  foreign  policy  transformation.    
First  of  all,  in  understanding  the  historical  Turkish  foreign  policy  lack  of  
interest  in  the  Middle  East  by  Turkey  prior  to  2002,  a  number  of  important  texts  
were  useful  that  help  build  a  historical  background,  which  will  be  a  central  theme  
in  the  next  chapter  3.  An  old,  but  influential  book  that  looked  at  the  history  of  
the  republic  of  Turkey  in  this  literature  was  Kemalist  Turkey  and  the  Middle  East  
by  Karl  Kruger  (1932)138.  The  author  explained  how  Turkey  became  a  republic  
and  the  main  role  of  Mustapha  Kemal  Ataturk.  He  was  also  able   to   illustrate  
how  the  new  nationalism  came  to  replace  pan-­Islamism.  The  author  showed  
how  Ataturk  changed  Turkey  in  its  political,  economic,  educational,  and  cultural  
aspects.  This  book  is  useful  as  a  way  to  introduce  and  give  a  background  on  
which   principles   the   new   Turkish   republic   was   formed.   This   enables   us   to  
understand   the   foundation   of   the  Kemalist   stance   in   Turkey   and   its   level   of  
influence.  What  is  more,  Philip  Robins  (1991)  in  his  work  Turkey  and  the  Middle  
East   illustrates   some   of   the   most   important   points   to   why   Turkey   was   not  
involved  as  much  in  the  Middle  East  since  the  end  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  until  
early  1990s139.  Philip  argued  that  there  has  been  a  “noticeable  lack  of  scholarly  
research  on  Turkey”140.  The  author  argued  that  although  there  has  been  a  lack  
of  interest  in  the  Middle  East  compared  to  Europe,  the  Middle  East  was  still  an  
important   region   for   Turkey.   He   stated   that   it   is   unjustifiable   that   all  
                                                                                                              138  Kruger,  Karl,  Kemalist  Turkey  and  the  Middle  East  (London:  Allen  &  Unwin,  1932).  139  Philip  Robins,  Turkey  and  the  Middle  East  (London:  The  Royal  Institute  of  International  
Affairs,  1991).    140  Ibid,  1.  
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Europeanists,  Sovietologists  and  Arabists   ignored  such  state.  He  added   that  
even   in  Turkey   itself,  academics  did  not  give  much  attention   to  such   foreign  
policy   direction,   which   reflects   the   Kemalist   view   of   Turkey’s   foreign   policy  
priorities.  Philip’s  work  aimed  to  counter  the  argument  that  Turkey’s  relations  
with  the  Middle  East  are  not  important  and  that  Turkey  played  an  important  role  
in  different  events  in  the  region  such  as  the  Iran-­Iraq  war  and  the  Gulf  war  as  
well  as  the  issue  of  Kurds  and  the  spread  of  Islamism.    
Philip  produced  another  book  in  2003  known  as  Turkish  foreign  policy  
since   the   Cold  War:   Suits   and   Uniforms141.   This   book   focuses   on   Turkey’s  
foreign  policy  issues  since  the  Cold  War.  The  author  looked  at  the  way  in  which  
Turkish  foreign  policy  is  affected  by  the  changing  international  system  around  
it  and  included  the  domestic  motivators  of  Turkish  foreign  policy.  Although  this  
book  was  produced  in  2003,  it  tends  to  focus  on  Turkey  during  the  1990’s.  Alon  
Liel  (2001)  in  his  work  Turkey  in  the  Middle  East:  Oil,  Islam,  and  Politics  focused  
on  Turkey’s  relations  with  the  Middle  East  and  particularly  with  Israel142.  The  
author  tends  to  also  look  at  the  economic  side  of  the  story  in  Turkey’s  relations  
with   the  Middle   East.   This   book   is   concerned  with   Turkey’s  Middle   Eastern  
policies  during  1970-­2000.  Another  book  that  can  help  identify  the  way  in  which  
Turkey’s   foreign  policy  was  prior   to   the  AKP  government   is  Turkish  Foreign  
Policy:  New  Prospects  by  Clement  Dodd  (1992)143.  Particularly  the  chapter  by  
Andrew  Mango  Turkish  policy  in  the  Middle  East:  Turning  danger  to  profit  was  
able  to  give  a  clear  picture  on  how  Turkey  regarded  the  region.  He  stated,  “The  
                                                                                                              141  Philip  Robins,  Turkish  foreign  policy  since  the  Cold  War:  Suits  and  Uniforms  (London:  C.  
Hurst  &  Co.  Publishers  Ltd,  2003).      
142  Aon  Liel,  Turkey  in  the  Middle  East:  Oil,  Islam,  and  Politics  (London:  Lynne  Rienner  
Publishers,  2001).    143  Clement  Dodd,  eds.,  Turkish  Foreign  Policy:  New  Prospects  (Huntingdon:  Eothen,  1992).    
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founding   fathers   of   the   Turkish   republic   believed   that,   in   its   last   phase,   the  
Ottoman  Empire  has  expended  to  no  good  purpose  the  human  and  material  
resources   of   Anatolia   in   the   lands   inhabited   by   the   Arabs.   They   were  
determined  not   to   repeat   the  mistake”144.  The  chapter   further   illustrated  how  
Turkey  found  it  more  important  to  develop  relations  with  the  West.  Although  this  
book  is  outdated,  it  allows  us  to  understand  the  historical  Turkish  prospect  of  
the  Middle  East.    
A  key  text  that  contributes  to  this  thesis  is  Turkey’s  Foreign  Policy  in  the  
21st  Century:  A  changing  Role  in  World  Politics,  by  Tareq  Y.  Ismael  and  Mustafa  
Aydin  (eds.)  (2003).  This  piece  of  work  is  important  because  it  offers  an  analysis  
of  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  not  only  towards  the  Middle  East,  but  also  to  other  
directions145.  This  book  offers  very  relevant  chapters  to  this  particular  research  
area,   such   as   “Turkey   and   the   West”   and   “Turkey   and   its   neighbours”.   It  
explains   the  nature  of  Turkey’s  relations  with   the  West  and  most   importantly  
Europe,  particularly  regarding  the  EU  membership.  On  the  other  hand,  it  also  
focuses   on   the   regional   political   nature   and   how   this   had   affected   Turkey’s  
involvement  with  its  neighbours,  particularly  after  9/11.  Therefore,  this  book  will  
contribute   to   the   analysis   and   understanding   of   Turkey’s   foreign   policy,  
particularly  in  the  21st  century.  Furthermore,  another  book  by  Barry  Rubin  et  al.  
(2002),  Turkey  in  World  Politics:  an  emerging  multiregional  power,  also  tend  to  
cover  different  Turkish  foreign  policy  issues  in  a  number  of  chapters  including  
the  Middle  East146.  The  most  relevant  was  “The  future  of  Turkish  policy  toward  
                                                                                                              144  Ibid,  58.    145  Tareq  Ismael  and  Mustafa  Aydin,  eds.,  Turkey’s  Foreign  Policy  in  the  21st  Century:  A  
Changing  Role  in  World  Politics  (Aldershot:  Ashgate,  2003).    146    Barry  Rubin,  et  al.  Turkey  in  world  politics:  an  emerging  multiregional  power  (Bogazici  
University  Foundation,  2002).    
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the   Middle   East”   by   Kemal   Kirisci147.   The   author   argued   that   although  
historically  the  Middle  East  was  not  of  high  priority,  Turkey  played  an  indirect  
role  in  assisting  Western  efforts  to  deny  the  Middle  East  to  the  Soviet  Union148.  
The  author  also  covered  the  security  challenges  that  Turkey  had  to  face  with  
the  Middle  East,  particularly  with  the  Kurdish  PKK  issue.    
Furthermore,   Sedat   Laciner   (2001)   in   his   work   From   Kemalism   to  
Ozalism,   the   Ideological   Evolution   of   Turkish   Foreign   Policy,   one   of   the  
contributing  works  to  the  historical  Turkish  foreign  policy  analysis  in  chapter  3,  
argued  that  there  have  been  a  number  of  ideological  developments  in  Turkish  
foreign  policy  starting  from  Kemalist  isolationism  to  Ozalist  neo-­Ottomanism149.  
Laciner   illustrated   that   Turkish   foreign   policy   cannot   be   explained   by   only  
looking  at  Kemalism.  He  stated,  “Turkish  foreign  policy  has  not  demonstrated  a  
unbroken  continuity  and  that  drastic  changes  in  Turkish  foreign  policy  positions  
cannot   be   explained   simply   by   looking   to   the   Kemalist   model”150.   Laciner  
provided  a  useful  critical  analysis  of  the  development  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  
during  different  periods  of  history.  This  included  the  formation  of  the  Kemalist  
identity  and  state,  which  was  highly  reflected  in  its  isolationist  foreign  policy;;  the  
neutrality  and  cautious  policy  during  the  Second  World  War;;  the  pro-­western  
position  particularly  in  the  Cold  War  period;;  and  the  post-­Col  War  developments  
and  role  of  Turgut  Ozal  in  revolutionising  Turkish  foreign  policy.  Laciner’s  work  
is  important,  but  will  be  useful  for  the  historical  background  part  of  this  research  
                                                                                                              147  Kemal  Kirisci,  “The  future  of  Turkish  policy  toward  the  Middle  East,”  in  Rubin  B.,  et  al.  
Turkey  in  world  politics:  an  emerging  multiregional  power    (Bogazici  University  Foundation,  
2002).    148  Ibid,  122.    149	  Sedat  Laciner,  “From  Kemalism  to  Ozalism,  The  Ideological  Evolution  of  Turkish  Foreign  
Policy”  (PhD  thesis,  Kings  College,  University  of  London,  2001).  	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as  his  work  focused  on  the  periods  of  Kemal  Ataturk  and  Turgut  Ozal  mainly  
from  early  1920s  to  early  1990s.    
Moreover,  Brian  Beeley  (2002)  presented  several  important  points  that  
need  to  be  considered  when  analysing  Turkey’s  Foreign  policy151.  His  work  on  
Turkish   Transformation:   new   century,   new   challenges   presented   important  
contributions   from  different  professionals  and  academics.  The  book   tends   to  
focus  on  the  different  domestic  and  international  challenges  that  are  facing  the  
republic   at   the   start   of   a   new   millennium.   Although   other   key   texts   have  
represented  different  external  challenges  to  Turkey,  this  book’s  high  importance  
to  this  thesis  comes  from  its  analysis  of  the  internal  challenges.  These  include  
the  problem  of  identity,  the  issue  of  minorities,  views  over  Islam,  and  the  role  of  
Women.  Therefore,  it  would  be  very  useful  to  analyse  those  domestic  issues  
and  particularly  to  examine  their  effects  on  Turkey’s  foreign  policy.  Therefore,  
the   books   mentioned   above   will   not   be   of   great   importance   to   this   thesis  
outcome.   However,   they   can   be   very   useful   as   a   way   to   understand   the  
historical  background  of  Turkey’s   relations  with   its  neighbouring  Arab  states.  
Such  works  will  be  beneficial  particularly  for  the  coming  chapter  3,  which  aims  
to  illustrate  the  nature  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  before  and  after  2002.    
One  of  the  most  important  and  popular  themes  in  the  literature  on  recent  
Turkish  foreign  policy,  which  can  be  placed  under  the  “ideational”   theoretical  
mainstream   as   mentioned   above,   is   the   role   of   political   Islam   and   AKP’s  
“Islamist”  ideology  in  changing  the  course  of  Turkish  foreign  policy.  Since  the  
AKP   took   power   and   ruled   Turkey,   many   scholars   viewed   the   AKP   and   its  
policies  with  great  suspicion.  The  level  of  suspicions  varied  depending  on  how  
                                                                                                              151  Brian  Beeley,  et  al.  Turkish  Transformation:  new  century,  new  challenges  (The  Eothen  
Press:  England,  2002).    
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each   scholar   and   analyst   viewed   the   AKP   and   its   founding   members.   For  
example,  Soner  Cagaptay  (2006)  in  his  work  Preventing  Turkey’s  Popular  Slide  
Away  from  the  West  argued  that  Turkey  was  actually  moving  away  from  the  
West  and  its  traditional  Western  allies  and  moving  closer  to  the  Middle  East  and  
the  Islamic  World152.  Cagaptay  argued  that  Turkey  under  the  AKP  has  moved  
closer  and  built  ties  with  “anti-­Western”  governments  and  groups  such  as  Iran  
and   Hamas.   He   further   argued   that   more   anti-­European   sentiments   were  
witnessed  and  there  are  clear  signs  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  disengagement  
with   its   Western   allies   during   the   AKP   government.   Moreover,   Ihsan   Dagi  
(2008)  argued  that  the  AKP  founding  members  “have  emerged  from  the  cadres  
of   the   first   organized   political   representative   of   Islamism   in   Turkish   politics,  
known  as   the   ‘National  view  movement’   led  by  Necmettin  Erbakan”153.  On  a  
different   paper,   Soner   Cagaptay   (2009)   argued   that   the   AKP   is   an   Islamist  
political  party  due  to   its  members’  experiences  in  previous  Islamist  parties   in  
Turkey  and   therefore   it   is   not   surprising   to   see   such   shift   in  Turkish   foreign  
policy  interests  towards  the  East,  the  Muslim  world,  and  particularly  the  Middle  
East154.    
Similarly,  Zia  Onis  and  Suhnaz  Yilmaz   (2009)   in   their  article  Between  
Europeanization  and  Euro-­Asianism:  Foreign  Policy  Activism  in  Turkey  during  
the  AKP  era  suggested  that  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  during  the  AKP  era  have  
                                                                                                              152  Soner  Cagaptay,  “Preventing  Turkey’s  Popular  Slide  Away  from  the  West,”  Policy  Watch  
1093,  April  2006,  accessed  April  9,  2016,  http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-­
analysis/view/preventing-­turkeys-­popular-­slide-­away-­from-­the-­west.    153	  hsan  Dagi,  "Turkey’s  AKP  in  Power,"  Journal  of  Democracy  19,  no.  3  (2008):  25-­26,  
accessed  22  September  2015,  
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v019/19.3.dagi.html.    154  Soner  Cagaptay,  “Is  Turkey  Leaving  the  West?”,  Foreign  Affairs,  October  26,  2009,  
accessed  October  10,  2015,  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2009-­10-­26/turkey-­
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witnessed  a  major  change155.  They  argued  that  although  in  the  early  years  of  
AKP  government  there  was  a  noticeable  strong  emphasize  on  Europeanization,  
however  this  was  later  changed.  They  stated,  “The  discontinuity  is  marked  by  
a  shift  from  a  commitment  to  deep  Europeanization  to  loose  Europeanization  
and  a  simultaneous  shift  to  soft  Euro-­asianism”156.  On  the  other  hand,  Valeria  
Giannotta  (2010)  in  her  paper  Is  Turkey  turning  its  face  from  the  West?  argued  
that  although  Turkey  is  becoming  more  involved  with  the  Middle  East,  it  does  
not  necessarily  mean  that  she  is  turning  away  from  the  West157.  She  stated,  “To  
be  a  proactive   regional  and  global  player  Ankara   increases   its   relations  with  
neighbouring  areas  and  widens  its  perspectives  without  moving  away  from  the  
West”158.  Similarly,  Graham  E.  Fuller  (2008)  The  new  Turkish  Republic:  Turkey  
as  a  pivotal  state  in  the  Muslim  world  is  vital159.  The  author  compared  Turkey’s  
foreign  policy  between   its  early  creation   to  early  21st   century  and   the   recent  
years  particularly  since  2004.  He  argued  that  Turkey  is  trying  to  reconnect  itself  
with   the   Middle   East   after   turning   its   back   for   a   long   period   of   time.   Most  
interestingly,   in   his   chapter   six   “The  Re-­emergence  of  Turkish   Islam”160,   the  
author  argued  that  the  AKP  was  successful  because  it  did  not  ignore  the  EU  
and  the  West,  but  instead,  it  expanded  its  foreign  role  to  the  Muslim  world.  Such  
information   is   vital   because   it   helps   understand   the   way   in   which   the   AKP  
balances  its  foreign  policy  between  the  East  and  the  West.  This  will  also  tell  us  
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more   about   the   AKP’s   foreign   policy   goals.   Therefore,   engaging   with   such  
debate  will  be  of  great  importance  to  this  thesis  and  its  examination.    
A  very  important  piece  of  work  presented  by  Svante  E.  Cornell  (2012)  
titled  Changes  in  Turkey:  What  drives  Turkish  Foreign  Policy?  He  argued  that  
the  role  of  Turkey  in  the  Middle  East  has  been  much  greater  particularly  in  the  
second   term   of   the   AKP   government161.   This   was   added   by   explaining   the  
AKP’s  ambition  towards  the  Islamic  World  and  how  the  AKP  is  determined  to  
increase   its   regional   role   especially   when   the   author   referred   to   Erdogan’s  
speech   in   the   victory   of   his   third   term.      The   author   illustrated   the   AKP’s  
international   aim   stating   “By   2023,   the   republic’s   centennial,   the   AKP   has  
promised  Turkey  will  be  among  the  world’s  ten  leading  powers”162.  Such  works  
contribute   to   the   thesis   because   they   help   us   draw   very   useful   insights.  
Therefore,   it   is  critical   to  consider   the  notion   that  Turkey’s   recent  shift  or   re-­
engagement  with  the  Middle  East  was  a  result  of  AKP’s  Islamist  outlook  and  
pro-­Islamic  lenience.    
This  will   however   be   further   critically   examined   in   this   thesis   in   order  
understand   whether   such   claims   do   represent   a   useful   explanation   or   not,  
especially   that   there   are   many   other   scholars   who   disagree   with   such  
arguments.   For   example,   other   scholars   think   the   AKP   as   party   serving  
Turkey’s  national  interests  just  like  any  other  state  seeking  to  maximize  its  gains  
and   benefits.   An   interesting   peace   of  work   that   shows   how  Turkey   became  
much  closer  to  the  Middle  East  and  how  the  AKP  affected  such  foreign  policy  
was   by   Nikolaos   Raptopoulos   (2004).   In   his   work   Rediscovering   its   Arab  
                                                                                                              161  Svante  Cornell,  “Changes  in  Turkey:  What  drives  Turkish  foreign  policy?  Changes  in  
Turkey,”  Middle  East  Quarterly  19,  no.  1,  (2012):  13-­24.    162  Ibid,  13.    
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neighbours?  The  AKP  imprint  on  Turkish  Foreign  Policy  in  the  Middle  East163,  
the  author  argued  that  Turkey  is  currently  following  a  distinct  foreign  policy  that  
serves   its  national   interest  and  that  Turkey  under   the  AKP  has  expanded   its  
benefits  from  its  neighbouring  Arab  states  as  a  way  to  fulfil  its  national  interests  
in   the   region.   Turkey’s   opening   doors   to   the   Middle   East   can   be   seen   as  
beneficial  both  politically  and  economically.  Such  work  is  important  because  it  
explains  not  only  the  AKP’s  role,  but  also  considers  Turkey’s  national  interests.  
Furthermore,  Ayse  Zarakol  (2011)  in  his  work  Turkish  Foreign  Policy  in  
the  AKP’s  Third  Term  provided  a  similar  argument  that  focused  on  the  AKP’s  
third   term  and  suggested   that  Turkey’s   foreign  policy   is   facing  more   towards  
other  parts  of  the  world  and  mainly  its  neighbouring  Middle  East164.  He  added  
that  the  AKP’s  second  and  third  term  is  “marked  by  an  ambitious  foreign  policy  
that   drifted   away   from   Turkey’s   traditional   partnerships   with   the   West   and  
toward  the  betterment  of  relations  with  regions  previously  neglected  by  Turkey,  
such  as   the  Middle  East,  North  Africa,   and  Eurasia”165.   Furthermore,  Hakan  
Yavuz  (2006)  in  his  book  The  Emergence  of  a  New  Turkey:  Democracy  and  the  
AK  Party  regarded  the  period  under  the  AK  Party  as  a  new  Turkey166.  This  book  
describes  the  economic,  social,  and  historical  background  of  the  ruling  party.  It  
also   covers   how   neo-­liberal   economic   policies   affected   Turkey.   The   book  
further  looks  at  the  roles  of  both  internal  and  external  factors  that  played  key  
roles  in  the  transformation  of  political  Islam.  This  book  will  be  of  great  interest  
                                                                                                              163  Nicolaos  Raptopoulos,  “Rediscovering  its  Arab  neighbours?  The  AKP  imprint  on  Turkish  
Foreign  Policy  in  the  Middle  East”  Les  Cahiers  du  RMES,  2004,  accessed  April  12,  2016,  
http://www.rmes.be/1-­NR1.pdf  .    
  
164  Aysse  Zarakol,  “Turkish  Foreign  Policy  in  the  AKP’s  Third  Term”  PONARS  Eurasia  Policy  
Memo,  no.  189,  (2011):  1-­5.    
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to  my  thesis  as  it  helps  explore  the  nature  of  the  AKP  and  its  founding  members  
in  an  attempt  to  draw  attention  to  their  religious  and  political  experiences.    
Another  important  theme  of  analysis  in  this  thesis  is  the  role  of  AKP  new  
ideas  and  ‘soft  power’  foreign  policy  approach,  which  is  a  term,  referred  to  when  
describing   Turkey’s   recent   role   in   the   Middle   East.   Therefore,   the   work  
presented  by  Nicholas  Danforth   (2010),   Ideology  and  Pragmatism   in  Turkish  
Foreign  Policy:  From  Ataturk  to  the  AKP,  is  particularly  interesting  because  it  
investigates  the  role  of  ideas  and  ideology  in  Turkey’s  foreign  policy,  which  will  
eventually   contribute   to   answering   the   thesis   question167.   The   author  
contributes  by  arguing,  “In  formulating  their  approaches  toward  Europe  and  the  
Middle  East,  Turkish   leaders  have  seldom  been  influenced  by  the   ideologies  
that   determine   their   domestic   politics”168.   He   also   suggested   that   Ataturk’s  
disengagement  and  AKP’s   re-­engagement  with   the  Middle  East  were  simply  
“practical  responses  to  strategic  realities”.  Such  argument  is  vital  to  consider  in  
the  analysis  to  try  and  develop  a  bigger  picture  to  understand  the  ideological  
nature   of   the   AKP   and   the   role   of   such   ideas   in   Turkish   foreign   policy  
transformation.    
Furthermore,  an  interesting  piece  of  work  by  Bulent  Aras  (2009)  Turkey’s  
rise  in  the  greater  Middle  East:  peace-­building  in  the  periphery  was  useful169.  
Aras   argued   that   Turkey   has   been   playing   an   important   peacemaker   in   the  
periphery   and   that   both   the  US  and  EU  are   becoming  more   appreciative   of  
Turkey’s  efforts  in  the  region.  The  most  important  roles  that  the  author  focused  
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on  were  Turkey’s  mediation  efforts   in   Iraq  and  between  Syria  and  Israel.  He  
argued  that   the  domestic   transformation   in  Turkey  and   its  new  foreign  policy  
vision   is   behind   its   emergence   as   a   peacemaker.   He   added,   “In   this  
environment  of  pluralism  in  foreign  policy-­making,  Turkey  has  acquired  a  new  
foreign  policy   identity,  which  led  to  the  emergence  of  a  self-­  confident,  multi-­
dimensional  and  dynamic  foreign  policy  approach”170.  Bulent’s  work   is  useful  
because  it  tends  to  explore  the  Turkish  role  in  the  region  as  well  as  investigating  
the  reason  behind  it.  The  argument  represented  by  Bulent  is  helpful  for  us  to  
take   into   account   domestic   transformations   when   analyzing   the   sources   of  
change  in  Turkey’s  foreign  policy.    
Another  book  that  discusses  some  of  the  AKP  domestic  influence  and  
ideology  practice  is  Torn  Country:  Turkey  between  Secularism  and  Islamism  by  
Zeyno  Baran  (2010)171.  The  author   illustrated   the  way   in  which   the  AKP  has  
been  practicing   its   internal  politics  and  how   it  affected  Turkey.  However,   the  
most  interesting  part  of  this  work  was  about  the  role  of  media  in  presenting  the  
AKP’s   ideology.   The   author   illustrated   that   the   AKP   created   its   own  media  
outlets  and  was  able  to  embark  its  ideology  and  build  an  image  that  serves  its  
interests.   Furthermore,   the   author   was   able   to   explore   the   AKP’s   economic  
success.  Turkey’s  economy  was  in  great  growth  for  the  last  number  of  years  
and  this  is  granted  to  the  AKP.  Such  economic  success  plays  a  role  in  AKP’s  
overall   success   and   influence   in   Turkey.   This   work   is   important,   as   it   will  
contribute   to   the   thesis   analysis   when   thinking   about   the   AKP’s   behaviour  
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internally  and  the  tools  this  government   is  using  to  expand  its  popularity  and  
success,  which  at  the  same  time  reflects  on  its  external  behaviour  as  well.        
The   work   by   Soner   Cagaptay   (2006),   Islam,   Secularism,   and  
Nationalism  in  modern  Turkey:  who  is  a  Turk?  Is  particularly  interesting  as  the  
author  tends  to  use  a  comparative  research  on  policies  regarding  citizenship  
and  ethnicity  in  mixed  ethnic  and  religious  states  including  Turkey172.  Cagaptay  
provided  a  close  examination  of  the  role  of  religion  in  shaping  Turkish  national  
identity.  He  argued  that  the  previous  Ottoman  “Millet  System”  contributed  to  the  
division  of  Turkish  society,  affecting  their  later  views  of  nationalism  and  national  
identity.  This  book   is   important   to  consider  when   thinking  about   religion  and  
ethnicity  in  Turkey  and  how  this  would  affect  its  foreign  policy  making.    
Similarly,  Ann  Dismorr   (2008)   in   his   work  Turkey   Decoded      tends   to  
question  the  nature  of  Turkish  Identity  since  the  creation  of  the  Turkish  republic  
by  Kemal  Ataturk  and   the  possible  challenges   that  an   Islamist  party   like   the  
AKP  might  pose  to  such  identity173.  This  book  tends  to  question  the  democratic  
nature  of  Turkey  and  the  role  of  the  AKP  in  it,  as  well  as  the  way  in  which  Turkey  
could   become   a  model   to   its   neighbouring   Arab   countries.   The   author   also  
covers  other  foreign  policy  issues,  such  as  the  EU  and  the  US,  Israel,  and  other  
Arab   states.  Regarding   the  Middle   East,   the   author   argued   that   there   is   an  
obvious  proactive  position  on  Middle  Eastern  policy  by   the  AKP.  He  added,  
“Turkey’s  Middle  Eastern  policy  has  become  increasingly  ambitious  and  high  
profile”174.  This  is  a  very  interesting  textbook  because  the  author  was  a  former  
Swedish  Ambassador  to  Turkey  and  who  visited  some  of  its  Arab  neighbours.  
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Such  experience  added  to  the  importance  of  his  work.  Although  this  book  tends  
to  tackle  a  number  of   issues,  there  are  some  important  parts  covered  by  the  
author,  particularly  the  Turkish  Middle  Eastern  policy.      
Moreover,  a  number  of  scholars  have  highlighted  the  key  role  of  identity  
in   foreign   policy   making.   For   example,   Hasan   Kosebalaban,   a   prominent  
Turkish   scholar,   who   presented   a   very   interesting   study   on  Turkish   Foreign  
Policy:   Islam,   Nationalism,   and   Globalization   (2011).   Influenced   by  
constructivist  theoretical  framework  of  International  Relations,  he  explored  how  
Turkey’s  competing  national   identities  had  a  major   impact  on  Turkish  foreign  
policy   making175.   The   study   covers   the   historical   Turkish   foreign   policy  
development   and   the   different   national   identities   that   played   a   role   in   such  
development.   Kosebalaban   argued   that   four   main   national   identity   groups;;  
Secular   Nationalists;;   Islamic   Nationalists;;   Secular   Liberalists;;   and   Islamic  
Liberalists  have  historically  shaped  Turkish  politics  and  foreign  policy.  However,  
Kosebalaban   Locates   the   AKP   under   the   Islamic   Liberalist   identity   group,  
arguing  that  this  is  due  to  their  assertive  globalist  foreign  policy  and  the  AKP  
government’s  interest  in  the  integration  with  Europe  as  well  as  the  increase  of  
interest   in   neighbouring   countries.   His   main   argument   was   that   different  
contesting   national   identity   groups   in   Turkish  modern   history   have   played   a  
central   role   in   shaping   Turkish   foreign   policy.   Kosebalaban’s   work   is   very  
interesting   and   useful   in   minimizing   the   struggle   for   researchers   in  
understanding  the  role  of  national  identity  and  the  different  types  that  exist  in  
Turkey.    
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Similarly,  Yucel  Bozdaglioglu  (2003)  in  his  book  Turkish  Foreign  Policy  
and   Turkish   Identity:   A   Constructivist   Approach   argued   that   Turkish   foreign  
policy  has  been  shaped  by  national  identity.  For  example,  the  Turkish  Western  
identity,  since   the  years  after   the  War  of   Independence,  has  been   the  major  
character   of   the   republic’s   foreign   policy   dimension176.   His   work   further  
analyses  the  important  roles  of  Islamic,  National,  and  Western  conceptions  in  
Turkish   domestic   politics,   criticizing   the   rational-­choice   analysis   by   some  
scholars  in  the  literature177.  Bozdaglioglu  suggests  that  Turkish  foreign  policy  
clearly  depends  on  the  distribution  of  power  between  Secularists  and  Islamists.    
Moreover,   Enver   Gulseven’s   work   on   Identity   Security   and   Turkish  
Foreign  Policy  in  the  Post  Cold  War  Period:  Relations  with  the  EU,  Greece  and  
the   Middle   East   is   particularly   interesting178.   Enver’s   work   offered   a   critical  
analysis  and  argued  that  the  literature  has  been  largely  dominated  by  rationalist  
interpretations.   He   stated,   “Most   scholars   approached   the   issue   from   a  
rationalist   perspective   by   fixing   security   as   the   main   foreign   policy   goal   of  
Turkey   and   focusing   merely   on   external   structural   imperatives   as   the   main  
determinant  of  Turkish  foreign  policy.  Only  a  small  share  of  research  in  this  area  
dealt  with  the  impact  of  identity  and  domestic  factors.”179  Enver’s  work  aimed  at  
developing  an  analysis  that  can  find  links  between  Turkish  identity  and  foreign  
policy  preferences.  He  argued  that  identity  has  a  direct  relationship  with  Turkish  
political   interests  and  foreign  policy.  Enver  used  the  constructivist   theoretical  
interpretation   in  his  analysis  and  argued   that   it   is  more  helpful   compared   to  
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other  rationalist  explanations.  The  role  of  identity  politics  is  one  of  the  important  
themes   that   this   thesis   intends   to   further   analyse   and   examine   in   order   to  
highlight   the   extent   to   which   such   explanation   provide   a   comprehensive  
account.    
On   the   other   hand,   not   only   did   some   scholars   view   the   AKP   as   an  
Islamist   party  with  an   Islamic  political   identity,   but   also  as  a  party  with  neo-­
Ottoman   sentiments   and   ideology.   For   example,   there   are   a   number   of  
definitions   found  of  neo-­Ottomanism.  A  useful  one  provided  by  Nimet  Seker  
(2009)  in  his  work  Turkey’s  Strategic  Depth:  A  Shift  in  Turkish  Foreign  Policy  
states,  “Neo-­Ottomanism  is  a  term  used  by  critics  to  describe  this  return  to  a  
notion   of   a   Turkey   exerting   power   over   its   traditional   Ottoman   sphere   of  
influence;;   those  who  use  the  term  mean  to   imply   that   the  new  foreign  policy  
involves  the  revival  of   imperial  ambitions”180.  Tarik  Oguzlu  (2008)  in  his  work  
Middle  Easternization  of  Turkey’s  Foreign  Policy:  Does  Turkey  Dissociate  from  
the  West?  argued  that  Turkish  foreign  policy  has  been  increasingly  becoming  
involved  in  the  Middle  East.  He  argued  that  Turkey  will  very  much  be  affected  
by  Middle  Eastern  events  than  European  ones.  Tarik  believes  that  this  is  due  
to  the  bargaining  power  the  Middle  East  offers  for  Turkey181.  
Furthermore,  Einar  Wigen  (2009)  in  his  article,  Turkish  Neo-­Ottomanism:  
A   turn   to   the  Middle  East?  argued   that  Turkey  has  been  adopting      the  neo-­
Ottoman  foreign  policy  led  by  Ahmet  Davutoglu,  the  man  who  invented  the  term  
in  Turkish  political  dictionary,  and  further  stated,  “its  neo-­Ottomanist  approach  
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to  foreign  policy  is  not  only  focused  on  Muslim  countries.  Turkey  has  recently  
made  serious  progress  in  its  relationship  with  Armenia,  and  the  border  between  
the  two  countries  is  set  to  open  in  the  near  future.  Instead  of  dominating  existing  
geographical  units,  Turkey  appears  to  try  to  create  a  region  of  their  won,  the  
centre  of  which  is  Ankara”182.  Similarly,  Ryan  Evans  (2014)  in  his  work  Turkey’s  
Shifting   Strategic   Culture,   argued   that   there   has   been   two   main   dominant  
strategic   cultures   in   modern   Turkey;;   the   republican   strategic   culture   that  
emerged  with  the  creation  of  the  republic  and  the  new  republican  elites  led  by  
Ataturk;;  the  second  is  the  neo-­Ottoman  strategic  culture  that  emerged  with  the  
“Turkish-­Islamic  synthesis”  that  came  after  the  1980  coup  and  the  leadership  of  
Turgut  Ozal183.  He  believes  that  the  republican  strategic  culture  has  been  fading  
since  then  and  much  more  weakened  during  the  AKP’s  era  representing  on  the  
other  hand  a  stronger  neo-­Ottoman  geostrategic  culture  supported  by  a  neo-­
Ottoman  elite.  For  example,  the  author  argued  that  Erdogan  has  been  following  
the   same   principles   and   policies   of   the   “first   neo-­Ottoman   national   leader”  
Turgut  Ozal.  
Moreover,  Mustafa  Sahin  (2011)  in  his  work,  Islam,  Ottoman  Legacy  and  
Politics  in  Turkey:  An  Axis  Shift?  agrees  that  since  the  AKP  took  power,  there  
has  been  a  clear  transformation  and  return  of  neo-­Ottomanism  and  that  there  
has  been  a  deliberate  re-­reading  of  Turkish  history184.  He  states,  “A  closer  look  
at  the  ideas  championed  by  the  AKP  party  and  the  resulting  changes  in  Turkish  
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politics,  clearly  demonstrates  that  this  transformation  is  not  purely  Islamic  and  
therefore  is  not  an  axis  shift.  This  process  is  rather  a  result  of  deliberate  reading  
of  Turkey’s  history  and  its  relevance  to  the  contemporary  politics”185.  However,  
Cagaptay’s   work   on   The   AKP’s   Foreign   Policy:   The   Misnomer   of   “neo-­
Ottomanism”  (2009)  suggested  that  the  notion  of  neo-­Ottomanism  in  describing  
Turkish  foreign  policy  in  the  Middle  East  is  misleading186.  He  argued  that  it  is  in  
fact  more  accurate  to  describe  it  as  an  “econo-­Islamist”  foreign  policy  because  
Turkey’s  foreign  policy,  in  his  view,  is  affected  by  the  AKP’s  religious  views  of  
the  world  and  its  economic  interests.  This  is  particularly  interesting  because  it  
allows  us  to  think  about  the  importance  of  Turkish  economic  interests  that  are  
behind  such  recent  foreign  policy  re-­direction.  Neo-­Ottomanism  is  one  of  the  
themes  that  this  thesis  aims  to  critically  analyse  and  assess  its  significance  in  
understanding  Turkish  foreign  policy  change  since  2002.  Although  the  Ottoman  
Empire  does  not  exist  anymore,  it  would  be  interesting  to  analyse  and  take  into  
account  such  explanations  suggesting  that  Turkey  still  has  imperial  ambitions  
in  its  foreign  policy  and  critically  examine  them  to  assess  their  significance  and  
contribution  to  this  field  of  study.    
However,  others  looked  at  the  key  role  Professor  Amet  Davutoglu,  the  
previous  Foreign  Minister  and  current  Prime  Minister,  played  in  “constructing”  
Turkey’s  new  foreign  policy  that  led  to  such  transformations.  Davutoglu  is  one  
of  the  most  important  and  influential  individuals  that  will  be  focused  on  in  this  
thesis  due  to  his  highly  influential  roles  both  as  an  academic  and  a  politician.  
One   of   his   most   famous   works   The   Strategic   Depth:   Turkey’s   international  
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position  (2000)  Davutoglu  argued  that  the  values  of  nations  are  affected  by  their  
historical   depth   and   geo-­strategic   location187.   Ahmet   asserted   Turkey’s  
connections  to  its  neighbours  and  that  Turkey  is  the  natural  successor  of  the  
Ottoman  Empire  and  has  the  chance  to  become  a  “Muslim  super  power”.  This  
book  is  therefore  crucial  because  it  gives  us  the  ability  to  understand  Turkey’s  
source   of   change   in   her   foreign   policy   and   the   importance   of   such   ideas  
represented  by  Davutoglu.  Another  important  point  to  take  into  account  is  the  
Turkish   “Zero   Problems   with   neighbours”   a   policy   presented   by   Ahmet  
Davutoglu  that  was  adapted  by  the  AKP.  This  can  be  argued  that  it  was  a  way  
to  solve  historical  issues  with  her  neighbours  in  order  to  be  able  to  start  a  new  
page.    This  is  an  important  policy  that  needs  to  be  focused  on  because  it  shows  
the  way  that  Turkey  has  changed  her  foreign  policy.  His  work  on  Turkey’s  Zero  
Problems  Foreign  Policy  (2010)  illustrated  the  main  principles  of  Turkeys  new  
foreign   policy   agendas   regarding   its   neighbours188.   This   work   is   particularly  
interesting  because  one  of  the  main  reasons  to  write  this  paper  was  to  try  and  
explain  how  Turkey  was  able   to  make  a  nuclear   fuel  swap  with   Iran.  Ahmet  
stated   that   Turkey’s   relations  with   its   neighbours   follow   a  more   cooperative  
track  and  more  economic  interdependence.  The  author  further  stated  “Turkey's  
considerable  achievements  in  its  regional  relationships  have  led  policymakers  
to  take  this  principle  a  step  further  and  aim  for  maximum  cooperation  with  our  
neighbours”189.  The  above  works  by  Davutoglu  was  highly  crucial  to  my  thesis  
because   he   is   the   current   foreign   minister   and   he   is   also   regarded   as   the  
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architect  of  the  new  Turkish  foreign  policy.  Therefore,  such  information  in  the  
literature  will  help  us  build  a  better  understanding.  
Furthermore,  Volker  Perthes  (2010)  in  Turkey’s  Role  in  the  Middle  East:  
An  Outsider’s  Perspective  discussed  Davutoglu’s  zero  problems  policy190.  The  
author  argued,  “Zero  problems  is  a  wise  policy  principle,  not  only  with  regard  to  
Turkey’s  relations  with  its  immediate  neighbours  but  –  and  this  should  not  be  
forgotten  –  to  all  relevant  actors  in  its  wider  Middle  Eastern  neighbourhood”191.  
However,   Bulent   Aliriza   and   Stephen   Flanagan   (2012)   in   The   end   of   Zero  
Problems?   Turkey   and   shifting   regional   dynamics   argued   that   this   zero  
problems  policy  is  under  threat192.  They  added,  “The  escalating  crisis  in  Syria  
and   related   regional   turbulence   are   complicating   Turkey’s   important  
relationships  with  both  Iran  and  Russia”193.  The  Zero  Problems  policy  and  its  
limitations  are  very  important  to  this  thesis.  Therefore,  such  publications  help  
further  investigate  this  aspect  of  Turkey’s  foreign  policy.    
On  the  other  side  of  the  literature,  a  number  of  prominent  scholars  in  the  
field  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  studies  have  been  analysing  the  shift  in  Turkish  
foreign   policy   since   2002   from   an   economic   perspective.   Arguments  
highlighting  the  pragmatic  and  materialist  side  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  can  be  
traced   back   to   the   neo-­liberal   and   neo-­liberal   institutionalist   theoretical  
interpretations  of  international  relations.  For  example,  Zı̇ya  Onis  (2011)  in  his  
work  Multiple  Faces  of  the  “New”  Turkish  Foreign  Policy:  Underlying  Dynamics  
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and  a  Critique,  criticized  the  way  in  which  some  scholars  in  the  literature  based  
their  understanding  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  shift  towards  its  neighbours  within  
an  ideological  and  identity  context194.  Instead,  Onis  argued  that  it  is  important  
to  look  at  the  economic  side  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  to  better  understand  its  
recent  “shift  of  axis”.  He  argued  that  recent  foreign  policy  decisions  have  been  
increasingly  driven  from  below  through  key  economic  actors  and  civil  society195.    
Similarly,   Faruq  Ekmekci   and  Abdulkadir  Yildirim   (2012)   in   their  work  
The  AKP  and  the  Eastern  Turn  (?)  of  Turkey:  An  Economic  Analysis,  were  also  
highly  critical  of  the  ideational  claims  in  the  literature  and  argued  that  there  are  
no  pro-­Muslim  and  anti-­Western  trends  driving  Turkish  foreign  policy,  instead  
AKP’s   foreign   policy   has   been   influenced   by   “economic   rationale”196.   They  
argued  that  Turkey’s  openness  and  increase  of  relations  with  its  neighbouring  
countries   in   the   region   have   been   driven   by   AKP’s   aim   to   enlarging   and  
diversifying   both   the   market   for   external   energy   supply   and   the   market   for  
Turkish  goods197.    
In   response   to   explanations   supporting   the   claim   that   there   is   an  
Islamisation   of   Turkish   foreign   policy   under   the   AKP,   Ekmekci   and   Yildirim  
argued  that  if  we  are  to  take  the  Islamist  and  anti-­Western  ideology  arguments  
into  account,  this  would  mean  that  Turkey’s  Islamist  government  would  be  more  
likely   to   reduce   economic   relations  with   pro-­US   countries   and   increase  with  
anti-­US  countries  for  example.  However,  they  argued  that  statistical  evidence  
showed   that   Turkey’s   economic   trade   relations  with  US-­friendly   states   have  
                                                                                                              194  Ziya  Onis,  “Multiple  Faces  of  the  “New”  Turkish  Foreign  Policy:  Underlying  Dynamics  and  
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drastically  increased198.  In  addition,  Mustafa  Kutlay  (2011)  in  his  work  Economy  
as   the   ‘Practical  Hand’  of   ‘New  Turkish  Foreign  Policy’:  A  Political  Economy  
Explanation,  looked  at  Turkish  foreign  policy  from  a  political  economy  point  of  
view   particularly   through   using   the   functionalist   and   interdependence  
approaches199.  Kutlay  argues  that  in  post-­2001  Turkey,  the  internationalization  
of   the   ‘Anatolian   Tigers’   has   been   the   ‘practical   hand’   of   Turkish   foreign  
policy200.  Like  many  scholars  sharing  similar  approach,   the  author  has  been  
highly   critical   of   the   overemphasis   on   “security-­based”   and   “identity-­based”  
approaches  in  the  literature  in  understanding  Turkish  foreign  policy.  He  argued  
that  the  2001  economic  crisis  influenced  all  Turks  and  paved  way  for  important  
and  “radical”  reforms  since  then.  He  added,  key  business  associations,  such  as  
TUSIAD,  MUSIAD,  and  SIADs,  supported  new  Turkish  reforms201.  Therefore,  
such  works  highlight  the  importance  of  considering  economic  interests  and  the  
way  in  which  Turkey  under  the  AKP  has  successfully  developed  international  
economic  ties  and  trade  agreements.      
   On  the  other  hand,  the  security  dimension  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  has  
also  had   reasonable  attention  by  some  scholars  and  analysts,  which   further  
highlights   the   current   debate.  Again,   here   some   chose   to   focus   on   a   single  
factor  based  analyses  and  approach,  which   is   the  role  of  security   threat  and  
concerns   in  Turkish   foreign  policy.  Such  explanations’   influence  can  also  be  
traced   back   to   the   realist   theoretical   interpretations   of   international   relations  
where  security  lies  in  the  heart  of  its  theoretical  interpretation.  For  example,  an  
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interesting  article  by  Stephen  Larrabee  (2007)  entitled  Turkey  Rediscovers  the  
Middle  East,  argued  that  Turkey’s  new  approach  and  role  in  the  Middle  East  is  
a  “response  to  structural  changes  in  its  security  environments  since  the  end  of  
the  Cold  War”202.  For  example,  the  2003  American  invasion  of  Iraq  is  seen  to  
be   an   event   that   drew   Turkey   into   the   Middle   East   affairs.   According   to  
Larrabee,  Saddam  Hussein   for  a   long   time  has  provided  stability   for  Turkish  
Southern  border  with   Iraq.  The  overthrow  of  Saddam  Hussein   leads   to  huge  
security  problems  for  Turkey  and  primarily  from  Kurds.  The  Turkish  government  
realized   the   potential   of   a   growing   Kurdish   nationalism   and   derives   for  
autonomy.  Therefore,  Turkey  sought  to  build  ties  with  Iran  and  Syria  to  be  able  
to  cooperate  in  solving  such  threat  and  complex  security  problem.    
Similarly,  Sonmez  Atesoglu  (2011)  in  his  work,  Security  of  Turkey  with  
Respect   to   the   Middle   East,   looks   at   the   important   role   of   Turkish   security  
concerns  in  shaping  its  relations  with  and  behaviour  towards  the  Middle  East203.  
The  study  particularly  focused  on  Turkey’s  relations  with  Syria,  Iraq,  and  Iran,  
whom   they   share   borders   with,   with   regards   to   common   security   concerns  
mainly  the  Kurdish  issue  and  the  PKK.  The  author  argued  that  Turkish  security  
concerns  and  threats  posed  by  the  PKK  changed  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  priority  
towards  these  states  in  the  expense  of  its  relation  with  Israel.  
On   the   contrary,   Cengiz   Dinc   (2011)   in   his   article,  Turkey   as   a   New  
Security  Actor   in   the  Middle  East:  Beyond   the  Slogans,  argued   that  Turkish  
foreign  policy  has  moved  beyond  “slogans”  in  the  sense  that  Turkey  under  the  
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AKP  government  has  become  more  “relaxed”  and  “flexible”204.  Similar  to  some  
scholars  mentioned  above,  Dinc  argues  that  Turkey  has  adopted  a  soft  power  
approach  making  it  much  closer  to  the  European  strategy.  Turkey  is  viewed  to  
have  been  matured  and  is  able  to  develop  new  different  strategies  to  deal  with  
security   concerns.   In   addition,   he   stated   that   the   domestic   transformation,  
democratization  process,  and  economic  development  have  been  key   factors  
behind  such  foreign  policy  transformation205.  Here  the  author  confirms  that  the  
Turkish  openness  and  new  approach  to  the  Middle  East  has  been  shaped  by  
different  domestic  reasons  more  than  anything  else.    
In   addition,   another   part   of   the   debate   comes   from   the   believe   that  
external  actors  play  a  significant  role  in  effecting  Turkish  foreign  policy  making  
and  most  importantly  for  the  Turkish  case,  the  European  Union.  For  instance,  
Gokalp,  D.  and  Unsar,  S.  (2008)  in  their  work  From  the  Myth  of  European  Union  
Accession  to  Disillusion:  Implications  for  Religious  and  Ethnic  Politicization  in  
Turkey,  have  focused  on  how  Turkey  failed  to  succeed  in  its  EU  membership  
application  as  well  as  explaining  how  the  AKP  faced  a  huge  challenge  from  the  
EU206.  Furthermore,   they  stated   that   the  EU  suspended   talks  with  Turkey   in  
December  2006207.  They  argued  that  the  Turkish  accession  to  the  EU  was  a  
myth   and   an   illusion.   Such   article   can   support   the   argument   that   such   EU  
membership  failure  paved  more  way  for  the  AKP  to  expand  its  foreign  relations  
with  other  parts  of  the  world  to  be  more  effective  specifically  since  their  second  
term  in  power.    
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Moreover,   David   L.   Phillips   (2004)   suggested   in   his   work   Turkey’s  
dreams  of  accession  that  the  failure  in  Turkey’s  membership  in  the  EU  will  result  
in  a  reaction  that  would  not  serve  the  EU  and  the  US  in  the  region208.  The  author  
argued  that  the  US  should  use  its  influence  to  convince  the  EU  to  accept  Turkey  
as  a  member  because  it  will  benefit  them  to  serve  their  interests  in  the  region  
and  to  make  Turkey  a  model  of  democracy  to  the  Muslim  world.  He  added  that  
turning  their  back  to  Turkey  “would  set  back  domestic  reforms  and  radicalize  
religious   extremists”209.   What   is   more,   the   article   titled   The   Turkey-­EU-­US  
Triangle   in   Perspective:   Transformation   or   Continuity?   by   Ziya   Onis   and  
Suhnaz  Yilmaz  (2005)  illustrated  the  importance  of  the  US  role  in  the  Turkish-­
EU  relations210.  The  authors  however  stated  that  the  US  was  not  successful  in  
making  the  Turkish-­EU  integration  work.  Therefore,  such  peaces  of  work  in  the  
literature   suggest   that   it   is   very   likely   that   the   shift   and   deep   interest   in   the  
Middle  East  by  Turkey  can  be  a  reaction  to  its  failure  in  Europe.  Although  I  might  
not  entirely  agree  with  the  authors’  argument,  it  is  interesting  to  consider  in  my  
analysis.  
On   another   side   of   the   debate,   some   scholars   saw   Turkey’s   foreign  
policy  in  the  Middle  East  as  an  “important”  asset  and  an  advantage  for  Turkey’s  
EU  membership   process,   as   well   as   that   Turkish   regional   policy   serves   its  
relations  with  Europe.  For  example,  Sinan  Ulgen  (2009)  in  his  work  Turkey’s  
Route   to   the  EU  maybe   via   the  Middle  East  argued   that   Turkey’s   proactive  
policies  in  the  Middle  East  and  diplomatic  efforts  as  well  as  mediations  would  
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attract  the  European  Union211.  Ulgen  stated,  “Turkish  accession  would  not,  as  
European  federalists  like  to  argue,  lead  to  a  weaker  Europe.  On  the  contrary,  
Turkey’s  membership  would  make  Europe  a  more  influential  and  capable  world  
power”212.   For   Ulgen   and   other   optimists,   the   Turkish   engagement   and  
influence  in  the  Middle  East  actually  increase  its  asset  value  for  Europe.    
Furthermore,  Steven  Everts  (2004)  in  his  work  An  asset  but  not  a  model:  
Turkey,  the  EU,  and  the  wider  Middle  East,  argued  that  Turkey’s  Middle  East  
approach   is  an  asset   for   the  EU,  but  not  a  democratic  model   for   the  Middle  
East213.  He  argued  that  Turkey  could  play  an  important  role  in  influencing  EU-­
Middle  East  policy.  The  author  added,   “Turkey’s  accession  will   increase   the  
salience   of   the  Middle   East,   and   accelerate   the   Union’s   already   deepening  
involvement  in  the  region”214.    
Therefore,  it  is  clear  that  there  are  even  further  disagreements  between  
scholars  who  favour  the  EU  approach  due  to  the  noticeable  different  ways  they  
perceive  how  Turkish  foreign  policy  in  the  Middle  East  is  linked  to  its  position  
towards  Europe.    From  the  literature  on  Turkish-­EU  relations,  one  can  draw  two  
main  competing  arguments  regarding  the  role  of  the  EU  in  Turkish  foreign  policy  
change.  Some  saw  Turkey’s   increasing   role  and   the   improved   relations  with  
Middle  Eastern  states  as  an  asset  and  advantage  for  the  EU,  while  others  saw  
it  as  a  result  of  the  EU  rejectionist  behaviour,  which  pushed  Turkey  to  pursue  
such  foreign  policy  directions  in  the  search  for  alternatives  and  new  zones  for  
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influence.  Such  scholarly  discussions  are  highly  valuable  to  the  analysis  in  this  
thesis  and  especially  in  examining  the  European  Union’s  role  as  a  cause  behind  
Turkish  foreign  policy  change  towards  its  Middle  Eastern  neighbours.    
On  the  other  hand,  Kilic  Bugra  Kanat’s  work  on  “Understanding  Changes  
in  the  Foreign  Policy  of  Nations:  The  Turkish  Case  and  the  Transformation  of  
Turkish  Foreign  Policy”,  in  book  History,  Politics  and  Foreign  Policy  in  Turkey  
(2011),   argued   that   the   literature   on   Turkish   foreign   policy   represented   a  
number   of   what   he   calls   “monocausal   explanations”   that   only   managed   to  
explain  a  “partial  picture”  of  the  Turkish  case215.  He  stated,  “Although  some  of  
these   earlier   analyses   provided   a   partial   picture   of   the   changes   in   Turkish  
foreign   policy   making,   these   explanations   were,   however,   incomplete   and  
insufficient   in   creating   a   comprehensive   account   of   the   transformations   of  
Turkish   foreign   policy”216.   Therefore,   Kanat’s  work   offered   a   new  method   of  
analysis.  His  work  mainly  derived  from  the  work  Jacob  Gustavsson  (1998)  and  
theory  of  foreign  policy  change217.  Kanat  borrowed  Gustavsson’s  model  of  “The  
Causal  Dynamics  of  Foreign  Policy  Change”  and  applied  it  to  the  Turkish  case.  
Similarly,  in  his  work  on  Continuity  of  Change  in  Turkish  Foreign  Policy  Under  
the  JDP  Government:  The  Cases  of  Bilateral  Relations  with   Israel  and  Syria  
(2012).   Kanat   presented   an   interesting   argument   regarding   the   changes   in  
Turkey’s   relations  particularly  with  Syria  and   Israel.  He  argued   that  although  
there  are  many  who  attach  such  changes  in  those  bilateral  relations  to  the  AKP  
government,   they  are  actually   traced  back   to  periods  prior   to  2002218.  Kanat  
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offered  an  interesting  analysis  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  starting  from  the  end  of  
the  Cold  War  until  recent  events.  This  particular  work  is  useful  to  this  thesis’s  
analysis,   particularly   when   analyzing   some   historical   accounts   of   Turkish  
foreign  policy  and  the  important  development  in  the  bilateral  relations  with  Syria  
and  Israel.  Another  interesting  and  more  recent  article  by  Kanat  titled  Derivers  
of  Foreign  Policy  Change  in  the  AK  Party  Decade  (2013)  where  his  analysis  
focused  on  three  main  levels  including;;  the  regional  politics  changes;;  the  global  
increasing   activism;;   and   the   effects   of   public   opinion   and   civilization219.   He  
analysed   the   importance  of   the  AKP  ambitious  outlook  and  aim   for   a   better  
global  role,  as  well  as  the  increasing  domestic  influence  presented  by  civilians  
and  the  public  on  foreign  policy  making.  Interestingly,  Kanat  this  time  looked  at  
some  of  the  challenges  of  the  Arab  Spring  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  especially  
regarding  Syria.    
Bill   Park   is   another   important   scholar   who   represented   an   inclusive  
account  of  Turkish  foreign  policy.  His  work  on  Modern  Turkey:  People,  State  
and   Foreign   Policy   in   a   Globalized   World   (2011),   focused   on   the   role   of  
globalization  and  its  impact  on  Turkish  foreign  policy220.  The  prime  goal  of  his  
work   was   to   analyse   how   globalization   affects   Turkey   and   the   process   of  
Turkish  foreign  policy  making.  Park  gave  a  very  useful  theoretical  background  
in  an  attempt   to  define  what   is  globalization  and  the   impact   it  has  on  states.  
Particularly,  he  argued  that  globalization  enables  the  transcendence  of  many  
different   issues   across   the   world   including   economy,   terrorism,   and   Islam,  
                                                                                                              
219  Kilic  Bugra  Kanat,  “Derivers  of  Foreign  Policy  Change  in  the  AK  Party  Decade”,  SETA  
Foundation  Washington,  D.C.  May  2013,  accessed  April  11,  2016,  http://setadc.org/drivers-­of-­
foreign-­policy-­change-­in-­the-­ak-­party-­decade/.  	  
220  Bill  Park,  Modern  Turkey:  People,  State,  and  Foreign  Policy  in  a  Globalized  World,  
(Routledge,  2011).      
103	  	  
which  have  great  impact  on  the  foreign  policy  of  Turkey.  In  addition,  the  author  
argued   that  globalization  has  decreased   the   role  of  borders  between  Turkey  
and  its  neighbours  and  pushed  for  greater  relations  enabling  Turkey  to  pursue  
a  multi-­level  foreign  policy.  He  added  that  the  Turkish  society  has  successfully  
adapted  to  the  global  age  through  new  technology,  particularly  social  media,  
and  travelling.  Park’s  work  looked  at  the  role  of  ideology  and  ideational  roots  as  
well   behind   Turkish   foreign   policy   developments.   Including   the   key   roles   of  
Europeanization  and  globalization  in  transforming  the  Turkish  political  life  and  
society.    
Finally,   it   is   useful   for   this   thesis   to   look   at   some   of   the   works   that  
analysed  the  Turkish  role  in  the  Arab  spring  and  how  such  event  has  affected  
Turkish  foreign  policy  making  for  the  last  number  of  years.  The  thesis,  however,  
will  only  be  covering  the  beginning  of  the  Arab  spring  and  this  is  because  it  is  
very   hard   to   determine   where   such   events   are   going   or   how   they   will   end.  
Steven  A.  Cook  (2011)  in  his  article  Arab  Spring,  Turkish  Fall,  argued  that  the  
Arab  uprising  seemed  “tailored  made’  for  Turkey  to  exert   its   influence  on  the  
region221.  However,  Turkey   in   fact   looked  clumsy   in  dealing  with   the  current  
Arab  Spring.  The  author  added,  at  the  beginning  Turkey  was  doing  well  in  the  
Arab  upheavals  particularly  with  the  case  of  Egypt.  On  the  other  hand,  Turkey  
seemed   to   struggle  when   it   came   to  dealing  with   the   case  of   Libya.  Steven  
argued  that  Turkey  found  it  quite  difficult  at  the  beginning  to  cut  ties  with  the  
Qaddafi   regime   and   objected   the   NATO   plan   for   a   no-­fly   zone.   He   stated,  
“Turkey's   leaders   are   looking   less   like   the   new   Ottomans   they've   imagined  
                                                                                                              




themselves  to  be  and  more  like  stumbling  politicians  afraid  of  a  new  regional  
order”.    
Furthermore,  Burak  Bilgehan  Ozpek   (2011)  argued   in  his  paper   ‘Arab  
Spring’   or   ‘Turkish   winter’?   That   Turkey’s   foreign   policy   since   2002   went  
through   serious   challenges   and   the   most   recent   was   evident   in   the   Arab  
spring222.  Moreover,  The  work  by  Hannah  Stuart  (2011)  Turkey  and  the  Arab  
Spring  shows  that  Turkey’s  role  in  response  to  the  Syrian  revolution  was  very  
supportive223.   Turkey   publicly   criticizes   Assad’s   actions   against   the  
demonstrators  and  called   for   the  government   to   resign.   In  addition  Nathalie,  
Tocci   et   al.   (2011)   in   Turkey   and   the   Arab   Spring:   Implications   for   Turkish  
foreign  policy  from  a  Transatlantic  perspective,  illustrated  the  important  role  that  
Turkey  would   play   as   a   successful   Islamic   democratic  model   for   the  Middle  
East224.  Therefore,  the  role  of  Turkey  in  the  Arab  spring  would  be  important  to  
consider   in  determining  some  very   recent  changes   in  Turkish   foreign  policy.  
The  above-­mentioned  works  help  us  understand   the  beginnings  of   the  Arab  
Spring  and  how  the  Turkish  policy  was  affected  as  well  as   the  way   in  which  
Turkey  was  able  to  deal  with  such  increasing  challenges.    
Overall,   from   the   literature  above,   it   can  be  said   that   there   is  enough  
information   that  enables   the  researcher   to   take  on   this   thesis.  However,   it   is  
important  to  clarify  that  primary  sources  are  also  going  to  play  a  strong  role,  as  
they  will  play  a  contributing  role  as  well  as  adding  to  the  originality  of  this  work.  
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The  research  question  fits  in  well  with  the  information  provided  in  the  literature.  
However,  there  is  a  gap  in  the  literature  that  needs  to  be  explained.  First  of  all,  
there  was  a  noticeable  amount  of  descriptive  work  in  the  literature  on  Turkish  
foreign  policy,  which  has  also  been  highlighted  before  in  Kanat’s  work  (2011)  
as  well225.  This   is  because  a  number  of  scholars  and  authors  seem   to  have  
mainly  described  Turkey’s  foreign  policy.  This  means  that  they  described  ‘what’  
happened  in  terms  of  events  and  changes  of  relations  with  its  neighbours  and  
the  EU  without  focusing  enough  on  explaining  ‘how’  and  ‘why’.  However,  we  
cannot  ignore  that  there  were  efforts  made  to  investigating  the  factors  that  led  
to  such  foreign  policy  changes.    
Such  investigations  have  disappointingly  confused  the  researcher  as  an  
observer.  Those  works  represented  different  answers  to  the  case.  For  example,  
there  were  studies  that  looked  at  the  role  of  the  AKP  Islamic  nature,  or  the  effect  
of  Middle  East  policies  on  the  European  Union  application,  or  even  questioning  
if  Turkey  was  actually  leaving  the  West.  These  are  all  relevant  and  valid  studies  
that   contributed   to   the   literature.  However,   due   to   the  complicated  nature  of  
Turkey,  such  studies  did  not  yet  give  a  clear  picture  to  the  main  source  behind  
Turkey’s  new  foreign  policy  agenda  in  the  Middle  East.    
This   leads   to   the   second   part   of   the   gap   where   a   large   number   of  
scholars   and   analysts   have   presented   several   different   and   in   many   cases  
contradictory  explanations  to  what  caused  Turkish  foreign  policy  to  change.  In  
addition,  the  work  by  Bill  Park  (2015)  on  Turkey's  Isolated  Stance:  an  ally  no  
more,  or  just  the  usual  turbulence?    Is  particularly  interesting.  His  work  focused  
on   the   recent  challenges  posed  by   regional  affairs  and   the   impact   it  had  on  
                                                                                                              
225  Kanat,  p.  220.    
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Turkey's  relations  with  Syria,  Iraq,  Iran,  Libya,  and  Israel226.  Park  argued  that  
recent  regional  circumstances  most  notably  the  Arab  Spring  have  confronted  
Turkish  foreign  policy  and  the  AKP  government.  For  Park,  Turkey's  position  has  
been  affected  by  the  growing  regional  events,  not  only  with  some  of  its  Middle  
Eastern  neighbours,  but  also  with  its  Western  allies.    
As  mentioned  earlier,  having  such  a  heavy  theoretical  debate  over  the  
sources  of  Turkish   foreign  policy   change   is  academically  healthy,  but  at   the  
same  time,  can  be  misleading,  where  observers  can  end  up  with  a  variety  of  
explanations  not  knowing  which  of  them  is  the  most  plausible  one.  So  far,  the  
works  and  their  explanations  in  the  literature  have  managed  to  provide  some  
important  elements  of  Turkish  regional   foreign  policy,  each  on   its  own.  Such  
gap   increases   the  demand   for  more   inclusive  and  wider  analyses   that  could  
represent  a  comprehensive  explanation.  
Therefore,  this  thesis  aims  at  filling  this  gap  by  providing  an  analysis  that  
tries  to  identify  the  most  plausible  explanation  of  change  behind  Turkey’s  new  
foreign   policy   agenda   under   the   AKP.   This   will   be   conducted   through   an  
examination  of  the  different  explanations  and  theoretical  hypotheses  provided  
by   previous   scholars   in   the   field   in   the   search   for   the   most   valuable.   The  
literature   provided   a   number   of   answers   and   explanations   to   this   research  
question,   but   unfortunately   the   result   was   a   mixture   of   different   and   even  
contrasting  answers.  An  observer  that  seeks  an  answer  will  arrive  at  a  list  of  
explanations  that  could,  and  did  at  least  from  a  personal  experience,  create  a  
puzzle.  This  puzzle  comes  from  questioning  the  sufficiency  and  necessity  of  the  
answers  provided.  Therefore,   there  needs   to  be  an  analysis   that  provides  a  
                                                                                                              
226  Bill  Park,  "Turkey's  Isolated  Stance:  an  ally  no  more,  or  just  the  usual  turbulence?"  
International  Affairs  91,  no.  3  (2015):  581-­600.    
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solid  explanation  for  observers  out  there  that  they  can  confidently  rely  on  when  
thinking   about   Turkish   foreign   policy   change.   This   thesis   will   represent   the  
strength  of  its  argument  through  its  examination  and  evaluation  of  the  different  
explanations   provided   in   the   literature   through   the   use   of   Process   Tracing  
Methodology,  illustrated  in  chapter  2,  which  enables  the  researcher  to  conduct  
close   up   examination   and   test   the   validity   and   plausibility   of   the   multiple  
competing   theoretical   hypotheses   in   the   search   for   the   most   possible  
comprehensive  explanation  so  far.  Therefore,  this  thesis  intends  to  represent  a  
method   that   allows   observers   to   understand   the   validity   of   other   alternative  
explanations  in  comparison.  What  this  research  is  trying  to  offer  is  not  new,  but  
unique   in   its  method  of  analysis  and  examination  of   the   literature  on  Turkish  
Foreign  Policy.  Moreover,  one  of  the  main  advantages  for  this  thesis  is  its  re-­
organization  of  the  wide  range  of  data  in  a  more  understandable  manner  under  
one   piece   of   work,   which   can   be   highly   valuable   for   researchers   in   future  
studies.  This  further  includes  a  re-­arrangement  of  the  competing  explanations  
(which   were   provided   by   different   Turkish   and   international   scholars   in   the  
literature)  making  them  easier  to  observe  and  analyse.    
Overall,  the  literature  review  has  been  useful  in  highlighting  key  works  
and   publications   that   are   of   high   importance,   discussing   the   nature   of   the  
literature  and  the  theoretical  debate  that  exist  within.  The  aim  was  to  critically  
summarize   the  most   important  explanations  and  key  concepts   in   this   field  of  
study  under  investigation,  hence  exploring  their  strengths  and  weaknesses  to  
further  facilitate  the  researcher’s  analysis.  Notably,  this  includes  highlighting  the  
gap  in  the  literature  and  the  necessity  to  apply  a  method  of  analysis  that  can  fill  
this  gap.  The  above-­analysed  themes  will  be  divided  into  the  coming  chapters,  
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in  accordance  with  the  methodology  applied,  in  an  attempt  to  represent  a  clear  
and  more   organized   thematic   structure   of   analysis   to  make   it   easier   for   the  
reader   to   follow.   Therefore,   this   chapter   is   critical   as   it   builds   an   important  
academic  foundation  and  an  important  source  that  paves  the  way  for  greater  























The  purpose  of   this  chapter   is   to   illustrate   the  nature  of  Turkish  politics  and  
foreign   policy   prior   to   2002   and   how   it   changed   after   the   Justice   and  
Development  Party   (AKP)   took  power.  For   readers   to  understand   the   recent  
Turkish   foreign   policy   changes   and   transformation,   it   is   necessary   to  
understand  how  Turkish  foreign  policy  used  to  operate  prior  to  2002.  Since  the  
creation  of  the  Republic  of  Turkey  in  1923  by  Mustafa  Kemal  Ataturk,  foreign  
policy   has   been   shaped   by   isolation   and   non-­activism.   Ataturk   aimed   at  
maintaining  and  protecting  the  survival  of  the  new  republic.  He  was  also  giving  
most  of  his  attention  to  the  establishment  of  a  new  Turkish  secular  identity  as  
the  new  character  of  the  state.  One  of  the  most  important  times  that  determined  
Turkish   foreign   policy   was   during   the   Cold   War.   Turkey   sought   to   join   the  
Western  Camp  and  its  membership  in  NATO  by  1951,  while  adopting  a  cautious  
foreign  policy  towards  its  neighbours.  After  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  and  with  
the  emergence  of  the  new  world  order,  Turkey  witnessed  another  major  turning  
point   in   its   foreign  policy  dimension.  The  end  of   the  bipolar   system  enabled  
Turkey  to  apply  a  multidimensional  foreign  policy  approach  allowing  it  to  move  
freely   and   readjusting   itself   in   accordance   with   the   new   system.   However,  
Turkey  maintained  a  hard  power  politics   for  a   long  time  and  securitization  of  
foreign  policy  was  a  central  character,  which  was  highly  evident  in  the  Kurdish  
case.  Since  the  end  of  the  cold  war,  Turkish  politics  was  mainly  instable  and  
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witnessed  several  military  coups  and  interventions.  Tensions  between  Islamist  
and  secular  establishments  in  the  country  were  becoming  more  evident.  The  
development   of   political   Islam   entered   a   number   of   phases   and   was  
successfully  able  to  influence  both  domestic  and  foreign  politics  of  the  country  
despite  the  military  and  secularists’  efforts  to  weaken  such  development.  The  
shift   towards   a  multiparty   system   in   1950   and   the   rule   of   Adnan  Menderes  
paved  way   for   the  emergence  and  development  of   Islamist  movements  and  
since  then  Turkey  entered  a  new  era.  Although  Islamist  parties  were  faced  with  
tough  measurements  and  military  coups,  they  still  managed  to  come  back  and  
rise  again  one  after  the  other.  However,  the  most  important  event  was  evident  
in  2001  when  all   political   parties  were  abandoned   including   Islamist   parties,  
which  led  to  the  creation  of  the  Justice  and  Development  Party  led  by  previously  
known  Islamist  figures  like  Recep  Tayyip  Erdogan  and  Abdullah  Gul.  The  newly  
established  AKP  was  a  conservative-­democratic  party  who  won  the  elections  
of  2002  and  managed  to  rule  Turkey  until  this  day.  
Turkey  under  the  rule  of  the  AKP  entered  a  new  phase  and  witnessed  major  
changes   in  all   social,   economic,  and  political  aspects.  Turkish   foreign  policy  
also  witnessed  huge  transformation  since  2002  and  the  AKP  government  was  
able  to  revolutionise  Turkey’s  international  position.  In  particular,  relations  with  
Middle  Eastern  countries  have  tremendously  improved  culturally,  economically,  
and  politically.  Although  relations  between  Turkey  and  Middle  Eastern  states  
have  been  witnessed  before  during  the  era  of  Turgut  Ozal  for  example,  the  AKP  
managed  to  take  it  into  another  level  never  witnessed  before  in  the  history  of  
the  republic.  However,  since  the  emergence  of  the  Arab  Spring,  Turkey  faced  
a  number  of  challenges  to  the  stability  of  its  relations  with  its  Arab  neighbours  
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and  tensions  were  evident  in  some  cases  and  particularly  regarding  the  case  of  
the  Muslim  Brotherhood  in  Egypt  and  Turkey’s  conflicting   interest  with  Saudi  
Arabia  and  some  Gulf  states  regarding  that  issue.  However,  the  most  significant  
fact  here  is  not  primarily  the  development  or  deterioration  of  relations  between  
Turkey   and   its   neighbouring  Middle   Eastern   states;;   it   is   in   fact   the   growing  
Turkish   involvement  and   influence  over  Middle  Eastern  affairs  within   the   last  
decade  and  is  expected  to  remain  so  in  the  coming  future.    
   In  order  to  give  enough  and  clear  analysis  of  the  topic,  this  chapter  will  
be  divided  into  seven  main  sections.  The  first  one  will  offer  a  background  on  
the  important  Turkish  geo-­strategic  location  and  social  structures.  This  section  
is  important  because  if  we  take  the  geographic  position  and  location  of  Turkey  
into  account,  we  will  understand  its’  strategic  significance  which  contributes  to  
its   international   position.   Furthermore,   the   social   structure   in   Turkey   is   a  
complex  one  and  therefore  needs  clarification  before  we  go  into  details  about  
the   nature   of   relations   between   secularists,   nationalists,   and   Islamists.  
Understanding   the  Turkish   identity   role   in   foreign  policy  making   is  of   central  
theme   to   this   dissertation.   Secondly,   I   will   analyse   the   nature   of   relations  
between  Turkey  and  the  Middle  East  prior  to  1923.  The  aim  here  is  to  illustrate  
the   level   of   deep   relations   and   dependence   that   Turkey   shared   with   other  
Arabian   providences   during   the   Ottoman   era   and   how   this   was   radically  
changed  after  the  collapse  of  the  Empire.  The  third  section  will  focus  on  and  
evaluate  the  politics  and  foreign  policy  orientation  of  the  new  republic  and  how  
Kemal  Ataturk  played  a  major  role  in  re-­shaping  it.  The  fourth  and  fifth  parts  aim  
to  analyse  and  examine  Turkish  foreign  policy  dimension  during  the  Cold  War  
and  after  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union.  These  parts  will  cover  a  vital  period  
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of   times   that   affected   Turkey’s   foreign   policy   direction   and   position   in  world  
politics.   The   sixth   section   will   critically   analyse   the   development   of   political  
Islam  in  Turkey  and  the  way  in  which  Islamist  movements  came  to  influence  
and  shape  the  political  life.  This  will  be  a  critical  part  of  the  chapter  representing  
Islamist  growth  in  Turkish  politics  and  influence  as  well  as  the  effects  it  had  on  
foreign  policy  making  and  particularly   towards   the  Middle  East.  The  seventh  
and   final   section   of   this   chapter   is   going   to   illustrate   the   emergence   and  
development   of   the   Justice   and  Development   Party   (AKP)   since   2001.   The  
section   aims   to   analyse   the   way   AKP   has   managed   to   transform   and  
revolutionise   Turkey’s   politics   and   foreign   policy   elements.   This   section  
however   will   be   discussed   in   much   further   details   in   the   coming   chapters  
examining   the   causes   of   such   foreign   policy   transformation   and   particularly  
towards  the  Middle  East.    
1.	  Significance	  of	  Turkish	  geographical	  position	  and	  social	  structure	  
  
Turkey   enjoys   a   very   important   geostrategic   location   that   contributes   to   its  
weight  and  influence  in  international  politics.  It  is  a  country  that  bridges  between  
the   two   continents   of   Asia   and   Europe227.   Therefore,   Turkey   has   a   special  
intercontinental  geography  that  makes  it  unique  and  different.  For  example,  the  
region   of   Marmara   is   situated   in   both   Asian   and   European   Continents.    
Moreover,  Turkey  is  at  the  same  time  located  between  highly  volatile  regions,  
such  as  the  Caucasus,  Balkans,  and  Middle  East.  It  borders  Greece,  Bulgaria  
in   the  northwest,   the   former  USSR  (Azerbaijan,  Georgia,  and  Armenia),  and  
                                                                                                              
227  Nezihi  Cakar,  “A  Strategic  Overview  of  Turkey,”  Journal  of  International  Affairs  3,  no.2  
(1998):  1.  
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Iran  to  the  east,  and  Iraq  and  Syria  to  the  south228.  It  is  a  unique  country  that  
can  be  considered  as  an  Asian,  European,  Balkan,  Caucasian,  Middle  Eastern,  
Black   Sea   and   Mediterranean   country   all   at   the   same   time.   Such   unique  
geographical  location  is  vital  to  Turkey’s  influence  and  engagement  with  many  
different  international  affairs.    
In  a  talk  presented  to  the  Institute  of  International  and  European  Affairs  
in  March  2010,  Ahmet  Davutoglu,  who  was  the  Turkish  Foreign  Minister  at  that  
time,  stated,  “in  post-­cold  war  era  we  realized  that  our  geography  is  not  a  wing,  
it   is   a   central   geography   a   pivotal   geography,   where   Turkey   has   a  
multidimensional  geography”229.  The  realization  of  the  importance  of  Turkey’s  
geographic   location   by   policy  makers   plays   an   important   role   in   using   such  
geostrategic-­position  to  the  country’s  favor  and  to  serve  its  interests.  Moreover,  
the  Anatolian  region  of  Turkey  for  instance  has  witnessed  greatest  civilizations,  
such   as   the   Anatolian,   Greek,   Roman,   Byzantine,   and   Ottoman230.   This  
geostrategic  position  of  Turkey  has  played  central  roles  in  many  international  
events  that  made  Turkey  an  asset  for  external  powers  and  enabled  it  to  play  a  
significant  role  i.e.  this  was  seen  in  WW2  and  during  the  Cold  War.    What  is  
more,   Turkey   is   positioned   in   a   region   that   witnessed   the   birth   of   three  
monotheistic  religions,  precisely  Judaism,  Christianity,  and  Islam.    
                                                                                                              
228About.  Geography,  “Turkey,”  about.com,  accessed  October  8,  2012,  
http://geography.about.com/library/cia/blcturkey.htm.    
  
229Ahmet  Davutoglu,  “Turkish  Foreign  Policy,”  the  Institute  of  International  and  European  
Affairs,  12  March  2010,  accessed  December  9,  2014,  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OwfoTCo_SbE.  
230Chatham  University,  “History  &  Culture  of  Turkey:  From  Anatolian  Civilization  to  Modern  




   Such  religions  and  civilisations  have  certainly  made  a  significant  mark  
on  the  way  in  which  societies  of   those  lands  think,  preserve  themselves  and  
others  around  them  as  well  as  in  the  way  they  relate  themselves  to  the  past  and  
future231.  As  a  consequence  of  such  complex,  Turkey  constitutes  a  number  of  
ethnic  and  religious  identities.  These  include  Turkish,  Arab,  Kurdish,  Armenian,  
Aramean,  Georgian,  Azerbaijani,  Muslim,  Christian,  Jewish  and  others232.  As  
illustrated  in  the  map  below,  Turkey  is  represented  by  multiple  identities  that  at  
the  same  time  show  how  diverse  and  secular  the  Turkish  society  has  been.    
Figure  1.  Ethnic  identities  in  Turkey233  
  
  
Another   distinctive   feature   about   the   Turks   is   that  when   they   travelled   from  
Central   Asia,   the   cultures   of   the   areas   they   arrived   and   lived   in   were   not  
destroyed.  Instead,  Turks  were  able  to  adapt  and  merge  with  their  own  culture  
                                                                                                              
231  Yuksel  Soylemez,  “Turkey:  Western  or  Muslim?,”  Turkish  Review,  (1992):45-­46,  Cited  in  
Sedat  Laciner,  “From  Kemalism  to  Ozalism,    The  Ideological  Evolution  of  Turkish  Foreign  
Policy”  (PhD  thesis,  Kings  College,  University  of  London,  2001).    
232  Cem  Safak  Cukur,  Maria  Rosario  T.  De  Guzman,  Gustavo  Carlo,  “Religiosity,  Values,  and  
Horizontal  and  Vertical  Individualism—Collectivism:  A  Study  of  Turkey,  the  United  States,  and  
the  Philippines,”  The  Journal  of  Social  Psychology  144,  no.  6,  (2004):  613-­634.    
233  Google  Images,  “Ethnic  Groups  in  Turkey”,  accessed  December  9,  2014,  
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and  others.  They  lived  with  the  Greeks  and  other  Christian  communities,  but  
kept  their  Islamic  identity.  Therefore,  Turkey  was  and  still  is  a  place  that  hosts  
a  mixture  of  Jewish,  Christian,  and  Muslim  populations  in  a  location  that  borders  
between   the   Islamic   East   and   Christian-­Jewish   West234.   Such   mixture   and  
complex  characters  that  structured  the  Turkish  society  have  created  some  kind  
of  an  “identity  crisis”  that  many  authors  have  focused  on235.  However,  this  can  
be  seen  from  a  positive  point  of  view  that  Turkey  is  a  very  diverse  country  that  
represents   a   mixture   of   cultures   and   religions,   which   in   turn   increases   its  
openness  towards  the  world  and  therefore  contribute  to  its’  importance.    
                            In  terms  of  foreign  policy  making  in  Turkey,  it  has  never  been  an  easy  
case  due  to  its  geographical  location.  Being  positioned  in  a  territory  that  borders  
Europe,  Asia,  and  the  Middle  East  makes  it  significant  for  Turkey  to  ensure  its  
border   security   and   national   sovereignty.   Therefore,   it   can   be   argued   that  
Turkey  also  had  to  seek  powerful  friends  and  allies  in  the  international  arena  
that  can  ensure  its  safety  and  security  when  they  are  threatened.  Furthermore,  
due  to  the  political  instability  of  bordering  countries  and  neighbouring  regions,  
Turkey   needed   to   guarantee   a   firm   control   and   protection   of   its’   borders.  
Consequently,   the   geostrategic   location   that   Turkey   enjoys   can   be   both  
beneficial  and  threatening  at  the  same  time.    
                          It  can  be  seen  that  Turkey  enjoys  a  very  unique  mixture  of  a  complex  
geographical   position   and   a   blend   of   various   ethnic,   cultural,   and   religious  
backgrounds.   This   makes   Turkey   a   very   special   country   and   opens   new  
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opportunities,  while  at  the  same  time,  poses  a  number  of  political,  economic,  
and   social   challenges   and   difficulties.   The   reason   why   I   aim   to   explain   the  
nature  of  Turkish  geography  and  identity  is  because  I  believe  that  they  play  an  
important  role  in  Turkish.  This  section  does  not  aim  to  go  into  a  deep  analysis  
of   the   way   that   identity   affect   Turkish   Foreign   Policy,   instead   it   offers   an  
introduction   and   background   to   the   reader   of   the   important   geographic   and  
social  formation  and  structure,  which  will  most  certainly  contribute  to  this  thesis’  
analysis.  We  will  see  how  Ataturk  tackled  this  issue  and  the  way  in  which  he  
attempted  to  establish  and  build  a  new  and  unified  National   identity   that  can  
represent  the  overall  sense  of  Turkishness  to  the  outside  world.  However,  the  
next   few   sections   of   this   chapter   will   illustrate   how   Turkish   foreign   policy  
towards  the  Middle  East  looked  like  prior  to  2002.  This  is  very  significant  as  it  
enables  the  reader  to  distinguish  the  difference  between  prior  and  post  2002  
foreign   policy   dimensions   towards   its   neighbouring   region   as   well   as   their  
possible  determinants.    
2.	  The	  nature	  of	  relations	  between	  Turkey	  and	  the	  Middle	  East	  prior	  to	  1923	  
  
Turkey  and  particularly  Istanbul  played  a  major  role  during  the  Ottoman  rule.  
Istanbul   presented   the   home   of   central   authority   and   administration   for   the  
Empire236.  It  was  an  Empire  that  controlled  most  parts  of  Anatolia,  the  Balkans,  
Caucasus,  North  Africa,  and  the  Arab  Middle  East237.    The  nature  of  relations  
between  the  central  authority  of  the  Empire  and  those  provinces  and  territories  
were   characterised   by   the   appointment   of   military   and   other   governors   to  
                                                                                                              
236  Roger  Owen,  State,  Power  and  Politics  in  the  Making  of  the  Modern  Middle  East  (London:  
Routledge,  1992),  8.    
237  Necati  Ucuzsatar,  “The  Dissolution  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  the  Foundation  of  Modern  
Turkey  under  the  Leadership  of  Mustafa  Kemal  Ataturk,”  Journal  of  Istanbul  Kultur  University  
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manage  those  conquered  provinces.  Some  of  which  were   from  Turkey  while  
others  came  from  the  same  provinces  they  governed238.  What  is  more,  some  
‘notables’   in   those  provinces  were  also  given   some  power  and   independent  
control,   but   certainly   with   Ottoman   administrative   control239.   Furthermore,  
Governors  would  have  to  deal  with  maintaining  control  and  deal  with  any  issues  
that  may  rise  and  if  necessary  seek  central  authority’s  support.  Every  province  
was  administered  in  accordance  to  the  hierarchy  of  administration.  Provinces  
were   referred   to   in   Ottoman   terms   as   Vilayet   or   in   Arabic  Wilaya   and   the  
governor  would  be  called  as  Vali  or  Wali.  Governors  were  also  referred  to  as  
Pasha,  a  very  prestigious  term  given  to  individuals  of  power  i.e.  Governors240.    
   However,  the  Ottoman  Empire  was  able  to  sustain  power  for  more  than  
Four  Hundred  Years.   It   represented  one  of   the   largest  and   longest  surviving  
Empires  in  history.    Unfortunately,  the  Empire  was  not  able  to  keep  up  with  the  
development   of   Europe   and   its   influence,   predominantly   after   the   “Post-­
Enlightenment   Thinking”   and   Industrial   Revolution241.   The   Ottoman   Empire  
declined  considerably  and  was  not  able  to  maintain  control  over  its’  provinces.  
This  was  added  by  European  intervention  and  occupation  mainly  by  the  British  
and  French  powers.  Ultimately,  the  collapse  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  was  evident  
after   World   War   One   (1914-­1918),   a   war   that   represented   an   Ottoman  
                                                                                                              
238  Jane  Hathaway,  The  Arab  Lands  under  Ottoman  Rule:  1516-­1800  (Harlow,  England;;  New  
York:  Pearson  Longman,  2008),  48.    
239  Philip  S.  Khoury,  Urban  Notables  and  Arab  Nationalism:  The  Politics  of  Damascus  1860-­
1920  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University,  1983),  Cited  in  Ebubekir  Ceylan,  Ottoman  Origins  of  
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241  Sevket  Pamuk,  The  Ottoman  Empire  and  European  Capitalism,  1820-­1913:  trade,  
investment,  and  production  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1987),  Cited  in  Erik  J.  
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weakness  in  comparison  to  the  Great  Powers  of  the  West  (Allied  Powers)242.  
The  emerging  Nationalist  movement  later  led  by  the  most  influential  character  
Mustafa  Kemal  Ataturk,  ended  this  long  lived  Empire  and  established  a  newly  
Turkish  Republic  with  its  capital  Ankara.    
Writing   on   the   nature   of   relations   between   central   authority   of   the  
Ottoman  Empire  and  controlled  provinces  can  take  a  very  long  time  and  go  into  
significant  details  including  the  Administration  divisions,  taxation,  land  tenure,  
and  many  others.  However,  the  reason  for  including  it  in  this  chapter  is  to  try  
and  give  a  general  sense  of  the  significant  historical  relations  between  Istanbul  
and  the  Ottoman  Provinces  i.e.  Arabian  Territories.  This  is  helpful  because  it  
allows  us   to  understand   the  characteristics  of   the   relations  between   the   two  
nations  while  at  the  same  time  appreciate  the  considerable  transformation  of  
relations   after   the   collapse   of   the  Empire   and   the   establishment   of   the   new  
Republic.      
3.	  The	  Turkish	  Republic:	  a	  new	  outlook	  and	  foreign	  policy	  dimension	  
  
The  Empire  that  occupied  most  of  the  Arab  Provinces,  and  Parts  of  Southeast  
Europe,  North  Africa,  and  the  Caucasus,  became  one  that  barely  managed  to  
control   its   central   territory.  However,  what   came  out   of   this   struggle  was  an  
influential   figure   that   changed   Turkish   history.   This   figure   is   known   to   be  
Mustafa  Kemal  Ataturk,  a  General  that  served  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  later  
created   the  Republic  of  Turkey.  A  Republic   that  was   fundamentally  different  
from   its   prior   authority.   Therefore,   the   main   question   here   is   what   role   did  
Ataturk  play  in  making  Turkey  the  world’s  First  Secular  Muslim  Republic?    
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   In   order   to   answer   this   question,   it   is   important   for   us   to   understand  
Ataturk’s  life  and  ideology  that  led  him  to  such  success.  Mustafa  Kemal  came  
from  a  family  with  ordinary  financial  situation  and  was  able  to  receive  intensive  
military  education  since  he  was  12  years  of  age243.  We  have  to  take  into  account  
that  Mustafa  received  his  education  and  served  in  the  military  while  the  Ottoman  
Empire   was   getting   weaker   at   that   time.   This   is   important   because   Ataturk  
believed  that  there  was  corruption  and  decadence  and  therefore  his  purpose  
was  to  fight  it  and  modernise  Turkey244.  By  his  late  twenties,  Ataturk  was  among  
the  revolutionary  young  Turks,  who  have  had  high  influence  on  him.    To  many,  
he  was  a  true  representative  of  Young  Turk,  particularly  that  he  is  a  soldier,  well  
educated,  and  French  speaking  who  had  a  vision  of  Modernization  for  Turks.  
Thus,  Ataturk  was  able  to  take  leadership  of  the  Young  Turks  movement  and  
established  the  Republic  by  1923245.    
   After  achieving  victory  in  resistance  against  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  war  
against  occupying  forces,  the  Republic  of  Turkey  was  established.  Ataturk  had  
full  support  militarily,  but  less  politically.  In  other  words  he  was  seen  as  a  figure  
that  can  guide  them  to  liberation,  but  was  not  seen  as  the  new  political  leader  
at   the  beginning246.  However,  Kemal  sought   to  end  the  Imperial  rule.  Ataturk  
aimed   at   limiting   the  Caliphate   system   to  Turkey’s   territories   and  wanted   to  
disengage  with  the  Imperial  past.  This  was  achieved  after  the  Lausanne  Treaty  
in  1922-­23  after  long  talks  and  negotiations  that  put  an  end  to  occupation  and  
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achieve  peace247.  Turkey  was  given   full   independence  and   recognition  as  a  
new  country  by  1923248.  This  was  a  victory  and  an  important  turning  point  in  the  
history  that  paved  way  for  transformation  under  Kemal’s  rule.    
   There  have  been  a  number  of  critical  changes  that  took  place  in  Turkey  
under  Ataturk  that  formed  a  new  national  identity  and  political  ideology.  One  of  
the   first   and   most   important   decisions   made,   was   the   abolishment   of   the  
Caliphate  in  1924249.  This  marked  an  important  breakaway  from  the  long  direct  
Religious  Muslim  relations.  Furthermore,  such  decision  had  a  direct  impact  on  
the  nature  of  Turkish-­Middle  Eastern  relations  in  the  coming  years.  In  addition,  
we  can  see  that  the  new  Republic’s  foreign  policy  took  a  fundamental  step  away  
from  the  direct  link  and  relations  it  used  to  enjoy  for  a  very  long  time.    However,  
this  decision  was  also  faced  with  rage  and  anger  among  some  Turks250.  It   is  
critical  to  take  this  on  board  because  it  gives  us  the  picture  that  not  everyone  in  
Turkey  accepted  what  Ataturk  presented.  This  will  help  us  further  understand  
the  challenges  to  the  Kemalist  system  that  came  about  in  the  later  stages.    
   Ataturk  was  very  aggressive  in  the  way  he  sought  to  change  Turkey.  A  
typical  example  of  this  was  when  he  took  over,  he  restructured  the  parliament  
and   limited   opponents   influence251.  Kemal  was   under   growing   pressure   and  
criticism   and   his   opponents   were   executed   and   prosecuted   under   the  
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“Maintenance   of   Order   Law”252.   Many   saw   this   as   a   position   towards  
authoritarianism.  Groups,  such  as  liberals,  Marxists,  and  Conservatives  were  
suppressed   and   seen   as   opponents   of   this   new   Kemlist   secularism.  
Furthermore,   the   Kurdish   Revolt   of   1925,   also   known   as   the   “Sheikh   Said  
Rebellion”,  was  faced  with  brutality  and  witnessed  huge  bloodshed253.  We  have  
to  remember  that  the  Kurds  however  played  a  central  role  in  the  success  that  
Kemal  had  in  the  War  of  Independence  between  1919  and  1922  fighting  against  
the  Armenians  and  wining  a  victory  for  Ataturk  by  Kurdish  forces254.  Kemal  gave  
hope  for  Kurds  to  gain  autonomy  in  order  to  maintain  Kurdish  support  during  
the  War255.  However,  later  Kemal  did  not  keep  up  with  his  promises  and  saw  
the  Kurdish  issue  as  a  threat  to  the  new  “united”  Turkish  identity  that  he  was  
building256.    
   Furthermore,  Ataturk  associated  his  vision  of  developing  a  modern  state  
with   the   adoption   of  Western   values   and   technology  moving   away   from   the  
“darkness”  and  “backwardness”  of  the  East  and  the  Muslim  Ottoman  past257.  
This  however  created  separation  and  division  among  Turks,  between  people  
who   identify   themselves   in  accordance  with  Western  culture  and  Secularism  
and  others  who  familiarized  themselves  with  the  conservative  Islamic  culture.  
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Here  we  can  see  the  process  of  constructing  a  national  identity  that  did  not  suit  
all  citizens,  but  with  hegemony  and  power  this  was  largely  achieved.    
With   the   creation   of   the   Republican   People’s   Party   (CHP),   Ataturk  
assumed  domination  and  the  “Kemalist  Influence”  was  in  progress.  There  were  
other  major  decisions  along  with  the  abolishment  of  the  Caliphate  that  we  need  
to  take  into  account.  Ataturk’s  main  aim  was  to  bring  the  Turkish  society  “up  to  
the  Western  level”  that  was  seen  as  the  ideal  model  for  him258.  Kemal  saw  the  
access  to  the  Western  world  as  the  best  way  for  enlightenment  and  survival.  
Therefore,  since  1924;;  Islamic  “Sharia”  law  was  abandoned,  state  control  over  
education   increased,   the  calendar  was  changed   to   the  Gregorian  one,   Islam  
was  announced  to  be  the  official  religion  of  the  state,  but  far  away  from  involving  
in  the  constitution  of  other  political  activities,  the  Arabic  Alphabet  was  changed  
to  the  Latin  Alphabet,  Friday  prayers  were  to  be  said  in  Turkish  language  not  
Arabic  any  other  Muslim  nation,  and   imposed   the  wearing  hat  as   the  official  
dress  code  as  a  way  to  replace  the  religious  fez  and  other  head  wares259.    Such  
reforms  had  major   impacts  on  Turkey  and   the  Turkish  population.  This  was  
seen   as   the   best   way   to   secularize   and   modernize   society   into   a  Western  
image.       
Kemalism  was  by  now  seen  as  a  movement  of  its  own  that  has  a  distinct  
ideology  and  identity.  As  a  result,  this  had  a  direct  relation  with  Turkey’s  new  
foreign   policy   direction.   The   national   identity   and   political   ideology   of   the  
Republic  was  represented  by  this  secular  Western  oriented  behaviour.  With  the  
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expanding  Kemalist  domination,  it  was  evident  that  Ataturk  was  seen  as  a  hero  
and  saviour.  Ataturk  aimed  at  re-­building  and  re-­constructing  a  nation  to  suit  
the  ambitions  and  dreams  that  he  had  for  a  long  time.  According  to  Anna  Marisa  
Schon  (2013),  “these  reforms,  even  more  than  previously  the  political  reforms,  
had   two   aims   and   consequences:   Firstly,   they   served   the   purpose   of  
diminishing   the  possible   influence  of   Islam  on  society   in  different  ways,  and  
secondly,  the  reforms  constituted  an  approximation  of  Europe.  Essentially,   in  
the   framework   of   the   Kemalist   reforms   secularization   came   to   equal  
Westernization”260.    
Such  drastic  changes  resulted  in  conducting  a  foreign  policy  based  on  
both  Westernization   and  Secularism.   Therefore,   a  Westernization   campaign  
took  place  and  Turkey  made  all  efforts  to  develop  its  relations  with  the  West.  
Kemal   argued   that   there   is   only   one   civilization   known   as   the   Western  
civilization  and  that  it  was  inseparable  and  had  to  be  entirely  embraced261.  In  
order   to   totally   adopt   Western   thinking   and   beliefs,   a   deep   and   strong  
relationship  had  to  be  built.  This  will   indeed  bring  with   it  disengagement  with  
the  Islamic  and  Ottoman  past.  Therefore,  Turkey  developed  a  strong  Turkish-­
European  and  Turkish-­Western  relations  on  different  levels.       
As   a   result,   the   Turkish   foreign   policy   during   Ataturk   was   highly  
determined  by  its  Pro-­Western  legacy262.  Therefore,  Turkey  took  a  supportive  
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foreign   policy   towards   Western   and   European   international   positions   and  
policies.   Ataturk   did   not   challenge   the   European   policies   in   the   region   and  
instead  took  a  supportive  position  attempting  to  integrate  further  with  Europe  
and   the  Western  World.  Hence,  Turkey  went   further   trying   to  be  part   of   the  
European  Co-­operation  and  Integration.  Turkey  did  not  even  bother  about  some  
the  European  positions  against  it  at  the  beginning  and  still  wanted  to  improve  
relations.  For  example,  Britain  supported   the  Anti-­Turkish  Campaign   in  WWI  
and   in   the   War   of   Independence   263   and   was   reluctant   to   represent   their  
ambassadors  in  the  new  capital  Ankara264,  but  this  was  ignored  by  Turkey  and  
insisted  in  improving  relations.    
The  main  characteristics  that  we  can  draw  of  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  at  
that  time  were;;  Isolation,  Pragmatism,  and  Rationalism  265.  Omer  Kurkcuoglu  
(1981)   in   his   article   ‘An   Analysis   of   Ataturk’s   Foreign   Policy,   1919-­1938’  
illustrated   that   Turkey’s   foreign   policy   was   shaped   by:   1-­   Dialogue   with  
everyone   2-­   Use   of   Contacts   and   Links   3-­   No   trust   of   other   actors   and   4-­  
Separation  between  individual  and  government  affairs266.  However,  due  to  the  
devastating  political  and  economical  results  of  the  War  of  Independence  and  
World  War  One,  Turkey’s  main  aim  was  to  protect  itself  and  keep  away  from  
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wars  and  therefore  the  concept  of  “Peace  at  Home  and  Peace  Abroad”  was  one  
of  the  main  pillars  of  Turkey’s  foreign  policy267.  Turkey  avoided  to  engage  with  
any  form  of  aggressive  foreign  policy  and  was  mainly  concerned  about  its  own  
safety  and  support  from  Western  powers.  Therefore,  Turkey’s  objectives  were  
to  ensure  its  territorial  right  and  maintain  peace  in  order  to  carry  out  reforms.  
Francis   Fukuyama   (1992)   argued   that   such   foreign   policy   ensured   Turkey’s  
future  power268.    
Turkey  was  surrounded  by  previous  Ottoman  territories  that  could  have  
paused  threats  to  the  stability  and  safety  of  the  Republic,  if  careful  measures  
were  not  taken.  Consequently,  the  policy  of  ‘non-­alignment’  was  another  feature  
of  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  and  this  was  evident  by   its  neutral  stance  during  a  
time  when  defeated  countries  of  WWI  were   trying   to   change   the  balance  of  
power  and  the  winners  to  defend  the  status  quo269.  Turkey’s  neutral  position  in  
the  international  arena  at  a  time  of  political  instability  in  the  region  and  around  
the   world   was   a   very   important   key   step   to   Turkey’s   national   development.  
Instead  of  involving  in  different  international  affairs  and  taking  part  in  different  
organizations,  Ataturk  sought  to  focus  on  the  structuring  and  development  of  
the  new  Republic270.    
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However,   this   did   not   mean   that   Turkey   did   not   want   to   develop  
friendship  with  the  West;;  in  fact  it  needed  its  support  as  well.  One  of  Ataturks  
main  aims  was  to  gain  friendship  of   the  Western  powers.   It  was  both  for   the  
integration  with  Western  Civilization  and  protection  of  a  new  and  weak  state.    
Another   good   example   can   be   found   on   Turkey’s   position   towards   the  
Moroccan  Rif  War  or  Rebellion  in  early  1920s.  Due  to  Turkey’s  keenness  on  
Western  support,  it  did  not  challenge  the  Spanish  or  French  powers  over  this  
issue,   despite   its   anti-­imperialist   attitude271.   What   is   more,   the   League   of  
Nations   was   another   important   interest   for   Turkey.   The   League   would   give  
Turkey  Western  support  and  protection.  Therefore,  Turkey  joined  the  League  
of   Nations   by   1932272,   a   Western   institution   that   can   pave   way   for   further  
cooperation.    
The  national   identity   that  Ataturk  built  was  mainly  characterized  by   its  
Anatolian-­Turkishness,  National,  Secular,  and  Western.  At  the  same  time,  the  
political  ideology  featured;;  modernism,  secularism,  republicanism,  statism,  and  
nationalism273.   Those   new   national   identity   and   ideological   characteristics  
helped   generate   a   foreign   policy   that   is   mainly   shaped   by   its   pro-­Western,  
avoiding  Ottoman  and  Muslim  past,  and  isolationist.  Such  characteristics  and  
foreign   policy   practices   formed   what   became   known   as   “Kemalism”   and  
“Kemalist  foreign  policy”.        
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Moreover,  Ataturk  was  able  develop  six  main  principles  that  represented  
the  main  characteristics  of  Kemalism.  These  are  also  known  as  the  six  arrows  
also  drawn  on  the  CHP  symbol274.  They  stand  for  Republicanism,  Nationalism,  
Populism,  Statism,  Secularism/Laicism,  and  Revolutionism275.  Republicanism  
means   that   Turkey   would   be   led   by   a   parliamentary   democracy   with   an  
independent  judiciary.  This  can  also  be  seen  as  a  way  to  try  and  shift  people  
from  being  servants  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  to  being  citizens  of  Turkey  with  a  
democratic  rule  that  allow  people  to  rule  themselves.  Nationalism,  in  the  sense  
to   be   proud   of   the   new  nation   state   and   defend   its   territories,   consequently  
keeping   Turkey   independence   from   any   Imperialist   rule   or   external   threat.  
Furthermore,  populism  by  building  respect  among  all  citizens  and  eliminating  
separation   between   any   classes   and   individuals   as   well   as   making   this  
revolution  a  social  revolution  that  saved  the  Turks.    
Moreover,  Statism  means  that  Turkey  will  have  to  act   in  a  way  that   is  
nationally  beneficial.  This  includes  the  state’s  ownership  and  responsibility  of  
natural   resources   and   industrial   institutions.   Secularism,   also   regarded   as  
Laicism  (Originating  from  French  Secularism),  is  another  distinctive  feature  of  
Turkey  that  Ataturk  implemented,  which  meant  a  separation  of  religion  from  the  
state   and   from   other   educational   and   government   affairs.   This   also   built   an  
understanding  that  citizens  should  have  independence  of  faith  and  though.  On  
governmental  level,  it  meant  that  government  institutions  should  be  free  from  
any  kind  of  religious  influence  or  dominance.  The  Kemalist  revolution  was  an  
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extreme   secular   revolution   that   opposed   the   dominance   of   Islam   over   both  
institutions  and  citizens,  and   finally,  Revolutionism,   in   the  sense   that  Ataturk  
came   to   replace   traditional   institutions   with   modern   ones.   This   includes  
reforming   the   country   in   a  way   that   it   can   be  more  modern   and   away   from  
traditionalism276.  These  principles  generally  summarize   the  overall   ideas  and  
aims  of  Ataturk.  He  was  successful  in  a  way  that  Turkey  and  Turkish  society  
never  looked  the  same  as  it  used  to  be.  This  change  was  also  evidence  with  
the  large  wave  of  reforms  that  took  place  and  changes  in  both  domestic  and  
foreign  policies.      
However,   after   the   death   of  Ataturk,   Turkey  witnessed   another  major  
World  War.  This  time  Turkey’s  role  was  not  as  direct  as  it  was  in  the  First  World  
War.   Ismet   Inonu,   the   new   Turkish   president   and   leader   of   the   Republican  
People’s  Party,  aimed  at  keeping  Turkey  neutral277,  An  Anglo-­French-­Turkish  
treaty  of  mutual  assistance  was  concluded  in  October  1939278,  which  promised  
assistance  to  Turkey  in  times  of  war  by  France  and  Britain.  A  non-­aggression  
Pact  was   also   signed  with  Germany   later   in   1941279.   These  were   important  
foreign  policy  decisions  that  were  believed  to  help  protect  Turkish  sovereignty.  
There  were  some  attempts  to  improve  Turkish-­Russian  relations,  witnessing  a  
number  of  agreements280,  Turkey  sought  to  ally  with  European  Powers.  During  
the  Second  World  War,  Turkey  managed  to  keep  itself  neutral  and  away  from  
pressure  of   joining   in  most  of   the  wartime281.  However,  Turkey  only  officially  
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announcer  war  against  the  Axis  Powers  in  February  1945282.  This  was  a  tactical  
foreign  policy  decision  at  a  time  when  the  United  Nations  was  established.  Due  
to  Turkey’s  strategic  thinking,  it  became  one  of  the  first  members  of  the  UN283.    
4.	  Foreign	  policy	  and	  position	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  
  
The  Cold  War  was  another  crucial  period  in  Turkish  foreign  policy.  The  World  
was  entering  a  War  of  Tensions  between  the  Western  (The  United  States  and  
NATO)  and  Eastern  blocks  (Soviet  Union).  Turkey  was  in  a  position  that  aimed  
at  ensuring  the  development  of  relations  with  the  West  after  joining  the  UN.  It  
was  benefiting   from  American  aid  after   the  1947  Truman  Doctrine  and  1948  
Mrshall  Plan284.  Further  links  were  established,  such  as  becoming  a  member  in  
1948  in  the  Organization  for  European  Economic  Cooperation  (OEEC),  enjoyed  
membership  in  the  Council  of  Europe  in  1950,  and  joined  NATO  in  1952.  This  
shows   the  way   in  which  Turkey  was  determined   to   intensify   its  alliance  with  
Europe  and  the  West.  The  NATO  is  a  particular  case  that  we  need  to  consider  
when  thinking  about  Turkish  Foreign  Policy.  Turkey  was  able  to  join  NATO  after  
its   participation   in   the   Korean  War.   A   brigade  was   sent   to   serve   under   UN  
command   between   1950   and   1953285.   This   marked   a   major   steppingstone  
marking  Turkey’s  serious  commitment  to  the  West  economically  and  militarily.  
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Turkey  became  increasingly  economically  and  militarily  dependent  on  the  West  
and  established  a  relationship  better  than  ever  before.    
Although  Turkey  had  to  face  a  number  of  coups  and  political  instability,  
its  foreign  policy  mainly  remain  on  the  same  track.  However,  we  cannot  deny  
that   American-­Turkish   relations   deteriorated   in   some   occasions,   particularly  
regarding   Turkish-­Greece   conflict286.   American   economic   aid   became   less  
significant  with  Turkey’s  association  with  the  OEEC.    Another  important  period  
for  Turkey  during  the  Cold  War  was  the  ‘Cuban  missiles  Crisis’  in  the  1960s.  
Turkey   became   a   central   player   between   Russia   and   the   U.S.287.      Russia  
demanded  the  removal  of  the  mid-­ranged  atomic  warhead  Jupiter  missiles  that  
were  given  to  Turkey  in  exchange  for  removal  of  missiles  from  Cuba.  This  was  
an  important  point  in  history  of  Turkish  Foreign  Policy.  Turkish-­USSR  relations  
interred  another  phase  from  1964  with  the  Turkish  rapprochement.  Reasons  for  
such  act  included  a  response  to  America’s  position  on  Cyprus,  need  for  further  
economic  assistance,  and  growing  anti-­American  sentiment288.  Turkey  entered  
a  new  phase  in  its  relations  with  the  Eastern  block,  witnessing  intensive  talks  
and  increase  in  both  exports  and  imports  between  both  sides.    
Although  that  my  thesis  does  not  intend  to  fully  cover  issues  over  Cyprus  
and  Greece,  I  still  think  that  it  is  important  for  us  to  understand  Turkey’s  foreign  
policy   regarding   those   matters   as   they   also   had   direct   affects   on   Turkey’s  
relations  with   the  West  and  America   in  particular.  Another  Cyprus  crisis  was  
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witnessed   in  1974   that   involved  Turkish   intervention,  which  highly   intensified  
tensions  with  Greece289.  This   in   return  worsened  Turkey’s   relations  with   the  
U.S,  while  at  the  same  time,  relations  with  the  Soviet  block  were  improved  and  
the  USSR  did  not  show  much  concern  over  Turkey’s  intervention  in  Cyprus290.    
It  is  important  to  note  that  this  incident  resulted  in  one  of  the  lowest  levels  of  
relations   between   American   and   Turkey   in   history.   However,   after   many  
attempts,  relations  were  slowly  growing  again  especially  after  1978  when  the  
American  embargo  was  fully  lifted291.  Although  Turkey  and  the  U.S.  have  had  
some   tensions   during   the   Cold  War   period,   Turkish   foreign   policy   was   still  
mainly  following  Western  interests292.  It  can  be  argued  therefore  that  Turkey  did  
not  give  much  attention  to  the  Middle  East  and  the  Muslim  World,  for  the  sake  
of  preserving  support  of  the  West.  In  1958  for  instance,  Turkey  supported  the  
British   intervention   in   Jordan   and   the   American   intervention   in   Lebanon293.  
Another  strong  evidence  can  be  found  when  Turkey  supported  France  during  
the  Algerian  Independence  War294.  These  are  some  of  the  examples  that  show  
the   extent   of   Turkish  Western-­Oriented   foreign   policy   during   that   time.   This  
identifies  the  way  in  which  Kemalism  has  influenced  Turkish  foreign  policy  even  
long  after  Kemal’s  death.    
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On  the  other  hand,  there  were  other  events  that  witnessed  Turkey’s  support  to  
her  Arab  neighbors.  Turkey  was  in  supported  the  Arabs  side  in  the  Arab-­Israeli  
wars   of   1967   and   1973.   Relations   slightly   improved   and   in   1973   Turkey  
announced  that  Israeli  occupation  of  Arab  territories  was  unacceptable.  At  the  
same  time  Turkey  confidently  open  air  space  for  the  Soviets  for  aid  purposes295.  
Another  step  forward  that  we  can  take  into  account   is  Turkey’s   joining  in  the  
Organization  of  Islamic  Cooperation  (OIC)  in  1969296.  This  can  be  seen  as  a  
way  forward  to  strengthen  relations  with  the  Muslim  World.  Turkey  supported  
the  PLO  after  its  recognition  in  the  UN  as  the  legitimate  representative  of  the  
Palestinians  and  permitted  the  opening  of  an  office  for  the  PLO  in  Ankara  and  
in  late  1970s.297      
On  the  other  hand,  Turkey’s  relations  with  the  Caucasus,  Central  Asia  
and   the   Balkans   during   the   Cold   War   can   be   regarded   as   low   in   profile.  
Relations  with  Central  Asia  and  the  Caucasus  were  not  existent  in  a  time  where  
the  USSR  tried  to  keep  Turkey’s  influence  far  from  those  areas  and  feared  Pan-­
Turkism.  While  Turkey  was  keeping  itself  inline  with  Ataturk’s  policy  of  dealing  
with  the  Turks  who  are  living  within  the  borders  of  the  republic298.  On  the  other  
hand,  Turkey’s  relations  with  the  Balkans  were  slightly  better.  They  managed  
to  maintain  political   and  economic   relations  with   states   in   the  Balkan  areas.  
However,  this  was  still  limited  due  to  the  Soviet  Union’s  dominance  and  control  
over  that  region.299      
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However,  by  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  the  balance  of  relations  with  the  
US  and  Turkey  were  changing  again.  With  the  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan  
and   the   Iranian   Revolution,   tensions   between   great   powers   increased   and  
Turkey  allied  itself  with  the  West.  As  a  result  Turkey  was  able  to  sign  in  1980  a  
Defense   and  Economic  Cooperation  Agreement  with   the  U.S.300   In   general,  
during  late  1980s  the  Soviet  Union  did  not  appreciate  Turkey’s  close  ties  with  
America  and  posed  huge  criticism,  while  at  the  same  time,  Turkey  condemned  
the   Soviet   invasion   of   Afghanistan   and   allowed   Afghani   refugees   to   enter  
Turkey301.  The  Soviet  Union  appeared  weak  and  faced  major  internal  instability  
and  its  collapse  and  end  of  the  Cold  War  in  1989  meant  that  Turkey  was  no  
longer   threatened   and   is   now   allied   with   the   greatest   power   in   the   World  
entering  a  New  World  Order.    
Overall,   Turkey   transformed   itself   from   being   a   country   that   did   not  
belong  here  or  there,  to  an  important  Western  partner.  Joining  the  NATO  was  
highly  critical   to  Turkey  and  was  able  to   increase   its  security  and   in  different  
events  showed  how  important  Turkey  was  as  a  member  of  this  organization.  
The  Cold  war  was  a  period  of  high  tensions  and  close  to  confrontations  and  
Turkey  was  able  to  play  a  major  part  and  her  foreign  policy  has  made  its  mark  
in   this  war.  We   can   see   that   Turkey   took   a   very   pro-­Western   foreign   policy  
direction,  while  at  the  same  time,  did  not  try  hard  enough  to  build  closer  ties  
with  the  Middle  East.      
5.	  Foreign	  policy	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  new	  World	  Order	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With  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  and  the  emergence  of  the  New  World  Order,  many  
small   and   large   states   sought   to   change   their   foreign   policies   and   roles   in  
international   politics   accordingly.   For   Turkey,   post-­Cold   War   led   to   major  
changes   in   its   foreign   policy   that   changed   its   international   position   and   role  
since   then.   The   collapse   of   the   former   Soviet   Union   and   the   emergence   of  
violent   ethnic   conflicts   in   the   Balkans   and   Caucasus   as   well   as   the   radical  
changes   in   the   landscape  of  Eastern  Europe,  created  new  opportunities  and  
new  challenges  at  the  same  time.  Therefore,  Turkey  sought  to  adopt  a  more  
active  foreign  policy  and  take  advantage  of  those  new  opportunities  as  well  as  
tackling  new  regional  challenges  that  affects  its  own  security  and  sovereignty.  
On   the  other  hand,   it   is   important   to  understand   that   the   intensified  Kurdish  
problem  has  been  a  major  factor  that  further  developed  the  challenges  Turkey  
had  to  deal  with,  which  had  a  direct  effect  on  its  foreign  policies.  For  example,  
Turkey  had  to  rethink  about   its  regional  strategic  partnership  and  particularly  
with  Iran,  Iraq,  and  Syria  in  order  to  be  able  to  deal  with  the  Kurdish  issue  and  
the   security   threat   of   the   PKK.   Therefore,   such   new   risks,   challenges,   and  
opportunities  posed  by  the  new  post-­Cold  War  era  helped  Turkey  to  break  away  
from  its  Kemalist  foreign  policy  tradition.    
   This   was   significantly   evident   in   the   era   of   Turgut   Ozal,   a   man   who  
changed   the   balance   of   power   against   Kemalists,   was   able   to   revolutionize  
Turkey’s  foreign  policy  and  its  international  position.  The  period  between  1983  
and  1993  of  Ozal’s  role  in  Turkey  witnessed  a  major  turning  point.  What  is  more,  
he  was  able  to  restructure  the  political  ideology  of  the  country  and  made  Turkey  
a  very  important  regional  and  international  player.  Ozal’s  participation  in  Turkish  
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politics  can  be   tracked  back   to   the  1980  military  coup302.   It  was  a  coup   that  
came  as  the  third  coup  in  the  history  of  Turkey.    The  first  was  in  1960  ending  
the  Menderes  period  by  Adnan  Menderes303,  which  I  will  go  into  more  details  in  
the  coming  sections.  The  second  coup  d’état  was  in  1971  also  known  as  “coup  
by  memorandum”  that  came  as  a  result  of  the  increasing  instability  and  chaos  
in  the  country304.    
However,   the   1980   coup   d’état   was   led   by   Kenan   Evren,   a   military  
General  who  wanted  to  end  radicalism  and  restore   the  civilian  parliamentary  
rule305.  It  was  also  in  a  time  when  Turkey  had  to  face  economic  drawbacks  and  
with  the  forming  of  the  new  government,  the  National  Security  Council  (NSC)  
appointed  Turgut  Ozal  as  Deputy  Prime  Minister  for  Economic  Affairs306.  Ozal  
had   a   more   business-­oriented   mindset   that   believed   in   the   importance   of  
economic  prosperity.  Therefore,  he  carried  out  a  number  of  economic  reforms  
that   resulted   in   a   better   economic   performance   in   1981   and   after307.  
Furthermore,   he   was   able   to   create   the   Motherland   Party   and   marked   an  
important  presence  in  1983  elections  in  the  parliament308.  However,  he  carried  
out  his  revolutionary  ideas  when  the  military  slowly  started  losing  its  power  over  
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2015,  http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/60/the-­menderes-­period-­1950-­1960.html.    
304  Aljazeera,  “Time  line:  A  history  of  Turkish  coups”,  Aljazeera,  accessed  May  9,  2015,  
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2012/04/20124472814687973.html.      
305  Karpat,  K.,  “The  Military,  the  State,  and  Politics,”  in  Heper,  M.  and  Evin,  A.  (eds.),  State,  
Democracy,  and  the  Military:  Turkey  in  the  1980s,  (Berlin  and  New  York:  Walter  de  Gruyter,  
1988),  149.    
306  Presidency  of  the  Republic  of  Turkey,  “Turgut  Ozal,”  tccb,  accessed  May  9,  2015,  
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the   government   and   after   his   victory   and   assuming   presidency   in   1989309.  
Ozal’s   politics   was   famous   with   its   pragmatic   side   to   it.   Therefore,   Turkish  
Foreign  Policy  during  Ozal’s  period  was  dominated  by  its  pragmatic  thinking.    
The   term   “Ozalism”  became   famous   in   the  post-­Cold  War  period  with  
Turgut  Ozal’s  revolutionizing  Turkey’s  position  in  the  international  arena.  The  
remarkable  changes  in  the  international  system  with  the  revolution  of  Turkish  
economy  donated  to  Ozalism  as  a  new  political  wave  in  Turkey  that  made  its  
mark  in  Turkish  history.  Ozal  was  able  to  contest  the  Orthodox  Foreign  Policy  
ideas,  style,  and  structure  in  Turkey310.    He  stated,  “In  foreign  policy  the  days  
of  taking  a  cowardly  and  timid  position  are  over.  From  now  we  will  pursue  an  
active  policy  based  on  circumstances…  My  conviction   is   that  Turkey  should  
leave  its  former  passive  and  hesitant  policies  and  engage  in  an  active  foreign  
policy”  311.  Therefore,  we  can  see  the  way  Ozal  was  trying  to  transform  Turkey  
into  a  new  actor  that  should  play  a  much  influential  role  in  international  politics.  
Turgut  Ozal  was  seen   to  be  a  moderate  Muslim  who  did  not  agree  with   the  
Kemalist  understanding  of  secularism  and  was  also  against  the  Arab  version  of  
Islamism.  Furthermore,  Ozal  believed  that  Turkey  was   in  need  of  an  “Anglo-­
Saxon  secularism”  and  a  “Turkish  version  of  Islam”  open-­minded  towards  other  
religious  groups312.    
In   terms   of   Turkish   foreign   policy,   Turgut   Ozal   sought   to   restore   the  
Turkish  position  and  international  relations  after  a  long  period  of  isolation  and  
military  dominance.  He  saw  that  integration  with  the  West  as  an  important  step  
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towards  better   relations.  Turgut  Ozal   regarded  Turkish  people  as   “European  
Muslims”  and  that  Turkey  is  part  of  Europe.  For  instance,  in  one  of  his  famous  
books  ‘Turkey  in  Europe,  Europe  in  Turkey’  (1991)  argued  that  Turkey  is  always  
European  and  is  actually  part  of  Europe313.  He  called  for  better  understanding  
between  Turkey  and  the  West  particularly  Europe  and  believed  that  Turkey  can  
solve  many  of  its  problems  and  achieve  prosperity  and  security  through  joining  
the  EC.  Furthermore,  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  changed  the  balance  of  power  in  
the  region  and  reduced  the  Russian  threat  for  Turkey.  Therefore,  allying  with  
the  Western  powers  headed  by  the  United  States  was  a  very  beneficial  step.  
Moreover,  Turkish   relations  during  Ozal’s  period   improved  especially  after  a  
long  history  of  tensions  regarding  the  Cyprus  conflict.  Therefore,  it  can  be  said  
that  Turkey  and  the  United  States  entered  a  new  period  of  better  relations  314.    
On  the  other  hand,  in  order  to  gain  Western  support  and  engagement,  
Ozal  had  to  re-­engage  with  the  neighboring  regions  and  make  more  efforts  to  
develop  relations  with  the  Balkans,  the  Black  Sea,  and  the  Middle  East.  As  a  
result,  Turkey  witnessed  improved  relations  with  these  regions  and  particularly  
on  economic  terms.  Hence,  Ozal  was  able  to  develop  economic  relations  with  
neighboring   states,   particularly   with   the   establishment   of   the   Black   See  
Economic   Cooperation   Organization   (BSEC)315.   The   economic   factor   was  
increasingly  becoming  important  in  shaping  relations  with  the  Middle  East,  while  
oil  prices  were  on  the  rise  and  the  increasing  dependency  of  Turkey  on  oil.  Ozal  
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was  very  much  keen  to  developing  relations  with  the  West  by  trying  to  convince  
Western   powers   that   Turkey   was   an   influential   and   important   power   in   the  
region,  particularly  the  middle  East.  For  instance,  during  the  Gulf  War  of  1990  
and  the  Iraqi   invasion  of  Kuwait,  Turgut  Ozal  recognized  that  this  chance  for  
him  to  persuade  the  United  States  that  Turkey  is  an  important  regional  ally  and  
fully  supported  the  coalition  against  Saddam  Hussein  to  free  Kuwait316.  Overall,  
the  Turkish-­Arab  relations  were  mainly  based  on  economic  interests  and  this  
played  an  important  role  in  the  growth  of  Turkey’s  economy.  For  example,  Ozal  
introduced   Islamic   Banking   (interest   free   banking   system)   in   Turkey   and  
performed  Hajj   in  a  way  to  promote  relations  and  economic  cooperation  with  
the  Middle  East  and  the  Islamic  World317.    
The   pre   and   post-­Cold   War   periods   in   Turkey   saw   major   waves   of  
changes  and  domestic  tensions  between  the  traditional  secular  establishment  
and   the   new   centre-­right   reformists.   Turkey’s   foreign   policy   was   mainly  
characterized  by  its  isolation  and  skepticism  at  the  beginning  of  the  Republic.  
This   was   slowly   changing   due   to   both   domestic   and   international   changing  
environments,  which  paved  way  for  Turkey  to  entre  the  international  arena  and  
play  and  much  influential  role.    However,  in  order  to  understand  the  changing  
nature   of   Turkish   foreign   policy,   one   must   analyse   the   domestic   political  
dynamics  and  changes  that  took  place.  The  development  of  Turkish  domestic  
politics   was   shaped   by   a   noticeable   struggle   between   the   secular   camp   of  
Kemalism  and  the  right-­wing  political  Islamists.  This  in  turn  had  a  major  impact  
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on  Turkey’s  foreign  relations  and  policy.  In  addition,  to  understand  the  current  
AKP  ruling  party’s  ideology  and  foreign  policy,  one  must  also  understand  the  
development  of  Political  Islam  in  Turkey.    
6.	  The	  emergence	  and	  development	  of	  Political	  Islam	  in	  Turkey	  
  
The   purpose   of   this   section   is   to   illustrate   the   way   in   which   political   Islam  
became  one  of  the  most   important  features  in  Turkish  politics.  Political  Islam  
has  certainly  been  central  to  understanding  Turkish  politics,  which  at  the  same  
time  saw  major  shifts  and  changes  of  foreign  policy  directions  when  Islamists  
were   highly   influential   and   took   part   in   the   decision   making   process.   The  
development  of  political  Islam  in  Turkey  is  unique  and  took  part  in  a  number  of  
phases  in  the  republic’s  history.  The  evolution  of  Islamism  has  certainly  affected  
Turkish  foreign  policy  and  particularly  towards  the  Middle  East.  This  section  of  
the   chapter   will   also   pave   way   for   understanding   the   emergence   and  
establishment   of   the   Justice   and  Development  Party   (AKP)   that   took   power  
since  2002.    
   Although   Turkey   is   regarded   as   a   secular   country,   it   is   however  
populated  by  a  majority  of  Muslims  that  account  for  around  99%318.  Therefore,  
this  gives  us  some  insights  to  why  Islamist  parties  have  had  growing  popularity  
in  the  past  few  decades.  The  experience  of  political  Islam  in  Turkey  after  the  
creation  of  the  newly  Republic  in  1923  was  very  tense  and  full  of  tensions.  As  
Kemal  Ataturk   the   founder  of   the  new  Republic  was  concerned   in  creating  a  
new   Turkish   identity   and   image   away   from   its   previous   Ottoman   identity,  
Islamists  in  Turkey  were  isolated  and  their  main  concern  was  how  to  survive  
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under  such  drastic  and  radical  changes  taking  them  away  from  Turkish  Islamic  
traditions.  Since  1923,  Turkey  was  controlled  by  a  single  party  known  as  The  
Republican  People’s  Party  (CHP)  led  by  Ataturk  until  his  death  in  1938  and  later  
by   Ismail   Inonu   until   1950319.   Therefore,   the   first   phase   of   Political   Islam   in  
Turkey  was  characterized  by  its  weakness  and  isolation.  The  role  of  Islamists  
in  the  early  years  of  the  republic  was  weak  and  had  very  little  influence  over  
Turkish  politics.    
   However,  this  has  changed  since  the  democratic  transition  took  place  in  
1946   with   the   introduction   of   the  multi-­party   system320,   which   created  more  
space  for  other  political  parties  to  emerge  and  a  new  platform  and  opportunity  
for  Islamists.  This  transition  from  authoritarianism  to  political  liberalization  had  
a   major   impact   on   Turkish   politics   and   society   ever   since.   The   Republican  
People’s  Party   led  by  Ismail   Inonu  lost   its  power  and  monopoly  over  Turkish  
politics   in  1950  and   therefore   the  new  Democratic  Party   (DP)   led  by  Adnan  
Menderes  won  the  elections  and  ruled  until  1960.  Turkey  entered  a  new  era  
that   famously   became   to   be   known   as   the   Menderes   period321.   Therefore,  
Prime   Minister   Menderes   enabled   more   democratization   and   openness   to  
religious   participation   in   the   political   process   and   established  more   political  
room  for  Islamist  groups  to  build  and  organize  themselves.  Adnan  Menderes  
gave  more   recognition  and   respect   to   the   importance  of   Islam  and   the   rural  
traditions.   The   call   to   prayer   was   allowed   to   be   read   in   Arabic,   which   was  
banned  during  Ataturk’s  rule,  radio  stations  were  allowed  to  broadcast  citations  
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of   the   Quran,   and   Islamic   education   was   growing   in   schools.   As   a   result,  
conservative  Muslims  and  rural  areas  and  citizens  were  able  to  gradually  entre  
the  political  competition.  Turkey  feared  the  Soviet  threat  and  therefore  a  shift  
towards   democracy   would   allow   it   to   enter   the   “Western   block”.   Therefore,  
Turkey  adopted  the  Marshall  Plan,  participated  in  the  Korean  War,  and  joined  
the  NATO  in  1952322.  The  Menderes  period  is  regarded  as  an  important  turning  
point  in  the  history  of  political  Islam  in  Turkey.  Prime  Minister  Menderes  became  
increasingly   popular   and   succeeded   in   winning   the   elections   of   1954   and  
1957323.    
   Unfortunately,  the  democratic  dream  was  crushed  by  Kemalist  elites  who  
were  represented  by  the  military  and  bureaucracy  staging  a  military  coup  and  
ended  the  Democratic  Party  government  on  27th  of  May  1960.  Furthermore,  DP  
members  were  imprisoned  and  Adnan  Menderes  was  executed  along  with  the  
Foreign   and   Finance  ministers   after   putting   them   in   front   of   a  military   court  
accusing  them  for  violating  the  constitution324.  Turkey  was  led  by  the  military  
since  1960   through   the   “National  Unity  Committee”  until  1961.  However,   the  
1961  constitution  brought  about  a  new  era  that  paved  way  for  more  freedom  
including   freedoms   for   religious   groups325.   By   1964,   the   Justice   Party   was  
created   by   Suleyman   Demirel,   a   man   who   won   the   elections   in   1965   and  
created  a  majority  government.  The  Justice  Party  came  to  rule  Turkey  for  the  
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next  four  years326.  However,  the  most  important  event  that  had  a  major  impact  
on   the  history  of  political   Islam   in  Turkey  was   the  1969  Milli  Gorus  “National  
View”  manifesto  by  one  of  the  most  influential  Islamist  figures  in  the  history  of  
Turkey   Necemettin   Erbakan327.   He   was   an   intellectual   figure   from   Istanbul  
Technical  University  who  was  very  concerned  about   the  religious  grounds   in  
Turkey  that  have  been  affected  by  the  Kemalist  elites  and  called  for  the  return  
to   traditional   values328.  Erbakan  was   influenced  by  Mehmet  Zahid  Kotku,  an  
Islamic  scholar,  who  also  supported  the  creation  of  the  first  Islamic  party  in  1970  
known   as   the   National   Order   Party   (MNP)   calling   for   a   new   political   and  
economic  order  through  Islamic  principles329.    Shykh  Kotku  became  one  of  the  
most  important  religious  leaders  in  Turkey  providing  MNP  and  other  important  
figures  in  Turkish  politics,  such  as  Turgut  Ozal  and  Recep  Tayyip  Erdogan,  the  
religious  guidance  and  legitimacy.  
   However,  only  one  year  later,  the  MNP  was  dissolved  by  another  military  
intervention  and  Erbakan  went  into  exile  out  of  Turkey  by  1971330.  Only  a  year  
later,  Erbakan  returned  to  Turkey  and  established  NSP  (the  National  Salvation  
Party)331.  Again  this  party  did  not  move  much  away  from  its  previous  one  and  
kept  much  of  its  Islamist  agendas.  The  NSP’s  slogan  was  yeniden  büyük  türkiye  
“A  great  Turkey  once  again”  calling  for  the  return  to  Islam  and  Muslim  way  of  
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life332.  Erbakan’s  popularity  during  the  1970’s  increased  and  Islamism  became  
much  stronger  and  influential.  In  the  1973  elections,  NSP  managed  to  win  48  
seats  in  the  parliament  making  for  the  first  time  an  official  entrance  for  Islamists  
to   the   Turkish   government333.   Most   interestingly,   Erbakan   agreed   to   join   a  
coalition  government  with  its  old  enemy  the  Republican  People’s  Party  led  by  
Bulent  Ecevit   in  1974334.  Erbakan  for   the  first   time  became  the  deputy  prime  
minister  in  control  of  a  number  of  ministries  and  promoted  the  return  of  Sharia  
in  Turkey335.  This  enabled  Erbakan  to  pave  way  for  NSP  members  and  other  
Islamists  to  access  government  institutions  that  eventually  affected  the  secular  
state.  Unfortunately,  this  coalition  government  only  lasted  for  Nine  months  and  
through  the  rest  of  the  1970s  Turkey  witnessed  high  tensions  between  Islamists  
and  leftists.  Banu  Eligur  in  his  book  The  Mobilization  of  Political  Islam  in  Turkey  
(2010)  argued  that  Turkey  during  the  1970s  entered  a  period  of  high  tensions  
and  referred  to  it  as  being  “on  the  brink  of  a  civil  war”  and  stated  that  “the  Turkish  
political   scene   was   characterized   by   a   thorough   ideological   polarization  
between  right-­wing  ultranationalists  and  radical  left-­wing  groups,  a  long  with  a  
lack  of  decisive  authority  on  the  part  of  the  government”336  
   As  a  result,  a  military  intervention  was  evident  in  1980  and  banned  all  
political   parties   including  NSP,   but   this   time   the  military   pursued   a   different  
policy  towards  Islamists  and  the  religious  discourse.  According  to  Hakan  Yavuz  
(2003)  “since  the  1980  coup,  the  Turkish  state  has  pursued  a  dual-­track  policy  
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of  cooptation  and  containment  by  opening  more  options  to  Islamist  groups  to  
participate   in  political  and  economic  processes”337.  Therefore,   Islamists  were  
integrated  into  the  democratic  process,  which  gave  another  major  opportunity  
for  political   Islam   to   flourish  again.   It  can  be  argued   that   the  Turkish  military  
establishment  during   the  cold  war   tried   to  stop   the  Communist  and   left-­wing  
ideologies’   influence  and   threat  by   increasing   the  role  of   Islam338.  Therefore,  
religious   education   received   intense   support   and   became   mandatory   in  
schools339.  However,  the  1982  constitution  defined  Turkey  as  a  secular  state  
and  was  put  to  a  referendum.  Kenan  Evren  was  appointed  president  and  the  
National  Security  Council  maintained  power  over  Turkish  politics340.  However,  
Erbakan   was   able   to   come   back   again   to   the   political   arena   in   1983   by  
establishing  the  Welfare  Party  (RP)341,  but  this  time  it   took  the  Welfare  Party  
some  time  to  reach  a  political  success.  However,  most  importantly,  Turgut  Ozal  
a  man   known   to   be   a   successful   bureaucrat   and   an   important   figure   in   the  
politics   of   Turkey   emerged   the   same   year   with   the   establishment   of   the  
Motherland   Party   (MP),   which   was   regarded   as   a   centre-­right   nationalist  
party342.   The   National   Security   Council   did   not   abandon   the   newly   formed  
Ozal’s   party.   Therefore,   between   1983   and   1993   he   managed   to   win   the  
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election,  become  Prime  Minister,  and  later  as  President,  which  marked  a  period  
of  significant  transformation  known  as  the  “Ozal  period”343.    
As  mentioned  in  previous  sections  of  this  chapter,  Turgut  Ozal’s  business  and  
economic  experiences  were  very  evident  in  his  successful  economic  policies.  
On   the   other   hand,   political   Islam  went   through   another   important   period   of  
success  during  his  term,  a  term  that  lasted  for  around  ten  years  and  brought  
about  drastic  changes  to  the  political  and  economic  situations  in  Turkey.    For  
example,  Ozal’s  economic  policies  gave  rise  to  a  new  middle  class  that  was  
referred  to  as  the  “Anatolian  Bourgeoisie”.  This  new  emerging  class  had  links  
and   ties   with   traditional   and   Islamic   culture344.   Furthermore,   Islamists   were  
given  more  freedoms  that  increased  their  powers  and  were  able  to  get  intensive  
financial  support   for  private  schools  and  universities.  For   instance,  Fethullah  
Gulen  one  of  the  most  important  and  leading  Islamist  scholars  was  able  to  fund  
and  establish  schools  both  in  and  out  of  Turkey.  Gulen’s  followers  were  able  to  
teach   Islamic   principles   and   his   ideas   that   were   famously   known   to   involve  
science   and   Western   thinking   as   well345.   Therefore,   the   Gulen   movement  
became  one  of  the  most  important  religious  movements  that  played  a  central  
role  in  the  Islamic  experience  in  Turkish  history.  Moreover,  Islamists  were  able  
to  access  influential  media  and  newspaper  chains346,  which  enabled  them  to  be  
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heard  and  gain  more  popularity.  Hence,  it  can  be  argued  that  Ozal’s  reforms  
created  more  space  for  political  groups  to  rise  and  particularly  Islamist  ones.      
During  the  1980s,  the  Welfare  Party  RP  led  by  Erbakan  went  through  an  
important   period   of   development.   For   example,   in   1987   the   Welfare   Party  
received  7.16%   in  parliamentary  elections347,  but  needed  10%  more   to  have  
representation  in  the  parliament.  Although  during  1980s  there  were  no  Islamist  
representations  in  parliament,  the  RP  was  still  in  the  process  of  development.  
However,  during  1990s,  Islamist  presence  was  increasing  and  this  was  evident  
during   the  1994  parliamentary  elections  when   the  RP  gained  19%  of   votes,  
which  enabled  them  to  have  representation  in  parliament,  and  most  importantly  
gained  21.38%  of  votes   in  1995  national  elections348.  Therefore,   in  1996   the  
Welfare  Party  managed  to  form  a  coalition  led  by  Erbakan  with  the  True  Path  
Party   (TPP)349,   another   conservative   party   headed   by   Tansu   Ciller.   They  
agreed   to   divide   ministries   between   them   and   shared   power   of   rule.   This  
marked  the  first  Islamist  party  to  rule  Turkey  since  the  creation  of  the  Republic.  
Some  policies  by  Erbakan  were   seen   to  be  quite   controversial,   such  as   the  
customs’  union  with  the  European  Union,  and  treaties  with  Israel350.  However,  
Erbakan  still   tried  to  push  for  a  more  Islamist  foreign  policy  calling  for  the  so  
called   (D-­8)   an   Islamic   Economic   Grouping   for   example351.   Fearing   that  
Erbakan  would  further  Islamize  Turkish  society  and  Turkish  foreign  policy,  the  
                                                                                                              
347  Paschalis  Zilidis,  “Turkey  and  European  Union.  Problems  and  Prospects  for  Membership,”  
(MA  diss.,  Naval  Postgraduate  School):  11,  accessed  May  11,  2015,  
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/1481/04Jun_Zilidis_NSA.pdf?sequence=1.    
348  Ibid,  11.    
349  Risa  Brooks,  Shaping  Strategy:  The  Civil-­military  Politics  of  Strategic  Assessment  
(Princeton  University  Press,  2008),  212.  
350  Angel  Rabasa  and  Stephen  Larabee,  The  Rise  of  Political  Islam  in  Turkey  (Rand  
Corporation,  2008),  43.    
351  Berdal  Aral,  “An  Enquiry  into  the  D-­8  Experiment:  An  Incepient  Model  of  an  Islamic  
Common  Market?,”  Turkish  Journal  of  International  Relations  4,  no.  1&2    (2005):  89.    
147	  	  
military  and  secular  establishments  were  highly  alarmed.  Hence,  this  led  to  the  
short  living  of  his  rule  and  resignation  in  1997  after  a  lot  of  pressure  in  a  so-­
called  “silent  coup”352.  The  Welfare  Party  was  later  banned  by  the  constitutional  
court  in  1998  and  Erbakan  was  forbidden  from  political  action.  The  first  Islamist  
party  and  prime  minister  rule  in  Turkey  was  short  lived  and  Erbakan  became  
much  weaker  after  banning  him  for  a  five  year  period.353    
Despite  Erbakan’s  ban  from  politics,  he  was  able  to  involve  in  the  making  
of   the  new  Virtue  Party  (FP)   in  1998354.  However,   this   time  they  had  to   tone  
down  their  criticism  of  the  secular  establishment  and  build  a  new  image  of  their  
party355.  Despite  all  of  this,  the  Virtue  Party  was  also  banned  in  2001  and  the  
party  MPs  were  able   to   form   two  new  parties;;   the  Justice  and  Development  
Party  (AKP)  a  modern  reformist  and  “Conservative-­Democratic”  party,  and  the  
Felicity   Party   (SP)   a   more   traditional   party   following   the   classical   Islamist  
ideas356.  Between  1999  and  2002,  Turkey  was   ruled  by   the  Democratic  Left  
Party  (DSP)  led  by  PM  Bulent  Ecevit357.  The  emergent  of  the  new  reformist  AKP  
party  in  2001  established  by  Recep  Tayyip  Erdogan  and  Abdullah  Gul  was  a  
major  turning  point  in  the  history  of  Political  Islam  in  Turkey,a  party  that  would  
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come  to  successfully  rule  Turkey  since  2002  and  lead  a  transformation  of  the  
county  on  all  levels.    
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The  AKP  came  at  a  time  when  Turkey  had  the  biggest  economic  crisis  in  the  
history  of   the   republic   that   they  suffered   few  years  before  particularly  during  
2000   and   2001358.   Therefore,   the   newly   emerged   Justice   and  Development  
Party  (AKP)  gave  hope  for  new  changes  and  won  the  elections  of  2002359.  This  
was  seen  as  a  victory  for  a  new  centre-­right  political  party  with  religious  roots.  
The  new  party  was  led  by  Recep  Tayyip  Erdogan  who  became  Turkey’s  new  
Prime  Minister  and  serves  today  as  its  President.  Leaders  of  the  AKP  asserted  
in   a   number   of   occasions   that   it   is   not   an   Islamist   party,   and   compared  
themselves   to   the   European   “Christian   democratic”   political   parties360.   The  
formation  of   the  AKP  saw  an  important  departure  from  its   leaders’   traditional  
Islamist   root.   The   new   party   came   to   offer   a   new   image   and   phase   in   the  
experience  of  political  history  of  Turkey.    
   The  most  important  factor  that  is  attributed  to  the  AKP  government  was  
its  success  in  weakening  the  military  influence  over  the  central  government  and  
involvement  in  Turkish  politics  and  decision-­making.  The  military  establishment  
has  been  very  much  involved  in  shaping  the  political  life  since  the  formation  of  
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the   Republic   in   1923.   Erdogan’s   government   took   steady   and   significant  
measures   in   weakening   such   historical   power   and   influence.   For   instance,  
several   military   figures   and   high-­ranking   officers   were   put   on   trial   and  
imprisoned   and   many   other   military   and   kemalist   associated   underground  
groups   who   attempted   to   overthrow   the   AKP   government361.   AKP   leaders  
believe  that  the  military  should  only  be  concerned  with  military  issues  and  leave  
politics  for  politicians362.  Therefore,  it  can  be  argued  that  there  has  been  a  shift  
in  the  balance  of  civil-­military  relations  and  this  enabled  Turkey  to  enhance  the  
development  of  its  democratic  process.  Hence,  for  the  first  time  in  Turkey,  an  
elected  civilian  government  has  much  more  power  than  the  military363.      
   Moreover,  during  the  rule  of  the  AKP  government,  Turkey  witnessed  a  
significant   democratic   transformation.   Erdogan’s   government   managed   to  
succeed   in   the   parliamentary   elections   and   presidential   vote   in   the  
parliament364.   The  motivation   behind   this   democratic   development   was   also  
part   of   Turkey’s   commitment   to   joining   the   European   Union.   Turkey   had   to  
change   and   improve   its   democratic   position   in   order   to   succeed   in   the   full  
membership   to   the   EU   negotiations.   According   to   Leila   Piran   in   her   book  
Institutional  Change   in  Turkey:  The   impact   of  European  Reforms  on  human  
rights  and  policing   (2013),  democratization  and   improvement  of  policing  and  
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human   rights   records  have  been   to  a   large  extent  affected  by   the  European  
Union  and  added  that  the  AKP  commitment  for  democratization  was  driven  by  
“Turkey’s  EU  membership  bid”  365.  Therefore,  Turkey  was  as  the  new  regional  
democratic  model  and  the  most  successful  Muslim  democracy  that  inspires  the  
rest  of  the  Islamic  World  and  particularly  the  Middle  East.    
   On  the  other  hand,  when  analyzing  Turkish  foreign  policy  since  2002,  we  
see   that   an   even   greater   transformation   took   place.   After   a   long   history   of  
Turkish  in-­active  foreign  policy,  the  AKP  came  to  revolutionize  Turkey’s  position  
once  again.  Turkey  opened  its  doors  to  all  continents  and  was  able  to  develop  
diplomatic,  economic,  and  cultural  relations  with  many  different  nations.  One  of  
the  most  important  doors  was  opened  towards  the  Middle  East  and  Turkey  was  
able  to  re-­engage  with  its  neighboring  Arab  states  especially  after  a  long  history  
of  disengagement.  Since  the  American  invasion  of  Iraq  in  2003,  Turkey  played  
an  increasingly  important  role  in  the  region.  Turkey  joined  the  war  on  terrorism  
and  was  an  important  member  of  the  anti-­terror  coalition366.  Furthermore,  as  a  
result   of   this   invasion   on   Iraq,   Turkish   security   concerns   increased   and  
particularly   regarding   the   Kurdish   issue   and   its   conflict   with   the   Kurdish  
Workers’   Party   (PKK).   Therefore,   Turkey   was   able   to   develop   security  
cooperation  and  efforts  with  some  of  its  Arab  neighbors,  such  as  Iraq  and  Syria  
in  dealing  with  this  security  concern367.    
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In  addition,  the  Turkish  government  was  able  to  expand  and  develop  its  
economic   relations   with   its   Middle   Eastern   neighbours.   Hence,   the   level   of  
exports  to  the  Middle  East  increased  dramatically  and  at  the  same  time  Turkey  
witnessed  an   increase  of  Arab   investments   in  Turkey368.     This  economic   re-­
engagement  with  the  Middle  East  played  a  major  role  in  Turkey’s  relations  with  
Middle   Eastern   states,   which   in   return   created   more   opportunities   and  
contributed   towards   its  economic  power.  The  AKP  was  able   to  gain  popular  
support  and  sympathy  of  the  Turkish  peoples  due  to  its  successful  economic  
policies.  In  less  than  a  decade,  Turkey  managed  to  become  an  important  and  
leading  international  economy.  According  to  the  World  Bank,  Turkey  is  the  18th  
largest  economy  in  the  world369.  Furthermore,  Erdogan  also  promised  to  make  
Turkey  reach  the  top  ten  economies  in  the  World  by  2023370.  This  has  been  one  
of  the  strongest  reasons  behind  AKP’s  continued  success  in  the  elections  until  
today.    
On   the   other   hand,   the   AKP   government   was   also   successful   in   the  
mediation  efforts   in  different   international   conflicts  and  events.  For   instance,  
Turkey   was   able   to   play   as   a   critical   mediator   between   Afghanistan   and  
Pakistan,  Sunnis  and  Shiites  in  Iraq,  Syria  and  Israel,  and  between  Iran  and  the  
United  States371.  Moreover,  the  AKP  was  also  able  to  establish  and  develop  the  
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famous   “zero   problems   with   neighbuors   policy”   and   adopt   a   Soft   Power  
approach372.  This  has  been  crucial  in  Turkish  foreign  policy  for  the  last  decade.  
Turkey  has  had  different  historical  conflicts  with  its  neighbors  and  was  able  to  
develop  a  policy  that  can  allow  them  to  overcome  such  conflicts.  Those  conflicts  
were   with   Armenia,   Cyprus,   Caucasia,   Kurds,   and   others.   This   Soft   Power  
policy  approach  has  been  at   the   center   peace  of  Turkey’s  previous  Foreign  
Minister   and   current   Prime   Minister   Mr.   Ahmet   Davutoglu’s   foreign   policy  
agenda  and  was  able  to  push  Turkey  forward  in  solving  many  of  its  historical  
conflicts   with   bordering   and   neighboring   countries.   Such   important  
development  makes  Turkey  a  key  regional  and  international  player  to  consider,  
which  at  the  same  time  highlights  its  growing  influence  over  key  regional  events.    
What   is   more,   Turkey   was   able   to   advance   its   relations   with   many  
countries  that  previously  shared  very  minor  or  even  non-­diplomatic  relations  at  
all.  For  example,  Turkey  opened  several  new  embassies  in  many  African  and  
Latin  American  states  for  the  first  time373.  Thus,  Turkey  today  enjoys  a  very  pro-­
active   international   role   and   is   participant   in   many   different   international  
organizations.  Turkey  is  a  member  of  NATO,  United  Nation’s  Security  Council,  
the   G20   Industrial   Nations,   Alliance   of   Civilizations,   Organization   of   Islamic  
Cooperation,  Economic  Cooperation  Organization,  World  Trade  Organization,  
Black   Sea   Economic   Cooperation   Business   Council,   European   Free   Trade  
Association,  Association  of  Caribbean  States,  and  the  Organization  for  Security  
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and  Cooperation  in  Europe,  and  many  more374.  It  is  also  important  to  note  that  
Turkey  has  negotiated  accession  to  the  European  Union  and  is  still  fighting  for  
it   because   the   current   Turkish   government   believes   that   it   is   part   of   the  
European  family375.    
Within   the   last   few   years,   the   so-­called   Arab   Spring   has   challenged  
Turkey’s  regional  policy.  A  popular  uprising  that  took  place  since  2011  in  the  
Middle  East   toppling  Arab  governments  one  after   the  other.     This  has  had  a  
major  impact  on  Turkey’s  relations  with  those  authorities.  Therefore,  AKP’s  new  
vision   and   stable   relations   with   regional   governments   have   been   greatly  
confronted.  Turkey  became  to  be  seen  as  a  source  of  inspiration  and  a  good  
democratic   model   for   the   Arab   population376.   Although   the   Arab   Spring  
challenged  the  Turkish-­Middle  East  policy,  Turkey  still  remained  to  be  a  central  
player  in  the  politics  and  events  of  the  region.  The  AKP  government  established  
an  increasingly  important  position  for  Turkey  both  regionally  and  internationally  
and  therefore  it  would  be  unthinkable  to  say  that  Turkey  since  the  Arab  Spring  
has  returned  to  turning  its  back  away  from  the  region.  Instead,  Turkey  remained  
heavily  involved  and  particularly  in  the  cases  of  Egypt  and  Syria.  According  to  
Soner  Cagaptay  (2012)  Turkey  has  focused  its  foreign  policy  more  towards  the  
Middle  East  in  the  hope  for  becoming  a  regional  power377.  Turkey’s  interest  in  
the  Middle  East   remains  high  and   the  current   tensions  between  Turkey  and  
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other   Arab   States   due   to   the   recent   political   development   in   the   region  
reassures  that  Turkey  is  still  a  central  player  and  will  remain  so  for  a  long  time.  
Such  developments  of  Turkish  role  and  increased  interests  in  the  region  will  be  
further  analysed  in  the  coming  chapters  and  particularly  examining  the  causes  
of  such  foreign  policy  transformation.      
Conclusion	  
  
It  can  be  argued  that  the  Turkish  politics  and  foreign  policy  went  through  four  
critical  phases.  The  first  phase  started  after  the  establishment  of  the  Republic  
of   Turkey   in   1923   with   the   rule   of   Ataturk.   Turkish   politics   was   under   the  
influence  of  a  monopoly  system  of  government  with  a  nationalist  and  secular  
identity.   Foreign   policy  was   characterised  by   its   isolationist,   non-­active,   pro-­
Western,  and  anti-­religious  position,  a  period  that  became  famously  known  as  
the  “Kemalist”  era.    The  second  wave  came  as  a  result  of  the  introduction  of  the  
multi-­party  system  that  gave  more  space  for  other  political  parties  to  emerge  
and  operate,   thus  giving   the   chance   for   political   Islam   to   re-­emerge  and   for  
Islamists  to  have  growing  influence  over  the  politics  and  foreign  policy  of  the  
country.   One   of   the   key   players   in   the   development   of   political   Islam   was  
Necmettin  Erbakan  who  played  a  major  role   in  maintaining  and  supporting  a  
number  of  Islamist  political  groups.  Islamist  parties  did  not  have  great  impact  
on  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  at  the  beginnings  and  the  Turkish  administration  was  
mainly  concerned  with  its  alliance  with  the  western  camp  during  the  Cold  War.    
It  is  only  during  the  third  phase  since  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  and  the  
emergence   of   the   new   world   order   that   Turkey   sought   to   re-­establish   its  
international  position  and  foreign  policy  interests.  One  of  the  main  figures  that  
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helped   revolutionise   Turkey’s   international   position   and   stimulate   its   foreign  
policy   was   Turgut   Ozal,   an   individual   having   deep   attachment   to   Islam,  
accompanied   by   a   strong   liberal   and   pragmatic   business  mindset.   It   is   only  
during  this  phase  that  a  new  “Anatolian  Bourgeoisie”  middle  class  emerged  that  
had  strong  links  with  traditional  Islam.  Ozal’s  foreign  policy  was  very  successful  
in   opening   new   channels   of   economic   and   diplomatic   relations   with   many  
countries   and   most   notably   with   Middle   Eastern   states.   Relations   with   the  
Middle  East  were  becoming  more  visible  and  more  economic   interests  were  
built.   Furthermore,   during   this   third   phase,   the   prominent   Islamist   character  
Necmettin  Erbakan  ruled  Turkey  for  a  very  short  time  between  1996  and  1997.  
However,  his  rule  gave  significant  insight  to  the  development  of  the  political  life  
in   Turkey.   Erbakan   gave   priority   and  more   attention   to  Middle   Eastern   and  
Muslim  countries  over  Western  countries,  while  at  the  same  time  did  not  directly  
challenge  Turkish-­European  and  Israeli  relations  at  that  time.    
Furthermore,  Turkey’s  political  instability  and  unclear  foreign  policy  particularly  
towards  the  Middle  East  came  to  an  end  with  the  emergence  of  the  AK  Party  
and   victory   in   2002   bringing   a   fourth   and   critical   wave   changed   both   the  
domestic   and   foreign   policy   characters.   This   fourth   wave   that   we   are   still  
witnessing,   brought   about   radical   transformation   and   re-­shaped   Turkey’s  
image.  Domestically,  the  AKP  was  able  to  challenge  and  weaken  the  military  
and   Kemalist   establishments.   There   was   a   noticeable   development   in   the  
democratic  process  and  there  was  a  major  shift  in  the  military-­civil  relations.  In  
terms  of  foreign  policy,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  AKP  re-­revolutionised  Turkey’s  
position  and  role  in  international  politics.  Turkey  since  2002  opened  new  doors  
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and  paved  ways  for  new  opportunities  for  cooperation  with  the  Middle  East  and  
many  other  countries  in  the  world  including  Asia,  Africa,  and  Latin  America.    
Turkey’s   economy   became   increasingly   stronger   and   powerful  
compared   to   its   situation   during   previous   governments.  Major   economic   co-­
operations   and   interdependences   were   built   wit   Middle   Eastern   States   and  
other  international  economies.  Thus,  Turkey  had  one  of  the  leading  economies  
in  the  world  and  is  seeking  to  enhance  it  even  further.    The  regional  role  became  
much   stronger   and   influential   and   Turkey   became   a   central   player   in   most  
regional   and  Middle  Eastern   affairs.   There   has  been  a   noticeable   shift   from  
Hard  Power  politics  to  Soft  Power  as  a  tool  for  re-­engagement  and  settlements  
of   historical   conflicts   and   this  was  particularly   evident   regarding   the  Kurdish  
issue.  Moreover,  Relations  with  Arab  neighbours  were  established  and  went  
through  major  cooperative  efforts  on  all  cultural,  economic,  and  political  levels.  
Turkish  foreign  policy  towards  the  Middle  East  during  this  fourth  wave  entered  
a  new  era.  Relations  with  Israel  were  deteriorating  and  the  AKP  government  
became  openly  critical  of  Israel’s  behaviour  towards  the  Palestinians  and  the  
region  as  a  whole.  Due  to  these  critical  foreign  policy  changes,  Turkey  became  
recognised   as   a   new   significant   player   in   the   region   who’s   role   is   of   high  
strategic  importance.    
However,  since   the  explosion  of  popular  uprisings   in   the  Middle  East,  
Turkey’s  new  foreign  policy  vision  was  challenged  and  a  number  of  obstacles  
emerged.  Security   threats   increased  as  a   result  of   the  Syrian   revolution  and  
relations   with   other   Arab   states   deteriorated   particularly   with   the   Gulf  
Monarchies   led   by   Saudi   Arabia   over   the   Egyptian   case   and   the   Muslim  
Brotherhood.  Despite  these  challenges,  Turkey  still  remains  a  critical  player  in  
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regional  affairs  and  is  highly  involved  in  those  Arab  revolutions.  Turkey  sought  
to   stand   by   the   Arab   populations   and   their   demands.   A   noticeable   shift   in  
Turkey’s  strategy   in   the  Middle  East   from  dealing  with  Arab  governments   to  
supporting   and   gaining   popularity   among   their   populations.   Hence,   AKP’s  
regional   influence   remains   and   its   role   is   becoming   increasingly   significant  
especially  in  dealing  with  the  Syrian  and  Iraqi  cases  as  well  as  the  recent  war  
on  ISIS.  However,  the  most  important  question  here  that  needs  to  be  examined  
is   what   caused   AKP’s   extensive   regional   Middle   Eastern   interest   and  
engagement  since  2002?  Thus,  this  leads  us  to  the  coming  chapters  that  aim  
to  investigate  the  possible  causes  of  such  foreign  policy  changes  by  evaluating  
and  assessing  the  accuracy  of  previous  theoretical  hypotheses  introduced  by  
scholars  and   researchers   through  Process  Tracing  method  of  analysis   to   try  
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Since   the   2002   elections   and   the   Justice   and   Development   party’s   (AKP)  
Turkey   witnessed   considerable   changes   in   particular   regarding   the  
transformation  in  its  foreign  policy.  Most  notably,  Turkey  became  a  very  active  
international   player   opening   up   to   many   regions   including   Europe   and   the  
Middle  East.  The  most  controversial  and  debatable  consequence  of  this  was  
the  increase  of  Turkish  political  and  economic  interests  and  influence  over  the  
region.   Turkey   was   able   to   re-­engage   actively   with   its   Middle   Eastern  
neighbours  and  increase  relations  and  cooperation  on  all  political,  economic,  
and  cultural   levels  on  both  bilateral  and  multilateral  platforms.   It  was  able   to  
increase  mediation  efforts  between  conflicting  states   that  helped  develop   its  
regional  role  and  position  among  the  Arab  states.  More  diplomatic  efforts  were  
made   in   key   cases   such   as   the   Palestinian-­Israeli   conflict   and   the   peace  
process  between  Arab  states  and  Israel.  On  the  other  hand,  Turkey  was  able  
to  expand  its  economic  interdependence  with  her  neighbouring  Middle  Eastern  
states.  Stronger  economic  ties  were  established  and  bilateral  trade  reached  its  
highest  levels.    Moreover,  the  Turkish  government  realized  the  importance  of  
being  culturally   inclusive  with  neighbouring   regions  not  only  Europe  and   the  
West  in  general,  but  also  with  the  Middle  East.    
This   brought   the   attention   of   many   researchers   in   this   field   who  
attempted   to   explain   the   causes   of   such   foreign   policy   change   of   behavior  
towards   the   Middle   East,   especially   after   having   a   long   history   of  
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disengagement.  The  dominant  question  in  this  field  of  study  was  attempting  to  
understand   the   causes   of   this   foreign   policy   change.   Therefore,   there   have  
been  many  attempts  by  researchers  and  scholars  to  explain  the  reasons  behind  
such   transformation  and  change.  As  an  observer  and   researcher  of   political  
science  who  became  very  interested  in  this  field  of  study  I  was  puzzled  by  the  
way  scholars  came  up  with  different,  and  in  many  cases,  contradictory  theories  
and  answers  to  this  question.  The  literature  on  Turkish  foreign  policy  became  
influenced   by   multiple   theoretical   mainstream   explanations   most   notably;;  
Realism,   Neo-­Liberalism,   and   Constructivism.   Scholars   were   influenced   by  
different   schools  of   thought  and   this   reflected  on   their   academic  work.  As  a  
result,   to   understand   the   reason   behind   Turkey’s   Middle   Eastern-­regional  
foreign   policy   development   any   researcher   will   come   across   a   number   of  
different   explanations.   These   include,   the   role   of   Islamism   and   Islamist  
ideology,  Neo-­Ottomanism,  National  Identity,  Economic  interests,  EU  influence,  
National  Security,  and  others.    
   Therefore,  this  chapter  aims  to  develop  an  analysis  that  helps  evaluate  
the  different  theoretical  hypotheses  provided  by  previous  scholars.  This  will  be  
carried  out  through  using  Process  Tracing  method  of  analysis,  as  it  allows  us  
to  test  the  value  of  the  different  explanations  presented  in  the  literature.  This  
Chapter   will   be   focusing   primarily   on   the   concept   of   Islamism   and   Islamist  
ideology  and  political  position  of  the  AKP  as  a  source  behind  Turkish  foreign  
policy  change  towards  the  Middle  East  since  2002.    
As  mentioned  earlier  in  the  methodology  chapter,  the  advantage  is  that  
Process  Tracing  allows  us  to  examine  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  those  
different  hypotheses.  Moreover,  it  enables  us  to  take  on  board  or  eliminate  any  
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explanation  as  well  as  help  search  for  an  alternative  one.  Furthermore,  Process  
Tracing  will  help  identify  the  possible  limitations  of  any  explanation  and  how  it  
may  have  failed  to  explain  intervening  inferences.  Empirical  evidence  of  primary  
and   secondary   sources,   as   well   as   collected   data   from   my   fieldwork   and  
interviews  will  be  employed  to  this  purpose.    
   Therefore,   this   chapter   aims   to   examine   the   notion   of   Islamism   and  
Islamist   ideology,   and   its   influence  over  Turkish   foreign  policy   as   the   cause  
behind  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  change  towards  the  Middle  East.  The  first  step  
will  be  to  evaluate  the  arguments  in  support  of  this  theoretical  explanation  and  
illustrating   their   limitations.   These   include   AKP’s   Islamist   roots   and   its  
leadership  past  involvement  in  the  development  of  political  Islam  in  Turkey;;  the  
Islamist  sentiments  in  the  writings,  speeches,  and  statements  by  the  two  most  
influential  leaders  of  the  party,  Ahmet  Davutoglu  and  Recep  Taiyyp  Erdogan;;  
and   finally   the   increased   “anti-­Western”   behaviour   mainly   reflected   by   the  
deterioration   of   the   relations  with   the  American   administration   and   Israel.   In  
other  words,  the  aim  of  this  first  step  is  to  give  a  clear  idea  of  the  nature  of  each  
explanation,   who   the  main   scholars   are,   and   based   on  what   evidence   they  
defended   such   arguments.   The   second   step   in   this   chapter   is   to   examine  
available  empirical   data,   archival   documents,   and  others   to  be  able   to   raise  
critical  questions  that  such  explanations  might  not  have  considered  or  looked  
at.    Here  the  researcher  will  develop  a  critical  engagement,  where  a  number  of  
questions   are   posed,   which   enables   the   researcher   to   identify   possible  
limitations  of  those  explanations.    The  third  step  will  analyse  possible  critics  of  
the   Isalmist   based   explanations   and   other   opposite   arguments   that   might  
contest  them  to  highlight  possible  weaknesses.  The  fourth  and  final  step  will  be  
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applying  interview  data,  which  will  enable  the  researcher  to  further  assess  the  
sufficiency  and  necessity  of  the  explanations  under  examination.  This  will  be  
carried   out   through   exploring   interviewees’   views   and   ideas   towards   such  
explanations  and  which  they  view  to  be  most  plausible.  
This  chapter’s  outcome  will  illustrate  that  the  Islamist  ideology  notion  in  
understanding  Turkish  foreign  policy  under  the  AKP  government  is  in  fact  very  
weak  and  requires   further  revision.  Although  there  are  very  clear  pro-­Islamic  
sentiments  and  behaviour  in  the  AKP  government,  one  cannot  understand  all  
aspects  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  primarily  by  looking  at  it  from  this  angle.  The  
results  show  that  scholars  who  have  used  this  notion  in  their  explanation,  failed  
to  explain  other  non-­Islamist  elements  present  in  the  AKP’s  policies  regarding  
non-­Islamic  states  and  regions  as  well  as  the  West.  Some  of  them  have  fallen  
into   the   trap  of  adapting  oriental   thinking   in  understanding  Turkish  politics   in  
general,   while   at   the   same   time,   others   presented   works   that   looked   very  
political   oriented.   Such   explanations   are   weak   because   they   tend   to  
overemphasize  the  role  of  Islamism  and  look  at  Turkish  foreign  policy  from  one  
single   angle.   However,   the   results   show   that   due   to   some   pro-­Islamist  
components   in  Turkish   foreign  policy   in   the  Middle  East,   particularly  with   its  
support  to  the  Muslim  Brotherhood,  we  cannot  totally  eliminate  this  hypothesis.  
The  study  shows  that  the  Islamist  explanation  fails  a  Straw  in  the  Wind  Test.  
This  means  that  this  explanation  is  neither  sufficient  nor  necessary  for  affirming  
causal  inference.  In  other  words,  failing  a  Straw  in  the  Wind  Test  suggests  that  
the  hypothesis  may  not  be  relevant,  but  at  the  same  time  does  not  eliminate  it.  
The  implication  of  this  result  is  that  this  explanation  is  highly  weakened,  while  it  
strengthens  the  existence  of  rival  explanations.    
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1.	  Islamism	  and	  Islamist	  ideology	  as	  the	  driving	  force	  behind	  foreign	  policy	  
change	  	  
  
Since  the  Justice  and  Development  Party  (AKP)  took  power,  many  analysts  
viewed  the  new  government’s  policies  and  behaviour  with  great  suspicion378.  
This  was  mainly  due  to  the  party’s  leaders’  direct  involvement  with  past  Islamist  
Political  Parties  and  influential  Islamist  figures  such  as  Necmettin  Erbakan,  a  
man  who  was  able  to  establish  a  number  of  Islamist  parties  that  challenged  the  
Secular  Military  establishment.  However,  despite   the  AKP   leaders’  assertion  
that  they  are  not  an  Islamist  party  that  is  moving  away  from  the  far  right  to  be  
closer  to  the  centre  and  regard  themselves  as  “Conservative-­Democrats”379,  a  
number  of  analysts  and  scholars  in  this  field  of  study  still  believe  that  the  AKP  
maintains  its  Islamist  core  roots.  With  the  development  of  relations  and  opening  
towards  the  Middle  East  and  the  greater  Islamic  world,  more  and  more  scholars  
believed  that  such  new  foreign  policy   is  actually  driven  by  political  Islam  and  
that  the  AKP  is  in  fact  a  party  that  has  “Islamist  hidden  agendas”380.  Therefore,  
the  aim  of  this  section  is  to  analyse  the  role  of  Islamism  as  a  driving  force  behind  
Turkish  foreign  policy  making  during  the  last  decade  to  give  a  clear  idea  of  the  
nature   of   this   explanation,   who   the   main   scholars   are,   and   based   on   what  
evidence   they   defended   such   argument.   Furthermore,   this   will   include   the  
examination  of  available  empirical  data,  archival  documents   that  should  help  
the  researcher's  evaluation.    
                                                                                                              
378  Ehud  Toledano,  “The  AKP's  New  Turkey,”  Hudson  Institute,  April  22,  2011,  accessed  
October  10,  2015,  http://www.hudson.org/research/9846-­the-­akp-­s-­new-­turkey.    379  Hakan  Yavuz,  "Adalet  ve  Kalkinma  Partisi  (AKP),"  The  Oxford  Encyclopedia  of  the  Islamic  
World,  Oxford  Islamic  Studies  Online,  accessed  Oct  10,  2015,  
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0924.    380  Ergun  Ozbudun  and  William  Hale,  Islamism,  Democracy  and  Liberalism  in  Turkey  (New  
York:  Routledge,  2010),  22.    
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In  order  to  do  so,  this  section  will  be  divided  into  five  main  parts;;  the  first  
part  will  discuss  the  nature  of  AKP’s  Islamist  roots  and  whether  this  is  strong  
enough  to  suggest  its  current  Islamist  position.  The  second  part  will  examine  
the  evidence  presented  by  some  scholars  after  the  analysis  of  key  leading  AKP  
members’  speeches  and  statements  in  support  of  their  Islamist  interpretation.    
The  third  part  aims  to  critically  assess  the  claim  that  Turkey  has  adopted  an  
anti-­Western   behaviour.   This   includes   analysing   the   fluctuating   nature   of  
relations  between  Turkey  and  the  United  States  as  well  as  paying  a  closer  look  
on  AKP  government’s  behaviour  towards  American-­Middle  East  policies  during  
the  last  decade.  Furthermore,  this  part  will  also  examine  the  latest  development  
of  Turkish-­Israeli  relations  and  analyse  the  reasons  behind  their  deterioration  
in  the  last  few  years.  The  fourth  part  will  discuss  the  argument  that  there  is  an  
“Axis  Shift”   in  Turkish  foreign  policy  that  moves  away  from  the  West.  Finally,  
after  illustrating  the  different  arguments  proposed  by  scholars  and  observers,  I  
will   critically  engage  with   them   to   test   the  validity  of   their  positions  by  using  
counter  arguments  presented  in  this  field  of  study  as  well  as  providing  evidence  
and  data  that  challenge  such  claims.      
2.	  Political	  Islamist	  roots	  of	  the	  AKP	  
  
Prior  to  the  AKP’s  elections  victory  in  2002,  many  observers  and  media  analysts  
have  regarded  the  AKP  as  a  “fundamentalist  party”  and  after  the  elections  they  
referred   to   it   as   an   “Islamist   party”381.   This   is   mainly   due   to   its   founding  
members’  involvement  with  mainstream  political  Islam  for  a  long  time  prior  to  
the  establishment   of   the   Justice  and  Development  Party.   Ihsan  Dagi   (2008)  
                                                                                                              381  Hakan  Yavuz,  Secularism  and  Muslim  Democracy  in  Turkey  (Cambridge  University  Press,  
2009),  1.    
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argued  that  the  AKP  founding  members  “have  emerged  from  the  cadres  of  the  
first  organized  political  representative  of  Islamism  in  Turkish  politics,  known  as  
the   ‘National   view   movement’   led   by   Necmettin   Erbakan”382.   Furthermore,  
Soner  Cagaptay  (2009),  argue  that  the  AKP  is  an  Islamist  political  party  due  to  
its  members’  experiences  in  previous  Islamist  parties  in  Turkey  and  therefore  it  
is  not  surprising  to  see  such  shift  in  Turkish  foreign  policy  interests  towards  the  
East,  the  Muslim  world,  and  particularly  the  Middle  East383.  
   Since  1950s,  Islamist  parties  gradually  became  stronger  and  influential  
and  managed  to  pave  their  way  into  Turkish  political  life.  However,  this  led  to  a  
clash   with   the   secular   establishment   and   its   institutions   mainly   against   the  
military384.  As  a  result,  Islamist  parties  had  to  suffer  closure  and  banning  coups  
whenever  they  were  seen  to  be  threatening  the  secular  nature  of  the  state385.  
The  National  View  was  seen  as  an  opposition  movement  to  the  foundation  of  
the  Republic   and   therefore  was   shut   down  by   the  Constitutional  Court386.  A  
coup  d’état  against  the  Welfare  Party  took  place  in  1997  and  against  the  Virtue  
Party   in   2001387.   A   number   of   the   newly   established   party   AKP   in   2001  
members  were  highly  active  in  previous  Islamist  parties.  This  is  one  of  the  main  
reasons   why   critics   suggest   that   the   AKP   is   an   Islamist   party   with   a   deep  
Islamist  affiliation  at  its  core.    
                                                                                                              382  Ihsan  Dagi,  "Turkey’s  AKP  in  Power,"  Journal  of  Democracy  19,  no.  3  (2008):  25-­26,  
accessed  22  September  2015,  
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v019/19.3.dagi.html.      383  Soner  Cagaptay,  “Is  Turkey  Leaving  the  West?,”  Foreign  Affairs,  October  26,  2009,  
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However,  it  is  important  to  clarify  that  when  the  Virtue  Party  was  closed  
by  the  Constitutional  Court  in  2001,  its  party  members  were  divided  between  
those  who  are  regarded  as  “traditionalists”  who  formed  the  Felicity  Party  (FP)  
that  maintained  its  traditional  Islamist  values  and  ideology,  and  the  “moderates”  
who  established  the  AKP  moving  away  from  its  traditional  Islamist   lineage  to  
follow   new   and   more   moderate   ideology   and   political   goals388.   This   newly  
established  party  presented  itself  as  a  “conservative-­democratic”  one  in  support  
of  democratic  values,  human  rights,  and  open  market  economy.      
Despite  this  moderate  step  away  from  traditional  Islam,  scholars  such  as  
Birol  Yesilada  and  Barry  Rubin  in  their  book  Islamization  of  Turkey  under  the  
AKP  rule  (2013),  argued  that   the  AKP  leadership  had  “Islamist  reflexes”  and  
added  that  “Once  in  the  government,  the  AKP  elite  encountered  the  powerful  
institutions  and  norms  of  the  state  and  had  to  conform  to  the  roles  prescribed  
by  the  positions  they  came  to  occupy”389..  This  meant  for  some  the  integration  
of  a  party  who  had   Islamist   roots   into   the  secular  political  system  became  a  
reality.    
   This   leads   us   to   an   interesting   critique   suggesting   that   the   AKP   is  
practicing   the  so-­called   “Takiyye”,  where   they  would  hide   their   true  views   to  
escape  prosecution  and  to  move  observers’  attention  away  from  its  traditional  
Islamist  foundation  and  hidden  values390.  It  is  therefore  believed  that  the  AKP’s  
hidden  agenda  is  to  build  an  Islamic  identity  that  would  challenge  the  secular  
establishment391.  Those  types  of  critics  usually  refer  to  examples  such  as  the  
headscarf  issue  and  the  controversy  over  adultery  as  well.  Opposition  parties  
                                                                                                              388  Dagi,  26.  389  Birol  Yesilada,  Islamization  of  Turkey  under  the  AKP  Rule  (Routledge,  2011).    390  Dagi,  26.  391  Ibid.    
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and  critics  have  always  looked  at  the  AKP  with  growing  suspicion,  fearing  that  
this  party  will  challenge  and  bring  an  end  to  Turkey’s  secular  foundation.  Galip  
Dalay  and  Dov  Friedman  (2013),  argued  that  the  AKP  was  able  to  learn  from  
the  mistakes  of  the  previous  Islamist  parties  in  Turkey392.  Therefore,  the  AKP  
was   able   to   develop   its   own   “unique”   position   in   their   domestic   and   foreign  
politics393.      
Similarly,  M.  Hakan  Yavuz   (2009)   in  his  book  Secularism  and  Muslim  
Democracy  in  Turkey  argued  that  the  AKP  is  an  Islamist  party  that  was  forced  
to   hide   its   Islamist   identity   fearing   that   it   would   follow   the   same   fate   as   its  
Islamist   parties   that   preceded   it.   He   added,   “Islamic   ideas   and   an   Islamic  
worldview  are  still   included  in  the  identity  of   its   leadership  and  might  also  be  
included   in   the  AKP’s   deep-­seated  philosophy,   but   the  AKP  never   uses   the  
explicit  language  of  political  Islam,  and  indeed  often  feels  compelled  to  stress  
that  it  is  not  an  Islamic  party”394.  Yavuz  argued  that  the  newly  emerging  Turkey  
under  the  AKP  is  based  on  three  main  principles,  “removing  secularism  as  a  
source  of  polarization  by  reimagining  “the  meaning  and  function  of  authoritarian  
secularism”,   redefining   political   community   on   the   bases   of   Ottoman  
cosmopolitanism  rather  than  ethnic  nationalism,  and  bolstering  the  democratic  
state  by  encouraging  “a  thickened  civil  society”  and  a  reduced  role  for  the  public  
sector”395.   A   large   number   of   scholars,   who   regard   the   AKP   as   an   Islamist  
political   Party   or   a   party   with   an   Islamist   hidden   agenda,   stress   on   the  
                                                                                                              392  Galip  Dalay  and  Dov  Friedman,  “The  AK  Party  and  the  Evolution  of  Turkish  political  Islam’s  
Foreign  Policy”,  Insight  Turkey,  15,  no.2,  (2013):  123-­139.    393  Ibid.  394  M.  Hakan  Yavuz,  Secularism  and  Muslim  democracy  in  Turkey  (Cambridge  University  
Press,  2009),  3.    395  Powell  Russell,  “Secularism  and  Muslim  Democracy  in  Turkey,”  November  1,  2010,  
Political  and  Legal  Anthropology  Review  396  (2010):  33,  accessed  27  August  2015,  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2234108.    
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experience  and   role   of  AKP  Party   founders  with   previous   Islamist   parties   in  
Turkey  and  their   Islamist  affiliation  and  hidden  agenda  to  explain  the  Islamic  
nature  of  current  Turkish  foreign  policy.    
3.	  Speeches	  and	  statements	  by	  leading	  members	  of	  the	  AK	  Party	  
  
Another   major   evidence   used   by   critics   of   the   AKP’s   government   is   the  
speeches  and  statements  made  by  leading  party  members  that  demonstrated  
their   Islamist  mindset.  A  number  of  works  have  been  written  about  how   the  
speeches,   statements,   and   writings   of   Recep   Tayyip   Erdogan   and   Ahmet  
Davutoglu  demonstrated  the  party  leaders’  Islamic  orientation.  The  aim  of  these  
studies  was  to  monitor  and  pay  close  attention  to  any  signs  that  could  link  those  
influential  politicians  to  the  previous  Islamist  engagement  that  they  insist  are  no  
longer  following.    
3.1	  Recep	  Tayyip	  Erdogan	  
  
Erdogan’s   experience   in   political   Islam   started   during   the   1970s   and   1980s  
when  he  was  an  active  member  of  Necmettin  Erbakan’s  Welfare  Party.  He  later  
was  appointed  as  Mayor  of  Istanbul  in  1994  and  served  for  few  years.  Erdogan  
became  the  Prime  Minister  of  Turkey  after  the  AKP  victory  in  2003  and  served  
for   three  terms  until  he  became  the12th  president  of   the  Republic   in  2014396.  
Since  the  formation  of  the  AKP  and  Erdogan’s  leadership,  more  attention  was  
given  by  analysts  to  his  statements  and  speeches  in  an  attempt  to  understand  
the   party’s   mind   set.   Analysts   who   criticize   the   AKP   are   viewed   by   this  
government  with  great  suspicion  and  mistrust.  This  is  because  they  point  out  
                                                                                                              396  Ibid.  
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statements  made  by  Erdogan  when  he  was  Mayor  of  Istanbul  in  1990s,  such  
as  “Thank  God,  I  am  for  Sharia”,  “One  cannot  be  secularist  and  a  Muslim  at  the  
same  time”;;  and  “for  us  democracy  is  a  means  to  an  end”397.    
According  to  Toni  Alaranta,  (2015)  in  his  book  National  and  State  Identity  
in   Turkey:   The   transformation   of   the   Republic’s   Status   in   the   International  
System,  “it  is  explicitly  clear  to  the  party’s  constituency  that  the  party  is  much  
more  than  a  political  party.  It   is,  as  the  leadership  puts  it,  an  expression  of  a  
historical   ‘cause’  (dava)”398.  The  author  quoted  one  of  Erdogan’s  statements:  
“As  I  have  said  before,  even  though  the  AKP  was  formed  no  longer  than  thirteen  
years  ago,  we  are  the  expression  of  a  holy  march,  a  holy  cause  (Kutlu  bir  dava)  
originally  inaugurated  centuries  before”  399.  Toni  Alaranta  therefore  argues  that  
“When  these  words  are  read  within  their  relevant  political  and  historical  context,  
it   is  crystal  clear  that  the  AKP  is  a  political  movement  that  represent  political  
Islam”400.   Furthermore,  Svante  E.  Cornell   in   his   paper,  What  Drives  Turkish  
Foreign   Policy?   (2012),   has   also   focused   his   analysis   on   AKP   leadership  
statements  and  speeches  suggesting  that  there  are  “plenty”  of  statements  that  
support  the  AKP’s  Islamist  ideology401.  Svante‘s  focus  on  Erdogan’s  statements  
includes   the   assimilation   of   Turks   in   Germany   would   be   “a   crime   against  
humanity”   in   2008;;   referring   to   Sudanese   leader   Al   Basheer   that   “a  Muslim  
cannot  commit  genocide”   in  2009  and  to  other  statements  that  are  “strikingly  
evocative”   towards   Israel   and   the   Jewish   state   including   the   expression   of  
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regret  about  the  fact  that  Turkey  had  recognised  the  state  of  Israel402.  Since  the  
beginning  of  the  Arab  Spring,  Erdogan  conducted  a  series  of  visits  to  the  Arab  
countries,   referred   to   as   the   “Arab   Spring   tour”,   the   most   important   one   to  
Egypt403.  He  was  welcomed   like  a  hero  and  made  a  speech   that  had  strong  
incentives  for  Egyptians  and  the  Arab  World.  Erdogan  showed  his  full  support  
of  the  democratic  transition  in  Egypt,  Tunisia,  and  Libya.  A  conference  entitled  
Turkish  Foreign  Policy  under  Erdogan:  What  drives  it?  Organised  by  the  School  
of   Advanced   International   Studies   (SAIS)   at   the   Johns   Hopkins   University  
(November  2014),  discussed  the  ideology  of  the  AKP  and  its  leaders’  Islamist  
nature.  On  that  occasion,  Michael  Reynold  insisted  on  that  “Erdogan’s  views  
are  very  much  shaped  by  Islam”404.  To  Reynolds,  the  American  administration’s  
foreign  policy  decision  mistakes  towards  Turkey  and  the  increased  tensions  in  
their  relations,  was  a  result  of  America’s  failure  in  understanding  Turkish  politics  
and  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  drivers405.    
3.2	  Ahmet	  Davutoglu	  
  
Ahmet  Davutoglu  is  another  major  character  who  received  a  lot  of  attention  due  
to  his  high  level  of   influence  on  Turkish  foreign  policy  making.  Prior  to  2002,  
Davutoglu  was  a  well-­known  academic  and  scholar  working  both  in  Malaysia  
and  Turkey  and  managed  to  write  over  300  articles  and  3  books406.  Davutoglu  
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What  Shapes  it?,”  School  of  Advanced  International  Studies  (SAIS),  November  18,  2014,  
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was  chosen  to  be  in  the  top  100  thinkers  list  in  the  foreign  policy  magazine407.  
In  2003,  he  became  the  advisor  to  the  Prime  Minister  Recep  Tayyip  Erdogan  
for  around  7  years  and  he  was  later  appointed  Foreign  Minister  in  2009408.  He  
became  known  as  the  “architect”  of  the  new  Turkish  foreign  policy  under  the  
AKP   government.   Davutoglu   played   a   major   role   in   the   transformation   of  
Turkish  foreign  policy  and  particularly  in  the  opening  up  and  the  adoption  of  the  
so-­called   “multidimensional   foreign  policy”409.  He   is   famous   for  his  academic  
works  on  Turkish  foreign  policy  and  his  attempts  to  turning  his  theoretical  work  
into   reality.   These   include   his   most   famous   book   Strategic   Depth   (2000),  
Civilizational  Transformation  and  the  Muslim  World  (1994),  and  his  PhD  thesis  
Alternative  Paradigms:  The  Impact  of  Islamic  and  Western  Weltanschauungs  
on  Political  Theory  (1993)410.    
   Critics   have   been   focusing   on   Davutoglu’s   work   and   his   theoretical  
hypotheses  on  Turkish  foreign  policy  and  Turkey’s  position  in  the  international  
system.  Svante  E.  Cornell’s  work   (2012)   looked  at  Davutoglu’s  writings  and  
argued,  “It  is  dominated  by  a  deep  conviction  in  the  incompatibility  of  the  West  
and  the  Islamic  world,  and  by  resentment  of  the  West  for  its  attempt  to  impose  
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its  values  and  political  system  on  the  rest  of  the  world”411.  Cornell  quoted  some  
of  Davutoglu’s  arguments  and  statements  and  stated   that  understanding   the  
ideas   and   thinking   of   such   top   foreign   policy   decision   makers   helps   us  
understand   the  way  Turkish   foreign  policy   is  shaped412.  According   to  Kerem  
Oktem  (2010),  Davutoglu  introduced  a  reconsideration  of  the  Turkish  role  from  
an  Islamic  position413.  In  a  workshop  on  “IR  and  Islam:  Turkey’s  Political  Islam  
and   Foreign  Policy”   part   of   the   8th   Pan-­European  Conference   (2013)   at   the  
University   of   Warsaw,   Zenon   Tziarras,   a   PhD   researcher   participant   from  
Warwick  University,  argued   that   the  AKP  government  does  have  an   Islamist  
ideology,  but  this  is  limited  in  its  foreign  policy  making  due  to  different  domestic  
and   international   circumstances414.   Tziarras   also   referred   to   some   of  
Davutoglu’s  statements.  For  example,  he  quoted  Davutoglu’s  when  he  was  the  
foreign  minister  in  2009  saying:  “As  in  the  sixteenth  century,  when  the  Ottoman  
Balkans  were  rising,  we  will  once  again  make  the  Balkans,  the  Caucasus,  and  
the  Middle  East,  together  with  Turkey,  the  centre  of  world  politics  in  the  future.  
That  is  the  goal  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  and  we  will  achieve  it”39.  He  argued  
that   this   tells   us   that   a   “more   assertive   foreign   policy   orientation   can   be  
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European  Conference  on  International  Relations,  University  of  Warsaw,  (September,  2013),  
accessed  26  August  2015,  http://www.coiris.org/sa06-­7-­ir-­and-­islam-­turkeys-­political-­islam-­
and-­foreign-­policy/.    
39  Quoted  in,  Hillel  Fradkin  and  Lewis  Libby,  "Erdoğan’s  Grand  Vision:  Rise  and  Decline,"  




identified,  informed  by  the  Ottoman  past  and  political  Islamic  notions,  at  least  
on  a  rhetoric  level”415.    
Moreover,   Bahlul   Ozkan   (2014)   an   intellectual   who   once  was   one   of  
Davutoglu’s   students   and   claims   to   have   studied   his   writings,   argued   that  
Ahmet   Davutoglu   is   an   “organic   intellectual   of   Turkey’s   Islamists”,   who   has  
been  working  as  a  columnist  at  the  Islamic  Daily  in  the  1990s  and  publishing  
articles   in   Islamist   journals   since   1986416.   He   added   that   Davutoglu’s   most  
influential  work  Strategic  Depth’s  main  argument  is  that  “Turkey  should  expand  
its   influence   in   the  Balkans,  Caucasus,  and   the  Middle  East”417.   In  an  article  
entitled  Turkey,  Davutoglu  and  the  Idea  of  Pan-­Islamism  (2014),  Ozkan  argued  
that  Davutoglu  was  the  first  who  managed  to  apply  a  rationalistic  and  Islamist  
foreign  policy418.  Other  critics  gave  more  attention  to  Davutoglu’s  speeches  and  
statements  since  he  became  foreign  minister.  It  is  argued  that  Davutoglu  stated  
that  Turkey  should  be  a   leader  of   the  Islamic  world  and  that  Arab  nationalist  
lack   legitimacy  and  that  “naturally”   the  successors  of   these  governments  are  
Islamist  Parties  particularly  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  whom  the  AKP  have  had  
strong  historical  ties  with419.  Pamela  Geller  (2015),  in  a  work  published  by  the  
Middle  East  Media  Research  Institute,  argued  that  there  have  been  a  number  
of  “anti-­western  statements”  made  by  PM  Davutoglu  that  represent  the  level  of  
hostility  of  the  AKP  government  towards  the  West420.  She  collected  and  quoted  
                                                                                                              415  Tziarras,  20.    416  Ozkan  and  Reynold,  Op  cit.    417  Ibid.    418  Behlul  Ozkan,  "Turkey,  Davutoglu  and  the  Idea  of  Pan-­Islamism,"  Survival  56,  no.  4  
(2014):  119-­140.  419  Alexander  Christie-­Miller,  “Davutoglu,  Erdogan’s  vision  man,  saw  Turkey  as  an  Islamic  
World  leader,”  The  Christian  Science  Monitor,  March  2,  2015,  accessed  October  10,  2015,  
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-­East/2015/0302/Davutoglu-­Erdogan-­s-­vision-­man-­
saw-­Turkey-­as-­an-­Islamic-­world-­leader.    420  Pamela  Geller,  “Anti-­West  statement  by  Turkish  President  Erdogan  and  PM  Davutoglu:  
Muslim  countries  must  ‘unite  and  defeat  the  successors  of  Lawrence  of  Arabia’;;  ‘No  one  will  
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different  statements.  For  example,  in  a  recent  speech  held  in  front  of  a  gathering  
of  Turks  who  lived  in  Europe  during  his  visit  to  Zurich  for  the  World  Economic  
Forum  2015,  PM  Davutoglu  said:  
  “I  again  call  this  out  from  Zurich:  Islam  is  Europe’s  indigenous  religion,  
and   it   will   continue   to   be   its   indigenous   religion.   From   Andalusia   to   the  
Ottomans,  and,  half  a  century  ago  with  the  holy  march  of  our  people  who  came  
here   from   every   corner   of   Anatolia.   The   sound   of   the   azan   [Islamic   call   to  
prayer],  brought  by  these  heroes  to  Europe,   the  domes  of   the  mosques  with  
which  they  dotted  this  continent,  will  all  be  protected.  We  will  continue  to  fight  
against  all   the  hands   that   reach  out   to  harm   them   [the  mosques].   I   kiss   the  
foreheads  of  my  brothers  who  carried  the  tekbir  [i.e.  the  call  “Allahu  Akbar”]  to  
Zurich.  May  Allah  bless  those  who  raised  you.  Blessed  be  those  who  came  here  
with  just  a  suitcase,  in  poverty,  but  with  rich  hearts  filled  with  their  faith  [Islam].  
How  holy  those  people  were,  who  came  and  sowed  the  seeds  here,  which  will,  
with  Allah’s  help,  continue  to  grow  into  a  huge  tree  of  justice  in  the  centre  of  
Europe.  No  one  will  be  able  to  stop  this”421.    
  
Such  statements  by  Davutoglu  are  considered  an  important  reflection  of  
his   Islamist  outlook  and   it   constitutes  a  major  source   for   the  Turkish   foreign  
policy  direction  of  the  last  13  years.  However,  the  main  question  here  is  to  what  
extent   such   statements   have   actually   been   visible   and   reflected   in   Turkey’s  
foreign   policy   on   the   ground?   This   will   be   further   analysed   in   the   coming  
sections  as  part  of  the  process  tracing  testing.    
4.	  A	  growing	  anti-­‐Western	  behaviour?	  
  
A  number  of  scholars  have  used   the   fluctuating  nature  and  deteriorations  of  
relations   with   different  Western   states   and   governments   including   Israel   as  
evidence  to  support  their  critics  towards  the  AKP  government  and  claims  that  
                                                                                                              
be  able  to  stop’  the  rise  of  Islam  in  Europe,”  Global  Jihad,  accessed  21  August  2015,  
http://pamelageller.com/2015/02/anti-­west-­statements-­by-­turkish-­president-­erdogan-­and-­pm-­
davutoglu-­muslim-­countries-­must-­unite-­and-­defeat-­the-­successors-­of-­lawrence-­of-­arabia-­no-­
one-­will-­be-­able-­to-­stop-­the-­rise-­of-­islam-­i.html/  ;;  &  MEMRI,  Middle  East  Media  Research  
Institute,  accessed  21  August  2015,  
http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/8431.htm#_edn8.    421  Ibid.    
174	  	  
there  has  been  a  noticeable  “Islamization  of  Turkish  foreign  policy”  under  the  
AKP  rule422.  Others  suggested  that  Turkey  is  “Leaving  the  West”  and  that  there  
is  an  “Axis  Shift”  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  under  the  AKP  government423.  Soner  
Cagaptay   (2009)   in  his  article   Is  Turkey  Leaving   the  West?  stated,   “In  early  
October,  Turkey  disinvited  Israel  from  Anatolian  Eagle,  an  annual  Turkish  air  
force  exercise  that  it  had  held  with  Israel,  NATO,  and  the  United  States  since  
the   mid-­1990s.   It   marked   the   first   time   Turkey's   governing   Justice   and  
Development  Party  (AKP)  let  its  increasingly  anti-­Western  rhetoric  spill  into  its  
foreign   policy   strategy,   and   the  move  may   suggest   that   Turkey's   continued  
cooperation   with   the   West   is   far   from   guaranteed”424.   In   another   article  
published  by  the  Washington  Post  (2009),  Cagaptay  argued  that  Turkey  under  
the  AKP  has  taken  a  turn  away  from  the  West  in  its  foreign  policy425.  He  added,  
“Liberal  political  trends  are  disappearing,  E.U.  accession  talks  have  stalled,  ties  
with  anti-­Western  states  such  as  Iran  are  improving  and  relations  with  Israel  are  
deteriorating”426.    
   This  part  will  focus  on  the  arguments  forwarded  by  scholars  and  analysts  
that  looked  at  the  deterioration  of  relations  with  the  United  States  and  Israel  as  
evidence   for   Turkey’s   anti-­western   foreign   policy   derived   by   AKP’s   Islamist  
agenda.   Therefore,   this   part   consists   of   two  main   sections;;   the   first   will   be  
looking   at   Turkish-­US   relations   under   the   AKP   government   and   how   some  
                                                                                                              422  Birol  Yesilada  and  Barry  Rubin,  ed.,  Islamization  of  Turkey  Under  the  AKP  Rule  
(Routledge,  2011).    423  Soner  Cagaptay,  "Is  Turkey  Leaving  the  West?."  Foreign  Affairs  26  (2009);;  Ahmet  Sozen  
and  Devrim  Sahin,  “Perception  of  Axis  Shift  in  Turkish  Foreign  Policy:  An  Analysis  through  
“Butterfly  Effect,”  Izmir  Review  of  Social  Sciences  1,  no.1  (2013):  47-­63.    424  Ibid.    425  Soner  Cagaptay,  “Turkey’s  turn  from  the  West”,  Washington  Post,  (2009),  accessed  
October  12,  2015,  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-­
dyn/content/article/2009/02/01/AR2009020101672.html.    426  Ibid.    
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critics  have  viewed  this;;  the  second  section  will  analyse  the  nature  of  Turkish-­
Israeli  relations  and  its  recent  fall  back.  However,  the  relations  between  Turkey  
and  the  European  Union  and  the  membership   issues  will  be  looked  at   in  the  
coming  chapter  because  it  needs  a  larger  section  on  its  own  in  order  to  address  
this  topic  with  a  more  adequate  analysis.    
4.1	  Turkish-­‐US	  relations	  and	  behaviour	  towards	  US-­‐Middle	  East	  policies	  	  
  
Historically,  Turkey  has  developed  ties  with  the  United  States  and  managed  to  
maintain  good  relations  with  it  for  a  long  time.  Turkish-­US  alliance  can  be  traced  
back  to  the  Cold  War  after  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War.  The  American  
administration  at  that  time  saw  the  importance  of  building  a  strategic  alliance  
with  Turkey  against  the  Soviet  expansionism  and  influence.  The  development  
of   this  alliance  was  further  strengthened  after   the  establishment  of   the  North  
Atlantic  Treaty  Organization  (NATO)  and  Turkey’s  membership  in  1951,  which  
manifested  “a  close  bilateral  alliance  within  the  multilateral  context  of  the  main  
Western   collective   defence   organization”427.   Relations   between   the   two  
countries  were  clear  based  on  mutual  interests;;  Turkey  supporting  US  interests  
and   countering   Soviet   expansion,   in   return   for   US   support   and   security  
assistance  and  efforts  in  fighting  against  the  Kurdish  Workers  Party  (PKK)428.  
Relations   generally   remained   healthy   and   cooperation   on   economic   and  
security  affairs  maintained.  Turkey  developed  strong  alliance  with   the  United  
                                                                                                              427  Bulent  Aliriza  and  Bulent  Aras,  “US-­Turkish  relations:  A  review  at  the  beginning  of  the  third  
decade  of  the  post  Cold  War  era,”  Centre  for  Strategic  and  International  Studies  (2012):  1,  
accessed  August  24,  2015,  
http://csis.org/files/publication/121107_Aliriza_USTurkishRelations_Web.pdf.    428  Ibid,  V.    
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States  and  the  West  during  the  Cold  War,  while  applying  very  cautious  foreign  
policy  towards  Middle  Easter  states429.    
However,  since   the  collapse  of   the  Soviet  Union  and  end  of   the  Cold  
War,  Turkey  entered  a  new  phase  in  its  foreign  policy.  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  
became  more  active  and  was  able  to  apply  a  “multi-­dimensional”  foreign  policy.  
However,  Turkey  remained  heavily  dependent  on  its  hard  power  politics  and  on  
the   securitization   in   its   foreign   policy.   At   this   regard,   Paula   Sandrin   (2009)  
argued  that  using  hard  power  in  dealing  with  external  problems  contributed  to  
viewing  Turkey  as  “a  post-­Cold  War  warrior”,  a  “coercive  regional  power”,  and  
“regional   bully”430.   However,   relations   with   the   United   States   remained  
important  for  both  states  and  particularly  both  on  a  strategic  and  security  level.  
For  example,  Turkey  supported  the  American  position  in  the  1990  Gulf  War431  
and  in  the  American  War  on  Terror  post  9/11432.    
However,   this  alliance  witnessed  a  drastic  change   in   the   last  decade.  
Turkey’s  negative  views  over  US  policies  in  the  Middle  East  became  much  more  
evident.  The  first  major  drawback  in  Turkish-­US  relations  happened  during  the  
2003  American  invasion  of  Iraq.  Turkey  opposed  US  invasion  and  did  not  allow  
the  American   troops   to  enter   Iraq   from  the  Turkish  Northern  borders433.  This  
was   due   to   America’s   changing   policies   and   positions   towards   the   Kurdish  
issue.  The  Turkish  government  was  concerned  about   the  possibility   that   this  
                                                                                                              429  Paula  Sandrin,  “Turkish  Foreign  Policy  after  the  end  of  Cold  War  –  from  securitizing  to  
desecuritizing  actor,”  Changing  Turkey  (2009),  accessed  August  24,  2015,  
http://changingturkey.com/2009/09/30/turkish-­foreign-­policy-­after-­the-­end-­of-­cold-­war-­–-­from-­
securitizing-­to-­desecuritizing-­actor-­by-­paula-­sandrin-­university-­of-­westminster/.    430  Ibid.    431  Sharon  Otterman,  “Iraq:  U.S.-­Turkey  Relations,”  Council  on  Foreign  Relations,  March  31,  
2003,  accessed  October  11,  2015,  http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-­us-­turkey-­relations/p7795.    432  Desmond  Fernandes,    “Turkey’s  US-­backed  War  On  Terror:  A  Cause  For  Concern?,”  
Variant,  27  (2006),  accessed  October  11,  2015,  
http://www.variant.org.uk/27texts/Kurds27.html.      433  William  Hale,  Turkey,  the  United  States  and  Iraq  (Middle  East  Institute,  2005).    
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invasion   could   lead   to   a   strengthening   of   the   Kurdish   PKK   and   to   the  
establishment   of   a   Kurdish   state   in   the   North434.   According   to  William  Hale  
(2005),  Turkey's  rejection  was  an  important  turning  point  that  created  a  major  
impact  on  US-­Turkish  relations  and  US-­Turkish  Middle  East  policies435.  Hale  
illustrated  that  such  event  has  changed  the  nature  of  the  long  strategic  Turkish-­
US  relations.    
The   AKP   government   became   highly   critical   of   US   regional   policies,  
relations  deteriorated,  and  anti-­American  sentiment  increased436.  Aylin  Guney  
in  her  article  Anti-­Americanism  in  Turkey:  Past  and  Present  (2008),  argued  that  
the  AKP  had  a  problem  making  a  decision  over   the  2003   Iraq   issue  due   to  
pressures  from  its  “grassroots”,  and  added,  “Despite  having  an  overwhelming  
majority  in  Parliament  with  363  seats,  the  AKP  would  have  had  difficulty  passing  
the  decision  wanted  by   the  Americans   regarding   Iraq  since   it   came   from  an  
Islamist  political  tradition  which  opposes  declaring  war  against  a  fellow  Muslim  
country”437.   The   Turkish   government   was   highly   critical   of   the   Bush  
administration   and   the   Turkish-­US   “strategic   partnership”   reached   its   lowest  
levels.  However,  signs  of  a  new  positive  era  of  relations  came  after  President  
Barack   Obama   was   elected   in   2008438,   especially   with   his   new   multilateral  
approach  in  his  foreign  policy.  Obama’s  first  international  visit  was  to  Turkey  in  
2009  and  one  of  the  most  important  signals  of  improvement  was  Obama’s  view  
                                                                                                              434  Banu  Eligur,  “Turkish-­American  Relations  Since  the  2003  Iraqi  War:  A  Troubled  
Partnership,”  Middle  East  Brief,  no.6  (2006):  1.  accessed  August  24,  2015,  
http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB6.pdf.    
435  Hale,  Op  cit.    436  Stephen  Larrabee,  “Troubled  Partnership:  Turkish-­US  relations  in  an  era  of  Global  
geopolitical  change,”  RAND,  (2010):  iii.  accessed  August  24,  2015,  
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG899.pdf.      437  Aylin  Guney,  “Anti-­Americanism  in  Turkey:  Past  and  Present,”  Middle  Eastern  Studies  44,  
no.3,  (2008):  477.    438  Larrabee,  xiii.    
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of   Turkish-­American   friendship   as   “model   partnership”439.   However,   this  
optimism  did  not  last  for  long.  Only  a  year  later  another  major  dispute  emerged  
over  the  Iranian  nuclear  problem.    
An  increasing  number  of  analysts  questioned  Turkey’s  relations  with  the  
United  States  and  the  West  in  general  after  the  Turkish  “No  Vote”  on  sanctions  
against  Iran  at  the  United  Nations  Security  Council  (UNSC)440.  Turkey  was  able  
to   sign  an  agreement  with   Iran  on  nuclear   fuel   swap  known  as   the   “Tehran  
Declaration”  along  with  Brazil   in  2010441.  The  American  government  rejected  
such  deal  and  forwarded  new  sanctions  against  Iran442.  Turkey’s  position  was  
not   in   favour   of   such   sanctions   and   voted   against.   Some   argued   that   this  
escalation  of  tensions  and  the  Turkish  decision  of  “No  vote”  was  a  result  of  the  
Gaza  flotilla  raid  by  Israeli  forces  also  known  as  the  Mavi  Marmara  incident  in  
May  2010443.  Israeli  alliance  is  highly  critical  to  American  interests  and  Turkey’s  
hostile  reaction  towards  Israeli  behaviour  and  policies  has  been  a  central  point  
of   dispute   between  Turkey  and   the  US.  The  Turkish   approach   towards   Iran  
made  many  observers  to  ask  weather  America  has  lost  its  Turkish  ally  or  not.  
Therefore,   such   Turkish   lenience   towards   Iran   was   not   surprising   to   some  
                                                                                                              439  Ahmet  K.  Han,  “From  "Strategic  Partnership"  to  "Model  Partnership":  AKP,  Turkish-­US  
Relations  and  the  Prospects  under  Obama,”  UNISCI  Discussion  Papers,  no.  23  (2010):  77-­
112.    440  Fulya  Ozerkan,  “Turkey's  no  vote  on  Iran  sanctions  a  'strong  rebuke,'  former  US  politician  
says,”  Hurriyet  Daily  News,  June  16,  2010,  accessed  October  11,  2015,  
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkey8217s-­no-­vote-­on-­iran-­
sanctions-­was-­a-­strong-­rebuke-­2010-­06-­16.    441  Julian  Borger,  “Text  of  the  Iran-­Brazil-­Turkey  deal,”  The  Guardian,  May  17,  2010,  
accessed  October  11,  2015,  http://www.theguardian.com/world/julian-­borger-­global-­security-­
blog/2010/may/17/iran-­brazil-­turkey-­nuclear.    442  James  Reinl,  “US  rejects  Iran  nuclear  deal  brokered  by  Turkey  and  Brazil  and  sets  up  new  
sanctions,”  The  National,  May  20,  2010,  accessed  October  11,  2015,  
http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/us-­rejects-­iran-­nuclear-­deal-­brokered-­by-­turkey-­and-­
brazil-­and-­sets-­up-­new-­sanctions.    443  Kadir  Ustun  and  Kilic  Bugra  Kanat,  “US-­Turkey  Relations  in  the  AK  Party  Decade,”  SETA  
Policy  Brief,  no.62  (2013):  9.    
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scholars  and  this  is  seen  as  part  of  AKP’s  pan-­Islamist  policies  and  openness  
to  the  Islamic  world444.    
Moreover,  the  Arab  Spring  has  been  another  major  issue  that  affected  
Turkey’s  foreign  policy.  With  the  development  of  popular  uprisings  in  the  Middle  
East,  Turkish-­US   relations  entered  a  new  phase.  The  uprising   in   the  Middle  
East  brought  about  significant  security  concerns  for  both  Turkey  and  the  United  
States.   Turkey   at   the   beginning   of   the   revolutions   was   quite   hesitant   in   its  
response   towards   popular   uprisings   against   Arab   dictatorships.   This   was  
particularly   evident   regarding   the   Libyan   uprising   due   to   Turkey’s   high  
economic  interests  in  that  country445.  Turkey  invested  a  lot  of  its  foreign  policy  
efforts  to  develop  good  relations  and  cooperation  with  those  governments.  The  
Arab  Spring  challenged  Davutoglu’s  “Zero  Problems  With  Neighbours”  policy  
after  working  closely  with  Arab  regimes  for  a  number  of  years446.    The  Turkish  
approach  to  the  Arab  uprisings  was  to  contribute  to  regional  peace  and  stability,  
while  at  the  same  time  supporting  the  demands  of  the  Arab  peoples447.  
Therefore,   the   American   administration   recognized   the   importance   of  
Turkish   regional   role.   As   a   result,   intensive   diplomatic   efforts   were   made  
between   Turkey   and   the   US   regarding   this   issue   especially   as   both  
governments   have   vast   interests   in   this   region448.   Observers   saw   the  
                                                                                                              444  Kenneth  H.  Williams,  ed.,  Rethinking:  A  Middle  East  in  Transition  (Marine  Corps  University  
Press,  2011),  117.    445  Fares  Thaher  Al-­Fayez,  “The  Turkish  Strategic  Restrictions  towards  the  Arab  Revolts,”  
Journal  of  Politics  and  Law  6,  no.2  (2013):  138.      446  Ahmet  Davutoglu,  “Turkey’s  Zero-­Problems  Foreign  Policy,”  Foreign  Policy,  May  20,  2010,  
accessed  October  11,  2015,  http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/05/20/turkeys-­zero-­problems-­
foreign-­policy/.    447  Ustun  and  Kanat,  11.    448  İlhan  Tanir,  “How  the  Arab  Spring  is  Transforming  Turkish-­American  Relations,”  Turkish  
Policy  10,  no.3  (2011):  75.  accessed  October  11,  2015,  http://turkishpolicy.com/pdf/vol_10-­
no_3-­tanir.pdf.    
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importance   of   the   Turkish   democratic   model   to   the   Middle   East449.   Turkey  
became   heavily   involved   and   this   was   seen   by   its   support   to   the   Muslim  
Brotherhood   in   Egypt   and   in   other   Arab   states.   According   to   Alexander  
Murinson   (2012),   “The  electoral   successes  of  Muslim  Brotherhood-­  affiliated  
parties  and  groups,  such  as  Ennahda  in  Tunisia  and  the  Freedom  and  Justice  
Party   in   Egypt,   provided   Turkey   with   an   opportunity   of   creating   a   belt   of  
moderate  Islamist  regimes   in  the  region”450.  Furthermore,  Anat  Lapidot-­Firilla  
(2012)   in   an   international   conference   entitled   “Political   Islam:   Is   Turkey   a  
Model?”  held  by  the  institute  of  National  Security  Studies  (INSS),  argued  that  
the   AKP   government   is   challenging   the   Western   world   and   the   Kemalist  
establishment   by   adopting   the   civilization   discourse   argument   by   claiming  
leadership  of  the  “Islamic  Civilization”451.    
Although  this  thesis  does  not  aim  to  cover  the  later  development  of  the  
Arab  Spring  and  most  recent  issues,  it  is  important  to  highlight  that  more  efforts  
have  been  made  in  fighting  terrorism  and  particularly  the  Islamic  State  (ISIS)  in  
Syria  and  Iraq.  Turkish-­US  relations  entered  a  new  phase  due  to  their  mutual  
security   interests   regarding   the   war   against   terrorism.   Turkey   and   the   U.S.  
administration  have  discussed  a  coalition  protected  “Safe  Zone”  inside  Syria  in  
return  to  allow  US  military  and  air  force  to  use  Turkish  military  bases  in  its  fight  
against  ISIS452.  The  US  has  provided  real-­time  intelligence  to  Ankara  on  PKK  
                                                                                                              449  Anna  Secor,  “Turkey’s  Democracy:  A  Model  for  the  Troubled  Middle  East?,”  Eurasian  
Geography  and  Economics  52,  Issue  2  (2013):  157-­172.      450  Alexander  Murinson,  “Turkish  foreign  policy  in  the  twenty  first  century,”  Mideast  Security  
and  Policy  Studies,  No.  9  (2012):  17.    451  Anat  Lapidot-­Firilla,  “A  new  version  of  Nationalist  Islam?,”  INSS,  (accessed  August  25,  
2015,  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TG6qIwGIvXU.    452  Simon  Tisdall,  “Syrian  Safe  Zone:  US  relents  to  Turkish  demands  after  border  crisis  




movements  and  provided  most  of  the  capabilities  used  by  the  Turkish  armed  
forces  against  the  PKK.  Therefore,  it  can  be  argued  that  Turkish-­US  relations  
went  through  different  phases  and  became  much  more  diverse  during  the  AKP  
government.  The  fluctuation  in  their  relations  is  due  to  a  number  of  global  and  
regional  circumstances  and  changes  that  are  taking  place.      
4.2	  Turkish-­‐Israeli	  relations:	  a	  new	  phase	  	  
  
Turkey  has  been  one  of   the   first  countries   to   recognize   the  state  of   Israel   in  
1949453.  Since  then,  Turkey  and  Israel  maintained  good  relations  and  strategic  
security   and   intelligence   cooperation.   Turkey   recognized   the   importance   of  
keeping  good  relations  with  Israel  as  this  helps  in  the  development  of  Turkish-­
US   relations   and   the  Western   world   in   general.   However,   it   is   important   to  
understand   that   Turkish-­Israeli   relations   have   fluctuated   from   time   to   time  
depending  on  different  events.  For  example,  after  the  1956  Suez  Crisis,  Turkey  
“downgraded”   its   relations   with   Israel454.   Moreover,   in   1980,   Turkey   closed  
down  its  consulate  in  Jerusalem  after  the  Israeli  announced  that  Jerusalem  was  
the  eternal  capital  of  Israel455.    
Bilateral  relations  and  cooperation  mainly   increased  in   late  1980s  and  
1990s  on  all  economic,  political,  cultural  and  security  levels.  According  to  Umut  
Uzer  (2013),  national  interests  were  so  close  that  “the  two  countries  were  on  
the  verge  of  establishing  an  informal  alliance  against  Syria,  Iraq  and  Iran  due  
to  common  threat  perceptions”456.  During  this  highly  cooperative  environment  
                                                                                                              453  Zeyno  Baran,  Torn  Country:  Turkey  between  Secularism  and  Islamism  (Hoover  Institution  
Press,  2010).    454  Umut  Uzer,  “Turkish-­Israeli  relations:  their  rise  and  fall,”  Middle  East  Policy  Council  XX,  
no.1  (2013),  accessed  August  25,  2015,  http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-­east-­policy-­
archives/turkish-­israeli-­relations-­their-­rise-­and-­fall.      455  Ibid.    456  Ibid.    
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between   the   two   countries,   Turkey   remained   cautious   towards   its   Arab  
neighbours.   Turkey   and   Israel   viewed   each   other   as   important   strategic  
partners.    
   Since  the  AKP  took  power  in  2002  Turkish  foreign  policy  and  relations  
with  Israel  took  gradual  shifts.  During  the  first  term  of  Erdogan’s  rule,  Turkish-­
Israeli   relations   remained   in   good   condition.   Turkey   even   adopted   intensive  
mediation   efforts   between   Syria   and   Israel457.   However,   as   relations   with  
Europe  and  the  West  deteriorated  since  the  2003  Iraq  war,  Turkey  opened  up  
to  the  East  and  became  closer  to  the  Arab  and  Muslim  world.  This  brought  along  
a   change   in   Turkish   behaviour   towards   Israel   and   its   actions   in   the   region.  
Turkey  suspended  its  mediation  efforts  between  Israel  and  Syria  in  2008  after  
Israeli  attacks  on  the  Gaza  strip458.  Since  this  Israeli  operation,  Turkish-­Israeli  
relations   took   a   sharp   down   turn.   This   was   followed   by   the   famous   Davos  
incident  in  the  G20  summit  2009  when  Erdogan  told  Israel’s  president  Shimon  
Peres  “You  know  killing  very  well”  referring  to  the  Israeli  killing  of  Palestinians  
in  Gaza459.  A  second  incident  that  further  escalated  tensions  between  Turkey  
and  Israel  occurred  a  year  later.  It  was  the  Israeli  attacks  on  the  humanitarian  
ships  known  as  Gaza  flotilla  and  storming  the  Turkish  Mavi  Marmara  ship  killing  
and   injuring   civilian   pro-­Palestinian   activists460.   The   flotilla   incident   caused  
significant   damage   in   the   relations   of   the   former   allies.   Turkey   withdrew   its  
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ambassador  from  Israel  and  Erdogan  called  for   Israel   to  be  punished  for   the  
killings  and  the  bilateral  military  cooperation  was  cancelled  as  well461.    
   Some  scholars  saw  this  as  an  increase  of  Turkish  anti-­Israeli  behaviour  
adopted  by  AKP  government.  Sevante  Cornell  (2011)  for  instance  suggested  
that  the  only  way  that  the  change  in  Turkish  foreign  policy  towards  Israel  can  
be   understood   is   by   understanding   the   AKP   ideology:   “the   salience   of   anti-­
Western  and  Islamist  thinking  in  the  Turkish  government”462.  He  further  argued  
that  Turkey  was   increasing  “solidarity  with  Islamist  causes  and  regimes”  and  
that  “AKP  leaders  appear  to  have  returned,  at  least  to  some  extent,  to  the  more  
Islamist  thinking  that  motivated  them  prior  to  the  moderation  of  the  conservative  
movement  in  2001-­2002  and  the  founding  of  the  AKP”463.  Furthermore,  during  
the  Arab  Spring,  Turkey-­Israeli  relations  remained  low.  After  the  military  coup  
against   Egypt’s   elected   president   Mohammed   Morsi   and   the   Muslim  
Brotherhood  in  2013,  Turkey’s  PM  Erdogan  accused  Israel  of  being  “behind  the  
ouster  of  Egypt’s  Islamist  president  Mohammed  Morsi”464.  This  shows  the  way  
Turkey  remained  highly  suspicious  of  Israeli  policies  in  the  region.    
On   the  other  hand,   the  Turkish  government   increased   its  support  and  
alliance  with  Hamas  -­  an  Islamist  political  organization  regarded  as  a  terrorist  
organization   by   Israel   and   the  US  –  which   is   seen  by   some  analysts   as   an  
important  signal  of  AKP’s   Islamist  affiliation.  For  examples,  Harold  Rhode,  a  
former  official  in  the  US  defence  department  stated  in  the  Jerusalem  Issue  Brief  
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Series  in  May  2010  “their  Islam  is  more  in  tune  with  the  fanatically  anti-­  Western  
principles  of  Saudi  Wahhabi  Islam”465.  Furthermore,  Thomas  Friedman  (2010),  
a  columnist  at  New  York  Times,  stated  in  an  article  entitled  Turkey  goes  from  
Pliable  Ally   to  Thorn  for  U.S.,  argued  that,   “Turkey’s  shifting  foreign  policy   is  
making  its  prime  minister,  Recep  Tayyep  Erdogan,  a  hero  to  the  Arab  world,  
and   is   openly   challenging   the  way   the  United  States  manages   its   two  most  
pressing  issues  in  the  region,  Iran’s  nuclear  program  and  the  Israeli-­Palestinian  
peace  process”466.    
In  an  article  entitled  Crisis  in  Turkish-­Israeli  relations  (December  2008-­
June  2011):  From  Partnership   to  Enmity   (2012)  Banu  Eligur  argued   that   the  
recent   Turkish   enmity   towards   Israel   is   a   result   of   Turkey’s   Islamist   foreign  
policy   towards   the  Middle  East467.  She   further   stated,   “the  AKP  government  
formed  close  political  and  economic  relations  with  political  Islamist  regimes  like  
Iran,  Sudan,  Saudi  Arabia,  Hamas,  and  Hezbollah”  and  that  this  “new  Turkish  
foreign  policy  led  to  a  crucial  divergence  of  strategic  interests  between  Turkey  
and  Israel”468.  Similarly,  Gallia  Lindenstrauss  and  Süfyan  Kadir  Kivam  in  their  
article  Turkish-­Hamas  relations:  between  strategic  calculation  and  ideological  
affinity  (2014)  argued  that  the  Turkish  AKP  government  has  ideological  affinity  
with  Hamas.  They  stated,  “With  both  Hamas  and  the  Justice  and  Development  
Party  seen  as  linked  to  the  global  Muslim  Brotherhood  movement,  there  also  
                                                                                                              465  Hugb  Pope,  “Pax  Ottomana?  The  mixed  success  of  Turkey’s  new  foreign  policy,”  Foreign  
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seems  to  be  an  ideological  affinity  between  the  two”469.    
Although  this  thesis  does  not  intend  to  engage  with  very  recent  regional  
developments,   it   is   necessary   however   to   highlight   that   the   recent  
developments  in  fighting  the  so  called  “Islamic  State”  in  Iraq  and  Syria  (ISIS)  
and  growing  worries  of  Turkey  and   Israel  of  a  spill   over,  both   recognize   the  
importance  of  increasing  military  engagement  against  terrorist  targets  on  their  
borders.  However,  Turkey’s  main  military  collaboration  against  ISIS  is  with  the  
United  States  and  the  international  coalition  troops,  while  Israel  is  conducting  
its   own   strikes   on   the   Syrian   border   also   in   cooperation   with   the   US   and  
Jordan470.  The  war  against  ISIS  could  be  seen  as  an  opportunity  for  creating  a  
new   platform   for   bilateral   cooperation.   In   this   light,   the   question   regarding  
Turkish-­Israeli   relations   still   persists   and   future   relations   are   far   from  
predictable.    
5.	  Assessing	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  “Islamist”	  approach	  and	  explanations	  in	  
understanding	  Turkish	  foreign	  policy	  
  
A   large   number   of   scholars   and   analysts   argued   that   the   recent   change   in  
Turkish   foreign   policy   driven   by   political   Islam,   represented   by   the   AKP  
government  and  its  leadership’s  Islamist  ideology.  The  arguments  presented  in  
the  literature  asserted  that  the  AKP  government  has  Islamist  hidden  agenda,  
pan-­Islamist  leadership,  and  Islamist  domestic  and  international  affiliation.  The  
evidence  they  focused  on  a  number  of  facts  and  events.  Some  looked  at  the  
                                                                                                              469  Gallia  Lindenstrauss  and  Sufyan  Kadir  Kivam,  “Turkish-­Hamas  relations:  between  strategic  
calculation  and  ideological  affinity,”  Strategic  Assessment  17,  no.2  (2014):  10.    470  Gul  Tuysuz  and  Zeynep  Bilginsoy,  “Ministry:  Turkey  joins  coalition  airstrikes  against  ISIS  in  
Syria,”  August  29,  2015,  accessed  October  12,  2015,  
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/08/29/europe/turkey-­airstrikes/  ;;  Roi  Kais,  “Jordan,  Israel  




AKP  leadership  Islamist  roots  and  the  way  in  which  a  number  of  its  founding  
members   were   associated   with   previous   Islamist   parties   in   Turkey.   Others  
collected  and  analysed  the  writings,  statements,  and  speeches  of  the  two  most  
influential   figures  in  the  party  (Recep  Taiyyp  Erdogan  and  Ahmet  Davutoglu)  
that   had   any   connection   or   links   to   Political   Islam.  While   others   paid   more  
attention  to  the  changes  in  relations  between  Turkey,  the  United  States,  and  
Israel  focusing  on  the  recent  tensions.    
   This  section  of  the  chapter  aims  to  identify  possible  critics  of  the  Islamist  
explanation   in   understanding   Turkish   foreign   policy   as   well   as   applying  
interview  data,  which  will  enable  the  researcher  to  identify  possible  errors  and  
weaknesses  to  help  determine  the  Islamist  explanation's  contributory  value.  
The  explanations  presented  above  are  found  to  be  weak  and  lacking  of  
comprehensiveness   in   their  approach.   In  other  words,   they   fail   in   taking   into  
account  and  explaining   the  different  AKP  policies   that  suggest  otherwise   i.e.  
commitment   to   EU   membership   and   criteria;;   developments   in   the  
democratization   process;;   economic   liberalization;;   and   openness   and  
cooperation   with   other   non-­Muslim   countries.   Furthermore,   some   of   those  
studies  seem  to  have  taken  certain  events  for  granted  and  dismissed  the  fact  
that  there  are  other  reasons  behind  the  disagreement  or  escalation  of  tensions  
between  Turkey  and  Western  or  “non-­Muslim  states”   than  simply  an  Islamist  
ideology  or  agenda.  What  is  more,  some  of  those  arguments  seemed  very  one  
sided  and  bias  because   they  have  been   focusing  on  one  aspect  of  Turkey’s  
foreign  policy  and  its  policy  makers.  For  example,  some  studies  focused  on  the  
allegedly  “anti-­western”  and  aggressive  speeches  against  Western  states  and  
other  pro-­Islamist  statements,  while  at   the  same  time  disregarding  any  other  
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form  of  positive  statements  towards  Western  states  and  negative  statements  
towards  some  governments  in  the  Muslim  World.    
A   number   of   analysts   have   disregarded   the   complicated   nature   of  
Turkish   history   and   society   and   their   modernization   process,   while   simply  
treating  it  as  another  Middle  Eastern  state.  Turkey  cannot  be  compared  to  any  
other   country   in   the   Middle   East   due   to   its   unique   social   conditions,   geo-­
strategic  position,  and  historical  development.  Therefore,  it  can  be  argued  that  
some  of  those  studies  fall  into  the  orientalist  approach  of  understanding  Turkish  
foreign  policy471.  In  my  interview  with  Dr.  Saban  Kardas,  president  of  the  Middle  
East   Strategic   Research   Centre   (ORSAM)   in   Ankara   he   argued   that   “The  
problem   is   that   most   of   the   literature   on   Turkish   foreign   policy   are   not  
necessarily   theoretical,   they   are   more   policy   oriented   and   not   theoretically  
oriented.  However,  they  are  at  the  same  time  based  on  either  approach”472.  The  
main  reason  why  such  claim  fails  to  explain  the  cause  behind  Turkish  foreign  
policy  since  2002  is  because  it  disregards  other  possible  explanations  that  we  
need  to   take   into  account.  However,   this  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  we  
should  totally  ignore  it,  instead  we  need  to  adopt  a  more  holistic  and  balanced  
approach.    
   The  aim  of  this  section  is  to  assess  the  plausibility  and  accuracy  of  the  
Islamist  approach.  In  doing  so  it  will  examine  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  
this  approach  by  testing  it  through  the  process  tracing  methodology  to  assess  
whether   it  will  or  not  survive  the  test.  First  of  all,  each  point   illustrated   in   the  
                                                                                                              471  Gurkan  Zengin,  “Orientalist  Steriotypes  and  Turkish  Foreign  Policy,”  Sundays  Zaman,  
August  21,  2010,  accessed  September  20,  
2015http://www.todayszaman.com/columnists_orientalist-­stereotypes-­and-­turkish-­foreign-­
policy_219622.html.    472  Saban  Kardas,  interview  by  author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  October  13,  2014.    
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sections  above  will  be  discussed  separately.  Secondly,  counter  arguments  will  
be  included  in  order  to  further  explain  the  limitation  of  the  approach.  In  addition,  
it   will   assess   the   necessity   of   taking   into   account   such   explanation   when  
analysing  Turkish  foreign  policy  in  the  last  decade.      
   When  looking  at  the  Islamist  roots  of  the  AKP  we  understand  that  AKP  
leaders  emerged  from  the  well-­known  Islamist  “National  View  Movement”  led  
by  Necmettin  Erbakan  and  have  been  associated  with  previous  Islamist  parties,  
but  does  that  necessarily  make  them  Islamists?  With  the  emergence  of  the  AKP  
and  its  split  from  the  Virtue  Party  in  2001,  AKP  founding  members  changed  the  
Islamist   ideology   and   pursued   a   new   path   based   on   “conservative-­
democracy”473.   Party   leaders   refused   any   attachment   to   political   Islam   and  
argued  that  they  are  now  representing  a  wider  range  of  the  Turkish  society  from  
right  to  left.  Moreover,  the  AK  Party  is  the  largest  political  party  in  Turkey  with  
around   258   members474.   Interestingly,   many   of   them   did   not   have   any  
engagement   with   previous   Islamist   parties   and,   according   to   one   of   my  
interviewee  in  Ankara,  some  young  men  who  came  from  very  liberal  families  
who  even   “drink  Alcohol   sometimes”.   In  addition,   recent   incidents  of  alcohol  
drinking  by  AKP  officials  have  been  on   the  news  as  well475.  However,  when  
examining   the  claim  that   the  AKP   is  an   Islamist  party,   it   is  necessary   to   first  
define  Islamism  and  identify  the  main  characteristics  of  an  Islamist  party  in  order  
to   know   if   that   applies   to   the   AKP   or   not.   According   to   Ihsan   Dagi   (2008),  
                                                                                                              473  Muge  Aknur,  ed.,  Democratic  Consolidation  in  Turkey:  State,  Political  Parties,  Civil  
Society,  Civil-­Military  Relations,  Socio-­Economic  Development,  EU,  Rise  of  Political  Islam  
and  Separatist  Kurdish  Nationalism  (Universal  Publishers,  Boca  Raton,  2012),  167.    474  Cansu  Colakoglu,  “Turkey  Between  Elections,”  Harvard  Political  Review,  October  6,  2015,  
accessed  October  12,  2015,  http://harvardpolitics.com/world/turkey-­elections/.    475  Hurriyet  Daily,  “Turkey’s  ruling  AKP  demands  resignation  of  ‘alcohol  drinking’  official,”  




Islamism  “refers  to  political  activism  that  aims  to  form  a  polity   inspired,   if  not  
defined,  by  the  principles  of  Islam,  and  envisages  the  construction  of  an  Islamic  
society  through  the  agency  of  the  state”476.  This  means  that  an  Islamist  party  
would  adopt   an   Islamization  project   on   the   country   and  will  most   likely   fight  
against  any  type  of  Western  Democratic  principles  and  liberal  values,  but  was  
this  actually  the  case  with  the  AKP  in  Turkey?  
AKP  leaders  have  repeatedly  asserted  that  such  label  does  not  exist  in  
its  agenda.   Instead,   it   is  a  party   that  adopted   far  more   liberal  principles.  For  
example,  the  Economist  (2008)  stated,  “No  Islamic  party  has  been  as  moderate  
and   pro-­Western   as   the   AKP,   which   catapulted   into   government   in   2002  
promising   to   lead   Turkey   into   the   European   Union”477.   Unlike   Necmettin  
Erbakan  “The  Father  of  Turkish  Islamism”  who  rejected  the  idea  of  joining  the  
European   Union,   one   of   AKP’s   main   foreign   policy   goals   was   to   join   the  
European  Union478.  Moreover,  Ihsan  Dagi  (2008)  in  his  article  Turkey’s  AKP  in  
power  argued  that  the  AKP  government  appears  to  be  far  less  of  an  Islamist  
party  and  more  as  one  that   is  pro-­Western,  market  oriented,  and  populist479.  
The   AKP   was   able   to   transform   Turkey   by   enhancing   the   democratization  
process   and  minority   rights   including   non-­Muslims   and   Kurds480,   proving   its  
distance  from  Islamist  parties  whose  aim  was  to  transform  the  country  into  a  
“Caliphate”  adopting  religious  principles  and  sharia  law.  In  fact,  since  2002,  the  
                                                                                                              476  Ihsan  Dagi,  “Turkey’s  AKP  in  power,”  Journal  of  democracy  19,  no.3,  (2008):  26.  accessed  
August  28,  2015,  http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v019/19.3.dagi.pdf.    477  The  Economist,  “A  state  prosecutor  wants  to  ban  the  ruling  party,”  The  Economist,  March  
19,  2008,  accessed  October  12,  2015,  http://www.economist.com/node/10881280.    478  Firat  Cengiz,  Lars  Hoffmann,  ed.,Turkey  and  the  European  Union:  Facing  New  Challenges  
and  Opportunities  (Routledge,  2014),182.    479  Dagi,  Op  cit.      480  Alparslan  Nas,  “Democratization  in  Turkey:  the  end  of  the  First  Republic?,”  Open  
Democracy,  October  14,  2013,  accessed  October  12,  2015,  
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AKP  government  adopted  a  number  of  reforms  in  line  with  European  norms  in  
human  rights,  civil-­military  relations,  and  judicial  system.    
According   to   Leila   Piran   (2013)   in   her   book   Institutional   Change   in  
Turkey:  The  Impact  of  European  Union  Reforms  on  Human  Rights  and  Policing,  
the   AKP   government   was   able   to   carry   on   a   large-­scale   institutional  
transformation   based   on   democracy   and   human   rights481.   However,   it   is  
important  here   to  explain   that   the   Islamist   roots  of   the  AKP  and  some  of   its  
leadership  Islamist  experience  cannot  be  simply  erased  completely  from  their  
memories.  Their  previous  experience  in  past  Islamist  parties  and  engagement  
with   Erbakan’s   political   movement  Milli   Görüş  must   have   played   a   role   in  
shaping   their   views   and   thinking.   Such   effects   are   evident   analyzing   their  
position  regarding  the  headscarf  and  religious  education  for  example482,  issues  
which  lay  at  the  heart  of  the  democratic  debate  in  Turkey.  Some  scholars  have  
used  such  examples  as  strong  evidence  for  the  AKP’s  Islamism  and  Islamist  
agenda,  while  at  the  same  time  disregarding  issues  regarding  the  liberal  and  
democratic  transitions  in  the  country,  the  respect  of  minority  rights  and  others  
that  are  not  involved  in  the  notion  of  political  Islam,  at  least  to  their  perception  
of  political  Islam.  Therefore,  it  can  be  argued  that  although  there  might  be  some  
pro-­Islamic  policies  by  the  AKP  government  that  can  be  located  at  the  party’s  
historical  Islamist  roots  and  experience,  there  are  also  other  policies  that  make  
the  party  closer  to  the  centre  than  it  is  to  the  right.  Therefore,  it  is  more  efficient  
to  regard  the  AKP  government  as  a  conservative-­democratic  and  one  that   is  
                                                                                                              481  Leila  Piran,  Institutional  Change  in  Turkey:  The  Impact  of  European  reforms  on  Human  
Rights  and  Policing  (The  United  States:  Palgrave  Macmillan,  2013).    482  Tulin  Daloglu,  “Turkey  allows  headscarves  for  young  students,”  Al  Monitor,  September  24,  
2014,  accessed  October  12,  2015,  http://www.al-­monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/09/turkey-­
headscarves-­early-­education-­allowed.html.    
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much  more  moderate  compared  to  other  Islamist  parties  both  in  Turkey  and  the  
Islamic  world  in  general.      
   On  the  other  hand,  analysts  who  relied  on  the  speeches  and  statements  
of  Ahmet  Davutoglu  and  Recep  Taiyyp  Erdogan  have  fallen  into  the  mistake  of  
overlooking  the  role  of  verbal  statements  in  general.  First  of  all,  it  is  difficult  to  
deny   that   such   leading   party   members   have   showed   some   pro-­Islamist  
positions  in  their  speeches  and  statements,  but  it  would  be  a  major  mistake  to  
take  them  for  granted  without  studying  their  policies  on  the  ground.  They  fail  to  
explain   the   Turkish   increasing   interests   in   other   non-­Muslim   countries   and  
nations,   such   as   in   Africa   and   Latin   America.   The   AKP   government   has  
employed   intense   diplomatic   efforts   to   increase   relations   and   cooperation  
between  the  two  sides.  Furthermore,  the  AKP  government  has  been  the  most  
successful  government   in  negotiating  Turkey’s  membership   to   the  European  
Union,  regardless  of  EU  rejections.  Turkey  has  shown  great  commitments  to  
apply  and  adopt  the  Copenhagen  Criterion  for  membership.  The  AKP  was  able  
to  develop  economic   ties  between  Turkey  and  Europe  as  well  as  other  non-­
Muslim  states  around  the  world.    
More  security  efforts  and  collaborations  with  the  US  and  the  international  
community  in  fighting  terrorism  took  place.  During  AKP  rule,  an  increase  in  civil  
liberties  and  push  for  more  democracy  has  been  witnessed.  Interestingly,  when  
the  AKP  won  the  elections  in  2002,  a   large  number  of   journalists   in  Western  
media   regarded   the   party   as   an   “Islamist”   one.   Despite   all   this,   soon   after  
adopting   the   Copenhagen   Criterion   and   showing   greater   commitments,   the  
same  journalists  changed  their  view  and  called  it  a  party  with  “Islamist  roots”.  A  
couple   of   years   later,   when   the   government   passed   a   number   of   important  
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reforms,  they  referred  to  it  as  a  “reformed  Islamist  party”483.  It  seems  like  many  
Western  journalists  and  observers  are  influenced  by  the  Islamist  notion  in  their  
understanding  of  the  current  government.  This  demonstrates  the  limitation  of  
their  analysis  and  understanding  of  Turkish  politics.  Therefore,  it  can  be  said  
that  such  views  have  been  proven  to  be  limited  and  simplistic.    
Moreover,  a  number  of  studies  have  suggested   that  Turkey  has  been  
developing  an  “anti-­Western”  position  turning  its  back  to  the  West  adopting  an  
“axis   shift”   in   its   foreign  policy.  These  statement  are     not  accurate  and   they  
generalize  the  issue  paying  less  attention  to  the  details  of  specific  events  and  
circumstances  that  led  to  tensions  with  some  Western  states.  If  Turkey  under  
the  AKP  has  turned  its  back  to  the  West,  then  what  explains  their  keenness  in  
joining  the  European  Union  and  their  cooperation  with  the  US  on  a  number  of  
economic  and  security   issues  of  mutual   interest?  However,  one  cannot  deny  
that  there  have  been  a  number  of  disagreements  and  clashes  of  opinions  over  
some  regional  issues,  but  these  were  rational  and  pragmatic  choices  to  serve  
Turkey’s   regional   interests   and   not   due   to   AKP’s   “Islamist”   approach.   With  
Turkey’s   geo-­strategic   location   and   with   the   current   globalized   world   where  
regional   and   international   issues   becomes   very   interlinked   along   with   the  
increasing  globalized  international  economy,  it  is  nearly  impossible  for  Turkey  
to  disengage  and  turn  its  back  to  the  Western  world.    
The  argument  presented  in  the  literature  that  there  is  an  “Axis  Shift”  in  
Turkish   foreign  policy   is   in   fact  very  weak  and  does  not   reflect   the   reality  of  
events   out   there.   Unfortunately,   a   number   of   scholars   have   fallen   into   the  
orientalist  trap  and  made  very  strong  distinction  in  their  studies  between  East  
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and  West.  For  example,  Ozlem  Demirtas  Bagdonas  (2012)  in  his  work  A  shift  
of   axis   in  Turkish   foreign  policy  or   a  marketing   strategy?  Turkey  uses  of   its  
uniqueness  vis-­à-­vis  the  West/Europe,  suggested  that  the  axis  shift  argument  
fails   to   explain   Turkish   foreign   policy  motives   and   stated   instead,   “Turkey’s  
‘recent’  turn  to  the  Middle  East  as  well  as  the  discourses  that  evoke  Turkey’s  
‘bridge’  and  ‘central  state’  roles  in  the  last  decade  show  continuity  in  the  logic  
of  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  practices,  rather  than  an  axis  shift  or  a  break  with  the  
past”484.    
   A  lot  of  the  attention  has  been  given  to  the  development  in  Turkish-­US  
relations   within   the   last   decade.   It   has   been   argued   that   there   has   been   a  
noticeable  deterioration  of  Turkish-­US  relations  during  this  time  without  taking  
into  account  that  there  has  been  a  continuous  cooperation  on  issues  of  mutual  
interest  at  the  same  time  i.e.  the  war  on  terror,  economic  cooperation,  and  other  
political  and  security  issues  of  common  concern.  Yes,  Turkey’s  relations  with  
the  United  States  have  witnessed  major  changes  as  a  result  of  many  factors  
including  domestic  change  and  transformation  in  Turkey,  regional  changes,  and  
the  attitude  of  the  American  administration  towards  Turkey’s  increasing  regional  
engagement.    
A  number  of  events  have  played  a  role  in  shaping  Turkish-­US  relations,  
such  as  the  2003  Iraq  war,  the  economic  crisis,  the  Iranian  nuclear  issue,  and  
the   recent   Arab   Spring.   However,   this   does   not   mean   that   there   was   a  
continuing  deterioration  in  relations,  instead  a  disagreement  over  certain  events  
and   issues.  To  be  more  accurate,  Turkish-­US  relations   fluctuated  during   the  
                                                                                                              484  Ozlem  Demirtas  Bagdonas,  “A  shift  of  axis  in  Turkish  foreign  policy  or  a  marketing  
strategy?  Turkey  uses  of  its  uniqueness  vis-­à-­vis  the  West/Europe,”  Turkish  journal  of  politics  
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last  decade  and  did  not  remain  bad  the  whole  time.  Instead,  Turkey’s  regional  
foreign  policy  under  the  AKP  has  been  trying  to  be  more  independent  and  gain  
self-­confidence.  Adopting  an  autonomous   regional   foreign  policy   to  serve   its  
interests  away  from  being  a  US  “junior  partner”  in  the  region  does  not  mean  to  
be  anti-­western.  Since   the  AKP   took  power,  Turkish   foreign  policy  has  been  
revised.    
Saban   Kardas   (2011)   argued   that   “the   drive   for   autonomous   action  
became  a  defining  feature  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  throughout  the  2000s,  as  a  
result  of  which  relations  with  the  United  States  entered  a  new  era,  characterized  
by  a  growing  number  of  frictions”485.  However,  he  believes  that  these  frictions  
were   not   the   only   character   that   shaped   their   relations;;   instead   “both  
cooperation  and  competition  have  become  routine  features  of  the  bilateral  ties,  
which   is   examined   in   various   issue   areas   and   regions”486.   The   increasing  
relevance  of  Turkey  as  regional  power  due  to  its  stronger  economic  and  political  
ties  in  Middle  Eastern  states  made  the  American  administration  see  the  AKP  
government  with  great  suspicion  and  rethink  its  relations  particularly  regarding  
important   regional   issues.   Indeed,   Turkey’s   geographic   role   and   regional  
interests  have  grown  drastically  shaping  its  foreign  policy  and  this  makes  it  less  
willing  to  follow  an  American  lead  that  might  put  at  risk  its  interests.  However,  
this   does  not  mean   that  Turkey   is   “turning   its   back”   to   the  US  or   the  West,  
Turkey   in   fact   needs   their   support   and   alliance   on   many   issues.   Since   the  
outbreak   of   the   Arab   Spring   in   2011,   Turkish-­American   communication   and  
cooperation  increased.    
                                                                                                              485  Saban  Kardas,  “Turkish-­American  relations  in  the  2000s:  Revisiting  the  basic  parameters  
of  partnership?,”  Journal  of  International  Affairs  XVI,  no.3  (2011):  25.    486  Ibid.    
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The  American  administration  saw  the  importance  of  a  Turkish  role  and  
its  partnership  in  an  increasing  hostile  region.  According  to  Ilhan  Tanir  (2011),  
“the  Arab  Spring  not  only  helped  the  US  and  Turkey  to  grow  closer  but  also  
helped  diplomats  on  both  sides  comprehend  the  local  factors  that  affect  each  
other’s’   lives  and   interests”487.  With   the  development  of   the  Arab  Spring  and  
especially  the  escalation  of  the  Syrian  crisis  and  the  emergence  of  ISIS,  Turkey  
and  the  US  became  much  keener  to  collaborate  in  tackling  regional  issues  and  
in   the   current   fight   against   ISIS.   Such   developments   in   the   region   and   the  
growing   Turkish-­American   cooperation   in   the   attempt   to   solve   them   have  
significantly  weakened  the  arguments  suggesting  that  there  is  an  “axis  shift”  or  
a  Turkish  turn  away  from  the  US  and  the  West.    
   On  the  other  hand,   the  deterioration  of  Turkish-­Israeli   relations   is  also  
believed   to   have  been   the   result   of  AKP’s   Islamist   affiliation   and  of   Islamist  
foreign  policy  agendas  that  seek  to  serve  its  Islamist  aims  at  the  expense  of  
losing   a   long-­standing   regional   partner.   Furthermore,   it   is   argued   that   there  
have  been  noticeable  anti-­Israeli  sentiments  within  the  Turkish  leadership.  The  
deterioration  of  relations  between  Turkey  and  Israel  was  not  a  result  of  AKP’s  
“Islamization”  of  foreign  policy;;  it  was  in  fact  the  result  of  a  number  of  events  
that   led   to   such   tensions.  The  Turkish  government   did  not  welcome   Israel’s  
aggressive  behaviour  towards  the  Palestinians  and  its  continuous  breaking  of  
international  law.    
First  of  all,  it  can  be  argued  that  Turkey’s  hostile  position  towards  Israel  
has  been  a  “reactive”  one.  An  important  question  arises  here,  if  Israel  did  not  
behave   in   such   aggressive  ways   against  Gaza   and   the   humanitarian   ships,  
                                                                                                              487  Ilhan  Tanir,  “How  the  Arab  Spring  is  transforming  Turkish-­American  relations,”  Turkish  
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would  Turkey  still  follow  that  same  level  of  hostility  towards  it?  As  mentioned  
earlier,  a  number  of  years  a  after  they  won  the  elections,  the  AKP  government  
played   an   important   role   in   the   Arab-­Israeli   peace   process   and   played   an  
important  mediating  role  between  Israel  and  Syria  who  were  very  close  to  sign  
a  peace  agreement.  Turkey’s  withdrawal  from  the  mediation  came  as  a  result  
of   Israel’s   aggression  on  Gaza.  This  was  purely   a   “reaction”   towards   Israeli  
behaviour   and   since   then   Israel   continued   with   its   aggression   targeting   the  
civilians   and   attacking   humanitarian   ships   as   in   the   case   known   as   the  
“Marmara  crisis”.      
   What  is  more,  the  majority  of  the  Turkish  population  did  not  welcome  the  
historical  Turkish-­Israeli  friendship.  In  fact,  there  has  been  a  growing  anti-­Israeli  
sentiment  among  Turks488.  In  the  international  conference  entitled  Ten  Years  
since  the  rise  of  power  of  the  Justice  and  Development  Party  in  Turkey  (14-­15  
November   2012),   organized   by   the   Institute   for   National   Security   Studies  
(INSS),   Prof.   Umut   Uzer,   in   his   presentation,   argued   that   historically   the  
Palestinian  problem  had  had  great  sympathy  not  only  among  conservatives  and  
Islamists  in  Turkey,  but  also  among  the  “extreme  left  wing”  and  argued  that  a  
number   of   secularist   politicians   and   journalists   have   been   highly   critical   of  
Israeli  policies  in  the  Palestinian  territories489.  He  added,  “while  the  style  and  
the  sympathy  of  the  current  PM  Recep  Taiyyp  Erdogan  might  have  intensified  
the   conflict   with   Israel,   another   government   would   have   had   difficulty   on  
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2015,  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DGC6OMoNVSI.  489  Ibid.    
197	  	  
continuing  warm  relations  with  Israel  because  of  the  negative  public  opinions  
regarding  Israeli  actions  in  Palestinian  territories”490.    
This  negative  perception  of  Israeli  policies  is  not  new  in  Turkey  and  most  
importantly  not  primarily  related  to  conservative  groups.  Therefore,  we  cannot  
merely  attribute   the  growing  anti-­Israeli  attitude  to   the  AKP  government.   It   is  
important   to   note   here   that   with   the   deterioration   of   the   relations   between  
Turkey  and  Israel  had  two  important  effects:  first  that  Turkey  was  able  to  win  
the  hearts  and  minds  of  many  in  the  Middle  East491;;  and  the  second  is  that  the  
number  of  votes  in  the  2011  elections  were  extremely  higher  than  the  2002  and  
2007  elections  jumping  from  around  11  million  votes  in  2002  to  over  20  million  
in  2011492.  Such  changes  give  us  critical   insights   in  analyzing  Turkish-­Israeli  
relations  and  Turkish  regional  foreign  policy.  According  to  such  statistics  and  
taking  into  consideration  the  new  Turkish  image  in  the  Middle  East  as  a  result  
of  tensions  with  Israel,  it  can  be  argued  that  rationally  this  have  helped  the  AKP  
to  win  more  domestic  support  as  well  as  more  popularity   in   the  Middle  East.  
Therefore,   such   calculations   should   not   be   ignored   by   analysts,  who   simply  
suggest  that  this  was  exclusively  due  to  Islamist  ideology  adopted  by  the  AKP.    
   Having  said  that,  it  is  believed  that,  while  the  AKP  is  pursuing  an  anti-­
Western  and  anti-­Israeli  foreign  policy,  there  is  a  growing  support  by  the  AKP  
government   for   Islamist   organizations   mainly   for   the   Muslim   Brotherhood.  
Turkey   has   expanded   its   interests   and   influence   in   the  Middle   East,   but   to  
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become  a  successful  regional  power  would  require  more  access  to  new  zones  
of  influence.  Access  for  political  influence  is  very  much  limited  when  there  are  
nationalist  governments  operating  in  the  Middle  East.  The  best  opportunity  for  
greater  influence  in  the  region  was  seen  when  the  Arab  uprising  started.  Behlul  
Ozkan,  in  a  conference  at  the  Johns  Hopkins  School  of  advanced  international  
studies   entitled   Turkey’s   Foreign   Policy   under   Erdogan’s   Presidency:   What  
shapes  it?  (November  2014),  argued  that  before  the  Arab  Spring,  the  aim  was  
to  turn  the  Middle  East  to  an  economic  “hinterland”  for  Turkey,  and  that  after  
2011,   Davutoglu   saw   the   opportunity   and   importance   to   increase   Turkey’s  
influence   in   the   Middle   East   especially   after   the   toppling   of   authoritarian  
regimes  which  had  strong  nationalist  positions  that  made  it  harder  for  Turkey  to  
practice  its   influence  in  those  areas493.  Furthermore,  Ozkan  believes  that  the  
AKP’s  aim  was  to  replace  those  nationalist  governments  in  the  Arab  world  with  
Islamist  parties  because  it  will  make  it  much  better  and  easier  for  Turkey  to  get  
greater  access  to  regional  influence494.  Islamist  parties  in  the  newly  emerging  
Middle  East  are  looking  at  the  AKP  as  a  successful  example  and  role  model,  
which  makes  it  natural  for  the  AKP  government  to  play  a  leading  role  for  those  
newly  established  governments.    
AKP’s  support  for  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  in  Egypt,  Tunisia,  and  other  
Arab  states  does  not  necessarily  reflect  an  Islamist  ideology;;  instead  I  believe  
it   is  a  decision  based  on  pragmatic  and  rational   tendencies   to  serve  Turkish  
interests   in   the   newly   emerging   governments   and   gain   greater   political,  
economic   and   social   influence   as  well   as   popular   support.   In   a   seminar   on  
Understanding  the  Transformation:  AK  Party  era  in  Turkey,  organized  by  the  
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Centre  for  Turkey  Studies  (CEFTUS)  held  in  the  House  of  Lords  in  London  (27th  
March  2015),  Etyen  Mahcupyan,  Senior  Advisor  to  the  Prime  Minister  Ahmet  
Davutoglu,   stated,   “the   regional   environment   has   changed   since   the   Arab  
Spring   and   therefore   Turkey   had   to   readjust   its   policies   accordingly”495.   He  
argued  that  the  Arab  Spring  forced  Turkey  to  change  its  strategy  towards  the  
Middle  East,  from  communicating  directly  and  only  with  national  governments  
to   communicating   with   other   Arab   nations.   This   is   because   of   the   unstable  
situation  of  the  Arab  governments.  Governments  can  change,  but  nations  stay  
the  same.  Having  to  win  the  hearts  and  minds  of  Arab  masses  is  highly  critical  
as  it  gives  far  greater  chance  of  accessing  influence  and  legitimacy  in  order  to  
play   a   leading   regional   role.   From   the   Davutoglu’s   writings   and   statements  
discussed   earlier   in   this   chapter,   we   realize   the   seriousness   of   the   Turkish  
government   in   seeking   regional   leadership.  Davutoglu   urged  Turkey   to   take  
advantage   of   its   historical   Islamic   and   geo-­strategic   positions   as   a   way   to  
increase  its  influence  in  the  Middle  East.  Therefore,  we  can  understand  that  the  
current  AKP’s  support   for   the  Muslim  Brotherhood   in   the  Middle  East  mainly  
serves  its  national  interests  and  contribute  to  its  leading  regional  role  and  it  is  
not  primarily  a  result  of  its  Islamist  agendas.    
On   the   other   hand,  we   cannot   attribute   AKP’s   support   of   the  Muslim  
Brotherhood  in  Egypt  entirely  on  the  alleged  AKP’s  “Political  Islam”.  What  about  
the  role  of  Turkish  civil-­military  relations  and  rivalry  in  affecting  AKP’s  position  
towards  the  Egyptian  case?  The  balance  of  civil-­military  relations’  experience  
in   Turkey   and   the   AKP   role   cannot   be   ignored.   A   significant   part   of   the  
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democratization  process   in  Turkey  was   limiting   the  military  role   in  controlling  
the  political  life.  The  AKP  was  successful  in  weakening  the  role  of  the  military  
in  Turkish  domestic  politics  and  in  balancing  civil-­military  relations  after  a  long  
history   of  military   dominance496.   It   can   be   argued   therefore   that   the   Turkish  
position  against  a  military  coup  and  dominance  in  Egypt  is  not  surprising  at  all.  
Many  see  Turkey  as  a  successful  democratic  model  for  the  Middle  East,  one  
that   can   bring   hope   and   help   in   the   regional   democratic   transformation497.  
Turkey  condemned  the  Egyptian  military  interference  into  the  new  democratic  
political   life   and   the   2013   coup   d’état   against   a   democratically   elected  
government498.  The  AKP  argued  that  military  dominance  over  politics  will  hinder  
the   democratic   transition   in   Egypt   whose   core   purpose   was   toppling   a  
dictatorship  ruled  by  a  military  man,  Hussni  Mubarak.  It  is  critical  that  analysts  
pay  more  attention   to   the   role  of  civil-­military   relations’  experience   in  Turkey  
and  how  that  affected  Turkey’s  position  towards  the  Egyptian  case  in  particular  
after  the  military  coup  led  by  the  current  president  General  Abdel  Fattah  el-­Sisi.  
Simply   focusing  on   the   role   of   political   Islam  behind  Turkish   support   for   the  
Muslim   Brotherhood   in   Egypt   can   be   misleading.   Such   simplistic   approach  
represents  another  gap  in  the  literature  and  further  analysis  on  this  is  very  much  
needed.  Therefore,   the   role   of   the  Turkish   civil-­military   relations’   experience  
during  the  AKP  rule  in  understanding  the  Turkish  position  towards  the  Egyptian  
case  and  the  support  for  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  against  the  Egyptian  military  
                                                                                                              496  Ariana  Keyman,  “Civil-­Military  relations  in  Turkey,”  E-­International  Relations  Students,  May  
21,  2012,  accessed  October  12,  2015,  http://www.e-­ir.info/2012/05/21/civil-­military-­relations-­
in-­turkey/.    497  Adam  Balcer,  “Turkey  as  a  Source  of  Inspiration  for  the  Arab  Spring:  Opportunities  and  
Challenges,”  in  Stephen  Calleya  &  Monika  Wohlfeld,  ed.,  Change  and  Opportunities  in  the  
Emerging  Mediterranean  (Mediterranean  Academy  of  Diplomatic  Studies,  2012),  370.    498  Mustafa  Akyol,  “Turkey  Condemns  Egypt's  Coup,”  Al  monitor,  August  21,  2013,  accessed  
October  12,  2015,  http://www.al-­monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/08/reasons-­turkey-­against-­
egypt-­coup.html.    
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represents   another   fact   that   contributes   to   the   weakness   of   the   Islamist  
approach  in  understanding  Turkish  foreign  policy.    
In  addition,  other  scholars  have  looked  at  the  improved  Turkish-­Middle  
East   relations   from   a   totally   different   perspective   away   from   this   Islamist  
interpretation.  For  example,  an  interesting  work  by  Kilic  Bugran  Kanat  (2012)  
titled  Continuity  of  Change  in  Turkish  foreign  policy  under  the  JDP  government:  
The  cases  of  bilateral  relations  with  Israel  and  Syria,  he  argued  that  the  causes  
of   rapprochement   with   Syria   and   increased   political,   economic,   and   social  
relations  accompanied  by  a  deterioration  of  relations  with  Israel  can  in  fact  be  
traced  back  before  the  AKP  was  established  and  took  power499.  Kanat  argued  
that   these   were   caused   by   both   the   transformation   of   regional   politics   and  
domestic  politics  prior  to  2002.    
Furthermore,  Kanat  stated,   “even   though   the  JDP  government  and   its  
leadership  played  a  key   role   in  strengthening  and   intensifying   the  change   in  
relations   with   these   countries,   the   changes   started   much   earlier,   in   most  
instances   as   a   result   of   changing   regional   dynamics   and   Turkey’s   threat  
perception  in  the  late  1990s”500.  The  author  argued  that  since  the  Luxembourg  
Summit,   Turkey   sought   to   diversify   its   foreign   policy,   which   paved   way   for  
improved  relations  with  Syria.  He  added,  since  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  Turkey  
went  through  an  identity  crisis  and  security  crises,  which  made  it  move  closer  
to   Israel  at   the   time.  However,  with   the  changing   regional  politics  and  newly  
emerging   international  system,  Turkey  went   through  a  process  of   re-­thinking  
                                                                                                              499  Kilic  Bugran  Kanat,  “Continuity  of  Change  in  Turkish  foreign  policy  under  the  JDP  
government:  The  cases  of  bilateral  relations  with  Israel  and  Syria,”  Arab  Studies  Quarterly  34,  
no.  4,  (2012):  232.    500  Ibid.    
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about  its  foreign  policy  position  and  saw  the  need  for  adopting  a  much  more  
active  foreign  policy.  
It  is  very  clear  that  “Islamist”  explanations  are  largely  weakened  and  fall  
short   in  explaining  the  real  derives  behind  Turkish  foreign  policy  since  2002.  
The   arguments   presented   in   support   of   this   claim   lack   detailed   analysis   of  
particular  events  and  policies  adopted  by   the  AKP  government   that   suggest  
otherwise.  As  we  have  seen  earlier,  these  analyses  have  been  mainly  bias  and  
relying  on  a  singular  point  of  view.  For  example,  Saban  Kardas,  in  his  interview,  
argued   that   the   religious   identity   and   ideology   debate   is   important,   but   it   is  
impossible  to  explain  everything.  He  said  that  “It  is  a  major  mistake  to  say  that  
the  AKP  is  an  Islamist  party.  I  believe  the  recent  debates  on  Islamism  in  Turkey  
are   not   based   on   analytical   concepts,   they   are   rather   policy   motivated”501.  
Furthermore,   professor   Mesut   Ozcan,   Chairman   of   the   Foreign   Ministry’s  
Diplomacy  Academy  and  Advisor  to  the  foreign  minister,  in  his  interview  spoke  
about  the  current  studies  that  claim  that  the  AKP  is  an  Islamist  party  and  replied,  
“if  both  domestic  and  foreign  critics  suggest  that  the  AKP  is  an  Islamist  country,  
then  they  should  too  say  that  half  of  the  population  are  Islamist”.  He  added  that  
“when  we  look  at  the  current  ruling  political  party,   it   is  obvious  that  there  are  
certain  Islamic  elements  in  their  identity,  but  at  the  same  time,  there  are  several  
Western  elements  as  well”502.    
Mehmet   Ozkan,   a   senior   researcher   at   the   Foundation   for   Political,  
Economic,  and  Social  Research  (SETA),  in  his  interview,  also  stated,  “I  totally  
disagree  that  the  AKP  is  an  Islamist  party.  However,  I  rather  call  it  ‘an  Islamic-­  
sensitive  party’,  which  means  that  Islam  is  not  the  main  force  deriving  their  
                                                                                                              501  Saban  Kardas,  interviewed  by  author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  October  13,  2014.    502  Mesut  Ozcan,  interviewed  by  author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  March  18,  2014.    
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foreign  policy,  but  they  care  about  the  Muslims  and  is  Islamic  sensitive  in  foreign  
policy  i.e.  the  issue  and  suffering  in  Palestine  or  the  massacres  in  Burma”503.  
Similarly,  Jahit  Tuz,  senior  advisor  to  Member  of  Parliament  and  former  Deputy  
Prime  Minister  Ali  Babacan,  in  his  interview  stated,  “first  of  all,  when  you  form  
an  “Islamist”  party,  it  means  that  you  will  not  be  representing  all  Turks.  On  the  
other  hand,  if  you  say  you  are  a  Secular  nationalist  party  you  will  still  have  the  
same   problem.   Here   the   AKP   comes   into   place   with   a   new   idea   in   Turkey  
creating  a  party  that  represent  all  parts  and  backgrounds  of  Turkey.  There  are  
both  conservative  and  liberal  members  and  supporters  of  the  party  as  well  as  
different  backgrounds,  such  as  my  self  I  am  a  Turkish-­Kurd”504.    
   It   is   interesting   here   to   look   at   this   issue   from   a   Middle   Eastern  
perspective  and  explore  what  would  some  officials  and  experts  in  Saudi  Arabia  
(the  second  field  work  country)  say  about  this.  It  is  important  to  analyse  the  way  
in   which   those   interviewees   observe   and   perceive   the   AKP   and   Turkey’s  
openness   to   them.   For   instance,   Professor   Yahya   Mahmoud   ibn   Junaid,  
Secretary-­General  of  King  Faisal  Centre  for  Research  and  Islamic  Studies,  in  
his  interview  argued  that  Erdogan  was  able  to  gain  popular  support  when  he  
was  Mayor   of   Istanbul505.      Ibn   Junaid   stated,   “He   has   an   Islamic   Religious  
perspective,   but   he   is   not   a   Political   Islamist”.   He   added,   “Yes   Erdogan  
supported  the  growth  of  Religious  schools  and  Shari’ah  Colleges.  He  supported  
the  teaching  and  learning  of  Arabic  language  due  to  its  importance  in  Islam  and  
because  it   is  the  language  of  the  Holly  Quran”.  For  Ibn  Junaid,  this  does  not  
necessarily  represent  a  political  position;;  it  is  clearly  a  religious  point  of  view.  
                                                                                                              503  Mehmet  Ozkan,  interviewed  by  author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  March  17,  2014.    504  Jahit  Tuz,  interviewed  by  author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  March  20,  2014.	  	  505  Yahya  Mahmoud  ibn  Junaid,  interviewed  by  author,  Riyadh,  Saudi  Arabia,  June  24,  2014.	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Regarding  his  view  on  AKP’s  image  and  political  position,  he  stated,  “I  believe  
that  the  AKP  is  a  very  moderate  Islamic  party  and  is  closer  to  the  centre  than  it  
is  to  the  right”.  Such  ‘Saudi’  view  is  understandable  especially  when  compared  
to   conservative   Islam   in   Saudi   Arabia.   The   Turkish   version   of   Islam   and  
practices  are  perceived  to  be  quite  moderate  compared  to  many  other  Islamic  
nations  including  Saudi  Arabia.  Dr.  Fayez  Al-­Shehri,  President  of  Saudi-­Turkish  
Parliamentary   Friendship   at   the   Shoura   Council   of   Saudi   Arabia,   shared   a  
similar  view.  He  argued  that  although  the  founding  members  of  the  AKP  have  
a   long   history   of   experience   with   Islamist   political   parties,   they   have  
successfully  managed   to  change   their  positions  and  principles506.  He  stated,  
“Some   analysts   usually   refer   to   Erdogan   as   a   graduate   of   the   Religious  
Vocational  Islamic  High  School,  but  this  was  in  early  1970s”.  Al-­Shehri  further  
argued   that   it   is   very   difficult   for   someone   to   confirm   that   the   AKP   and   its  
founding  members  have   “hidden   Islamist  agendas”,  especially  when   there   is  
not  much  to  grasp  when  it  comes  to  AKP’s  policies  and  practical  reality.  
  Al-­Shehri   agrees   that   AKP   officials   have   openly   demonstrated   their  
Islamic  values  and  that  they  are  proud  of  their  Islamic  heritage,  but  this  does  
not  make   them   Islamists.  He   argued   that  many   observers,   especially   in   the  
West,   fall   into   the  mistake   of   not   being   able   to   differentiate   between  AKP’s  
Islamic  heritage  and  values,  and  political  positions.  As  being  the  president  of  
the  Saudi-­Turkish  Parliamentary  friendship,  Dr.  Al-­shehri  highlighted  that  most  
of   the  work  and  collaboration  between  Saudi  Arabia  and  Turkey   is  based  on  
mutual   interests   and   future   relations.   He   added   that   our   relations   and  
cooperation   with   Turkey   is   not   based   on   Islamic   agendas   and   any  matters  
                                                                                                              506  Fayz  Al-­Shehri,  interviewed  by  author,  Riyadh,  Saudi  Arabia,  June  13  2014.    
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discussed  that  would  involve  religious  issue  would  be  done  under  the  umbrella  
of  the  Organisation  of  Islamic  Cooperation  (OIC).  Therefore,  it  can  be  argued  
that  Turkey’s  openness  to  the  Middle  East  involve  a  much  deeper  and  complex  
factors  than  just  due  to  its  Islamic  lineage  towards  the  Islamic  world.      
Overall,  in  the  interviews  carried  out  in  the  fieldwork,  all  participants,  who  
are  all  experts  and  professional  academics  and  government  advisors,  disagree  
with   this   claim   and   they   seem   to   all   agree   that   one   cannot   understand   the  
complex   nature   of   Turkish   foreign   policy   by   relying   on   such   notion.   Such  
Islamist  explanations  mainly  emerged  during   the  establishment  and   first   few  
years  of  AKP  government,  but  since  then  have  significantly  fallen  short.  Such  
explanations  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  in  the  Middle  East  seem  to  underestimate  
the  roles  of  regional  economic   interests  and  security  concerns  for  examples.  
They   also   fail   to   explain   other   elements   of   the   AKP’s   policies   that   suggest  
otherwise.    
Therefore,  when  applying  Process  Tracing  tests  of  inferences  and  study  
the   evidence   provided   by   scholars   and   their   counter   arguments,   along  with  
other  empirical  and  primary  interview  data  collected  in  my  field  work  mentioned  
above,  it  appears  that  the  concept  of  Islamism  in  understanding  Turkish  foreign  
policy  in  the  Middle  East  since  2002  fails  to  survive  a  Straw  in  the  Wind  Test.  
Evidence  of  such  explanation  show  to  have  a  very  low  demanding  standard  due  
to   its   weakness   to   stand   against   evidence   collected   and   analysed   in   this  
research.  The   reason  behind   the   researcher’s  selection  and  application  of  a  
Straw   in   the   Wind   Test   is   because   Islamist   explanations   do   not   provide  
evidence   that   can  either   rules   it   in   or   out.   Furthermore,   interview  data  have  
considerably   weakened   its   reliability   and   significance   in   explaining   Turkish  
206	  	  
foreign  policy  change.  It  became  clear  that  evidences  are  neither  sufficient  nor  
necessary  for  establishing  causation.  In  other  words,  failing  a  Straw  in  the  Wind  
Test  suggests  that  this  hypothesis  may  not  be  relevant,  but  at  the  same  time  
does  not  eliminate  it.    
The   Islamist   hypothesis   is   not   relevant   in   understanding   the   causes  
behind  Turkish  foreign  policy  interests  in  the  Middle  East,  but  due  to  the  clear  
existence   of   some   pro-­Islamic   sentiments   in   the   AKP’s   policies,   we   cannot  
totally  eliminate  it.  This  Process  Tracing  test  does  not  confirm  this  hypothesis  
and  at  the  same  time  does  not  eliminate  it.  As  a  result,  the  implication  of  failing  
this  test  is  that  it  slightly  weakens  this  hypothesis  and  slightly  strengthens  rival  
explanations  at  the  same  time.  So  far,  Islamist  explanations  show  to  be  one  of  
the  weakest   in   this  study  and  present   the   least  demand  on   the   researcher’s  
knowledge   and   assumptions.   To   further   simplify   and   clarify   this   process   of  
examination,  figure  1  below  table  summarizes  the  main  points  of  the  Islamist  
explanation  and  its  value  in  the  thesis  so  far.    
Figure  1.  Assessment  of  the  Islamist  explanation  in  Process  Tracing  
Explanation  1:    -­‐‑   AKP’s  Islamism  and  political  Islam  caused  Turkish  foreign  change  
towards  the  Middle  East  since  2002.    
  
Evidence  constituting  this  explanation:    -­‐‑   Historical  Islamist  roots  and  experiences  of  AKP  founding  members.  -­‐‑     Pro-­Islamist  statements  and  references  by  leading  members  of  AKP.    -­‐‑   Anti-­Western  behavior:  deteriorating  relations  with  the  US  and  Israel.      
  
  Process  of  examining  empirical  evidence  and  interview  data:  
   -­‐‑   AKP  leaders  have  publicly  announced  the  abandonment  of  Islamist  
past,  commitments  to  democratization,  and  commitment  to  EU  
membership.  On  the  other  hand,  showed  strong  affiliation  with  
Islamic  heritage  and  members  were  proud  to  express  their  Islamic  
identity.    
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-­‐‑   Statements  do  not  suggest  much  as  they  are  not  truly  reflected  by  
policies  and  particularly  foreign  policies  i.e.  increase  of  relations  with  
non-­Muslim  states  in  Africa  and  Latin  America.  -­‐‑   Relations  with  the  US  have  actually  been  fluctuating  and  were  not  in  
decline  between  2002  and  2012.  Some  efforts  remained  and  
particularly  on  security  levels.  On  the  other  hand,  Turkey’s  criticism  
of  Israel  is  more  of  a  reaction  of  Israel’s  increasing  irresponsible  
behavior  in  the  region  and  especially  after  the  war  on  Gaza  and  the  
Marmara  incident.  Evidence  suggests  that  more  civilian  criticism  has  
been  recorded  and  that  this  has  also  influenced  Turkish  policy  
makers.  This  is  not  necessarily  due  to  AKP’s  Islamist  agenda,  
especially  after  noticeable  Turkish  mediation  between  Israel  and  
Syria  during  AKP  government’s  first  term.    -­‐‑   Interviewees  showed  clear  disagreement  with  the  Islamist  notion  and  
explanations.    
Results:  
   -­‐‑   Set  the  least  demanding  standard  for  researcher’s  knowledge  and  
assumptions.  -­‐‑   Weak  evidence  that  does  not  either  rule  the  explanation  in  or  out.    -­‐‑   Neither  necessary  nor  sufficient  to  establish  causation  (Not  
necessary  because  the  AKP  does  not  declare  itself  as  an  Islamist  
party  and  has  not  yet  been  sufficiently  proven  to  be  one.  Not  
sufficient  because  it  does  not  represent  a  satisfactory  explanation  
and  does  not  have  strong  enough  evidence  as  examined  through  
empirical  evidence  and  interview  data).    -­‐‑   Therefore,  fails  a  Straw  in  the  Wind  Test.    
Implication:    




The  Islamist  critic  has  been  haunting  the  AKP  since  day  one.  After  the  victory  
of  2002  elections,  AKP’s   leaders  asserted   in  a  number  of  occasions  that   the  
AKP   has   abandoned   its   classical   Islamism   and   are   now   more   liberal   and  
democratic.  AKP’s  leaders  like  to  be  referred  to  as  “Conservative  Democrats”  
just  like  the  German  Christian  Democratic  Union  and  the  centre-­right.  However,  
since  the  AKP  sought  to  increase  relations  and  role  in  the  Middle  East  and  the  
208	  	  
Muslim  world  in  general,  many  analysts  and  scholars  viewed  such  foreign  policy  
developments  with  great  suspicion.  As  a  result,  increasing  works  focusing  on  
the  AKP  Islamist  ideology  were  carried  out.  Some  scholars  argued  that  AKP’s  
political  Islam  came  from  its  leaders’  Islamist  historical  experience,  while  others  
looked  at  the  academic  work  and  verbal  statements  of  Ahmet  Davutoglu  and  
Recep  Taiyyp  Erdogan.  On  the  other  hand,  others  looked  at  the  deterioration  
of  relations  with  the  US  and  Israel,  and  the  improved  relations  with  Iran,  Hamas,  
and  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  as  driven  by  strong  Islamist  insights.    
The  chapter  evaluated  the  plausibility  of  the  Islamist  explanation  through  
applying   the   four   steps   strategy.   First   the   researcher   analysed   the   main  
components   of   this   concept   and   the   different   arguments   presented   in   the  
literature   supporting   them.   Secondly,   examined   empirical   data,   archival  
documents,   and   raised   critical   questions.   Third,   the   researcher   analysed  
available  critics  of  Ismalism  and  political  Islam  as  a  source  of  Turkish  foreign  
policy  change,  as  well  as  analysing  other  contrasting  arguments  that  critically  
reviewed  the  Islamist  explanation  and  helped  highlight  possible  weaknesses.  
In  addition,  the  researcher  applied  interview  data,  which  helped  in  assessing  
the  sufficiency  and  necessity  of  the  explanations  under  examination.  This  was  
carried  out  through  reflecting  on  interviewees’  views  and  ideas  in  assessing  the  
explanatory  value  of  this  explanation.  
After   testing   the   Islamist   explanation   through   analyzing   opposite  
arguments   presented   in   the   literature   and   use   of   empirical   evidence   and  
interview  data,  results  show  that  the  Islamist  ideology  concept  in  understanding  
Turkish   foreign   policy   since   2002   is   in   fact   very   weak   and   requires   further  
revision.  Although  there  are  clear  signs  of  pro-­Islamic  elements  and  behaviour  
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by   the   AKP   government   that   can   be   attributed   to   its   historical   Islamist  
experience,  it  is  impossible  to  understand  all  aspects  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  
by  simply  looking  at  them  through  the  Islamist  “lenses”.  The  results  showed  that  
analysts   in   favour  of   this  explanation   failed   to  explain   the  other  non-­Islamist  
elements   of   AKP   policies   regarding   the   development   of   relations   and  
cooperation  with  non-­Islamic  states  like  China  and  Russia  and  other  countries  
in  Asia,  Africa,  Latin  America  as  well  as  the  West.  According  to  some  scholars,  
some   critics   have   fallen   into   the   trap   of   orientalism   by   generalizing   and  
overemphasizing  the  role  of  Islam  in  Turkish  foreign  policy.  While  at  the  same  
time,   others   presented   works   that   looked   very   policy   oriented.   Such  
explanations   are   weak   because   they   tend   to   overemphasize   the   role   of  
Islamism  and  look  at  Turkish  foreign  policy  from  one  angle.  However,  due  to  
some  pro-­Islamist  policies  in  the  Middle  East,  we  cannot  totally  eliminate  such  
hypotheses.  The  study  shows   that   the   Islamist  explanations   fail   to  survive  a  
Straw  in  the  Wind  Test.  Meaning  that  they  are  neither  sufficient  nor  necessary  
for  affirming  causal  inference.  In  other  words,  failing  a  Straw  in  the  Wind  Test  
make   them   slightly   irrelevant,   but   at   same   time   cannot   be   eliminated.   The  
implication  of  failing  a  Straw  in  the  Wind  Test  weakens  the  Islamist  explanation,  
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The  first  part  of  this  chapter  will  examine  the  concept  of  Neo-­Ottomanism  and  
the  claim  that  it  has  been  the  main  driving  force  behind  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  
making.   In   particular,   it   will   focus   on   the   analysis   of   its   strengths   and  
weaknesses  and  on  whether  we  should   ignore  such  claim  or  not.   In  order  to  
achieve  this  goal,  this  section  will  include  an  illustration  of  Davutoglu’s  Strategic  
Depth  doctrine;;  the  speeches  and  statements  by  AKP  leaders  in  support  such  
claim;;  the  Soft-­Power  element  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  used  by  some  scholars  
as  an  aspect  of  the  neo-­ottoman  regional  project;;  and  the  examination  of  the  
notion   of   “re-­Ottomanization”   of   Turkish   foreign   policy   by   the   AKP’s  
government.  
This  part  of  the  chapter  aims  at  examining  the  significance  of  the  neo-­
Ottoman  concept   in  understanding  Turkish   foreign  policy   towards   the  Middle  
East  under  the  AKP’s  government.  This  will  be  carried  out  through  applying  the  
"4  steps  Strategy"  mentioned   in   the  methodology  chapter.  The   first   step  will  
analyse   the   main   components   of   this   concept   and   the   different   arguments  
presented   in   the   literature   in   its   favour.  The  second  step   in   this  chapter   is   to  
examine  available  empirical  data,  archival  documents,  and  others  to  be  able  to  
raise   critical   questions   that   such  explanations  might   not   have   considered  or  
looked  at.     Here   the   researcher  will   develop  a  critical  engagement,  where  a  
number  of   questions  are  posed,  which  will   enable   the   researcher   to   identify  
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possible  limitations  of  those  explanations.    The  third  step  will  analyse  possible  
critics  of  the  neo-­Ottoman  based  explanations  and  other  opposite  arguments  
that  might   challenge   them   to  highlight  possible  weaknesses.  The   fourth  and  
final  step  will  be  applying   interview  data,  which  will  enable   the  researcher   to  
further   assess   the   sufficiency   and   necessity   of   the   explanations   under  
examination.  This  will  be  carried  out  through  exploring  interviewees’  views  and  
ideas  to  help  understand  such  explanatory  value.    
The  results  of  this  chapter  will  show  that  the  argument  of  Turkish  neo-­
Ottomanist  foreign  policy  fails  to  survive  a  Hoop  Test  as  a  consequence  and  
that   it   will   be  eliminated   from   this   study.   A  major  weakness   of   this   concept  
comes   from   the   fact   that   there  are  a  number  of   “distinct”   definitions  of   neo-­
Ottomanism  in  the  literature  adding  to  its  complexity  and  limitation.  Moreover,  
it  fails  to  explain  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  interests  and  presence  in  the  regions  
outside   the   former   “Ottoman   lands”  such  as  Africa,  Asia,  and  Latin  America.  
Therefore,   the   implication   of   failing   a  Hoop  Test   is   that   it   strengthens   other  
competing  explanations  considered  until  now.    
The  second  part  of  this  chapter  focuses  on  the  role  of  national  identity  in  
Turkish   foreign   policy   making   since   2002.   In   particular,   it   will   focus   on   the  
complex  nature  of  ethnic  and  religious  identities  in  Turkey;;  the  change  of  elite  
structure  and  the  emergence  of  a  new  middle  class  since  the  1990s;;  and  the  
notion  of   the   Islamic   identity  and  Muslim  “Umma”.  This  part  will  highlight   the  
existing   debate   over   Turkish   national   identity   that   is   characterized   by   some  
scholars   as   Neo-­Ottoman,   Islamist,   Islamist-­Liberal,   and   conservative-­
democrat.   This   variety   of   definitions   demonstrates   a  major  weakness   in   the  
literature  and  in  the  value  of  the  identity  role  hypotheses  as  a  whole.  This  part  
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aims   to   evaluate  whether   national   identity   has  been   the  main   cause  behind  
Turkish  foreign  policy  change  towards  the  Middle  East  or  whether  it  has  played  
a  minor  role.  This  identity  explanation  will  be  put  to  test  through  the  analysis  of  
its  critics,   the  presentation  of  empirical  evidence,  and  by  providing  data  from  
interviews.    
The  results  of  this  part  will  show  that  the  identity  explanation  is  useful  in  
understanding  Turkish   foreign  policy  change  as   it  successfully  demonstrates  
the   impact   that   national   elites   and   the   business   class,   influenced   by   the  
discourse  of  national   identity,  have  on   the  process  of   foreign  policy  decision  
making.  However,  one  of  the  major  weaknesses  of  the  identity  explanation  is  
the  existence  of  different  and  contradictory  characterizations  of  Turkish  national  
identity.  Furthermore,  scholars  who  used  the  notion  of  identity  in  understanding  
the   cause   behind   Turkish   foreign   policy   change   have   failed   to   explain   the  
significance  of  different  external  factors  such  as  the  US  and  institutions  mainly  
the  European  Union  as  well  as  the  role  of  different  emerging  security  concerns  
posed  by  neighbouring  countries  and  in  the  region.  Although  the  notion  identity  
does  not  explain  all  aspects  of  Turkish  foreign  policy,  it  managed  to  survive  and  
pass  a  Hoop  Test  in  the  process  tracing  method  applied.  This  means  that  the  
identity  role  will  remain  under  consideration  and  cannot  be  eliminated  from  the  
study  as  it  still  gives  us  useful  insights  into  important  aspects  of  Turkish  foreign  
policy.  Passing  a  Hoop  Test  affirms  relevance  but  does  not  confirm  it;;  while  at  
the  same  time  weakens  other  rival  explanations  presented  in  this  study.    
Overall,   the   results   of   this   chapter  will   show   that   the   concept   of   neo-­
Ottomanism  has  no  significance   in  explaining   foreign  policy  change  and   the  
causes  behind  it.  Its  weakness  led  to  its  elimination  from  the  study  so  far.  While,  
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on  the  other  hand,  the  role  of  identity  explanation  have  proven  to  be  much  more  
powerful   and   useful   in   understanding   one   of   the   important   derives   behind  
Turkish   foreign  policy   in   the  Middle  East,   highlighting   the   substantial   role   of  
Turkish   national   identity   in   affecting   foreign   policy   making.   However,   both  
explanations   seem   to   overlook   the   significant   roles   of   the   European   Union,  
security  concerns,  economic  interests,  and  other  pragmatic  aspects  of  Turkish  
foreign  policy  in  the  region.    
1.	  What	  does	  it	  mean	  neo-­‐Ottoman	  foreign	  policy?	  
  
Neo-­Ottomanism  has  been  an  important  concept  used  by  a  number  of  scholars  
when   trying   to  understand  Turkish  politics.  This  has  been  evident   in  a   large  
number  of  studies  where  analysts  utilized  the  concept  while  analysing  Turkish  
foreign  policy.  It  is  a  popular  concept  widely  applied  in  this  field  of  study  long  
before  the  establishment  of  the  AKP.  It  is  not  a  new  concept  or  one  that  came  
as   a   result   of   AKP’s   policies.   However,   the   concept   lacks   questioning   and  
examining  in  the  literature  and  therefore  needs  further  analysis.  The  aim  of  this  
part  of   the  chapter   is   to  analyse   the  notion  of  Neo-­Ottomanism  and   its  main  
arguments.   This   includes   examining   available   empirical   data,   archival  
documents,  which  enables  the  researcher  to  raise  critical  questions.    
This  chapter  argues  that,  despite   its   frequent  use   in   the   literature,   the  
concept   of   neo-­Ottomanism   does   not   have   any   real   explanatory   power   in  
understanding  Turkish   foreign  policy  under   the  AKP’s  government.  This  part  
will   be   divided   into   four   sections:   The   first   section   will   try   to   define   neo-­
Ottomanism  and   its  key  elements.  This  will   include  arguments  presented  by  
some  scholars  in  this  field  of  study  that  support  such  explanation  and  agree  to  
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the  existence  of  this  notion.  The  second  section  focuses  on  the  “Strategic  Depth  
Doctrine”,   a   book   presented   by   Ahmet   Davutoglu   in   2001.The   section   will  
explain   the   main   principals   of   this   book   and   Davutoglu’s   main   argument.  
Furthermore,   the  analysis  will   focus  on  how  several  scholars   tend  to  refer   to  
this  book  as  a  source  for  understanding  Turkey’s  neo-­Ottomanism  and  foreign  
policy  change  since  2002.  The  third  section  aims  at  covering  the  way  in  which  
some   critics   have   referred   to   a   number   of   Erdogan’s   and   Davutoglu’s  
statements   and   speeches   that   show   links   to   neo-­Ottomanism.   These   are  
included  because,  for  the  critics,  they  represent  important  evidence  in  support  
of  their  argument,  which  deserves  further  analysis  and  examination.  The  fourth  
and  final  section  will  be  an  assessment  of  the  above  critics  and  arguments  in  
favour  of  the  neo-­Ottomanist  explanation,  putting  it  to  the  test  in  order  to  assess  
its  plausibility.    
1.1	  Understanding	  the	  concept	  	  
  
In  order  to  understand  the  significance  of  the  concept,  it  is  necessary  to  define  
what  Neo-­Ottomanism  means  and  then  identify  where  it  can  be  found  in  Turkish  
foreign  policy  since  2002  under  the  AKP’s  government  as  suggested  by  many.  
The  term  was  first  introduced  by  Cengiz  Chander,  a  Turkish  academic  and  a  
columnist,   in   an   attempt   to   understand  Turkey’s   new  move   towards   a  more  
active   a   diversified   foreign   policy   after   the   Cold   War507.   The   term   became  
prominent  during  the  1990s  and  during  Turgut  Ozal’s  rule.  However,  there  are  
a  number  of  definitions   found  of  neo-­Ottomanism.  A  useful  one  provided  by  
Nimet  Seker   (2009)   in  his  work  Turkey’s  Strategic  Depth:  A  Shift   in  Turkish  
                                                                                                              507  Anita  Sengupta,  Myth  and  Rhetoric  of  the  Turkish  Model:  Exploring  Developmental  
Alternatives  (Springer  Science  &  Business,  2014):  87.    
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Foreign  Policy  states,  “Neo-­Ottomanism  is  a  term  used  by  critics  to  describe  
this  return  to  a  notion  of  a  Turkey  exerting  power  over  its  traditional  Ottoman  
sphere  of  influence;;  those  who  use  the  term  mean  to  imply  that  the  new  foreign  
policy   involves   the   revival  of   imperial  ambitions”508.  Critics   therefore  suggest  
that  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  under  the  AKP  has  been  very  much  following  an  
imperial  direction509.    
Since   the   AKP   took   power,   Turkish   foreign   policy   has   been   carefully  
watched  with  great  suspicion.  The  openness  towards  the  Balkans,  Caucasia,  
and  the  Middle  East  regions  were  seen  to  be  an  attempt  by  Turkey  to  regain  its  
historical   imperial   dominance.   A   number   of   scholars   support   the   view   that  
Turkey   is  pursuing  a  neo-­Ottoman  foreign  policy.  For  example,  Tarik  Oguzlu  
(2008)   argued   that   Turkish   foreign   policy   has   been   increasingly   becoming  
involved  in  the  Middle  East,  “Middle  Easternising”  according  to  him.  He  states  
that  Turkey  will  very  much  be  affected  by  Middle  Eastern  events  than  European  
ones.  Tarik  believes  that  this   is  due  to  the  bargaining  power  the  Middle  East  
offers   for   Turkey510.   Furthermore,   Einar  Wigen   (2009)   in   his   article,  Turkish  
Neo-­Ottomanism:   A   turn   to   the  Middle   East?   argued   that   Turkey   has   been  
adopting    the  neo-­Ottoman  foreign  policy  led  by  Ahmet  Davutoglu,  the  man  who  
invented   the   term   in  Turkish   political   dictionary,   and   further   stated,   “its   neo-­
Ottomanist  approach  to  foreign  policy  is  not  only  focused  on  Muslim  countries.  
Turkey  has  recently  made  serious  progress  in  its  relationship  with  Armenia,  and  
                                                                                                              508  Nimet  Seker,  “Turkey’s  Strategic  Depth:  A  shift  in  Turkish  Foreign  Policy,”  Qantara.de,  
August  7,  2009,  accessed  September  20,  2015,  https://en.qantara.de/content/a-­shift-­in-­
turkish-­foreign-­policy-­turkeys-­strategic-­depth.    
509  Arda  Baykal,  “Where  are  Turkey‘s  new  international  relations  taking  it?,”  International  Affair  
of  Defense  Section,  2010,  accessed  September  18,  2015,  http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-­
papers/SN05348.pdf.    
510  Tarik  Oguzlu,  “Middle  Easternization  of  Turkey’s  Foreign  Policy:  Does  Turkey  Dissociate  
from  the  West?,”  Turkish  Studies  9,  no.1,  (2008):  3-­20.    
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the  border  between  the  two  countries  is  set  to  open  in  the  near  future.  Instead  
of   dominating   existing   geographical   units,   Turkey  appears   to   try   to   create   a  
region  of  their  won,  the  centre  of  which  is  Ankara”511.    
   Ryan   Evans   (2014)   in   his   work   Turkey’s   Shifting   Strategic   Culture,  
argued   that   there  has  been   two  main  dominant  strategic  cultures   in  modern  
Turkey;;  the  republican  strategic  culture  that  emerged  with  the  creation  of  the  
republic  and  the  new  republican  elites  led  by  Ataturk;;  the  second  is  the  neo-­
Ottoman  strategic  culture  that  emerged  with  the  “Turkish-­Islamic  synthesis”  that  
came  after  the  1980  coup  and  the  leadership  of  Turgut  Ozal.  He  believes  that  
the   republican   strategic   culture   has  been   fading   since   then  and  much  more  
weakened  during  the  AKP’s  era  representing  on  the  other  hand  a  stronger  neo-­
Ottoman  geostrategic  culture  supported  by  a  neo-­Ottoman  elites.  For  him  “This  
neo-­Ottoman   strategic   culture   accepts   diverse,   substantial   identities;;   prefers  
more  balance  in  Turkey’s  Western-­Eastern  orientation;;  seeks  greater  regional  
power,  if  not  regional  hegemony;;  favours  activism  and  involvement,  particularly  
in   the  Middle   East   and   broader   Muslim  World;;   and   views   security   as   a   far  
broader  concept  than  territorial  integrity”512.  He  further  argued  that  Erdogan  has  
been   following   the   same   principles   and   policies   of   the   “first   neo-­Ottoman  
national   leader”   Turgut   Ozal.   Ryan   made   interesting   comparisons   between  
Ozal  and  Erdogan  and  argued  that  there  are  many  parallels,  adding,  “In  some  
cases,  where  Ozal  fell  short,  Erdogan  has  succeeded.  But  in  others  Erdogan  
has  fallen  into  the  same  traps”513.  Similarly,  Mustafa  Sahin  (2011)  agrees  that  
                                                                                                              
511  Einar  Wigen,  “Turkish  Neo-­Ottomanism:  A  turn  to  the  Middle  East?,”  Security  policy  library  
19,  no.3,  (2008):19. 	  512  Ryan  Evans,  “Turkey’s  Shifting  Strategic  Culture,”  Foreign  Policy  Research  Institute,  2014,  
accessed  September  20,  2015,  http://www.fpri.org/geopoliticus/2014/09/turkeys-­‐‑shifting-­‐‑strategic-­‐‑culture-­‐‑part-­‐‑i.    513  Ibid.  
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since  the  AKP  took  power,  there  has  been  a  clear  transformation  and  return  of  
neo-­Ottomanism  and   that   there  has  been  a  deliberate   re-­reading  of  Turkish  
history.  He  states,  “A  closer  look  at  the  ideas  championed  by  the  AKP  party  and  
the   resulting   changes   in   Turkish   politics,   clearly   demonstrates   that   this  
transformation   is   not   purely   Islamic   and   therefore   is   not   an   axis   shift.   This  
process   is   rather   a   result   of   deliberate   reading   of   Turkey’s   history   and   its  
relevance  to  the  contemporary  politics.  This  deliberate  attempt  of  reconfiguring  
Turkish   politics   is   a   normative   shift   in   defining   Turkey’s   history,   culture   and  
identity   which   have   been   dominated   by   Ataturk’s   Kemalist   legacy.   This  
transformation  represents  a  ‘return  of  the  repressed’;;  the  Ottoman  legacy  which  
is  best  explained  by,  as  this  paper  argues,  Neo-­Ottomanism”514.    
   Since  the  beginning  of  the  Arab  Spring  in  2011,  Turkey  had  to  deal  with  
a   region   that   is   facing   structural   changes   and   it   is   significantly   instable.  
Therefore,   this   led   to  Turkey  change  some  of   its   foreign  policies   in  order   to  
adapt   to   the   new   changes.   Tensions   increased   with   some   Arab   national  
governments  most  notably  Syria,  a  fact   that   for  many  marked  the  end  of   the  
Davutoglu’s   “Zero-­problems   with   neighbours”   policy.   However,   interestingly,  
Turkey  remained  heavily  involved  in  regional  affairs  and  sought  to  play  a  greater  
role   in   this   critically   changing   environment.   Consequently,   more   and   more  
critics  focused  on  the  Turkish  role  in  the  Middle  East  during  the  Arab  uprisings  
and  heavily  regarded  it  as  a  continuation  of  AKP’s  neo-­Ottoman  legacy.  Paolo  
Quercia  (2011)   in  his  paper  The  Turkish  neo-­Ottoman  foreign  policy  and  the  
Arab   Spring,   argued   that   since   2002   the   AKP   has   increasingly   showed   its  
                                                                                                              514  Mustafa  Sahin,  “Islam,  Ottoman  Legacy  and  Politics  in  Turkey:  An  Axis  Shift?,”  The  




commitment   to  neo-­Ottoman  revival.  For  Paolo  Quercia,   the  Arab  Spring  will  
dominate  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  had  played  an  important  role  in  characterizing  
the  political  evolution  of  the  AKP  government515.  Furthermore,  Omer  Taspinar  
(2011)   stated   that   the   AKP’s   neo-­Ottomanism   filled   a   vacuum   of   strategic  
leadership   in   the  Arab  World516.  Omer  Taspinar   argued   that   there  are   three  
main  factors  that  help  us  understand  the  AKP  neo-­Ottomanism:  “the  willingness  
to   come   to   term   with   Turkey’s   Ottoman   and   Muslim   heritage”;;   “a   sense   of  
Turkey’s  grandeur  and  self-­confidence  in  Turkey’s  role   in  the  world”;;  and  “its  
goal  of  embracing  the  West  as  much  as  the  Muslim  world”517.    
Professor   Serhat   Erkemen,   head   of   Department   of   International  
Relations   at   Kırşehir   Ahi   Evran   University   and   Middle   East   ex-­advisor   at  
ORSAM  ‘Centre  for  Middle  Eastern  Strategic  Studies’,  in  his  interview,  agreed  
with  the  notion  of  neo-­Ottoman  foreign  policy  and  arguing  that,  “Regarding  the  
Middle   East,   there   are   two  main   concepts   existing   in   the   literature,   the   first  
regards  the  role  of  Islam  and  the  second  looks  at  the  historical  role.    I  believe  
that  Turkey  does  not  have  the  mentality  which  classical  Islamic  approach  has  
towards  the  Middle  East”.  Then  he  added,  “Turkey  is  trying  to  abandon  the  idea  
of   separating   borders,   what   type   of   integration   does   Turkey   want   from   the  
Middle  East?  If  Turkey  is  against  having  borders  with  the  Middle  Eastern  states  
that  means  Turkey  is  against  sykspecot”518.  
                                                                                                              515  Paolo  Quercia,  “The  Turkish  neo-­Ottoman  foreign  policy  and  the  Arab  Spring,”  Quarterly,  
no.1,  (2011):  11-­15.    516  Omer  Taspinar,  “The  Turkish  Model  and  its  Applicability,”  in  Tocci,  Nathalie,  et  al.  Turkey  
and  the  Arab  Spring:  Implications  for  Turkish  Foreign  Policy  From  a  Transatlantic  Perspective  
(German  Marshall  Fund:  United  States,  2011),  11.    517  Ibid,  9-­10.	  	  518  Serhat  Erkemen,  interview  by  author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  March  21,  2014.    
219	  	  
Many  scholars  try  to  understand  Turkish  foreign  policy  in  the  Middle  East  
from   this   perspective   and   are   tracking   any   regional   Middle   East   policies   in  
support   of   this   view.   Furthermore,   they   seem   to   include   both   Eastern   and  
Western  Turkish  policies  in  defining  this  neo-­Ottomanist  approach.  However,  it  
is  important  to  note  that  there  are  a  number  of  different  interpretations  of  neo-­
Ottomanism,  many  of  which   failed   to  clarify   its  definition  and  characteristics,  
which  further  complicate  and  weaken  the  concept  as  a  whole.  Nick  Dabforth  
(2014)   argued   that   understanding   the   concept   neo-­Ottomanism  depends   on  
how  we  view  the  Ottoman  Empire  in  the  first  place.  He  further  argued  that  there  
are  several  Ottoman  Empires  that  persist  in  the  Turkish  imagination519.    
1.2	  Davutoglu’s	  “Strategic	  Depth”	  
  
One  of  the  most  important  intellectual  works  of  Ahmet  Davutoglu  was  his  book  
Strategic  Depth:  Turkey’s  International  Position  (2000)520,  a  book  that  has  been  
recognized   as   the  main   inspiration   behind  Turkish   Foreign  Policy   under   the  
AKP  government.  Through  his  work,  Davutoglu  was  able   to  construct  a  new  
foreign  policy  vision   for  Turkey.  His  main  argument  was   that  Turkey  made  a  
mistake  by  ignoring  its  neighbouring  regions  and  therefore  should  play  a  more  
active   role   and  exert   its   influence   in   the  Balkans,  Caucasia,   and   the  Middle  
East521.  The  book  was  published  one  year  before  the  establishment  of  the  AKP  
party.  After  the  elections  victory  of  2002,  Davutoglu  became  advisor  to  Erdogan  
                                                                                                              519  Nick  Danforth,  “The  Empire  Strickes  Back,”  Foreign  Policy,  2014,  accessed  September  20,  
2015,  http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/27/the-­empire-­strikes-­back-­2/.  	  
520  Ahmet  Davutoglu’s  book,  The  Strategic  Depth:  Turkey’s  international  position,  (2001),  
illustrated  that  Turkey  is  a  product  of  the  Ottoman  history  and  empire,  and  that  Turkey  needs  
to  recognise  its  history  and  significant  strategic  location  to  help  overcome  conflicts  in  the  
region.    521  loannis  N.  Grigoriadis,  “The  Davutoglu  Doctrine  and  Turkish  Foreign  Policy,”  Hellenic  
Foundation  for  European  and  Foreign  Policy  (ELIAMEP),  no.  8,  (2010):  4.  
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–  the  Prime  Minister  at  the  time  and  current  President  –  playing  a  central  role  
in  engineering  Turkey’s  new  regional  and  international  position.  Since  he  was  
appointed   as   the   Turkish   Foreign   Minister   in   2009,   Turkey’s   foreign   policy  
improved   its   international  cooperation  and  diplomatic   relations.  For  example,  
Turkey   was   able   to   open   new   embassies   in   countries   that   never   hosted   a  
Turkish  embassy  before  in  Latin  America522.    Ahmet  Davutoglu  became  known  
as  the  architect  of  Turkey’s  new  “active”  foreign  policy523.  This  section  of   the  
chapter  aims  to  illustrate  the  main  ideas  that  Davutoglu  presented  in  his  book  
as  well  as  analyzing  its  critics.    
   One  of   the  main  arguments  presented   in   this  book   is   that   “a  nation’s  
value   in  world  politics   is  predicted  on   its  geo-­strategic   location  and  historical  
depth”524.  Turkey’s  location  is  one  of  the  most  important  factors  that  contribute  
to  its  international  important  position.  It  is  a  country  that  connects  the  West  to  
the  East  and  the  Muslim  world.  It  borders  the  Black  Sea,  the  Aegean  Sea,  and  
the   Mediterranean   Sea.   It   shares   borders   with   Greece,   Bulgaria,   Georgia,  
Armenia,   Azerbaijan,   Syria,   Iraq,   and   Iran.   Such   position   gives   Turkey   an  
enormous  importance,  but  also  a  great  responsibility,  being  located  in  a  region  
of   continuous   tensions   and   instability.   Therefore,   Davutoglu   believes   that  
Turkey  should  take  advantage  of  such  position  to  expand  its  political,  economic,  
and  cultural  interests  increasing  its  influence  in  those  regions.  For  Davutoglu,  
                                                                                                              522  MFA,  “Statement  by  H.E.  Mr.  Ahmet  Davutoglu  at  the  Meeting  of  Turkey-­CARICOM  
Consultation  and  Cooperation  Mechanism,”  Republic  of  Turkey  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  
July  18,  2014,  accessed  October  13,  2015,  http://www.mfa.gov.tr/statement-­by-­h_e_-­mr_-­
ahmet-­davutoğlu-­at-­the-­meeting-­of-­turkey_caricom-­consultation-­and-­cooperation-­
mechanism_-­18-­july-­2014_-­istanbu.en.mfa.    523  MEE,  “Davutoglu:  Architect  of  Turkish  Foreign  Policy  to  be  new  Prime  Minister,”  Middle  
East  Eye,  accessed  September  21,  2015,  http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/davutoglu-­
architect-­turkish-­foreign-­policy-­be-­new-­pm-­2142298220.    524  Joshua  W.  Walker,  “Learning  Strategic  Depth:  Implications  of  Turkey’s  New  Foreign  Policy  
Doctrine,”  Insight  Turkey  9,  no.3,  (2007):  33.	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“Turkey  is  a  European  country,  a  Middle  Eastern  country,  a  Black  Sea  country,  
a  Mediterranean  country,  a  Caspian  Sea  country,  even  a  Gulf  country  through  
access”525.   Davutoglu’s   work   created   a   new   geographical   imagination   for  
Turkey.  He  argued  that  Turkey  has  a  geographical  depth  that  “places  Turkey  
right  at  the  centre  of  many  geopolitical  areas  of  influence”526.    
   Davutoglu   rejects   the   idea   that  Turkey   is  a  Wing  State  or  a  state   that  
plays  a  bridge  Role  between  East  and  West.   Instead,  he  argues  that  Turkey  
needs   to   play   a   central   role   in   regional   and   international   affairs.   Turkey’s  
location,   history,   and   power   contribute   to   its   centrality   and   confidence   in  
international   affairs.   Therefore,   the   geographical   depth   of   Turkey   has   been  
highlighted  as  an  important  source  for  a  more  active  foreign  policy.  His  thesis  
encourages  Turkey  to  apply  a  Multi-­Dimensional  Foreign  Policy  expanding  its  
cooperation  and  diplomatic  relations  to  other  regions  in  the  world  as  a  way  to  
help   expand   Turkey’s   political,   economic,   and   cultural   interests.   Davutoglu  
asserts  that  this  should  help  promote  regional  and  international  peace,  stability,  
and  prosperity.  According  to  him,  “Turkey  cannot  wait  forever  at  the  EU  door,  
and  needs  to  develop  a  genuinely  multi-­directional  foreign  policy  by  utilizing  its  
geostrategic  advantages”527.  
   Another  major  element  of  Davutoglu’s  work,  which  also  represents  one  
of   the   most   important   new   Turkish   foreign   policy   principles,   is   the  Balance  
between  Freedom  and  Security.  Davutoglu  argued  that  it  is  essential  for  Turkey  
to  provide  security  for  its  citizens,  but  not  at  the  expense  of  their  freedoms  and  
                                                                                                              525  Ahmet  Davutoglu,  “Ahmet  Davutoglu  on  Turkish  Foreign  Policy,”  The  Institute  of  
International  and  European  Affairs,  February  27,  2015,  accessed  September  21,  2015,  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OwfoTCo_SbE.    526  Alexander  Murinson,  “The  Strategic  Depth  Doctrine  of  Turkish  Foreign  Policy,”  Middle  
Eastern  Studies  42,  no.6,  (2006):  947.    527  Ibid,  952.	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human  rights.  In  his  article  Turkey’s  Foreign  Policy  Vision:  An  assessment  of  
2007   (2008),   he   stated,   “if   there   is   not   a   balance   between   security   and  
democracy   in   a   country,   it   may   not   have   a   chance   to   establish   an   area   of  
influence  in  its  environs.  The  legitimacy  of  any  political  regime  comes  from  its  
ability   to   provide   security   to   its   citizens;;   this   security   should   not   be   at   the  
expense  of  freedoms  and  human  rights  in  the  country”528.    
Since  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  freedom  and  liberal  values  became  very  
much   important   internationally.   However,   with   the   increase   of   terrorism   and  
high  security  alerts  since  the  attacks  of  September  11th  2001,  national  security  
became  the  top  priority  of  states’  agenda  resulting  in  limiting  citizen  freedoms.  
For  those  states,  controlling  citizen’s  freedoms  makes  it  easier  to  fight  terrorism,  
but  this  is  not  the  case  so  far  as  terrorism  still  flourishes  and  is  on  the  increase.  
However,   Davutoglu’s   argument   suggested   that   states   that   fail   to   balance  
between  freedom  of  its  citizens  and  state  security  would  turn  into  authoritarian  
regimes529.   Therefore,   Turkey’s   aim   under   the   AKP   was   to   achieve   such  
balance   first   by   adopting   the   Copenhagen   criteria   for   joining   the   EU   and  
introducing  new   reforms   to   give  more   freedoms   for  minorities   especially   the  
Kurds,   and   secondly   combating   terrorism   and   any   security   threat   without  
restricting  citizens’  movements  and  daily  lives.  For  example,  Davutoglu  argued  
that   during   the   war   with   the   PKK,   elections   continued   and   Turkey   did   not  
announce  a  state  of  emergency530.  However,  this  balance  may  not  have  been  
achieved   in   the   best   possible   way.   According   to   Ibrahim   Kalin   in   his   work  
Foreign  Policy:  Continuity  and  change  (2011),  Turkey  under  the  AKP  was  able  
                                                                                                              528  Ahmet  Davutoglu,  “Turkey’s  Foreign  Policy  Vision:  An  assessment  of  2007,”  Insight  Turkey  
10,  no.  1,  (2008):  79.    529  Ibid.    530  Ibid.	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to  reach  a  balance  between  freedom  and  security.  However,  Turkey  yet  needs  
more  work  to  improve  this  equilibrium531.    
Moreover,  an  important  argument  in  the  Strategic  Depth  approach  is  to  
increase  Turkey’s  regional  influence  though  the  use  of  Soft  Power.  This  concept  
was  first  introduced  by  Joseph  Nye  after  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  in  1990  and  
discusses  the  idea  of  classical  power  and  the  new  role  of  soft  power.  Nye  takes  
into   account   the   role   of   coercion,   persuasion   and   attraction   to   influence   the  
behaviour  of  others  to  achieve  specific  outcomes  needed  without  using  force  or  
military  aggression532.  He  contributed  to  the  literature  by  introducing  the  role  of  
non-­material  sources  of  power   including  culture,  political  values,  and   foreign  
policy,  which  also  involve  non-­state  actors533.  Following  Nye’s  path,  Davutoglu  
argues  that  Turkey  has  been  widely  seen  as  a  hard  power  with  strong  military  
through  history  and  particularly  during  the  Cold  War  and  therefore  this  image  
needs  to  change534.  Adopting  a  Soft  Power  approach  enables  Turkey  to  gain  
further   access   to   influence   particularly   in   the  Middle   East.   Turkey’s   history,  
culture  and  geography  should  help  promote  Turkey’s  Soft  Power  image  rather  
than  viewing  them  as  obstacles.  This  enables  Turkey  to  advance  its  regional  
and  international  strategic  communications.  Hence,  a  Soft  Power  dimension  in  
Turkish  foreign  policy  will  play  a  central  role  in  paving  the  way  for  further  political  
                                                                                                              531  Ibrahim  Kalin,  “Foreign  Policy:  Continuity  and  Change,  in  Bechey  Dimitar  (eds.),  What  
Does  Turkey  Think  (European  Council  of  Foreign  Relations:  London,  2011),  accessed  
September  28,  2015,  http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-­/ECFR35_TURKEY.pdf.  532  Joseph  Nye,  “The  Changing  Nature  of  Soft  Power,”  Political  Science  Quarterly  105,  no.  2  
(1990):  177-­192;;  Joseph  Nye,  “Notes  for  a  Soft  Power  Research  Agenda”  in  Felix  
Berenskoetterve  M.  J.  Williams  (eds.),  Power  in  World  Politics  (Routledge:  London,  2007),  
162-­172.    533  Joseph  Nye,  Soft  Power:  The  Means  to  Success  in  World  Politics  (Public  Affairs:  New  
York,  2004).    534  Ahmet  Davutoglu,  “Ahmet  Davutoglu  on  'Turkish  Foreign  Policy,”  Institute  of  International  
and  European  Affairs,  March  12,  2010,accessed  October  13,  2015,  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OwfoTCo_SbE.  	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and  diplomatic   relations  –  playing  mediation   roles  and   rhythmic  diplomacy  –  
and  economic  cooperation.  Therefore,  “A  country’s  soft  power  capacity  defines  
the  success  of  its  public  diplomacy  as  much  as  does  the  integrity  and  efficacy  
of  its  policies”535.  Turkey  and  the  Middle  East  lived  together  for  many  centuries  
under  the  Ottoman  rule  and  therefore  share  many  similarities  while  at  the  same  
time  developed  some  differences  after  the  establishment  of  the  new  republic.  
The  soft  power  element  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  in  the  Middle  East,  therefore,  
comes  to  strengthen  the  historical  common  features.    
According  to  Aylin  Şenol  (2010),  “the  soft  power  assets  of  Turkey  in  the  
Middle  East  range  from  democracy  to  culture,  foreign  policy  to  economy,  in  a  
sense  including  all  aspects  of  life”536.  Davutoglu  tends  to  use  certain  elements  
of   the  Ottoman   history,   identity   and   culture   to   benefit   Turkey’s   international  
position  and  foreign  relations.  Professor  Yahya  Mahmoud  ibn  Junaid,  from  the  
Secretary-­General  of  King  Faisal  Centre  for  Research  and  Islamic  Studies  in  
Riyadh-­  Saudi  Arabia,  argued   that  Turkish  officials  supported   the   intellectual  
and   cultural   collaboration   with   the   centre.   He   stated,   “Turkey   and   Turkish  
representatives  have  been  keen  to  exchanging  and  developing  cultural  ties  with  
us.  For  example,  President  Erdogan  attended  the  opening  of   the  “Jerusalem  
Gallery”  in  Riyadh,  Dr.  Davutoglu  also  visited  the  centre  and  he  gave  a  speech  
and  a  debate.  There  were  many  Arabic  books  that  were  requested  by  them  that  
we  sent  and  we  were  able  to  open  two  libraries  in  Turkey  as  well”537.  This  shows  
how  the  AKP’s  government  is  willing  to  enhance  cultural  ties  and  understanding  
                                                                                                              535  Ibrahim  Kalin,  “Soft  Power  and  Public  Diplomacy  in  Turkey,”  Journal  of  International  Affairs  
XVI,  no.3,  (2011):  8.    536  Aylin  Şenol,  “Understanding  the  New  Activism  of  Turkey  in  the  Middle  East:  Turkey  as  an  
Emerging  Soft  Power,”  (PhD  thesis,  Middle  East  Technical  University,  2010):  38.    537  Yahya  Mahmoud  ibn  Junaid,  interviewed  by  author,  Riyadh,  Saudi  Arabia,  June  24,  2014.	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of   each   other  with  Middle  Eastern   countries   and   this   fits  well  with   their   soft  
power  element  of  foreign  policy.  On  the  other  hand,  the  AKP’s  government  was  
able  to  use  the  media  for  promoting  Turkey’s  image  in  the  Middle  East.    
An  interesting  study  by  Osman  Bahadir  Dincer  and  Mustafa  Kutlay’s  on  
Turkey’s  Power  Capacity  in  the  Middle  East:  Limits  of  the  Possible,  An  Empirical  
Analysis  (2012),  suggested  that  Turkey  was  able  to  establish  Arabic  speaking  
TV  channels  like  TRT  channel,  Turkish  television  series,  Arabic  news  sites,  and  
other   personal   blogs.   However,   they   argued   that   these   are   limited   and   fall  
behind  other  competing  channels  and  news  sites  in  reaching  Arabs538.  On  the  
other   hand,   Dr.   Mehmet   Ozkan,   an   advisor   researcher   and  member   of   the  
SETA  foundation,  he  stated,  “I  believe  that  the  influence  of  Turkish  television  
series  was  not  a  planned  one.  Aljazeera  International  produced  a  documentary  
where   they   interviewed   some   of   scripts   writers   and   producers   of   Turkish  
television  series  and  their  answer  was  that  they  produced  and  worked  on  these  
shows  for  Turks  and  for  financial  benefits  as  well,  but  they  never  had  in  mind  
that   those  shows  will  be   famous   in   the   region”539.  He  suggested   that   the  TV  
series  and  shows   famous   in   the  Middle  East   today  were  not   a  product   of   a  
planned  government  project.  Although  soft  power  has  been  one  of   the  most  
important  aspects  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  since  2002,  it  has  not  yet  been  able  
to  reach  its  ultimate  goal.    
   Another  major  concept  developed  in  the  Strategic  Depth  volume  was  the  
Zero-­Problems  with  Neighbors.  A  policy  believed  to  be  necessary  for  Turkey’s  
regional  and  international  success.  Davutoglu  argued  that  Turkey  should  find  
                                                                                                              538  Osman  Bahadir  Dincer  and  Mustafa  Kutlay,  “Turkey’s  Power  Capacity  in  the  Middle  East:  
Limits  of  the  Possible,  An  Empirical  Analysis,”  USAK  Reports,  no.  12-­04,  (2012):  30-­31.    539	  Mehmet  Ozkan,  Interviewed  by  Author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  March  17,  2014.	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solutions   and   develop   a   new   free-­problems   atmosphere   with   neighbours  
particularly   with   its   bordering   ones.   The   Zero-­Problem   doctrine   was   seen  
necessary  especially  that  Turkey  is  located  in  a  very  turbulent  and  difficult  area.  
By  overcoming  problems  with  neighbouring  states,  Turkey  would  present  itself  
with  a  new  image,  supporting  its  position  for  membership  in  the  European  Union  
and  promoting   further  political  and  economic   regional  cooperation.  This  new  
philosophy  developed  by  Davutoglu  received  high  attention  both  domestically  
and  internationally.  Davutoglu  was  able  to  transform  such  theory  into  practice  
and  Turkey  was  able  to  overcome  many  of  its  conflicts  and  disagreements  with  
its  neighbouring  countries.  However,  this  strategy  was  highly  challenged  with  
the  emergence  and  development  of  the  Arab  Spring  and  became  the  target  of  
heavy  criticism540.    
   In  addition,  Davutoglu’s  vision  of  Turkish  Ottoman  past  is  one  that  it  gives  
Turkey  great  historical  depth  that  creates  a  strategic  advantage  for  the  country.  
Furthermore,  this  historical  depth  makes  Turkey  unlike  any  other  ordinary  state,  
because  it  has  been  the  centre  of  the  Islamic  civilization  for  many  centuries.  He  
believes   that   this   should   contribute   to   the   cultural   enrichment   and   Turkish  
identity   as   a   political   actor541.   Richard   Folk   (2004),   argued   that   Davutoglu  
emphasized  the  “accommodative”  nature  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  at  its  peak542.  
Unlike   secular   Turkish   politicians,   Davutoglu   believe   that   Turkish   Ottoman  
historical   experience   is   an   important   element   that   contributes   to   Turkey’s  
international  position  and  therefore  needs  to  be  utilized  in  Turkey’s  advantage.  
                                                                                                              540  Piotr  Zalewski,  “How  Turkey  Went  From  ‘Zero  Problems’  to  Zero  Friends  and  Lost  its  
Leverage  Everywhere,”  Foreign  Policy,  August  22,  2013,  accessed  September  21,  2015,  
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/22/how-­turkey-­went-­from-­zero-­problems-­to-­zero-­friends/.    541  Richard  Falk,  “Reconsidering  Turkey,”  Zaman,  October  6,  2004,  accessed  September  21,  
2015,  http://www.armeniandiaspora.com/showthread.php?10711-­Reconsidering-­Turkey.    542  Ibid.	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Moreover,  Davutoglu   referred   to   the  Ottoman  past   as  a   time   that  witnessed  
multiple  cultures  living  at  harmony  and  gave  examples  of  cities  like  Bagdad  and  
Sarajevo.  According  to  Christopher  Caldwell  “What  is  new  about  Davutoglu's  
formulation  is  that  it  looks  to  Ottoman  history  for  inspiration”543.  
   Overall,   as   mentioned   above,   the   Strategic   Depth   doctrine   of   Ahmet  
Davutoglu   stresses   the   importance   of   recognizing   the   geographical   and  
historical  depth  of  Turkey  as  well  as  the  importance  of  re-­positioning  itself  in  the  
international   arena.   Furthermore,   in   his   view,   Turkey   should   expand   its  
influence   in   the   Middle   East,   Balkan,   and   Caucasian   states   through  
implementing   soft   power.   According   to   his   book,   Turkey   should   become   a  
regional  leader  and  key  international  player.    
   However,   the   strategic   depth   doctrine   received   many   critics   among  
scholars   suggesting   that   Davutoglu   is   promoting   “Ottoman   Revival”544.   For  
example,   Alexander   Murinson   (2006)   argued   that   Davutoglu   is   a   neo-­
Ottomanist   thinker  who  demands  an  active  regional  engagement.  He  stated,  
“Ahmet  Davutoglu  is  the  architect  of  the  new  Turkish  foreign  policy  concept.  His  
‘Strategic   Depth’   doctrine   calls   for   an   activist   engagement   with   all   regional  
systems   in   Turkey’s   neighbourhood.   Davutoglu   is   a   truly   neo-­Ottoman  
thinker”545.  Furthermore,  Omer  Taspinar  (2011)  in  his  work  The  Three  Strategic  
Visions  of  Turkey,  argued  that  Davutoglu’s  work  and  AKP’s  neo-­Ottoman  vision  
is   a   continuation   of   Turgut   Ozal’s   approach.   He   added,   “Davutoglu’s   main  
argument  is  that  Turkey  is  a  great  power  that  has  neglected  its  historic  ties  and  
                                                                                                              543  KURE,  “Strategic  Depth:  Turkey’s  International  Position,”  kureyayinlari,  2014,  accessed  
September  21,  2015,  http://www.kureyayinlari.com/EnglishBlog/6.    544  Hillel  Fradkin  and  Lewis  Libby,  “Turkey  and  the  Dream  of  Ottoman  Revival,”  Hudson  
Institute,  May  17,  2013,  accessed  September  21,  2015,  
http://www.hudson.org/research/9604-­turkey-­and-­the-­dream-­of-­ottoman-­revival.    545  KURE,  “Strategic  Depth:  Turkey’s  International  Position”.  	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diplomatic,  economic  and  political   relationships  with   its  neighbouring   regions  
(Middle   East,   North   Africa,   the   Balkans,   and   Eurasia),   dating   back   to   the  
Ottoman   era.   It   should   be   noted   that   this   “neo-­Ottoman”   vision   is   not   an  
imperialist  agenda.  It  is  also  very  different  from  policies  advocated  by  Necmettin  
Erbakan,   the   Islamist   leader   of   the   now  defunct  Welfare  Party”546.  Here   the  
author  is  defining  Turkey’s  neo-­Ottomanism  in  a  new  way  far  from  its  original  
Ottoman  imperialist  vision.      
The  same  author  in  a  different  article  on  Turkey’s  Middle  East  Policies:  
between   Kemalism   and   Neo-­Ottomanism   (2008)   argued   that   there   are   two  
major   factors   deriving   Turkey’s   new   foreign   policy   in   the  Middle   East:   neo-­
Ottomanism  and  the  Kurdish  challenge547.  The  term  neo-­Ottoman  seems  to  be  
popular  among  scholars  and  journalists  who  tend  to  view  any  type  of  Turkish  
engagement  and  active  policy  in  the  former  Ottoman  territories  negatively.  This  
notion  of  neo-­Ottomanism  in  understanding  Turkish  foreign  policy  has  not  been  
significantly   challenged   and   still   is   very   popular   in   the   literature   and   among  
Western   media.   The   usefulness   of   this   concept   in   understanding   Turkish  
foreign  policy  will  be  further  examined  and  tested  in  the  final  part  of  this  section  
of  the  chapter.    
1.3	  AKP	  leadership’s	  “Ottomanist”	  statements	  and	  references	  	  
  
Once  again,  a  number  of  scholars  and  analysts  have  been  focusing  on  Recep  
Taiyyp  Erdogan’s  and  Ahmet  Davutoglu’s   statements  and  speeches,   tracing  
not  only  any  reference  to  political  Islam,  but  also  any  reference  to  the  Ottoman  
                                                                                                              546  Omer  Taspinar,  “The  Three  Strategic  Visions  of  Turkey,”  US-­Europe  Analysis  Series,  
no.50,  (2011):  1.    547  Omer  Taspinar,  “Turkey’s  Middle  East  Policies:  between  Kemalism  and  Neo-­Ottomanism,”  
Carnegie  Papers,  no.10  (2008):  1.	  	  
229	  	  
past   as   evidence   for   the   existence   of   the   AKP’s   neo-­Ottomanist   vision.   An  
interesting   study   by   Ali   Erken   (2013)   on  Re-­Imagining   the  Ottoman   Past   in  
Turkish  Politics:  Past  and  Present,  focused  on  the  Ottoman  references  of  AKP  
leaders.   Erken   argued   that   there   are   increasing   references   to   the   Ottoman  
history  in  the  party  leadership’s  discourse548.  He  further  stated,  “The  AK  Party  
won  the  2002  elections  with  a  great  majority   in   the  Parliament  and  the  party  
elite   started   to   show   that   they   would  make   use   of   the   Ottoman   heritage   in  
carving  out  a  new  vision  for  the  country’s  foreign  policy”549.  Furthermore,  Erken  
referred  to  a  number  of  speeches  and  statements  of  different  AKP’s  elites.  He  
went  further  to  compare  Erdogan’s  vision  to  that  of  Necmettin  Erbakan’s  and  
argued   that   there   are   noticeable   similarities.   Using   one   of   Erdogan’s  
statements,  the  author  referred  to  Erdogan’s  speech  after  the  Marmara  Flotilla  
and   the   increasing   tensions   with   Israel,   when   he   said:   “We   speak   as   the  
grandchildren   of   the   Ottomans,   who   host   you   when   you   were   exiled   from  
Spain”550.  On  another  occasion,  Erdogan  also  commented,  “Presiding  over  the  
heritage  of  our  ancestors,  the  Ottoman  State  that  ruled  the  World  for  600  years,  
we   would   revive   the   Ottoman   consciousness   again”551.   On   the   other   hand,  
according   to   Erken,   Ahmet  Davutoglu   argued   in   a   conference   held   by  Türk  
ocakları  in  2011  that  Turkey  will  “keep  a  close  eye”  on  previous  Ottoman  lands  
and  quoted  Davutoglu  stating:  
“Just  as  a  state  [meaning  the  Ottoman  Empire],  the  political  centre  of  an  
ancient  civilization  was  torn  apart  in  twelve  years  from  the  Tripolitanian  
War   in   1911   to   1923,   and   foundational   elements   of   this   state   were  
psychologically  and  historically  divided  apart   to  be   replaced  by  a  new  
Republic   founded   in   1923   as   a   nation   state   and   the   leftovers   of   this  
                                                                                                              548  Ali  Erken,  “Re-­Imagining  the  Ottoman  Past  in  Turkish  Politics:  Past  and  Present,”  Insight  
Turkey  15,  no.3  (2013):  171-­188.    549  Ibid,  179.    550  Ibid,  184.    551  Ibid.	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heritage   took   on   the   mission   of   “order”   conveying   the   World   certain  
values,   now   we   need   to   unify   the   elements   of   this   broken   and   frag-­  
mented  nation  again.  The  question  is  how  do  we  unify  this  geography?  
How  do  we  build  a  new  generation,  who  can  shape  the  flow  of  history  
marching   towards   the   future   with   a   great   hope   from   these   divided  
histories?   Therefore,   “Towards   the   Great   Turkey”   is   the   right   title  
[meaning  the  title  of  conference].”  552  
  
Erken’s  study   therefore  suggests   that   the  Ottoman  past  played  a  major   role  
during  the  AKP’s  rule  as  a  model  for  Turkey’s  geopolitical  vision.  Most  recently,  
some  media  sources  focused  on  PM  Davutoglu’s  statement  that  he  would  bring  
the  Ottoman  justice  system  and  order  back.  The  Hurriyet  Daily  News  quoted  
him   during   his   meeting   with   party   members   of   the   AKP   headquarters  
congratulating  them  for  the  Eid  al-­Fitr  on  17  of  July  2015,  saying  “God  willing,  
we   will   bring   the   order   and   justice   of   the   Ottomans   to   today   and   into  
tomorrow”553.  Since  the  Arab  Spring,  more  studies  emerged  suggesting  that  the  
AKP’s  government   is   perusing  a  neo-­Ottoman   foreign  policy.  Paolo  Quercia  
(2011)   in   his   article  The   Turkish   neo-­Ottoman   Foreign   Policy   and   the   Arab  
Spring,  illustrated  that  since  the  third  term  victory  of  the  AKP  in  2011,  it  became  
clearer  that  this  government  is  adopting  a  neo-­Ottoman  foreign  policy554.    
The  author  focused  on  Erdogan’s  victory  speech  on  12th  of  June  2011  
and  argued  that  this  victory  speech  provides  a  clear  evidence  of  this.  He  quoted  
part  of  Erdogan’s  speech,  “Believe  me,  today  Sarajevo  has  won  just  as  Istanbul  
has  won;;  and  Beirut  has  won  just  as  Izmir  has  won;;  Gaza  and  the  West  Bank  
have  won  just  as  Diyarbakir  has  won.  Today  the  Middle  East,  the  Caucasus,  
                                                                                                              552  Ibid.    553  HDN,  “Turkish  PM  promises  to  bring  back  ‘Ottoman  justice,  order,”  Hurriyet  Daily  News,  
July  17,  2015,  accessed  September  23,  2015,  http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-­pm-­
promises-­to-­bring-­ottoman-­order-­justice.aspx?PageID=238&NID=85581&NewsCatID=338.    554  Quercia,  “The  Turkish  neo-­Ottoman  foreign  policy”.    
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the  Balkans  have  won  as  Turkey  has  won”555.  Quercia  argued   that   this  neo-­
Ottoman  tone  is  adopted  without  a  reason  and  that  this  was  a  well-­structured  
metaphor556.    
In   addition   to   the   vocabulary   signs,   others   focused   on   the   Ottoman  
images  that  the  AKP’s  government  has  shown  so  far.  For  example,  in  a  visit  by  
Mahmoud  Abbas   to  Ankara   in  January  2015,  Erdogan  welcomed  him  at   the  
new  presidential  palace  -­  AK  Saray  –  with  a  classical  imperial  style  presented  
by  16  warriors  each  representing  one  empire  of  Turkish  history  starting  from  
the  Hunnic  Empire,  all  the  way  to  the  Ottoman  Empire557.  Walid  Shoebat  –  a  
former  member  of  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  –  argued  that  the  image  presented  
by  Erdogan  represents  a  clear  sign  of  an  Ottoman  revival.   In  his  article  The  
many  reasons  why  Erdogan   is   reviving   the  Ottoman  Empire  and   the  coming  
Caliphate  (2015),  he  stated,  “Erdogan  by  intrigue  and  deception  is  changing  set  
times  and  set  laws  took  over  the  most  powerful  Muslim  nation  on  earth  and  is  
now   reviving   its   dead   image   to   everyone’s   astonishment”558.   This   is   despite  
AKP  leadership’s  constant  rejection  of  being  classified  as  Neo-­Ottomans.  If  so,  
what  does   it  mean  then?  What  does  such  references  and   images   tell  us?   Is  
there  something  missing  in  these  critics’  analysis?  This  will  be  further  examined  
in  following  sections.    
  
                                                                                                              555  Ibid,  14.	  	  556  Ibid.  557  RT,  “Erdogan  welcomes  Abbas  in  Ottoman  Empire  style  ceremony,”  RT  News,  January  
13,  2015,  accessed  23  September  23,  2015,  http://www.rt.com/news/222027-­erdogan-­abbas-­
ottoman-­welcome/.    558  Walid  Shoebat,  “The  many  reasons  why  Erdogan  is  reviving  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  the  




1.4	  Testing	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  concept	  in	  understanding	  Turkish	  Foreign	  Policy	  
change	  	  
  
The  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  test  the  validity  of  the  neo-­Ottoman  approach  
in  understanding  Turkish  foreign  policy.  A  central  element  that  will  contribute  to  
this   evaluation   is   the   application   of   interview   data,   which   will   enable   the  
researcher   to   identify  possible  errors  and  weaknesses   to  help  determine   the  
explanation's  contributory  value.  
First   of   all,   it   is   important   to   state   that   neo-­Ottomanism   has   been  
constantly  rejected  and  refused  by  the  AKP’s  leadership  which  stated  that  the  
Turkish  engagement  with  the  former  Ottoman  regions  is  the  result  of  a  rational  
and   pragmatic   foreign   policy.   In   an   interview   with   Balkan   Insight   in   2011,  
Davutoglu  stated,  “I  am  not  a  neo-­Ottoman.  Actually  there  is  no  such  policy.  We  
have  a   common  history   and   cultural   depth  with   the  Balkan   countries,  which  
nobody  can  deny.  We  cannot  act  as  if  the  Ottomans  never  existed  in  this  region.  
My  perception  of  history  in  the  Balkans  is  that  we  have  to  focus  on  the  positive  
aspects  of  our  common  past”  559.  If  we  break  it  down  and  try  to  understand  the  
concept,  the  term  neo-­Ottomanism  refers  to  two  main  factors;;  imperialism  in  a  
sense  that  Turkey   is  seeking  to  establish  a  new  empire  similar   to   that  of   the  
Ottoman   Empire;;   and   secondly   the   term   focuses   explicitly   on   territories  
previously  under  Ottoman  rule.  Dautoglu  argued  in  one  of  his  speeches,  "Why  
is  it  that  when  the  whole  of  Europe  is  casting  off  its  borders  and  unifying  they  
don't  become  the  Neo-­Romans  or  the  New  Holy  Roman  Empire,  but  when  we  
call  for  the  peoples  who  lived  together  just  a  century  ago  to  come  together  once  
                                                                                                              559  Altin  Raxhimi,  “Davutoglu:  ‘I  am  not  a  neo-­Ottoman’,”  Balkan  Insight,  April  26,  2011,  
accessed  September  23,  2015,  http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/davutoglu-­i-­m-­not-­a-­
neo-­ottoman.    
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again,  we  are  accused  of  being  Neo-­Ottomans?"560.  What  is  more,  the  critics  of  
neo-­Ottomanism  fail   to  explain  Turkey’s  expansion  of   foreign  policy  reaching  
beyond  old  Ottoman  territories.  Turkey  under  the  AKP  managed  to  increase  its  
diplomatic   relations  and  economic  cooperation  with  countries   in  Africa,  Asia,  
and  Latin  America  far  away  from  its  pre-­Ottoman  lands.     On  the  other  hand,  
others  suggested  that  even  not  all  pre-­Ottoman  lands  have  been  the  primary  
focus  in  AKP’s  foreign  policy.  Soner  Cagaptay  in  his  article  The  AKP’s  Foreign  
Policy:  The  Misnomer  of  Neo-­Ottomanism  (2009)  argued  that  if  we  pay  a  closer  
look  at  Turkish  foreign  policy,  we  see  that  Turkey  has  been  focusing  more  on  
the  Middle  East  and  “ignoring  other  areas  of  the  Ottoman  realm”561.  Therefore,  
we  can  see   that   if  we  apply   the   term   to   the  practical  side  of  Turkish   foreign  
policy,  it  would  fail  to  explain  both  Turkish  interest  in  reaching  areas  beyond  the  
Ottoman   lands,  and   the  disengagement  with  other   countries   in   the  Ottoman  
realm.      
   Another   major   weakness   in   applying   this   concept   is   that   there   are  
different   definitions   and   explanations   of   what   neo-­Ottomanism   means.  
According   to   Agnes   Czajka   and   Edward  Wastnidge   (2015),   “An   analysis   of  
foreign  policy  literature  as  well  as  broader,  non-­academic  and  policy  discourses  
referencing   ‘neo-­Ottoman  foreign  policy’   reveals   the  presence  of  a  variety  of  
distinct   interpretations  of  neo-­Ottomanism,  many  of  which  retain  a  degree  of  
vagueness  and  ambiguity  that  decreases  the  analytical  and  explanatory  value  
                                                                                                              560  Cina  Kiper,  “Sultan  Erdogan:  Turkey's  Rebranding  Into  the  New,  Old  Ottoman  Empire,”  
The  Atlantic,  April  5,  2013,  accessed  September  23,  2015,  
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/sultan-­erdogan-­turkeys-­rebranding-­
into-­the-­new-­old-­ottoman-­empire/274724/.      	  561  Soner  Cagaptay,  “The  AKP’s  Foreign  Policy:  The  Misnomer  of  Neo-­Ottomanism,”  The  




of   the   concept   itself”562.   They   further   added,   “If   Turkish   diplomacy   were   to  
promote  an  explicit  ‘neo-­Ottoman’  agenda  -­  however  that  might  be  defined  -­  it  
would   be   diplomatic   suicide.   There   is   not   one   state   in   the   former   Ottoman  
domains  that  would  wish  to  see  any  kind  of  assertive  Turkish  influence.  Indeed  
the  ‘neo-­Ottoman’  label  has  been  used  pejoratively  in  the  regional  press  and  
much  analysis  of  perceived  Turkish  over  ambition”563.  Moreover,  Nick  Dabforth  
(2014)  argued  that  understanding  the  concept  of  neo-­Ottomanism  depends  on  
how  we  view  the  Ottoman  Empire  in  the  first  place.  He  further  argued  that  there  
are  several  Ottoman  Empires   that  persist   in   the  Turkish   imagination564.  As  a  
result,  it  can  be  argued  that  neo-­Ottomanism  lacks  a  common  definition  and  is  
an   elusive   term   that   can   mean   different   things   and   can   even   include   new  
characteristics  that  were  not  primarily  associated  with  the  Ottoman  Empire.    
   Behlul  Ozkan,  an  academic  and  a  former  student  of  Davutoglu,  studied  
Davutoglu’s  writings,  statements  and  speeches,  argued  that  it  is  a  mistake  to  
regard  Davutoglu  as  a  neo-­Ottomanist,  and   instead  Ozkan  regards  him  as  a  
pan-­Islamist565.      In   a   conference   organized   by   the   School   of   Advanced  
International   Studies   (SAIS)   at   John   Hopkins   University,   entitled   Turkish  
Foreign  Policy  Under  Erdogan’s  Presidency:  What  Shapes   it?  Behlul  Ozkan  
stated,  “Davutoglu  is  not  a  neo-­Ottomanist  because  Davutoglu  never  believed  
                                                                                                              562  Czajka,  Agnes,  and  Edward  Wastnidge.  "‘The  Centre  of  World  Politics?’Neo-­Ottomanism  
in  Turkish  Foreign  and  Domestic  Politics,"  Isanet,  2015,  p.  2,  accessed  23  September  2015,  
http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/GSCIS%20Singapore%202015/Archive/a1b05e35-­
80f6-­40ae-­9c56-­b5708c5c321e.pdf.    563  Ibid,  6.    564  Danforth,  Op  cit.    565  Behlul  Ozkan,  “Turkey’s  Imperial  Fantasy,”  The  New  York  Times,  August  28,  2014,  
accessed  September  28,  2015,  http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/29/opinion/ahmet-­davutoglu-­
and-­turkeys-­imperial-­fantasy.html?_r=0.    
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in  Ottomanism.  He   is   a   pan-­Islamist”566.  Ozkan  argued   that  Davutoglu   even  
criticized   Turgut   Ozal,   who   ruled   between   1983   and   1993,   and   his   neo-­
ottomanism   for  being   theoretically   “unprepared,  pragmatic,  and  generalistic”.  
Ozkan  further  stated  that  Davutoglu  refused  Ozal’s  neo-­Ottomanist  approach  
in  trying  to  protect  Turkey’s  territorial  integrity  by  Western  support,  just  like  what  
the  Tanzimat  reforms,  which  were  a  number  of  reforms  established  to  prevent  
the   collapse   of   the   Ottoman   Empire,   aimed   to   achieve   during   the   Ottoman  
era567.  In  other  words,  Davutoglu  is  against  the  neo-­Ottoman’s  vision  of  solving  
Turkey’s   problems   through   Western   support   and   is   instead   supporting   the  
establishment  of  an  independent  foreign  policy.    
   Another   limitation   to   the   neo-­Ottomanist   ideological   understanding   of  
Turkish  foreign  policy  was  also  presented  in  Nick  Danforth’s  work  (2008).  He  
argued   that  scholars  have  overemphasized   the   role  of  domestic   identity  and  
ideology   in  determining  Turkish   foreign  policy,  both  now  and   in   the  past.  He  
states  that    review  of  the  pragmatic  concerns  that  shaped  Turkey’s  international  
relations  during  key  periods  in  its  history  –under  Ataturk,  during  the  Cold  War  
and  under  Turgut  Ozal–  will  provide  the  background  for  the  claim  that  pragmatic  
concerns  have  influenced  the  AKP  much  more  than  any  Islamist  ideology”568.  
Danforth  argued  that  Davutoglu’s  support  of  engagement  with  the  Middle  East  
was  more  based  on  a  pragmatic  perspective,  arguing  that  Turkey  have  missed  
important   opportunities   due   to   the  Kemalist   “ideology   fixation  on  Europe”569.  
                                                                                                              566  Behlul  Ozkan  and  Michael  Reynold,  “Turkish  Foreign  Policy  Under  Erdogan’s  Presidency:  
What  Shapes  it?,”  School  of  Advanced  International  Studies  (SAIS),  November  18,  2014,  
accessed  August  20,  2015,    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k1S5zQl1-­iA.      567  Ibid.	  568  Nick  Danforth,  “Ideology  and  Pragmatism  in  Turkish  Foreign  Policy:  From  Ataturk  to  the  
AKP,”  Turkish  Policy  Quarterly  7,  no.3  (2008):  85.    569  Ibid,  91.    
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Here  Nick  Danforth  stresses  the  importance  of  Turkish  economic  interests   in  
the  Middle  East  and   that  by  simply   focusing  on  AKP’s   ideological  motives   is  
ignoring  the  pragmatic  side  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  regional  interests.      
Interviews   conducted   by   researcher   also   suggested   that   using   neo-­
Ottomanism  as  a  way  to  understanding  Turkish  foreign  policy  change  towards  
the  Middle  East  is  not  useful.  For  example,  Dr.  Fayz  Al-­shehri,  a  member  of  the  
Shoura   Council   in   Saudi   Arabia   and   the   President   of   Saudi-­Turkish  
Parliamentary  Friendship,  in  his  interview  stated,  “Yes  Turkey  has  a  new  foreign  
policy  approach  under  the  AKP,  but  I  don’t  believe  that  it  is  a  neo-­Ottoman  one,  
it   is   more   of   an   ‘Erdoganist’   approach”570,   suggesting   that   the   AKP   led   by  
Erdogan   is  actually   following  a  new  approach.  Al-­shehri   further  added,   “The  
Ottoman  Empire  does  not  exist  anymore  and  there   is  no  valid  foundation  for  
arguing  that  the  AKP  members  are  neo-­Ottomanist”571.  In  addition,  Professor  
Yahya   Mahmoud   ibn   Junaid,   Secretary-­General   of   King   Faisal   Centre   for  
Research   and   Islamic   Studies,   argued   that   the   Middle   East   and   the   Arab  
governments  have  welcomed  Turkey  and  this  is  another  fact  that  we  have  to  
take  into  account572.  He  stated,  “I  believe  that  it  is  natural  for  Turkey  to  open  its  
doors  to  the  Middle  East.  Closing  its  doors  is  not  natural”.  He  further  argued,  
there  is  a  great  geographical  and  historical  ties  that  Turkey  share  with  the  rest  
of  the  region.  Dr.  Yahya  believes  that  “Turkey  needs  her  Arab  neighbours  and  
vice  versa”.  Therefore,  suggesting  that  an  opening  to  the  Middle  East  should  
not  be  surprising  and  it  is  certainly  a  mistake  to  view  it  with  such  suspicion.  We  
have  to  keep  in  mind  that  Professor  Yahya  and  Dr.  Fayz  are  key  experts  from  
                                                                                                              570  Fayz  Al-­Shehri,  interviewed  by  author,  Riyadh,  Saudi  Arabia,  June  13  2014.    571  Ibid.	  572  Yahya  Mahmoud  ibn  Junaid,  interviewed  by  author,  Riyadh,  Saudi  Arabia,  June  24,  2014.    
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Saudi   Arabia   and   they   provide   an   important   viewpoint   from   outside   Turkey  
being  from  one  of  the  most  important  countries  in  the  Middle  East.  On  the  other  
hand,  Professor  Yasin  Aktay,  the  Foreign  Affairs  Deputy  Chairman  and  one  of  
the  founding  members  of  the  AKP,  argued  in  his  interview  that  the  Neo-­Ottoman  
critics  are  “far  from  reality”573.  Although  we  want  to  see  the  Muslim  World  in  a  
better  situation,  “this  does  not  make  us  want  to  control  them”.  He  used  the  case  
of  Palestinian  political  dispute  between  Fatah  and  Hamas  as  an  example.  He  
stated  that  the  Egyptian  effort  to  bring  Hamas  and  Fatah  together  was  met  with  
“applause”  by  Turkey.  He  stressed  “we  do  not  care  who  takes  lead  in  peace  
and  mediation  efforts  in  the  region  as  long  as  it  is  for  the  better”.  Aktay  argued  
that   Turkey   does   not   aim   to   dominate   the   region   or   become   a   regional  
hegemony.  Instead,  Turkey  wants  to  play  a  greater  positive  role  and  is  willing  
to   cooperate   with   other   Arab   governments   in   doing   so574.   Although   this   is  
coming   from  an  AKP’s  official,   it   gives  us  significant   insights  of   the   fact   that  
instead   of   dominating   regional   politics,   the   AKP  welcomes   and   encourages  
governments  in  the  Middle  East  to  play  a  greater  regional  role  along  with  Turkey  
for  the  benefit  of  all.    
Moreover,  Suheyl  Sapan,  a  Turkish  Professor  specialized   in  Ottoman  
and  Turkish  political  history  at  King  Saud  University  in  Saudi  Arabia,  told  me  in  
his   interview  that  the  AKP  realized  that  focusing  primarily  on  the  West   is  not  
going   to   take   them   anywhere,   “Turkey   will   remain   within   its   borders”,   and  
therefore   wanted   to   increase   relations   with   the   Middle   East   also   for   both  
economic  and  geo-­political  interests575.  He  added  “the  argument  that  Turkey  is  
                                                                                                              573  Yasin  Aktay,  interviewed  by  author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  March  19,  2014.    574  Ibid.    575  Suheyl  Sapan,  interviewed  by  author,  Riyadh,  Saudi  Arabia,  June  26,  2014.    
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pursuing   a   neo-­Ottoman   foreign   policy   has   no   ground   and   does   not   make  
sense,  especially  when  we  see  Turkey  expanding  its  relations  and  interests  to  
countries  outside  the  Ottoman  hinterlands”576.  Similarly,  Ersel  Aydinili,  a  well-­
known   Turkish   scholar   and   Professor   at   Bilkent   University   in   Ankara   and  
executive   director   of   the   Fulbright   Commission,   argued   that   the   Ottoman  
Empire  is  gone  and  with  it  its  people  and  that  there  will  only  be  one  Ottoman  
Empire  and  there  will  never  be  another  one577.  Aydinili  stated,  “the  AKP  believe  
that  the  Ottoman  Empire  has  left  a  vacuum  in  the  region,  and  that  this  vacuum  
is   still   there.   So,   that   space   can   be   filled.   Therefore,   calling   that   as   a  Neo-­
Ottoman  would  not  be  accurate.  Acknowledging  the  gap  or  space  in  the  region  
and  trying  to  fill  it,  is  a  pretty  much  a  Realist  policy”578.    
Furthermore,  Jahit  Tuz,  a  senior  advisor  to  Member  of  Parliament  and  
former  Deputy  Prime  Minister  Ali  Babacan,  argued  that  Turkey  aimed  to  build  a  
common   platform   with   Middle   Eastern   states   especially   that   both   share   a  
common   history,   religion   and   culture,   but   this   does   not   suggest,   at   all,   that  
Turkey  wants  to  control  the  Middle  East  and  revive  the  Ottoman  Empire579.  He  
added,  “The  Turkish  strategy  is  a  win-­win  one,  which  means  both  Turkey  and  
the  Middle  East  benefit  from  each  other’s  relations.  If  Turkey  was  pursuing  a  
Neo-­Ottoman   policy,   it  will   be   totally   against   its   interests   in  Europe   and   the  
West,  which  is  not  the  case  with  the  AKP”.  On  the  other  hand,  only  one  of  my  
interviewees,  Dr.  Serhat  Erkmen,  as  mentioned  earlier,  seemed  to  have  agreed  
with  the  neo-­Ottomanist  notion  suggesting  the  example  of  lifting  visa  restrictions  
between  Turkey  and  other  Middle  Eastern   states;;   however,   he  never   stated  
                                                                                                              576  Ibid.	  577  Ersel  Aydinili,  interviewed  by  author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  March  18,  2014.    578  Ibid.  579  Jahit  Tuz,  interviewed  by  author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  March  20,  2014.    
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directly  that  the  AKP  is  a  neo-­Ottomanist  government  or  one  that  is  following  a  
neo-­Ottomanist  foreign  policy  agenda580.        
If  we  pay  closer  attention  to  some  of  the  arguments  mentioned  earlier  in  
support  of  the  existence  of  the  neo-­Ottoman  AKP’s  ideology,  we  find  that  they  
have  been  ignoring  some  facts  that  may  suggest  otherwise.  Although  some  of  
the  speeches  and  images  presented  by  the  AKP  may  present  a  Smoking  Gun  
evidence  for  some  analysts  supporting  this  claim,  I  believe  that  this  can  be  the  
case   if   this  was   truly   reflected   in  AKP’s  policies.  For  example,  as  mentioned  
above  by  Behlul  Ozkan’s  arguments,  we   realize   that  Davutoglu  was  actually  
critical  of  the  Tanzimat  reforms  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  believed  that  Turkey  
should  not  mainly  rely  on  the  West  for  modernization  and  development,  but  this  
also  requires  opening  up  to  different  regional  and  global  lands  and  peoples  and  
certainly  not  only  with  former  Ottoman  provinces581.    
Erdogan’s   welcome   ceremony   for   President   Mahmud   Abbas   did   not  
present  an  Ottoman  image  as  many  have  argued.  In  fact,  the  warriors  standing  
in  the  picture  published  via  international  media  were  actually  representing  16  
different  empires  of  Turkish  history  and  certainly  not  all  of  them  belonging  to  
the   Ottoman   Empire   however   some   critics   focused   only   on   the   Ottoman  
costume.  This  can  rather  be  viewed  as  one  of  the  first  examples  of  the  AKP’s  
use   of   soft   power   aiming   at   reminding   the  world   the   uniqueness   of   Turkish  
history.   Another   example   regularly   mentioned   by   critics   was   Davutoglu’s  
references  of   the  Ottoman  past  and   its   importance.  Davutoglu  called   for   the  
importance  to  understand  their  Ottoman  past  and  stated  that  one  cannot  simply  
erase  it  from  history.  Being  proud  to  be  a  Muslim  makes  you  an  Islamist,  and  
                                                                                                              
580  Serhat  Erkmen,  interview  by  author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  March  21,  2014.    
581  Ozkan  and  Reynold,  “Turkish  Foreign  Policy  Under  Erdogan’s  Presidency”.	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recognizing  the  importance  of  the  Ottoman  history  of  Turkey  makes  you  a  neo-­
Ottomanist?   I   believe   that   Davutoglu   was   attempting   to   find   some   common  
grounds  between  Turkey  and  the  Middle  East  to  gain  access  for   influence  in  
that   region  and   to  enhance  bilateral   cooperation  by  promoting   the   idea  of   a  
common   history   and   religion.   The   neo-­Ottoman   argument   ignores   many  
important  aspects  including  the  roles  of  the  European  Union,  security  concerns,  
and  economic  interests.  The  previous  studies  based  on  this  argument  often  fall  
into  the  trap  of  ignoring  evidence  that  might  suggest  otherwise  and  of  choosing  
picking  data  that  support  the  primary  theoretical  hypothesis  instead.      
Overall,   this   notion   fails   to   explain   the   cause   behind   Turkish   foreign  
policy  change  towards  the  Middle  East  since  2002  and  shows  that  a  more  of  a  
holistic  approach  in  in  this  sense  is  very  much  needed.  I  agree  that  Turkey  is  
following  a  policy  seeking  more  regional  power  and  a  bigger  global  role,  but  to  
directly  associate  it  back  to  the  Ottoman  Empire  is  not  so  convincing,  at  least  
according   to   the   results   of   this   thesis.   According   to   the   evidence   found   by  
scholars  who  disagree  with  the  neo-­Ottoman  explanation,  empirical  evidence,  
and   primary   interview   data,   this   concept   fails   a   Hoop   Test   in   the   Process  
Tracing   method.   Evidence   of   the   Ottomanist   explanations   set   a   more  
demanding   standard   compared   to   the   Islamist   explanations.   Evidence   of   a  
Hoop   Test   usually   does   not   set   a   sufficient   criterion   for   accepting   the  
explanation,  but  it  establishes  a  necessary  criterion.    
However,   Ottomanist   hypotheses   must   “jump   through   the   hoop”   to  
remain  under  consideration  in  this  study.  Here,  it  is  a  very  similar  situation  to  
the  Islamist  explanations  in  the  previous  chapter,  but  the  main  difference  lay  
within  the  value  of  evidence  provided.  Although  the  value  and  significance  of  
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evidence  differ  to  that  of  the  Islamist  explanations,  interview  data  results  seem  
to   be   quite   similar.   All   interviewees,   except   one,   have   disagreed  with   these  
Ottomanist  explanations,  which  highly  contributed  to  their  failure.  The  failing  a  
Hoop  Test  means   that   the   concept   of  Neo-­Ottomanism   is   eliminated   in   this  
stage   of   the   process   due   to   its   weakness   and   incapability   of   providing   a  
comprehensive  explanation.  This  means  that  the  Ottomanist  notion  should  not  
remain  and  no  longer  be  considered  in  this  thesis.  Compared  to  the  Straw  in  
the   Wind   Test,   failing   a   Hoop   Test   has   a   much   stronger   implication   for  
competing  explanations.  The   implication   is   that   it   somewhat  strengthens   the  
likelihood  of  other  competing  explanations  so  far  in  this  study.  To  further  simplify  
and  clarify  this  process  of  examination,  the  below  table  summarizes  the  main  
points  of  the  neo-­Ottoman  explanation  and  its  value  in  the  thesis  so  far.    
Figure  1.  Assessment  of  the  neo-­Ottoman  explanation  in  Process  Tracing  
Explanation  2:    -­‐‑   Turkish  foreign  policy  change  towards  the  Middle  East  since  2002  
was  a  result  of  AKP’s  neo-­Ottomanism  and  aim  to  revive  the  
Ottoman  Empire.    
  
Evidence  constituting  this  explanation:    
   -­‐‑   Recognizing  the  importance  of  the  Ottoman  historical  ties  with  the  
Middle.  East  and  particularly  through  Ahmet  Davutoglu’s  work  and  
writings  (i.e.  Strategic  Depth).    -­‐‑   AKP  leaders’  “Ottomanist”  statements  and  references.  -­‐‑   Turkey  seeking  a  leadership  role.    
Process  of  examining  empirical  evidence  and  interview  data:  
   -­‐‑   Lack  of  consensus  in  defining  neo-­Ottomanism  =  definition  problem.  -­‐‑   History  cannot  be  ignored  or  deleted.  Instead  is  mainly  used  for  
establishing  common  grounds  for  further  cooperation.    -­‐‑   Ottomanist  references  and  statements  were  not  necessarily  reflected  
in  Turkish  foreign  policies.  Evidence  show  that  the  AKP  is  exploiting  
Turkey’s  greater  Ottoman  history  to  strengthen  Turkey’s  global  image  
and  prestige.    -­‐‑   Yes,  Turkey  is  certainly  seeking  a  leadership  role,  but  not  a  
hegemonic  one  that  aim  to  “control”  the  region.    
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-­‐‑   The  AKP  recognized  the  power  vacuum  in  the  region  and  aims  to  fill  
it  with  positive  contribution  seeking  regional  stability.    -­‐‑   Fail  to  explain  Turkey’s  openness  beyond  its  previously  Ottoman  
lands  i.e.  Africa,  South  America,  and  East  Asia.    -­‐‑   Majority  of  interviewees  disagree  with  the  neo-­Ottoman  hypotheses  
and  do  not  support  such  claim.  Only  one  interviewee  agreed  and  
supported  this  claim.    
Results:  
   -­‐‑   Evidence  set  a  more  demanding  standard.    -­‐‑   Simplified  and  overemphasized.    -­‐‑   Fail  to  provide  a  holistic  explanation.    -­‐‑   Does  not  contribute  to  the  study  any  further.    -­‐‑   Necessary,  but  not  sufficient  to  establish  causation  (Necessary  as  
Ottoman  Empire  represent  an  important  period  of  Turkish  history  and  
demonstrates  a  critical  part  of  Turkish-­Middle  East  relations  as  well  
as  Turkey’s  image  that  cannot  be  disregarded.  Therefore,  it  is  
necessary  to  consider  when  analyzing  the  nature  of  Turkish-­Middle  
East  relations,  but  it  has  not  been  sufficient  enough  to  explain  recent  
foreign  policy  change  and  evidence  was  proven  to  be  weak  and  not  
convincing).  -­‐‑   Therefore,  fails  a  Hoop  Test.    
  
Implication:    -­‐‑   Explanation  is  eliminated.  -­‐‑   Somewhat  Strengthens  rival  explanations  in  the  study.    
  
2.	  Turkish	  Domestic	  Politics:	  The	  Role	  of	  National	  Identity	  
  
This  second  part  of  the  chapter  aims  at  examining  the  significance  and  role  of  
national  identity  on  foreign  policy  change.  A  number  of  scholars  have  presented  
different  arguments  supporting  the  identity  approach  in  understanding  Turkish  
foreign  policy.  Therefore,  the  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  first  demonstrate  and  
analyse   those   arguments,   and   then   evaluate   and   test   their   plausibility   in  
answering  the  research  question.  Secondly,  is  to  examine  available  empirical  
data,  archival  documents,  and  others  to  be  able  to  raise  critical  questions  that  
such  explanations  might  not  have  considered  or  looked  at.    Here  the  researcher  
will  develop  a  critical  engagement,  where  a  number  of  questions  are  posed,  
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which   enables   the   researcher   to   identify   possible   limitations   of   those  
explanations.    The  third  step  will  analyse  possible  critics  and  other  contrasting  
arguments   that   might   contest   the   identity   approach   to   highlight   possible  
weaknesses.  In  addition,  the  final  step  will  be  applying  interview  data,  which  will  
enable   the   researcher   to   further  assess   the  sufficiency  and  necessity  of   the  
explanations   under   examination.   This   will   be   carried   out   through   exploring  
interviewees’  views  and  ideas  towards  such  explanation.    
This  part  of  the  chapter  will  be  divided  into  four  main  sections.  The  first  section  
will  attempt  to  show  the  complex  nature  of  identity  and  the  identity  crisis  that  is  
witnessed   in  Turkey.   It   is   important   for  us  to  understand  the  characterization  
and  components  of  the  Turkish  sub  national-­identities  before  we  go  into  further  
analysis  into  the  topic.  The  second  section  aims  at  looking  at  the  role  of  national  
identity  and  its  main  features.  It  will  engage  with  the  existing  debate  over  the  
classification  of  the  current  national  identity  represented  by  the  AKP.  The  third  
section  focuses  on  the  role  of  the  Islamist  and  neo-­Ottomanist  identity  and  the  
notion   of   the   “Islamic   Umma”.   In   addition,   the   fourth   section   analyses   such  
arguments  and   tries   to  understand  how   those  conclusions  were  established.  
The  purpose  of  section  four  is  to  submit  the  identity  approach  and  arguments  
to  the  process-­tracing  test.  This  will  be  done  by  referring  to  empirical  data  and  
evidence  as  well  as  interview  data  conducted  as  part  of  this  study.    
The   prime   argument   is   that   the   identity   approach   is   useful   and  
contributes  to  our  understanding  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  change  towards  the  
Middle  East.  However,   this  approach  does  not  explain  all  aspects  of  Turkish  
foreign   policy.   It   overlooks   the   roles   of   external   factors,   such   as   the  United  
States  and  the  European  Union.  Furthermore,  it  does  not  take  into  account  the  
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impact  of  the  constantly  changing  and  transformative  nature  of  the  international  
system  on  foreign  policy  making.  This  study  however  does  not  aim  to  engage  
with   the   agency-­structure   relation’s   debate.  What’s  more,   scholars   who   are  
influenced  by  realist  thinking  argued  that  external  security  threats  also  have  a  
great  impact  on  state’s  foreign  policy  behaviour.  Therefore,  arguments  within  
the  identity  approach  in  the  literature  on  Turkish  foreign  policy  seem  to  have  
not   been   able   to   explain   such   factors.  Unlike   the   neo-­Ottoman   explanation,  
discussed   in   the   previous   section,   results   show   that   the   identity   approach  
passes  a  Hoop  Test  of  process   tracing.  However,   this  does  not  mean  that   it  
confirms  it  as  the  primary  cause  behind  Turkish  foreign  policy  change.  Instead,  
it  only  affirms  relevance,  which  means  that  it  cannot  be  eliminated  so  far  as  it  
offers  some  useful  insights.  However,  it  is  a  very  highly  debated  topic  on  both  
the   international   relations’   theoretical   level   and   on   Turkish   foreign   policy  
studies.    
2.1	  The	  complex	  nature	  of	  Turkish	  identity/ies	  
  
It  is  important  to  first  understand  the  nature  of  Turkish  identity  and  what  makes  
it  so  unique  and  different  from  any  other  Arab  or  Muslim  countries  around  the  
World.  One  of  the  major  themes  of  Turkey’s  distinctiveness  in  the  region  is  that  
it  hosts  a   large  number  of  different  ethnic  and   religious   identities.  Due   to   its  
significant   geographical   location   and   long  history,   ethnic   identities   in  Turkey  
today  include;;  Turkic,  Kurd,  Arab,  Albanian,  Armenian,  Assyrian,  Azerbaijani,  
Greek,  Persian,  Bosnian,  Chechen,  Circassian,  and  many  more.  On  the  other  
hand,  there  are  different  religious  identities  as  well,  such  as  Muslims,  who  are  
the   overwhelming  majority   including  Sunnis,   Shias   and  Alawites,   as  well   as  
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Christians,  Jews,  and  others582.  However,  such  complex  nature  of  identities  in  
Turkey  has  been  a  source  of   identity   conflict  particularly  with  conservatives,  
seculars,  and  Kurds.  Therefore,  forming  a  unified  Turkish  national  identity  has  
been  one  of  the  most  difficult  tasks  so  far.    
Since   the   abolishment   of   the   Ottoman   Empire   and   its   Sultanate   and  
Caliphate,  and  the  creation  of  the  Turkish  republic  in  1923,  Kemal  Ataturk  tried  
to   build   a   new   identity   for   Turkey   and   the   Turkish   population.   He   aimed   at  
creating  a  new  monolithic  state  based  on  pro-­Western   identity  and   image583.  
Ataturk   believed   that   Turkey   could   only   become   a   modern   nation   state   by  
following   and   adopting  Western  modernization.   Therefore,   he   abolished   the  
Caliphate  System  and  introduced  new  reforms  -­  Atatürk  Devrimleri584.  Ataturk  
introduced   a   series   of   reforms   covering   all   political,   economic,   social,   and  
cultural   aspects.   The  aim  was   to   establish   a   new   form  of  Turkish   state   and  
national  identity.  This  included  the  abolishment  of  the  Arabic  language  with  the  
introduction  of  the  Latin  alphabet  instead.  Furthermore,  traditional  Islamic  hats  
such  as  the  Fez  and  Turban  were  abandoned  and  made  illegal  and  replaced  
with  Western   looking   hats   and   a   new   dress   code585.   Moreover,   the   Islamic  
traditional  calendar  was  also  changed  and  replaced  with  the  Christian/Georgian  
one,   and   the   Adhan   was   changed   from   Arabic   to   Turkish586.   In   addition,  
religious   schools   were   closed   and   the   Ministry   of   Religious   Endowments  
                                                                                                              582  Nigar  Karimova  and  Edward  Deverell,  “Minorities  in  Turkey,”  The  Swedish  Institute  of  
International  Affairs,  no.  19  (2001).    583  Ahmet  Kuru  and  Alfred  Stepan,  ed.,  Democracy,  Islam,  &  Secularism  in  Turkey  (Columbia  
University  Press,  2012),  79.  	  584  Toni  Alaranta,  National  and  State  Identity  in  Turkey:  The  Transformation  of  the  Republic's  
Status  in  the  International  System  (Rowman  &  Littlefield,  2015),  74.    585  Alper  Y.  Dede,  Islamism,  State  Control  Over  Religion  and  Social  Identity:  Turkey  and  
Egypt  (PhD  thesis,  Western  Michigan  University,  2008),  77-­78.    586  Ibid.    
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eliminated587.   All   this   aimed   at   changing   Turkey’s   traditional   identity   and  
creating  a  new  one  more  in  line  with  Europe  and  the  Western  World.    
However,  these  came  at  the  expense  of  all  religious  and  ethnic  identities.  
Ataturk  was  repressive  against  other   identity  groups  or  minorities   in  order   to  
ensure  the  survival  of  this  new  Turkish  identity  based  on  Western  image.  For  
example,  Kurdish  identity  was  disregarded  and  seen  as  a  major  threat  to  the  
unification   of   the   new   Kemalist   national   identity588.   However,   the   important  
question  to  be  asked  here,  was  Ataturk  successful   in  creating  a  new  Turkish  
identity?  I  believe  Ataturk  was  able  to  weaken  the  Islamic  traditional  elements  
of  the  Ottoman  past  and  other  ethnic  minorities,  but  he  was  not  able  to  totally  
eliminate  the  plural  nature  of  Turkish  identity.  In  other  words,  Ataturk  failed  to  
achieve  national  consensus.  Instead,  the  Kemalist  secular  identity  was  able  to  
survive  thanks  to  a  single  party  system  of  government  and  to  an  authoritarian  
rule589.  Therefore,  since   the  emergence  of   the  multiple  party  system,  Turkey  
saw  an  increasing  support  among  the  population  for  Islamist  parties  in  particular  
by  the  conservative  masses590.  The  Kemalist  identity  was  mainly  represented  
by  the  new  secular  elites,  bureaucrats  and  national  government.  Whereas  the  
majority   of   rural   and  middle   class   populations   did   not   totally   agree  with   this  
transformation.   Therefore,   there   was   a   noticeable   disregard   of   the   multiple  
identity  nature  of  Turkey  by  secularist  foreign  policy  makers  prior  to  2002,  who  
mainly  looked  to  the  West.    
                                                                                                              587  Ibid.    588  Mustafa  Akyol,  “The  Origin  of  Turkey's  Kurdish  Question:  An  Outcome  of  the  Breakdown  
of  the  Ottoman  Ancien  Régime,”  (MA  thesis,  Bogazı̇çı̇  University,  2006).      589  Zeyno  Baran,  Torn  Country:  Turkey  between  Secularism  and  Islamism  (Hoover  Institution  
Press,  2010),  29.    590  Ibid,  29-­51.    
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This   created   a   conflict   between   the   conservative   and   secular   identity  
groups.  Seculars,  believe  that  Ottoman  historical  and  religious  identity  has  been  
a   source   of   backwardness   and   chaos591,   and   that   Western   identity   and  
modernization   is   the   key   for   success,   whereas   conservatives   believe   that  
Muslim  Turks,  who   are   the   overwhelming  majority,   should   be   proud   of   their  
history   and   religion   and   for   who   they   are592.      This   conflict   reflected   in   both  
domestic  and  foreign  politics.  On  the  domestic  level,  there  have  been  an  intense  
protests  and  tensions  between  the  secular  establishment,  mainly  represented  
by  the  military  and  secular  elites,  and  conservative  political  parties  and  groups.  
For  example,  since   the  adoption  of   the  multiparty  system   in  1945,   there  has  
been   an   intense   conflict   between   right   wing   conservatives   and   secular  
nationalists.    
As   mentioned   in   chapter   three,   since   1945,   Islamist   parties   were  
gradually   gaining  more   support   and   power   in   Turkish   political   life.   This  was  
mainly   characterized   by   Necmettin   Erbakan   and   his   Milli   Gorus   followers.  
However,   the   rise  of   Islamist  parties  was  not  stable;;   it  went   through  a   lot  of  
struggle  and  pressure  by  the  secular  establishment.  As  a  result,  a  number  of  
Islamist   political   parties   were   abandoned   and   many   Islamist   activists   were  
imprisoned.  However,  Islamists  would  still  continue  their  efforts  and  growth  in  
influencing  Turkish  politics.  For  example,  Necmettin  Erbakan  had  to  establish  
a   number   of   parties,   one   after   the   other,   such   as  The  National  Order  Party  
(MNP),  The  National  Salvation  Party  (MSP),  The  Welfare  Party  (RP),  The  Virtue  
                                                                                                              591  M.  Hakan  Yavuz,  Toward  an  Islamic  Enlightenment:  The  Gulen  Movement  (Oxford  
University  Press,  2013),  205.    592  Etyen  Mahcupyan,  “Understanding  the  Transformation;;  AK  Party  Era  in  Turkey,”  Centre  for  




Party  (FP),  and  recently  The  Felicity  Party  (SP)593.  The  continuous  emergence  
of   Islamist  parties   in  Turkish  history  was  a   result  of   the  Kemalist  authorities’  
abolishment  and  abandonment  of   them  from   the  political   life.  However,  after  
numerous   efforts,   Erbakan   became   the   first   Islamist   Prime   Minister   to   rule  
Turkey  in  1996594.  However,  this  was  not  the  end  of  the  conflict,  Erbakan  did  
not  last  for  long,  and  was  forced  to  step  down  one  year  later  by  the  military.  A  
number   of   coups   took   place   and   the   conflict   became   very   fierce595   until   the  
establishment  and  victory  of  the  AKP  in  2002,  which  is  a  more  moderate  party  
coming  from  the  Islamist  root.    
On  the  other  hand,  the  most  dominant  identity  conflict  in  Turkey  has  been  
with  the  Kurds,  a  conflict  that  affected  Turkish  security  and  political  stability  for  
a  long  time.  The  Kurdish  problem  has  been  one  of  the  most  controversial  issues  
in  Turkish  history.  Kurdish  minorities  have  been  neglected  and  repressed  since  
the  creation  of  the  republic.  They  were  seen  as  a  threat  to  the  unity,  stability,  
and  national  security  of  Turkey596.  The  Kurds  who  live  inside  Turkish  territories  
did  not  enjoy  equal  rights  and  freedoms  until  lately,  which  is  still  a  debated  topic.  
As  a  result,  this  affected  the  Kurds  in  their  rights  for  political  representation,  in  
the   right   to   receive  an  education   in   their   language  and   in  other   fundamental  
rights  until  the  AKP  government  came  into  power.    
The  PKK,  a  Kurdish  militant  group,  an  internationally  recognized  terrorist  
group,  intensified  the  conflict,  carrying  out  a  number  of  bombings  and  attacks  
                                                                                                              593  Birol  A.  Yesilada,  “The  Virtue  Party,”  in  Political  Parties  in  Turkey,  (Routledge,  2013),  62-­
69.    594  BBC,  “Necmettin  Erbakan,  Turkey's  first  Islamist  PM,  dies,”  BBC  News,  February  27,  
2011,  accessed  October  15,  2015,  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­europe-­12590773.      595  Aljazeera,  “Timeline:  A  history  of  Turkish  coups,”  Aljazeera  News,  April  4,  2012,  accessed  
October  15,  2015,  http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2012/04/20124472814687973.html.  	  596  Evin  Cheikosman,  “Turkey’s  violations  to  human  rights  towards  Kurds:  A  hindrance  on  
admittance  to  the  EU,”  Ekurd  Daily,  January  3,  2013,  accessed  October  15,  2015,  
http://ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2013/1/turkey4388.htm.      
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inside   Turkey597.   The   Kurdish   minority   issue   and   the   PKK   have   had   direct  
impact   on   both   the   domestic   and   foreign   policies   of   Turkey   for   a   long   time.  
Turkey  had  to  deal  with  this  security  problem  engaging  in  military  cooperation  
and  diplomatic  efforts  with  some  of  its  bordering  neighbours  i.e.  Iran,  Iraq  and  
Syria.  Domestically,  the  AKP  has  given  more  rights  to  Kurdish  minorities  than  
ever  before,  compared  to  previous  governments598.  This  is  still  one  of  the  most  
controversial   issues   in   Turkey.   The   Kurdish   issue   represents   one   aspect   of  
Turkey’s  identity  crisis.    
2.2	  National	  identity	  and	  the	  change	  of	  elite	  structures	  	  
  
Although  Turkey  has  a  great  mixture  of  ethnic  and  religious  social  identities,  a  
number   of   scholars   argued   that   Turkish   foreign   policy   making   has   been  
influenced  by  the  national  identity  of  the  ruling  elites.  Furthermore,  it  has  been  
argued  that  the  change  in  Turkish  foreign  policy  since  2002  has  been  the  result  
of   the  change   in  elite   structures  and  national   identity.  This  did  not   come  up  
suddenly  in  2002  with  the  victory  of  the  AKP,  but  was  part  of  an  ongoing  process  
that   was   taking   place   during   Ozal’s   period599.   During   this   time,   a   new   elite  
started  to  emerge  represented  by  powerful  Anatolian  businessmen600.  The  elite  
structure  since  the  creation  of  the  republic  was  dominated  by  the  Secular  elites  
who   controlled   key  positions   and  had  great   economic   power   in   the   country.  
However,  another  social  group  started  to  emerge  contributing  to  the  change  of  
elite  structures  in  Turkey.  According  to  Kamil  Yilmaz  in  his  work  The  Emergence  
                                                                                                              597  Yonah  Alexander,  Edgar  H.  Brenner,  and  Serhat  Tutuncuoglu  Krause,  eds.,  Turkey:  
Terrorism,  Civil  Rights,  and  the  European  Union  (Routledge,  2008),  8.    598  Cengiz  Gunes,  Welat  Zeydanlioglu,  The  Kurdish  Question  in  Turkey:  New  Perspectives  on  
Violence,  Representation  and  Reconciliation  (Routledge,  2013).  	  599  Taptuk  Emre  Erkoç,  “Economy  and  Democratization:  Turgut  Ozal  era  in  Turkey,”  Journal  
of  Business  Economics  and  Political  Science  3,  no.6  (2014):  55-­74.      600  Ibid.    
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and  Rise  of  Conservative  Elite  in  Turkey  (2009),  “Turkey  since  the  1980s  that  
have  paved  the  way  for  the  emergence  and  rise  of  a  “new  social  group,”  that  is,  
a  religiously  more  conservative  elite  which  can  also  be  defined  by  an  amalgam  
of   “Islamic   and  modern”601.   Yilmaz   argued   that  Ozal’s   economic   and   liberal  
reforms  gave  rise  to  a  new  middle  class,  which  contributed  to  the  existence  of  
the  current  AKP’s  government602.  For  him,  the  AKP  is  a  product  of  a  process  of  
changing  elite  structure  that  started  during  Ozal’s  rule.    
Hasan   Kosebalaban,   a   prominent   Turkish   scholar,   presented   a   very  
interesting   study   on   Turkish   Foreign   Policy:   Islam,   Nationalism,   and  
Globalization   (2011).   Influenced   by   constructivist   theoretical   framework   of  
International  Relations,  he  explored  how  Turkey’s  competing  national  identities  
had  a  major  impact  on  Turkish  foreign  policy  making603.  The  study  covers  the  
historical  Turkish  foreign  policy  development  and  the  different  national  identities  
that  played  a  role  in  such  development.  Kosebalaban  developed  a  very  useful  
graph  showing  the  way  in  which  Turkish  politics  and  foreign  policy  historically  














                                                                                                              601  Kamil  Yilmaz,  “The  Emergence  and  Rise  of  Conservative  Elite  in  Turkey,”  Insight  Turkey  
11,  no.2,  (2009):  114.    602  Ibid,  121.    603  Hasan  Kosebalaban,  Turkish  Foreign  Policy:  Islam,  Nationalism,  and  Globalization  
(Palgrave  Macmillan,  2011).  	  
251	  	  
Figure  2.  Hasan  Kosebalaban’s  Four  Major  Identities  in  Turkish  Politics  604    
  
In  a  conference  held  by  the  INSS  (The  Institute  for  National  Security  Studies)  
in  November  2012,  Kosebalaban  stated,  “Turkish  identities  are  influenced  by  
two   sets   of   questions;;   the   dilemma   or   discourse   between   Islamism   and  
Secularism,  and  Liberalism  and  Nationalism”605.  For  him,  the  vertical  line  on  the  
graph  demonstrate  the  economic  side  where  liberalists  seek  to  make  Turkey  
an  economic  global  player,  whereas  nationalists  want  to  limit  access  to  global  
market  and  maintain  economy  it  under  state  control606.  On  the  top  half  of  the  
graph,  Kosebalaban  located  on  the  left  Islamic  Liberals  and  on  the  Left  Secular  
Liberals.  Islamic  Liberals  are  the  ones  who  want  Turkey  to  be  a  global  economic  
and  political  player,  while  maintaining  their  Islamic  identity.  Whereas,  Secular  
Liberals  who  are   living  a   secular   lifestyle  and  maintain   secular   ideals  of   the  
republic  by  Ataturk,  but  also  want  Turkey  to  become  a  global  player.    
                                                                                                              604  Ibid,  8.    605  Hasan  Kosebalaban,  “Turkey  and  the  Middle  East:  Interests  or  Identity?,”  INSS  -­  The  
Institute  for  National  Security  Studies’  Conference,  November  14-­15,  2015,  accessed  October  
15,  2015,  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o2e6iu_QZGo.    606  Ibid.	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On  the  other  hand,  on  the  bottom  half  of  the  graph  he  located  the  Islamic  
Nationalists   and   Secular   Nationalists.   Islamic   Nationalists   represented   by  
Islamist  political  parties   in  Turkish  political  history  who  are   less  supportive  of  
liberal  and  Western  values.  Whereas,  Secular  Nationalists  who  are   the  hard  
line  Kemalists  who  seek  to  limit  Turkey’s  global  role  and  believe  that  it  should  
not  participate  in  regional  and  international  affairs.  Furthermore,  Kosebalaban  
in   his  work   developed   another   table   that   helps   further   explaining   the   above  
graph.  The  table  individuates  where  different  Turkish  political  parties  fit  in  and  
their  foreign  policy  agenda.    
  
Figure  3.  Turkey’s  syncretic  ideologies:  present  and  historical  representative  




Kosebalaban   Locates   the   AKP   under   the   Islamic   Liberalist   identity   group,  
arguing  that  this  is  due  to  their  assertive  globalist  foreign  policy  and  the  AKP  
government’s  interest  in  the  integration  with  Europe  as  well  as  the  increase  of  
                                                                                                              607  Kosebalaban,  8.    
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interest   in   neighbouring   countries.   He   added,   “Islamic   liberalism   seeks  
integration  within  liberal  Western  institutions  with  an  authentic  Islamic  identity  
and   assertive   diplomacy”608.   Kosebalaban   separates   AKP   from   previous  
Islamist  parties.  He  located  Islamist  parties  namely  the  National  Salvation  Party  
(MSP),   The  Welfare   Party   (RP),   and   Felicity   Party   (SP)   under   the   Islamist  
Nationalism.   This   is   due   to   their   great   pro-­Islamic   policies   and   support   for  
integration   with   the   Muslim   World   under   Turkish   leadership.   However,  
according  to  him,  both  Islamic  Nationalists  and  Islamic  Liberalists  share  the  fact  
that   they   both   lay   “Islamic   Sensitivity   at   the   centre   of   their   identity”609.   The  
author’s   main   argument   is   that   Turkish   foreign   policy   has   been   shaped   by  
different   contesting   national   identity   groups   in   Turkish   modern   history.  
Kosebalaban’s  work  is  very  interesting  and  useful  in  minimizing  the  struggle  for  
researchers  in  understanding  the  role  of  national  identity  and  the  different  types  
that  exist  in  Turkey.    
   Similarly,   Yucel   Bozdaglioglu   in   his   book  Turkish   Foreign   Policy   and  
Turkish  Identity:  A  Constructivist  Approach  (2003)  argued  that  Turkish  foreign  
policy  has  been  shaped  by  national  identity.  For  example,  the  Turkish  Western  
identity,  since   the  years  after   the  War  of   Independence,  has  been   the  major  
character   of   the   republic’s   foreign   policy   dimension610.   His   work   further  
analyses  the  important  roles  of  Islamic,  National,  and  Western  conceptions  in  
Turkish   domestic   politics,   criticizing   the   rational-­choice   analysis   by   some  
scholars  in  the  literature611.  Bozdaglioglu  suggests  that  Turkish  foreign  policy  
                                                                                                              608  Ibid.    609  Kosebalaban,  Op  cit.    610  Yucel  Bozdaglioglu,  Turkish  Foreign  Policy  and  Turkish  Identity:  A  Constructivist  Approach  
(Routledge,  2004),  46.    611  Ibid.	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clearly  depends  on  the  distribution  of  power  between  Secularists  and  Islamists.  
In   another   article   presented   by   the   author   entitled  Modernity,   Identity,   and  
Turkish   Foreign   Policy   (2008),   Bozdaglioglu   argued   that   the   identity   power  
struggle  between  Secularists  and  Islamists  in  Turkish  history  has  been  affecting  
the   foreign   policy   direction612.   For   example,   Seculars   were   able   to   build  
institutions   that   gave   them   more   power   and   protection   mainly   through   the  
military,  judicial,  and  elite  structures  and  therefore  were  able  to  shape  Turkish  
foreign  policy   for  a   long   time.  However,  with   the  evolution  and  expansion  of  
political   Islam,   Turkey’s   foreign   policy   witnessed   some   changes   particularly  
during   the  1980s  and  1990s  with   the   rise  of  Necmettin  Erbakan  and  Turgut  
Ozal.   Furthermore,   with   the   AKP’s   success   in   weakening   the   secular  
establishment   and  power,  mainly   through   the  military,   Turkish   foreign   policy  
witnessed  a  dramatic   change.  Therefore,   the  power   struggle  between   those  
identity  groups,  have  been  central  to  Turkish  foreign  policy  making.    
   In  an  interesting  seminar  attended  by  the  researcher  on  21st  of  October  
2014   titled   Turkey’s   Foreign   Policy:   A   Middle   Power’s   Quest   for   Status,  
organized  by  Bilkent  International  Security  and  Strategy  Seminar  (BISSS)  held  
at  the  Bilkent  Hotel,  Dr.  Ozgur  Ozdamar,  a  Professor  of  International  Relations  
at  Bilkent  University,  presented  important  data  and  findings  from  his  project  on  
“Turkey’s   Foreign  Policy  Roles:  An  Empirical   Approach”,   in   association  with  
TUBITAK   (The  Scientific   and  Technological  Research  Council   of  Turkey)613.  
One  of  Dr.  Ozdamar’s  central  themes  in  the  project  was  to  explore  and  analyse  
the  attitudes  of  social  elites   towards  Turkish   foreign  policy  roles.  The  project  
                                                                                                              612  Hasan  Kosebalaban,  “Modernity,  Identity,  and  Turkish  Foreign  Policy”,  Insight  Turkey  10,  
no.1  (2008):  55-­76.    613  Ozgur  Ozdamar,  “Turkey’s  Foreign  Policy:  A  Middle  Power’s  Quest  for  Status,”  (Seminar  
presentation,  Bilkent  Hotel,  Ankara,  Turkey,  October  21,  2014).    
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included  50  elite  interviews  were  conducted  in  different  Turkish  cities,  such  as  
Ankara,  Istanbul,  Izmir,  Erzurum,  Antalya,  and  Diyarbakir.  Foreign  policy  elite  
interviews  also  included  officials  from  the  bureaucracy,  academia,  businesses,  
civil  society,  and  media.  Dr.  Ozdamar  argued  that  there  were  three  main  roles  
that   those   elites   identified   with   Turkish   foreign   policy   and   they   are;;   “model  
country”,  “regional  power”,  and  “bridge  country”614.  For  him,  Turkish  elites  are  
concerned  with  regional  and  local  roles  more  than  international  or  global  ones.  
Such  elites’   ideas  can  be  seen  as  an   important   factor   that  could  have   led  to  
Turkish  increasing  regional  role.    
Furthermore,  O.  Bahadir  Dincer  in  his  article  Transformation  of  Political  
Identity  in  Turkish  Foreign  Policy  (2011)  stated,  “Transformation  under  way  in  
Turkish   foreign   policy,   one   that   is   inextricably   linked   to   the   change   in   the  
country’s   identity”615.  He  argued  that  previously  Turkey   identified   itself   in   line  
with  the  Western  world  and  therefore  gave  very  little  attention  to  the  Arab  world,  
whereas   since   the   AKP   took   power,   a  more   inclusive   perception   of   identity  
emerged.  This  was  seen   in   its   influence  on  Turkey’s   international   stabilizing  
role,  for  example616.  Therefore,  by  Turkey’s  re-­identifying  itself  in  relations  with  
its  neighbouring  and  Islamic  region,  a  more  active  foreign  policy  towards  the  
Middle  East  emerged.    
   Furthermore,  in  an  interesting  PhD  thesis  entitled  Identity  Security  and  
Turkish  Foreign  Policy   in  The  Post  Cold  War  Period:  Relations  with   the  EU,  
Greece,   and   the   Middle   East   (2010)   by   Enver   Gulseven,   suggested   that   a  
                                                                                                              614  Ibid.    615  Osman  Bahadir  Dincer,  “Transformation  of  Political  Identity  in  Turkish  Foreign  Policy,”  
Turkish  Weekly,  September  27,  2011,  accessed  October  3,  2015,  
http://www.turkishweekly.net/2011/09/27/comment/transformation-­of-­identity-­in-­turkish-­
foreign-­policy/.    616  Ibid.	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constructivist   approach   is  more   helpful   for   us   to   understand   Turkish   foreign  
policy  compared  to  the  rationalist  analysis.  The  author  argued  that  Turkey  has  
had  a  major  problem  in  having  an  insecure  identity,  which  led  to  the  fluctuation  
and   instability  of   foreign  policy  making617.  He  added,   “The  extent  of  debates  
and  the  existence  of  a  strong  opposition  to  change  in  both  domestic  and  foreign  
policy   issues,  namely   the  adoption  of  EU-­related   reforms  and  a  new  Cyprus  
policy,  was  actually  a  reflection  of  Turkey‘s  contested  identity.  Due  to  a  lack  of  
consensus  on  its  state  identity,  Turkish  politics  have  been  ambivalent  and  the  
resulting   foreign   policy   preferences   have   been   unstable”618,   suggesting   that  
there  never  has  been  national  identity  consensus,  which  has  directly  affected  
Turkish   foreign   policies.   Such   discussions   on   the   role   of   identity   in   Turkish  
foreign   policy   are   very   much   complicated   due   to   the   plural   nature   of   “sub-­
national”   identities  who   have   also   been   affecting  Turkish   politics   particularly  
with  the  recent  reforms  and  democratization  process.  However,  this  approach  
led  by  constructivist  thinking  will  have  to  be  further  examined  in  the  following  
sections  and  tested  to  understand  the  level  accuracy  and  relevance  it  presents  
in  trying  to  understand  Turkish  foreign  policy  change  in  the  ten  years  between  
2002  and  2012.    
2.3	  Islamic	  identity	  and	  the	  “global	  Umma”	  
  
A  number  of  scholars  who  have  been  influenced  by  the  constructivist  theoretical  
framework  have  suggested  that  AKP’s  Islamist  identity  is  related  to  the  Islamic  
“Umma”   (All  Muslims)   and   that   this   gives   it   a   sense   of   duty   towards   it.   For  
                                                                                                              617  Enver  Gulseven,  “Identity  Security  and  Turkish  Foreign  Policy  in  The  Post  Cold  War  
Period:  Relations  with  the  EU,  Greece,  and  the  Middle  East,”  (PhD  thesis,  Brunel  University,  
2010).      618  Ibid.	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example,   Osman   Gultekin   (2015)   in   his   work,   relying   on   the   constructivist  
theoretical   school   of   thought,   stated,   “A   constructivist   ‘ummah’   identity  
approach   serving   for   realist   purposes   is   found   to   be   the   most   accurate  
explaining   theory   for   the   transformation   of   the   Turkish   foreign   policy”619.  
Gultekin   argued   that   since   the  AKP   took  power   in   2002,   a   new  constructed  
“Umma  image”  in  a  pan-­Islamist  contextual  framework  in  foreign  relations  has  
taken  place.  Furthermore,  he  presented  Ahmet  Davutoglu’s  Strategic  Depth  as  
the  main  source  behind  building  such  image  and  foreign  policy.  His  work  gives  
us  some  insights  on  alternative  explanations  to  the  realist  or  pragmatic  ones.  
For  Gultekin,  the  constructivist  explanation  is  more  inclusive  and  is  successful  
in  taking  into  account  the  domestic  elite’s  identities  and  interests.    
   Alexander  Murinson   (2012)   in   his   work  Turkish   Foreign   Policy   in   the  
Twenty  First  Century,  argued  that  the  AKP  has  been  pursuing  a  neo-­Ottoman  
foreign   policy,   which   gave   a   central   place   of   Islam   in   the   foreign   policy  
agenda620.  He  also  tend  to  look  mat  Davutoglu’s  work  as  a  source  behind  AKP’s  
vision  and   the  way   it   identifies   itself   in   relation   to   the   Islamic  Umma  and   the  
pride  of  its  heritage  and  tradition.  For  him,  the  identification  of  self  (Turkey)  as  
part  of  the  Muslim  Umma  and  one  that  has  great  responsibility  towards  it,  due  
to   Turkey’s   Islamic   history   and   rule,   have   been   a   significant   source   behind  
Turkey’s  Middle  Eastern  policies  and  foreign  policy  transformation  in  general621.  
Here  an  emphasis  has  been  given  more  on  the  Islamic  “Ottoman”  identity  of  the  
                                                                                                              619  Osman  Gultekin,  “Inquiry  on  Pan-­Islamist  Feature  of  the  Recent  Turkish  Foreign  Policy  
with  Constructivist  Perspective,”  (ECPR  General  Conference,  de  Montreal  University,  August  
26-­29,  2015),  p.  1,  accessed  October  3,  2015,  
http://ecpr.eu/Events/PaperDetails.aspx?PaperID=26296&EventID=94.      620  Alexander  Murinson,  “Turkish  Foreign  Policy  in  the  Twenty  First  Century,”  Mid  East  
Security  and  policy  Studies,  no.97  (2012):  1.    621  Ibid,  12.	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AKP.  Therefore,  this  generates  not  only  a  Pan-­Islamist  foreign  policy,  but  also  
a  neo-­Ottoman  one.    
   Furthermore,   in   an   interesting   study   by  William   Joseph  Bullen   (2009)  
examined  the  role  of  national  identity  in  affecting  Turkish  foreign  policy  making.  
Bullen  argued  that  the  AKP’s  “neo-­Ottomanist”  identity,  “one  that  blend  between  
modern,  secular,  and  Western  customs  with   traditional  Ottoman  and   Islamic  
culture”622.  He  added,  “As  a  result  of  the  historical  aspirations  and  effectiveness  
of  neo-­Ottomanism,  the  neo-­Ottoman  identity  grew  until  it  became  solidified  in  
2002  with  the  election  of  the  AKP  as  the  dominant  political  party.  As  the  neo-­
Ottoman  identity  was  consolidated  as  the  dominant  national  identity  in  Turkey,  
this  change   in   identity  paralleled  a  change   in  Turkey’s   foreign  policy”623.  His  
study   looked   at   the   Turkish   increased   political   and   economic   relations   with  
neighbouring  Arab  countries  and  the  view  of  being  a  regional  leader.  However,  
the  author  stressed  a  number  of  important  points  on  the  limits  and  weaknesses  
of  his  study  and  the  notion  of  identity  in  understanding  Turkish  foreign  policy,  
which  will  be   further  examined  as  part  of   the   test  on   the   identity  explanation  
later  on.    
   Moreover,  after  the  Arab  Spring,  a  number  of  scholars  also  have  tried  to  
understand  Turkey’s   foreign  policy  position   towards   the  Middle  East   from  an  
identity  approach.  Hossein  Mofidi  Ahmadi  (2015)  highlighted  the  central  role  of  
Turkish   national   identity   in   shaping   Turkish   foreign   policy   towards   the   Arab  
Spring.  He  stated,  “Turkey’s  foreign  policy  actions  following  the  developments  
that  have  come   to  be  collectively   known  as   the  Arab  Spring  arose   from   the  
                                                                                                              622  William  Joseph  Bullen,  “The  Dynamic  between  National  Identity  and  Foreign  Policy  in  
Turkey,”  (MA  thesis,  Naval  Post  Graduate  School,  Monterey,  2009):  5.    623  Ibid,  72.	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country’s   identity   components,   as   has   been   the   case   with   other   regional  
countries”624.   The   author   explained   that   there   are   three   main   “identity  
components”   to   be   taken   into   account,   the   Turkish,   Islamic,   and   European  
“layers”.  The  Turkish  layer  of  the  state’s  identity,  represent  the  link  between  the  
developments  in  Syria  and  Iraq  and  their  impact  on  the  Kurdish  question,  which  
is  part  of  the  Turkish  identity  problem.  Ahmadi  argued,  “Ankara  has  been  very  
intent  on  introducing  a  new  concept  of  being  Turkish,  which  would  also  include  
the  Kurdish  minority  in  the  country.  This  process,  which  has  come  to  be  known  
as  “normalization  of  the  Kurdish  problem,”  faced  a  serious  challenge  due  to  the  
sudden  breakout  of  regional  developments,  which  have  been  described  as  Arab  
Spring”625.    
Secondly,  on  the  Islamic   layer  of  Turkish   identity,  Ahmadi  argued  that  
Turkey   feels   alarmed   about   the   Iranian   Shia   influence   in   the   region,   highly  
critical  of  Western  policies  in  the  Middle  East,  and  its  support  for  a  democratic  
transformation  in  those  countries  through  the  support  of  Islamist  figures.  The  
third  layer  of  Turkish  identity  affecting  Turkish  foreign  policy  towards  the  Arab  
Spring   has   been   its   European   identity.   The   author   suggests   that   this   was  
evident  with  Turkey’s  alliance  with  a  number  of  European  countries  in  trying  to  
remove  the  Assad  regime.  On  the  other  hand,  Ahmadi  argued,  “Ankara  saw  its  
own  interests  dependent  on  making  efforts  to  help  establish  more  democratic  
and   more   broad-­based   governments   in   its   surroundings.   In   fact,   from   the  
viewpoint   of   Turkish   officials,   absence   of   broad-­based   nation-­states   in   the  
                                                                                                              624  Hossein  Mofidi  Ahmadi,  “Turkey’s  foreign  policy  after  the  Arab  Spring:  An  Identity-­Based  
Approach,”  Iran  Review,  accessed  October  4,  2015,  
http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Turkey-­s-­Foreign-­Policy-­After-­the-­Arab-­Spring-­
An-­Identity-­Based-­Approach.htm.    625  Ibid.    
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region   is   one   of   the   most   important   factors   that   have   caused   a   wide   gap  
between  Shias  and  Sunnis  in  the  Arab  Middle  East”626.  Therefore,  for  him,  an  
identity-­based   approach   is   the   best   way   to   understand   Turkey’s   policies  
towards  the  Middle  East  subsequent  to  the  developments  of  the  Arab  uprisings.    
2.4	  Putting	  the	  identity	  approach	  and	  explanations	  to	  the	  test	  
  
This   part   of   the   chapter   aims   to   identify   the   value   of   the   identity-­based  
explanations   in   understanding   Turkish   foreign   policy,   as   well   as   applying  
interview  data   that  enable   the   researcher   to   identify  possible  weaknesses   to  
help  determine  the  explanation's  contributory  value.  
From   this   research   and   evidence   provided   above,   it   is   important   to  
understand  that  Turkish  identity  plays  an  important  role  in  shaping  foreign  policy  
making.   However,   does   this   identity   approach   help   explain   all   aspects   of  
Turkish   foreign  policy?  And   is   the  only   source  behind  Turkish   foreign  policy  
change   towards   the  Middle   East   since   2002?   There   are   some   limits   to   this  
explanation  and  approach  that  weaken  its  plausibility  and  comprehensiveness  
in  explaining  the  reason  behind  Turkish  foreign  policy  not  only  since  2002,  but  
before?  This  section  of  the  chapter  aims  at  examining  the  effectiveness  of  this  
approach  as  an  explanation  through  the  use  of  different  empirical  evidence  and  
interview  data  collected  during  the  fieldwork.  It  will  show  that  although  the  notion  
of   identity   offers   important   insights   in   explaining   certain   foreign   policy  
outcomes,  it  is  still  limited  due  to  a  number  of  reasons.  First  of  all,  there  is  no  
consensus   over   defining   Turkish   national   identity.   Scholars   have   offered  
different  characterizations  of  Turkish  identity,  such  as  Islamist-­Liberal  identity,  
                                                                                                              626  Ibid.  	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Islamist  identity,  Neo-­Ottoman  identity,  and  an  identity  that  has  three  different  
Turkish,  Islamist,  and  European  layers.  Secondly,  the  identity  explanations  fail  
to   recognise   the   important   roles   of   some   external   factors,   such   as   the   US,  
NATO,  UN,  and  the  European  Union  in  affecting  some  foreign  policy  decisions.  
In   addition,   it   has   been   criticised   by   scholars  who   argue   that   this   approach  
ignores   the   rational   and   pragmatic   side   of   Turkish   foreign   policy   particularly  
through  Turkey’s  economic  desires.    
   As   analysed   above,   there   have   been   a   number   of   different  
interpretations  on  the  AKP’s  national  identity  and  its  effects  on  Turkish  foreign  
policy.  Four  main  arguments  within   the   identity  debate  have  been   influential.  
The   first,   suggests   that   the   AKP   identity   is   an   “Islamic-­Liberal”   or   a  
“Conservative-­Democratic”  one.  That   supports  democratic  principles   through  
adopting  the  Copenhagen  criteria;;  seek  a  global  role,  assertive,  and  opening  
up   to  new  zones  of   influence  particularly   in   the  Middle  East  and   the   Islamic  
world  in  general.  The  second  argument  looks  at  the  Islamist  historical  nature  of  
the  AKP’s  leaders  and  the  government’s  increasing  interest  in  the  Islamic  world,  
describing  the  party  as  one  that  holds  an  “Islamist”  identity.  The  third  argument  
suggest  that  Turkish  foreign  policy  since  2002  has  been  shaped  by  the  AKP  
“neo-­Ottomanist”   identity,   which   has   a   mixture   of   both   western,   liberal   and  
Islamic  elements  all  at  the  same  time.  The  fourth  argument  suggests  that  there  
are  actually  three  different  components  of  Turkish  identity  that  affect  its  foreign  
policy  making,  specifically  the  Turkish,  Islamic,  and  European  identity   layers.  
This   represents   a   lack   of   consensus   and   unified   understanding   of   Turkish  
national   identity   in   the   literature.   Scholars   who   use   identity   to   understand  
foreign  policy  in  Turkey  have  characterized  the  AKP  and  the  current  national  
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identity  differently.  As  a  result,  this  led  to  different  conclusions  and  explanations  
within  the  identity  approach  on  its  own,  which  further  contribute  to  the  complex  
variety  of  answers  available  in  the  literature.    
   Islam  seems  to  be  the  central  element  in  Turkish  current  national  identity  
identified  in  the  literature.  However,  this  was  also  criticised  by  some  scholars  
who  disagree  not  with  the  existence  of  such  identity  component,  but  with  the  
degree  of   its   impact.  For  example,  Frevzi  Sarac   in  his  work  Turkish  Foreign  
Policy  in  Theory  and  Practice  (2010)  argued  that  the  notion  of  Islam  in  Turkish  
national  identity  does  not  actually  gives  us  a  complete  picture  or  useful  insights.  
Sarac  stated,  “Despite  the  past  relations  of  AKP  leaders,  I  believe  that  Islam  
does  not  play  a  decisive  role  in  TFP.  Turkey  is  not  only  strengthening  relations  
with   Iran,  Syria,  and   Iraq,  but  also  with   its  other  neighbours   like  Greece  and  
Armenia.   Moreover,   as   Turkey   wants   to   consolidate   its   relationship   with  
Organization   of   the   Islamic   Conference,   it   also   wants   to   consolidate   its  
relationship  with  European  Union,  or  wants  to  be  more  influential  in  the  United  
Nations”627.   The   author   presented   a   very   useful   example   focusing   on   the  
number  of  Turkish  formal  visits  to  Western  and  Islamic  states  in  order  to  obtain  
some  useful  information  that  could  tell  us  something.  Sarac  argued  that  in  2009  
the  Turkish   foreign  minister   at   that   time,  Ahmet  Davutoglu,  made   93   formal  
international  visits.  47  of  them  were  made  to  European  Countries,  whereas  22  
to  the  Middle  East  and  15  to  Asia,  and  9  to  the  US628.  Such  statistical  analysis,  
to   him,   provides   clear   evidence   that   Islam   is   not   the  main  derive  of  Turkish  
foreign  policy.    
                                                                                                              627  Frevzi  Sarac,  “Turkish  Foreign  Policy  in  Theory  and  Practice,”  Washington  Review,  2010,  
accessed  October  4,  2015,  http://www.thewashingtonreview.org/articles/turkish-­foreign-­policy-­
in-­theory-­and-­practice.html.    628  Ibid.  
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What’s  more,  Faruk  Yalvac  in  his  work  Approaches  to  Turkish  Foreign  
Policy:  A  Critical  Realist  Analysis  (2014)  argued  that  scholars  who  used  identity  
approach  “fail  to  discuss  how  identities  are  translated  into  state  power,  nor  is  it  
so   clear   that   identity-­based   foreign   policy   is   based   less   on   geopolitical  
considerations  leading,  for  instance,  to  different  policies  when  and  if  security  of  
a  state  is  at  stake”629.  The  author  questioned  if  Turkey  was  starting  to  follow  a  
less  state-­interested  policy  today  due  to  its  changing  social  identity?    
Another  major  weakness  comes  from  the  fact  that  identity  explanations  
overlook   the   role  of   the   changing   international   environment  and   the  existing  
external   powerful   players   that   affect   Turkey’s   foreign   policy   making.   For  
example,   in  many   occasions  Prime  Minister   Ahmet  Davutoglu   asserted   that  
Turkey  is  adapting  to  the  changing  international  environment  and  system  and  
becoming  an  active  international  player.  Since  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union  
and  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  the  international  system  changed  from  being  a  
bipolar   system  dominated  by  The  USSR  and   the  US,   to  a  unipolar  with   the  
United  States  as  the  only  great  power  as  well  as  the  emergence  of  the  so  called  
“New  World  Order”.  This  transformed  the  international  system  and  had  a  major  
effect  on  different  states  including  Turkey.  It   is  evident  how  Turkey  sought  to  
change  its  foreign  policy  position  and  become  more  assertive  after  the  end  of  
the  Cold  War.    
Similarly,  Turkey  has  been  affected  by  the  transformation  and  changes  
that   took   place   in   the   international   system   since   then.   For   some   scholars,  
including  Ahmet  Davutoglu,   think   the   transformation   in  Turkish   foreign  policy  
                                                                                                              629  Faruk  Yalvac,  “Approaches  to  Turkish  Foreign  Policy:  A  Critical  Realist  Analysis,”  Taylor  &  




has   been   a   response   to   the   changes   in   the   international   system   and  
environment.  In  a  conference  held  in  the  Centre  for  Strategic  and  International  
Studies  (CSIS),  on  February  10,  2012  in  Washington,  Davutoglu  explained  how  
the  international  system  since  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  have  had  a  great  impact  
on  both  Turkish  domestic  and   foreign  policy  making630.  He  stated   that   there  
were  three  main  international  “earthquakes”  that  affected  Turkish  domestic  and  
foreign  policies.  The   first  was   in  1991  with   the  collapse  of   the  Soviet  Union,  
changing   the   geo-­political   structure   with   the   emergence   of   new   states   and  
transformations  taking  place   in  Eastern  Europe,  Caucasia,  and  Central  Asia.  
This  created  for  Turkey  the  need  to  reassess  its  international  position  and  roles.  
The  second  earthquake  came  in  2001  with  the  9/11  terrorist  attacks,  which  led  
to  a  new  international  security  vision  and  approach.  The  third  earthquake  was  
more  complex  one  emerging  in  2011  as  a  result  of  both  a  European  economic  
crisis,  and  regional  political  transformation  known  as  the  “Arab  Spring”631.  For  
Davutoglu,   all   of   these   three   international   earthquakes   were   central   to   the  
changes  and  transformation  of  Turkish  foreign  policy.      
Furthermore,   the  United  States  has  been  a  major  external  player   that  
affected  Turkish   foreign  policy  making   in  particular   towards   the  Middle  East.  
The  American  Middle  East  policies  do  have  an  effect  on  Turkish  interests  in  the  
Middle  East.  One  cannot  disregard  the  role  of  US  hegemony  on  states  and  their  
behaviours.  For  example,  since  the  US  War  on  Iraq  in  2003,  instability,  security  
problems,   and   Iranian   engagement,   all   increased   concerns   for   Turkey   and  
                                                                                                              630  Ahmet  Davutoglu,  “Turkish  Foreign  Minister  Ahmet  Davutoğlu  Remarks  at  CSIS,”  Centre  
for  Strategic  and  International  Studies,  February,  10,  2012,  accessed  October  15,  2015,  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SdCsd4Ak_Ak.      631  Ibid.    
265	  	  
especially   in   relation   to   the  Kurdish   issue  and   the  PKK632.  Other  US  policies  
regarding   Iran,   Iraq,   and  Syria   have  also   been  highly   critical   by   the  Turkish  
administration,  which  affected  Turkish-­US  relations  for  some  time.    
Other  important  international  actors  are  the  international  institutions.  The  
most   influential   international   intergovernmental   institution   on   Turkish   politics  
has   been   the  European  Union.   The  EU  has   been   a  major   force   behind   the  
changes  in  both  domestic  and  foreign  policies  of  Turkey633.  The  AKP  adopted  
the  Copenhagen  criteria  and  pushed  for  democracy  and  this  was  also  reflected  
in   its   foreign   policy   norms   of   changing   its   hard   power   image   to   more   of   a  
soft/civilian  power  like  similar  to  EU  promoting  democracy,  peace,  and  stability  
in   the   region634.   Furthermore,  with   the   development   of   the  Arab  Spring   and  
particularly   the  Syrian  conflict,  Turkey  became  highly  affected  by   the   flow  of  
refugees  and   spill   over,   and   the  development  of   security   threats  by   terrorist  
groups   mainly   ISIS.   These   were   other   major   and   more   recent   external  
contributors  affecting  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  position  towards  the  Syrian  crisis,  
for  example.    
On   the   other   hand,   the   identity   approach   in   the   literature   on   Turkish  
foreign  policy  did  not  emphasize   the  significant   role  of  economic   interests   in  
shaping  it.  Turkey’s  economy  under  the  AKP’s  government  witnessed  a  drastic  
improvement  and  AKP’s  leaders  frequently  addressed  the  importance  of  having  
a   strong   economy.   Therefore,   there   was   an   increase   in   Turkish   economic  
international   cooperation   and   relations   with   a   particular   attention   paid   to  
                                                                                                              632  Ebru  Canan-­Sokullu,  Debating  Security  in  Turkey:  Challenges  and  Changes  in  the  Twenty-­
First  Century  (Rowman  &  Littlefield,  2013),  126-­127.    633  Ozlem  Terzi,  The  Influence  of  the  European  Union  on  Turkish  Foreign  Policy  (Ashgate  
Press,  2010).    
  634  Ibid.    
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opportunities   in   new   markets.   Trade   between   Turkey   and   the   Middle   East  
reached   significant   levels   compared   to   figures   before   2002635.   Turkish  
economic   interests   in   the  Middle  East   have  been  a   key  element   in  Turkish-­
Middle  East  relations  for  a  long  time.  According  to  Javier  Albarracin  (2011),  the  
World  Bank  stated  that  “Turkey  account  for  50%  of  the  GDP  of  the  Middle  East  
and  North  Africa  (MENA)  region,  including  Israel  and  Iran”636.  What’s  more,  the  
author  stated  that  regardless  the  major  global  economic  crisis  in  2010,  Turkey’s  
economy  continued  to  grow  for  around  8.9%,  the  highest  growth  rate  in  Europe  
and   third   in   the   world637.   This   shows   the   level   of   importance   and   role   of  
economic   interests  for  Turkey  under  the  AKP’s  administration.  This  does  not  
mean  that  identity  does  not  matter,  but  rather  that  there  are  other  factors  that  
shape  Turkish  foreign  policy  and  interests  in  the  Middle  East  and  elsewhere.    
John   Mershiemer,   a   prominent   Realist   scholar,   gave   an   interesting  
lecture  at  the  Turkish  Foreign  Ministry  titled  Turkish  Foreign  Policy:  A  realist’s  
Assessment  in  October  2012.  He  focused  on  the  importance  of  Turkish  power  
and   security   threats   in   the   region   that   affect   Turkish   foreign   policy638.  
Mershiemer  argued  that  the  most  two  powerful  players  in  the  region  are  Turkey  
and  Iran.  He  looked  at  the  importance  of  population  and  wealth  in  this  power  
relation   and   argued   that   Turkey   is   in   a   good   position   compared   to   Iran’s  
population  growth  rate  and  economic  situation.  Mershiemer  also  looked  at  the  
                                                                                                              635  Hurriyet  Daily,  “Turkey  and  Arabs  seek  to  boost  economic  ties,”  Hurriyet  Daily  News,  
September  26,  2013,  accessed  October  16,  2015,  http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-­
and-­arabs-­seek-­to-­boost-­economic-­ties.aspx?pageID=238&nid=55142.    636  Javier  Albarracin,  “The  Role  of  Turkey  in  the  New  Middle  Eastern  Economic  Architecture,”  
Economy  and  Territory,  2011,  p.  234,  accessed  October  5,  2015,  
http://www.iemed.org/observatori/arees-­danalisi/arxius-­
adjunts/anuari/med.2011/Albarracin_en.pdf.    637  Ibid.      638  John  Mershiemer,  “Turkish  Foreign  Policy:  A  Realist’s  Assessment,”  Ministry  of  Foreign  
Affairs,  October  4,  2012,  accessed  October  5,  2015,  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=geC1vNBj2Yk.    
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security   threat   as   another   major   element   that   affects   Turkey,   a   threat   that  
comes  mainly  by  the  PKK  and  other  troubled  neighbours,  which  share  borders  
with  Turkey.  For   example,   the  development   of   the  Syrian   issue,   increase  of  
Syrian  refugees,  and  increasing  security  threats  by  ISIS  and  the  PKK  affected  
Turkish  relations  and  behaviour  towards  the  Assad  regime,  as  well  as  Iran  and  
recently  Russia,  due   to   the  growing  military  presence   in  Syria   threatening  of  
Turkish  borders.    Security  threats  also  forced  Turkey  to  seek  alliance  and  join  
the   international   coalition   against   ISIS   as   well   as   attacking   the   PKK639.  
Mershiemer  further  argued  that  any  state  aims  at  maximizing  its  relative  power  
and  the  ideal  situation  for  Turkey  is  to  be  a  regional  hegemon  to  ensure  that  no  
one  can  “fool  around”.  At  the  same  time,  the  second  goal  for  states  is  to  have  
a   smart   foreign   policy   or   a   smart   “Grand   Strategy”   to   deal   with   threatening  
environments640.  Turkey  is  located  in  a  very  hostile  environment  and  this  had  a  
direct   effect   on   its   regional   foreign   policy   objectives   and   behaviour.  
Mershiemer’s  main  argument  highlights  the  importance  of  Turkey’s  position  in  
the   balance   of   power   and   the   threat   environment   that   surrounds   it.   This  
demonstrates  the  existence  of  other  factors  that  affect  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  
besides  identity.    
From  the  interviews  conducted  for  this  thesis,  it  is  possible  to  notice  an  
important  difference  among  the  interviewees  about  the  characteristic  of  Turkish  
national   identity   and   its   role   in   understanding   Turkish   foreign   policy   change  
under   the   AKP’s   government.   Some   agreed   that   identity   is   central   to   our  
understanding  of  Turkish  foreign  policy,  but  they  also  stated  that  we  should  not  
                                                                                                              639  Gul  Tuysuz  and  Zeynep  Bilginsoy,  “Ministry:  Turkey  joins  coalition  airstrikes  against  ISIS  in  
Syria,”  CNN  News,  August  29,  2015,  accessed  October  16,  2015,  
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/08/29/europe/turkey-­airstrikes/.  	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eliminate  all  other  factors.  For  example,  Dr.  Saban  Kardash,  President  of  the  
Middle  East  Strategic  Research  Centre  (ORSAM),  argued  that  actually  there  is  
more  than  one  identity  group  that  is  affecting  Turkish  foreign  policy,  and  that’s  
what  makes  Turkey  different  and  complicated  to  many.  Kardas  further  stated,  
“The  religious  identity  is  important,  but  we  cannot  explain  everything  through  it  
either.  In  other  words,  it  means  something,  but  it  does  not  mean  everything”641.  
Furthermore,  Professor  Murat  Yasiltas,  Director  of  Security  Studies  at  SETA  
Foundation   for   Political,   Economic,   and   Social   Research,   agreed   with  
Kosebalaban’s   approach   for   understanding   Turkish   national   identity   and   its  
effect  on   foreign  policy642.  However,  Yasiltas  also  mentioned   in  his   interview  
the  importance  of  the  economic  side  of  Turkish  foreign  policy.  He  argued,  “AKP  
foreign  policy  carry  both  material  interests  and  social  or  ideational  aspects  as  
they   complete   and   support   each   other”643.   Similarly,   Professor   Selcuk  
Colakoglu,   Vice   President   at   USAK   the   ‘International   Strategic   Research  
Organization’   and   the   director   of   the   USAK   centre   for   Asia-­Pacific   Studies,  
supported  Kosebalaban’s   argument   and   further   stated   “every   ten   years,   the  
identity  of  Turkish  politics  is  changing  somewhat”644.    
Dr.   Mesut   Ozcan,   chairman   of   the   Foreign   Ministry’s   Diplomacy  
Academy  and  Advisor  to  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  in  his  interview  argued  
that  National  identity  and  its  input  is  subject  to  change645.  He  argued  that  in  the  
past  we  can  say  that  the  identity  of  the  elites  were  reflective  in  Turkey’s  foreign  
policy  i.e.  Secular-­Kemalists.  He  added,  “Turkey  is  currently  in  a  much  better  
                                                                                                              641  Saban  Kardash,  interviewed  by  author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  October  13,  2014.    642  Murat  Yasiltas,  interviewed  by  author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  October  14,  2014.  	  643  Ibid.    644  Selcuk  Colakoglu,  interviewed  by  author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  March  17,  2014.  645  Mesut  Ozcan,  interviewed  by  author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  March  18,  2014.    
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democratic  situation  compared  to  its  past.  With  the  continuing  victories  of  the  
AKP,  we  can  say  that  the  party  represents  the  majority  of  people  in  Turkey  and  
elections  are  best  evidence”.  Dr.  Ozcan  argued  that  since  the  end  of  the  cold  
war,  identity  politics  and  the  effects  of  identity  groups  on  foreign  policy  making  
in  Turkey  has  been  growing  rapidly.  He  stated,  “As  we  have  seen  more  and  
more  people  are  being  proud  of   their   identity  groups  and  are  putting  forward  
their  demands”.  Here,  Dr.  Ozcan  suggests  that  it  is  not  the  “national  identity”  of  
a   certain   elite   group   that   influence   Turkish   foreign   policy,   but   instead   the  
different   identity   groups   in   Turkey   that   are   growingly   becoming   influential   in  
foreign  policy  making.  However,  he  argued  that  we  should  not  overemphasize  
the  role  of  identity  in  Turkish  foreign  policy  change,  as  there  are  a  number  of  
other  factors  that  need  to  be  considered  at  the  same  time.  He  argued  that  the  
vast  changing  regional  and  international  environments  also  affect  foreign  policy  
making  and  particularly  Turkey  due  to  its  important  strategic  position.      
On  the  other  hand,  only  one  interviewee  suggested  that  the  AKP  has  a  
strong   Islamic   identity   that   directly   affects   its   behaviour   and   foreign   policy  
outlook   especially   towards   its   Muslim   neighbours.   For   instance,   Professor  
Serhat  Erkmen,  suggested  that  although  Davutoglu  stated  that  he  is  an  Islamic  
Liberal,  “when  you  read  his  writings  you  find  him  Islamic  Nationalist,  especially  
in  the  strong  emphasis  he  makes  on  the  Turcoman  cases  in  Syria  and  Iraq”646.  
However,  Erkmen  also  tends  to  highlight  the  important  economic  role  in  shaping  
Turkish-­Middle  East  relations.  He  stated,  “Whenever  the  Turkish  prime  minister  
or   foreign  minister  goes  to  a  country,   they  bring  with   them  a  high  number  of  
businessmen  to  sign  some  agreements  and  contracts.  The  AKP  then  facilitates  
                                                                                                              646  Serhat  Erkmen,  interview  by  author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  March  21,  2014.  
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these  businessmen  activities”647.  Although  there  were  some  differences  in  the  
way  interviewees  viewed  Turkish  identity  and  its  effect  on  foreign  policy,  they  
all  share  the  idea  that  focusing  on  identity  role  on  its  own  without  considering  
other  factors  is  misleading.    
Therefore,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  identity  approach  in  understanding  
Turkish   foreign  policy   is   important,  but  does  not  explain  all  aspects  affecting  
Turkish   foreign   policy   making,   particularly   regarding   the   Middle   East.   As  
mentioned  earlier,  there  has  been  a  wide  range  of  arguments  and  definitions  
over   Turkish   national   identity   and   its   role   presented   in   the   literature.  
Furthermore,   although,   constructivists   in   international   relations   theories  may  
have   included   the   pragmatic   and   material   explanations   in   their   theories,  
scholars  in  the  literature  on  Turkish  foreign  policy  favouring  identity  approach  
seem  to  have  failed  to  explain  the  significant  role  of  economic  interests,  security  
concerns,   changing   international   environment,   and   international   actors   in  
shaping  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  directions.  However,  this  does  not  mean  that  
the   identity   approach   can   be   eliminated   from   this   study,   but   rather   that   it  
constitutes  a  weak  explanation.    
Therefore,  from  the  empirical  evidence  and  from  the  data  collected  from  
the  interviews,  the  identity  explanation  in  understanding  Turkish  foreign  policy  
change   since   2002   has   passed   a  Hoop   Test   in   the   theory   testing   Process  
Tracing   methodology.   This   means   that   evidence   found   helped   the   identity  
hypothesis  to  “jump  through  the  hoop”  and  remain  under  consideration.  Similar  
to   the   Ottomanist   explanations   in   the   first   half   of   this   chapter,   identity  
explanations   seem   to   set   a   more   demanding   standard   than   the   Islamist  
                                                                                                              647  Ibid.  	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explanations.    However,  identity  explanations  seem  to  pass  a  Hoop  Test  this  
time.  After  analysing  the  data  collected,  empirical  evidence,  and  interview  data,  
identity  explanations  seem  to  give  a  much  greater  value  than  the  neo-­Ottoman  
explanations.   Unlike   the   noticeable   disagreement   among   interviewees  
regarding   the   neo-­Ottoman   explanations,   there   seem   to   be   a  much   greater  
agreement   with   the   identity   role   in   Turkish   foreign   policy.   However,   identity  
explanations  were  not  confirmed  due  to  the  interviewees’  suggestion  that  such  
explanations  do  not  explain  the  whole  picture.  Instead,  there  are  other  factors  
that   need   to   be   acknowledged   that   have   played   a   role   as   well,   such   as  
economic  interests  and  the  role  of  the  EU  and  other  external  factors.  Passing  a  
Hoop  Test  affirms  relevance  of  hypothesis,  but  it  does  not  confirm  it.  Although  
it   does   not   represent   a   sufficient   criterion   for   accepting   the   explanation,   it  
however  establishes  a  necessary  criterion.  The  implication  of  passing  a  Hoop  
Test  is  that  it  somewhat  weakens  other  explanations  so  far.  In  other  words,  it  
somewhat  weakens  the  plausibility  of  other  explanations,  without  excluding  the  
possibility  that  alternative  hypotheses  may  be  relevant.  To  further  simplify  and  
clarify  this  process  of  examination,  the  table  below  summarizes  the  main  points  
of  the  Identity  explanation  and  its  value  in  the  thesis  so  far.    
Figure  4.  Assessment  of  the  Identity  explanation  in  Process  Tracing  
Explanation  3:    
   -­‐‑   Turkish  identity  politics  has  been  the  domestic  source  behind  Turkish  
foreign  policy  change  under  the  AKP  government.    
Evidence  constituting  this  explanation:    
   -­‐‑   The  role  of  national  identities  over  history  in  Turkey.    -­‐‑   The  change  of  elite  structures  and  the  emergence  of  a  new  
conservative  bourgeoisie.  -­‐‑   AKP  Islamic-­liberal/Conservative-­democratic  identity  as  a  source  of  
motivation.  
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-­‐‑   Foreign  policy  affected  by  the  distribution  of  power  between  Secular  
and  Islamic  identities.    
Process  of  examining  empirical  evidence  and  interview  data:    
   -­‐‑   There  has  been  a  noticeable  change  in  elite  structures  since  1980s  
with  an  emergence  of  new  elite  contesting  traditional  groups  
challenging  the  Kemalist  traditional  elites.    -­‐‑   Noticeable  disagreement  over  the  AKP  identity  characters  as  a  
political  party  and  national  identity  groups  over  history.    -­‐‑   Identity  politics  in  Turkey  represent  an  important  element  of  Turkish  
foreign  policy  that  should  be  taken  into  account.  -­‐‑   Consensus  among  interviewees  over  the  important  role  of  national  
identity  in  Turkish  foreign  policy  making.  -­‐‑   Interviewees  have  largely  demonstrated  that  there  are  other  factors  
along  with  identity  that  need  to  be  included.    -­‐‑   Identity  explanation  is  useful,  but  not  strong  enough  on  its  own  to  
represent  a  comprehensive  explanation.    
Results:  
   -­‐‑   Evidence  set  a  more  demanding  standard  compared  to  Islamist  and  
neo-­Ottomaist  explanations.  -­‐‑   Useful  explanation  and  needs  to  be  considered.    -­‐‑   Explains  an  important  part  of  the  picture,  but  does  not  explain  the  
whole  picture  on  its  own  due  to  the  complex  nature  of  the  Turkish  
case.  -­‐‑   Necessary  but  not  sufficient  to  establish  causation  (Necessary  
because  identity  politics  is  one  of  the  most  important  elements  in  
shaping  international  relations  and  states’  affairs  and  therefore  needs  
to  be  considered  as  it  has  proven  to  explain  an  important  part  of  the  
Turkish  case,  but  the  explanation  has  not  been  successful  to  
sufficiently  explain  the  entire  case  on  its  own  representing  only  part  
of  the  answer).  -­‐‑     Higher  demand  for  a  more  inclusive  approach  and  multiple  factors  
explanation.  -­‐‑   Therefore,  passes  a  Hoop  Test.  
Implication:    





The  purpose  of  this  chapter  was  to  examine  and  test  the  plausibility,  through  
Process  Tracing  method,  of  two  of  the  main  ideational  explanations  presented  
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in  the  literature  on  Turkish  foreign  policy;;  the  concept  of  neo-­Ottomanism,  and  
the   notion   of   national   identity.   This   chapter   has   been   a   continuation   of   the  
previous  chapter  in  the  sense  that  they  both  cover  ideational  and  non-­material  
explanations  and  arguments  presented  in  the  literature.  The  prime  focus  of  this  
chapter   has   been   on   the   notions   of   neo-­Ottomanism   and   national   identity  
explanations.  The  researcher  was  able  to  evaluate  and  test  the  plausibility  of  
those   explanations   through   applying   the   four   steps   strategy.   First   the  
researcher  analysed  the  main  components  of  those  concepts  and  the  different  
arguments   presented   in   the   literature   supporting   them.   Secondly,   examined  
available  empirical  data,  archival  documents,  and  raised  critical  questions  that  
such   explanations  might   not   have   considered   or   looked   at.   The   researcher  
developed  a  critical  engagement,  where  a  number  of  questions  were  posed,  
which  helped  identify  limitations  of  those  explanations.    The  third  step  required  
an  analysis  of  available  critics  and  other  contrasting  arguments   that  critically  
reviewed   the   neo-­Ottoman   and   Identity   explanations   and   helped   highlight  
possible   weaknesses.   The   fourth   and   final   step   of   applying   interview   data  
enabled  the  researcher  to  further  assess  the  sufficiency  and  necessity  of  the  
explanations   under   examination.   This   was   carried   out   through   exploring  
interviewees’  views  and  ideas  in  assessing  their  explanatory  value.  
Therefore,   the   first   part   of   the   chapter   analysed   the   concept   of   neo-­
Ottomanism   and   its   main   characteristics   in   an   attempt   to   help   define   this  
concept.  However,  it  was  evident  that  a  number  of  distinct  definitions  exist  in  
the   literature.   Furthermore,   the   section   demonstrated   the   existing   variety   of  
arguments  presented  in  the  literature  by  different  scholars  who  use  this  concept  
in  understanding  different  Turkish  foreign  policies  under  the  AKP.  Some  have  
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focused  on  Ahmet  Davutoglu’s  work  known  as  “Strategic  Depth”  as  the  source  
of   neo-­Ottomanist   foreign   policy,   while   others   paid   more   attention   on   the  
statements  and  speeches  delivered  by  Davutoglu,  as  a   foreign  minister  and  
currently   as   a   prime   minister,   and   Erdogan   in   his   prime   ministry   time   and  
presidency.  However,  the  concept  of  neo-­Ottomanism  has  been  proven  to  be  
significantly   weak   in   explaining   Turkish   foreign   policy   change   towards   the  
Middle  East  since  2002.  This  is  because  it  fails  to  explain  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  
expansion   and   influence   to   countries   and   regions   far   away   from   the   former  
Ottoman   territories.   On   the   other   hand,   the   diversity   and   complex   range   of  
definitions   presented   in   the   literature   demonstrate   a  major   weakness   in   the  
concept  itself.  There  has  been  no  consensus  over  the  characteristics  of  neo-­
Ottomanism   as   well   as   its   affect   over   Turkish   foreign   policy.   Therefore,  
according  to  the  evidence  found,  this  explanation  have  failed  to  survive  a  Hoop  
Test  in  the  process  tracing,  which  eliminates  it  from  this  study,  while  at  the  same  
time  strengthens  other  competing  explanations  so  far.    
The  second  part  of  the  chapter  covered  the  notion  of  identity  and  its  role  
in  shaping  Turkish  foreign  policy,  particularly  towards  the  Middle  East.  Turkey  
is  unique  compared  to  other  countries  in  the  Middle  East  due  to  its  geographical  
location   and   complex   nature   of   the   existing   multiple   ethnic   and   religious  
identities.  This,  to  a  large  extent,  made  it  very  difficult  for  researchers  to  define  
and  understand  the  role  of  identity  in  Turkish  foreign  policy  making.  However,  
scholars   were   able   to   develop   arguments   focusing   on   the   role   of   national  
identity  shaped  by  the  national  elite  and  powerful  business  class.  The  identity  
explanations   have   presented   very   useful   insights   in   understanding   Turkish  
foreign  policy  change  since  2002.  The  emergence  of  a  new  conservative  middle  
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class  and  business  groups  during  the  1990s  has  paved  way  for  the  change  of  
elite  structures   from  one   that  was  mainly   represented  by  secular  elites,   to  a  
more   conservative-­liberal   business   class   elites.   This   emerging   conservative  
middle  class  has  been  highly  supported  by  the  AKP  since  2002.  However,  the  
problem   with   the   identity   approach   is   that   scholars   have   presented   distinct  
explanations   of   the   current   national   identity   ranging   from   a   neo-­Ottomanist  
identity,  Islamist-­Liberal  identity,  and  Islamist  identity.  Such  variety  of  definitions  
highly  weakens  the  important  contribution  that  such  explanations  can  offer.    
At   the   same   time,   the   fact   that   such   explanations   overlook   the  
importance  of  other  external  factors  that  might  affect  Turkish  foreign  policy  they  
also  undermine  the  significance  of  this  approach.  The  United  States’  hegemony  
and  policies  in  the  Middle  East  have  had  great  impact  on  Turkish  foreign  policy  
and  particularly  towards  the  Middle  East.  Since  the  US  invasion  of  Iraq,  Turkey  
had  to  deal  with   increasing  security   threats  by   terrorist  groups  and  the  PKK.  
Furthermore,  the  increasing  regional  instability  as  a  result  of  this  war  affected  
the  Turkish  regional  stability  and  peace  building  approach  for  example.  Another  
external   body   that   had  major   impact   on   both   Turkish   domestic   and   foreign  
policies  during  the  AKP  era  was  the  European  Union.  The  AKP’s  government  
has  taken  necessary  measures  to  apply  the  Copenhagen  criterion  as  part  of  its  
EU   membership   access.   Therefore,   a   number   of   important   reforms   were  
introduced   that   transformed   Turkey.   The   Turkish   administration   has   been  
arguing  that  Turkey’s  Middle  East  policy  is  an  asset  for  the  EU  as  it  presents  
an  important  and  strategic  Eastern  gate,  as  it  will  be  further  explained  in  chapter  
6.   Although   identity   approach   does   engage   with   some   of   these   debates,   it  
seems  to  ignore  some  evidence  and  looks  at  all  foreign  policy  changes  towards
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the  Middle  East  from  a  predominantly  identity  side.  Therefore,  after  analysing  
critics  of  this  approach  and  applying  necessary  empirical  evidence  and  primary  
interview  data,  the  identity  approach  seem  to  have  passed  a  Hoop  Test  in  the  
process   tracing   methodology.   This   means   that   this   has   to   remain   under  
consideration  and  cannot  be  eliminated  from  the  study,  as  it  still  gives  us  useful  
insights  for  understanding  important  aspects  of  Turkish  Foreign  Policy.  Passing  
a  Hoop  Test  affirms  relevance  but  does  not  confirm  it;;  while  at  the  same  time  
weakens  other  rival  explanations  in  this  study.    
So   far,   approaches   that   are   listed   under   the   ideational   side   of   the  
literature,   mainly   influenced   by   the   constructivist   school   of   thought   in  
International  Relations,  have  been  showing  both  strong  and  weak  insights  to  
understanding  Turkish  foreign  policy  change  towards  the  Middle  East  and  the  
driving   force   behind   that.   For   example,   the   Islamist   approach   was   highly  
weakened  after  testing  its  plausibility  in  chapter  4,  but  it  was  not  eliminated  due  
to  some  of  the  existing  pro-­Islamist  policies  by  the  AKP.  On  the  other  hand,  the  
neo-­Ottomanist  concept  failed  to  survive  the  test  it  failed  in  explaining  the  reality  
behind  many  of  AKPs’  policies  and  therefore  had  to  be  eliminated,  whereas  the  
identity  approach  has  proven  to  be  the  strongest  explanation  among  ideational  
accounts.  However,  none  of  the  examined  ideational  approaches,  in  chapters  
4  and  5  so   far,  have  successfully  presented  a  complete  and  comprehensive  
explanation  for  all  the  different  aspects  of  Turkish  foreign  policy.  Therefore,  this  
study  has   to  examine  other  explanations  offered   in   the   literature  by  scholars  
who  applied  and  favored  the  so-­called  “materialist”  and  “pragmatic”  approaches  
in  understanding  the  causes  behind  Turkish  foreign  change  since  2002  beyond  
the  theoretical  debate.    
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  SEVEN	  





The  literature  on  Turkish  foreign  policy,  particularly  the  case  of  the  Middle  East,  
has   been   shaped   by   two   mainstream   theoretical   debates:   “Ideational”   vs.  
“Pragmatic”.   So   far,   chapters   four   and   five   looked   at   and   analysed   the  
“ideational”  part  of   this   theoretical  debate   in   the   literature  on  Turkish   foreign  
policy  based  on  ideology  and  identity  explanations.  They  looked  at  the  roles  of  
political   ideology  of  the  AKP  including  the  role  of  Islamism,  neo-­Ottomanism,  
and  Turkish  national  identity  in  an  attempt  to  understand  Turkish  foreign  policy  
transformation  towards  the  Middle  East.  This  chapter,  on  the  other  hand,  aims  
at   covering   the   second   part   of   this   theoretical   debate   focusing   on   the  
“pragmatic”   aspects   and   role   in   understanding   the   cause   behind   Turkey’s  
change  of  approach   towards   its  neighbouring  Middle  Eastern  countries.  This  
second   part   of   the   literature   has   been   largely   dominated   by   economic   and  
security   based   explanations.   Therefore,   this   chapter   aims   at   analysing   and  
examining  the  significance  of  understanding  this  foreign  policy  change.    
Therefore,   this  chapter  will  be  divided   into   two  parts;;   the   first  part  will  
focus   on   the   economic   based   explanations,   including   the   notion   of   Turkey  
emerging   as   a   “Trading   State”   and   the   idea   of   promoting   economic  
interdependence.  The  second  part  of  the  chapter  will  cover  the  security-­based  
approach   provided   in   the   literature.   This   includes   the   long-­standing   Kurdish  
problem  and  Turkey’s  counter  PKK  strategies,  as  well  as  the  highly  instable  and  
hostile   region   Turkey   is   located   in.   Later,   both   parts   and   together   with   the  
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theoretical  explanations  of  this  chapter  will  be  examined  and  tested  through  the  
Process  Tracing  theory  testing  method.  The  purpose  is  to  know  whether  any  of  
these   competing   explanations   in   the   literature   present   a   plausible   and  
comprehensive   understanding   the   cause   behind   Turkey’s   new   approach  
towards   the  Middle  East  since  2002.  The   test  will  be  conducted   through   the  
application   of   available   empirical   evidence,   possible   counter   arguments   and  
critics,  and  collected  interview  data  from  the  fieldwork  of  this  thesis  to  test  them  
against  and  analyse  their  strengths  and  weaknesses.    Therefore,  results  of  this  
chapter  will  show  that  the  economic  approach  in  the  literature  seems  to  pass  a  
Hoop  Test,  presenting  a  necessary  but  not  sufficient  cause.  This  means  that  
this   is   highly   important   to   consider   in   this   study   because   it   helps   explain   a  
considerable   part   of   Turkey’s   Middle   East   approach   under   the   AKP  
government.    
However,   there   are   some   weaknesses   demonstrated   in   the   lack   of  
explaining  and  taking  into  account  certain  international  actors  and  events  that  
might  have  affected  Turkish  foreign  policy  away  from  any  economic  issues.  In  
other  words,  it  is  important,  but  we  cannot  understand  the  case  solely  through  
it.  The  implication  for  passing  a  Hoop  Test,  is  that  it  strengthen  it  while  at  the  
same  time  somewhat  weakens  other  rival  non-­economic  based  explanations  in  
the   literature   so   far.   This  means   that   the   economic   factor   in   understanding  
Turkish  foreign  policy  change  towards  the  Middle  East  cannot  be  eliminated.  
On  the  other  hand,  the  security  approach  of  the  literature  fails  a  Straw  in  the  
Wind  Test  showing  that  it  is  neither  sufficient  nor  necessary  to  affirm  it  as  the  
cause  behind  such  foreign  policy  change.  In  other  words  the  security  approach  
in  understanding  Turkish  foreign  policy  change  towards  the  Middle  East  since  
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2002  is  a  weak  explanation  and  one  that  does  not  explain  much  “on  its  own”.  
Security   concerns   have   played   a   role   in   shaping   Turkey’s   relations   with  
countries  like  Syria,  Iraq,  and  Iran  who  all  share  borders  with  Turkey  and  are  
directly   involved  with   the   Kurdish   issue.   However,   with   the   de-­securitization  
process  and  approach  to  countries  beyond  Turkey’s  borders,  the  explanation  
does  not  take  into  account  other  non-­security  factors  i.e.  economic,  ideological,  
cultural,  and  other  international  actors  that  might  have  affected  Turkey’s  Middle  
East  outlook  and  caused  this  new  opening.  As  a  result,  failing  this  test  reduces  
its   relevance  and  cannot  be  used  as  a  plausible  explanation.  However,   it   is  
important  to  note  that  failing  this  test  does  not  eliminate  it.  As  long  as  Turkey  
has   to   deal   with   certain   security   issues   and   especially   the   endless   Kurdish  
problem,   security   explanations   can   give   us   insights   to   understand   particular  
policies  directly  related  to  security   threats.  Therefore,   the  security   theoretical  
hypothesis,   in   this   case   study,   shows   that   it   can   only   explain   “part”   of   the  
answer.  The   implication  of   failing   this   test   is   that   it  slightly  strengthens  other  
competing  explanations  in  the  study.    
Therefore,   the   economic-­based   approach   seem   to   give   stronger  
indications   and   valid   insights   compared   to   the   security-­based   approach.  
Choosing  which  test  to  apply  for  each  explanation  in  this  thesis  depends  on  the  
evidence  at  stake.  However,  the  similarity  between  the  economic  and  security  
theoretical  approaches  is  that  both  cannot  be  eliminated  from  this  study,  as  they  
both  tend  to  explain  some  aspects  of  this  new  Turkish-­Middle  East  policy.  This  
reminds  us  so  far  that  Turkey,  as  mentioned  at  the  opening  of  this  thesis,  is  a  
highly  complex  country  operating   in  a  highly  complex   region.  Therefore,   it   is  
very  much  difficult  and  almost  impossible  to  explain  Turkey’s  regional  political,  
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economic,   and   cultural   openness   and   re-­engagement   with   the   Middle   Eat  
through  one  theoretical  lens  or  a  singular  approach.    
1.	  The	  role	  of	  economic	  interests	  	  
  
Economic   interests   have   increasingly   been   a   central   theme   contributing   to  
international   relations   and   foreign   policy   making   for   a   long   time.   With   the  
development   of   globalization,   the   importance   of   economic   relations   has  
increased  dramatically.  A  large  number  of  successful  foreign  policies  have  been  
recently  measured  by  their  economic  impact.  Since  the  Cold  War,  international  
trade  has  been  a  central  theme  in  leading  foreign  policy  making  for  many  states.  
Leaders  of  countries  in  both  the  Western  and  Eastern  worlds,  as  many  would  
like  to  refer  to,  have  increasingly  recognized  the  benefits  of  international  trade.  
Barriers  to  international  trade  have  been  greatly  minimized  and  liberalized  by  
developments  of  international  law  and  efforts  by  the  World  Trade  Organization  
(WTO),   which   contributes   to   the   centrality   of   economic   interests   in  
understanding  international  relations.    
   The  aim  of  this  section  of  the  chapter  is  to  assess  the  role  of  economic  
interests  in  understanding  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  change  towards  the  Middle  
East  since  2002  and  whether  it  was  the  main  contributing  factor,  as  many  have  
argued,   or   not.   As   this   chapter’s   purpose   is   to   analyse   the   pragmatic   and  
materialist  side  of  Turkish  foreign  policy,  economic  interests  and  trade  relations  
are   central   to   such   analysis.   However,   has   economic   interests   been   “the  
deriving  factor”  behind  Turkish  reengagement  with  the  Middle  East?  That’s  the  
most  important  question  that  I  aim  to  answer  in  this  section.  In  doing  so,  this  
section  of   the  chapter  will  be  divided   into  three  main  parts.  The  first  part  will  
illustrate  the  economic  growth  and  success  witnessed  in  Turkey  during  the  AKP  
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government  and  particularly  in  their  first  two  terms.  This  will  include  important  
facts   and   figures   that   help   demonstrate   to   the   reader   the   level   of   economic  
growth  witnessed  and  policy  efforts  made  by  the  government  that  can  give  us  
useful  insights  to  the  AKP  keenness  in  serving  Turkey’s  economic  interests  in  
the  region.  The  second  part  aims  to  critically  analyse  the  different  explanations  
and  theoretical  hypotheses  presented  in  the  literature  that  prefer  to  understand  
Turkish   foreign   policy   change   towards   the   Middle   East   from   an   economic  
perspective  supported  by  the  realist  and  neo-­liberalist  theoretical  interpretations  
of   international   relations.   The   purpose   of   this   part   is   to   understand   such  
explanations  and  the  evidence  they  are  based  on  in  order  to  be  able  to  examine  
their   credibility.   The   third   and   final   section   will   examine   the   economic  
explanations  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  change  through  analysing  existing  critics  
of   such  notions  and   their   potential  weaknesses.  This  will   include   the  use  of  
different   empirical   evidence   and   interview   data   collected   in   my   fieldwork.  
Testing  the  economic  variable  will  be  through  the  use  of  Process  Tracing,  as  
usually   followed   in   this   thesis,   which   will   enable   us   to   understand   the  
importance  of   this  concept  and   its  sufficiency  and  necessity  as  a  variable   in  
answering  the  thesis’s  main  question.    
1.1	  The	  growing	  Turkish	  economic	  interests	  in	  the	  Middle	  East:	  facts	  and	  figures	  
  
The  aim  of  this  part  is  to  illustrate  the  economic  situation  and  development  since  
the   Justice   and  Development  Party   (AKP)   took   power.   This  will   offer   useful  
insights  to  the  government’s  seriousness  and  commitment  to  serving  Turkey’s  
economic  interests,  which  will  highly  reflect  in  understanding  its  foreign  policy  
making.   Therefore,   this   part   aims   at   first   giving   a   brief   explanation   of   the  
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economic  situation  and  the  way  in  which  Turkish  foreign  policy  was  not  primarily  
driven  by  economic   interests  since   the  creation  of   the   republic  and  how   this  
changed  since  2002.  Secondly,  the  AKP  commitment  to  economic  growth  and  
prosperity  demonstrated  by  the  new  economic  reforms  and  policies.  This  will  
include   some   important   facts   and   figures   showing   the   major   difference  
compared   to   previous   government   and   AKP   economic   commitment   and  
success.  Finally,  will  briefly  analyse  what   the  Arab  Spring  meant   for  Turkish  
economic  relations  and  trade  with  Arab  countries  and  the  critical  challenges  it  
brought  about.  The  argument  of  this  part  mainly  rely  on  the  fact  that  since  2002,  
Turkey  has  been  very  successful  in  increasing  its  economic  interdependence  
and   trade   relations   with   Middle   Eastern   states   leading   to   a   tremendous  
economic  growth  and  prosperity  in  Turkey  changing  the  political  landscape  for  
the  AKP  and  its  popularity.  However,  are  significant  economic  facts  and  figures  
enough   in   supporting   the   economic   explanation   in   understanding   Turkish  
foreign  policy  change  towards  the  Middle  East?  This  leads  us  to  examining  the  
arguments  put  forward  by  scholars  and  academics  in  support  of  such  notion  to  
try  and  arrive  at  a  solid  conclusion.    
   Since   the   establishment   of   the   republic   by   Kemal   Ataturk   in   1923,  
economic  interests  did  not  significantly  affect  Turkey’s  foreign  policy.  The  new  
Republic’s  aim  was  to  ensure  its  survival  and  domestic  unity  at  a  time  of  intense  
political   instability   just   after   the   collapse   of   the   Ottoman   Empire.   Instead,  
security  concerns  were  the  main  elements  that  characterized  Ataturk’s  foreign  
policy   for   a   long   time   to   protect   the   new-­born   republic648.  Much   of   the   new  
policies   concentrated   on   empowering   the   new   single   party   government   and  
                                                                                                              
648  Francis  Fukuyama,  The  End  Of  History  and  the  Last  Man  (London:  Penguin  Books,  1992),  
256-­257.    
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implementing   new   reforms.  Security   dimensions  were   the  main   themes   that  
shaped  Turkish  foreign  policy  for  a  long  time.  However,  a  major  turning  point  
emerged  with  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  and  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union.  The  
end  of  the  Cold  War  brought  about  new  opportunities  for  Turkey  and  necessities  
to   reshape   its   foreign   policy   especially  with   the   emergence   of   a   new  World  
Order   and   growing   Liberalization   of   global   economy.   Therefore,   during   the  
1980s,  there  was  a  noticeable  change  in  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  priorities.  As  
mentioned   in   earlier   chapters,  Turgut  Ozal’s   government   in   1980s  was   very  
successful  in  developing  new  economic  reforms.  Furthermore,  Ozal  managed  
to  put  economic   interests  as  a  key  element   in  Turkish  foreign  policy  making.  
Turkey’s  economic  situation  was  not  in  a  good  shape  and  was  in  great  need  for  
such  changes.  As  a   result,  Ozal  played  a  central   role   in   the  development  of  
Turkey’s  economy  and  supporting   it   into  becoming  a  productive  country   that  
can  contribute   the  global  market.  Ozal’s  main  aim  was   to  develop  economic  
relations  with  neighboring  countries  as  it  played  an  important  role  in  improving  
relations  at  the  same  time.  Ozal  believed  that  by  developing  mutual  interests,  
risks  will  be  lower  and  conflict  can  be  much  easier  solved649.    
Another  major  element  characterizing  Ozal’s  period  was  the  emergence  
of  a  new  conservative  business  elite  who  played  and  still  plays  an   important  
economic   role   in   Turkey   and   affect   economic   policies.   Ozal   supported   the  
Anatolian   entrepreneurs   who   were   behind   the   transformational   power   in  
supporting   democratization,   human   rights,   rule   of   law,   and   became   heavily  
                                                                                                              
649  See  Sedat  Laciner,  “Ozalism  (Neo-­Ottomanism):  An  Alternative  in  Turkish  Foreign  
Policy?,”  Journal  of  Administrative  Sciences  1,  no.  1  (2003-­2004):  162-­202;;  and  Abdulkadir  
Civan,  et  al.,  “The  effect  of  new  Turkish  Foreign  Policy  on  international  trade,”  Insight  Turkey  
15,  no.  3  (2013):  108.    
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involved  in  foreign  policy650.  This  new  group  became  famously  known  as  the  
Anatolian  Tigers  “Anadolu  Kaplanları”  651.  Ozal  was  a  very  business  oriented  
man  with  a  pragmatic  mindset  who  believed  in  economic  prosperity.  It  can  be  
argued   that  Turgut  Ozal  was   the  main   figure  building   the  modern  economic  
infrastructure  of  Turkey.  A  good  example  of  his  economic  commitments  was  his  
establishment  of  the  Black  Sea  Economic  Cooperation  Organization  (BSEC)652.  
Ozal  believed  that  regional  peace  promotes  successful  economic  relations  and  
all  countries  in  the  region  can  benefit653.  This,  for  many,  is  very  much  similar  to  
what   the   AKP   government   has   been   doing   for   more   than   a   decade.   Many  
scholars   have   originated  AKP’s   foreign   policy   aims   to   Turgut  Ozal   and   that  
current   AKP   officials   are   seen   as   followers   of   Turgut   Ozal’s   footsteps654.  
However,  it  is  important  to  mention  that  the  EU  established  a  Customs  Union  
with   Turkey   in   1995   covering   trade   of   industrial   goods   between   the   two.  
Although   this  was   two   years  after  Ozal’s   government,   it   can  be  argued   that  
many   of   his   work   and   efforts   led   to   such   achievements.   Prior   to   the   AKP  
government,  Ozal’s   government  was   the   government  which  most   prioritized  
economic  interests  in  its  foreign  policy  making.  However,  Turkish  foreign  policy  
before   2002   was   mainly   characterized   by   its   security   orientation   and   hard  
power655.      
                                                                                                              
650  Taptuk  Emre  Erkoc,  “Economy  and  Democratisation:  Turgut  Ozal  Era  in  Turkey,”  Journal  
of  Business  Economics  and  Political  Science  3,  no.  6  (2014):  68.      
651  Ibid.    
652  Sabri  Sayarı,  “Turkey  and  the  United  States:  Changing  Dynamics  of  an  Enduring  Alliance,”  
in  Turkey’s  Foreign  Policy  in  the  21st  Century,  A  Changing  Role  in  World  Politics,  eds.,  Tareq  
Y.  Ismael  and  Mustafa  Aydin  (Aldershot:  Ashgate,  2003),  30.    
653  Oktay  F.  Tanrisever,  “The  Black  Sea  Economic  Cooperation  Organization  and  its  
Strengths  and  Weaknesses  in  promoting  the  Globalization  of  the  Black  Sea  Region:  1992-­
2012,”  Journal  of  Central  Asian  and  Caucasian  Studies  (OAKA)  7,  no.  13  (2012):  57-­72.    
654  Khash  Hemmati,  “Turkey  Post  1980  Coup  D’etat:  the  Rise,  the  Fall,  and  the  Emergence  of  
Political  Islam,”  Illumine  12,  no.  1  (2013):  70.    
655  Tarik  Oguzlu,  “Soft  power  in  Turkish  foreign  policy,”  Australian  Journal  of  International  
Affairs  61,  issue.  1  (2007):  81-­97.    
285	  	  
   The   second   and   most   important   turning   point   in   Turkish   history   and  
foreign  policy  emerged  with  the  formation  and  victory  of  the  AKP  in  2002.  One  
of   the  main  challenges   to   this  new  government  was   the  economic  crisis   that  
was  evident   in  2001.  The  new  government  had   to  deal  with  many  economic  
problems   and   therefore   aimed   to   develop   a   number   of   reforms   and   new  
economic  policies.  The  AKP  promised  to  fix  the  economic  crisis  at  that  time  and  
achieve  economic  prosperity.  The  AKP  promised  to  build  a  powerful  economy  
and   reach   by   2023   the   top   10   economies   of   the  world656.   One   of   the  most  
significant   factors   behind   AKP’s   economic   policies’   success   is   that   they  
introduced   new   reforms   that   lay  within   the   context   of   the   IMF   (International  
Monitory   Fund)   and   the   European   Union   regulations657.   The   new   AKP  
government   introduced  new  policies   for   the  banking  system,  privatized  state  
owned  projects,  and  took  necessary  measures  to  increase  public  finance  with  
avoiding  debts.  Therefore,   the  AKP  was  successful   in   reforming   the  Turkish  
economy,  which  made  Turkey  do  better  than  expected  during  strong  European  
economic  crises.    
Turkey’s  economy  extensively  grew  and  recovered  from  its  crisis  prior  to  
2002.   For   example,   during   only   the   first   term   of   government,   the   national  
income  increased  at  an  annual  rate  to  around  7%  and  inflation  rate  decreased  
from   30%   to   approximately   9.7%658.   The   table   below   presented   by  Mehmet  
Ugur  (2008)  in  his  work  Turkish  Economic  Policy  under  AKP  government:  an  
                                                                                                              
656  Constanze  Letsch,  “  Turkey's  economic  success  threatened  by  political  instability,”  The  
Guardian,  January  9,  2014,  accessed  January  10,  2016,  
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/09/turkey-­instability-­threatens-­economic-­success-­
erdogan.    
657  Mehmet  Ugur,  “Turkish  economic  policy  under  AKP  government:  an  assessment  for  2002-­
2007,”  Munich  Personal  RePEc  Archive,  accessed  January  10,  2016,  https://mpra.ub.uni-­
muenchen.de/18235/1/MPRA_paper_18235.pdf.    
658  Ibid,  5.    
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assessment   for   2002-­2007   demonstrates   the   basic   economic   indicators  
between  2001  and  2007  during  the  first  two  terms  of  the  AKP  government.    
  
Figure  1.  Basic  Economic  Indicators  Turkey  2001-­2007659  
  
  
This   is   an   interesting   table   as   it   helps   us   understand   and   compare  
Turkish   economic   growth   rates   before   and   during   the   AKP   government.  
Moreover,  Mehmet  Ugur  (2008)  also  stated  that  AKP’s  economic  success  came  
with   “its  embracing  of   the  pre-­established  stabilization  policy   framework  and  
structural  reform  agenda  supported  by  the  IMF  and  the  World  Bank”660.  On  the  
other  hand,  the  decision  to  adopt  new  democratic  reforms  in  accordance  with  
the  EU  part  of  Turkey’s  accession  process  was  another  major  contribution  that  
allowed   for   better   liberal   economic   reforms   and   policy   framework.   Turkey’s  
economic   relation  with   the  EU  has  been  very  beneficial   for  Turkey  and  was  
recognized  as  a  “win-­win”  game661.  For  example,  since  the  Ankara  agreement  
                                                                                                              
659  Ibid.    
660  Ibid,  5-­6.    
661  Turkish  Review,  “Turkey  and  the  EU:  win-­win  or  game  over?,”  accessed  January  10,  2016,  
http://www.turkishreview.org/reports/turkey-­and-­the-­eu-­win-­win-­or-­game-­over_540817.      
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in  1963,  Turkey  enjoyed  membership  of  the  European  Economic  Community  
(EEC)  leading  to  the  Customs  Union  agreement  in  1995662.  This  did  not  include  
important  sectors,  such  as  agricultural  products663.  However,  these  were  all  part  
of   the   Turkish   accession   efforts   that   contributed   to   the   2005   accession  
negotiations.    
   The   growing   Turkish   economy   since   2002   paved   the   way   for   more  
integration  and  stronger   role   in   the   international  market.  Turkey  managed   to  
reach  out  to  new  markets  in  Asia,  Africa,  Latin  America,  and  the  Middle  East.  
For   example,   Turkish   trade   to   Asian   markets   (including   the   Middle   East)  
account   for   around   39.1%   of   Turkey’s   exports   in   2012664.   Furthermore,  
according   to  Erdal  Tanas  Karagol   (2013)  Turkey   reached   its  historic  highest  
volume   of   exports   at   $151.8   billion665.   Turkey   is   a  member   of   a   number   of  
important   international  economic  organizations,  such  as   the  Organization   for  
Economic   Cooperation   and   Development   (OECD),   the   World   Trade  
Organization   (WTO),   G20   Industrial   Nations,   and   many   other   international  
organizations   that   include   different   economic   efforts   and   relations.   Turkey’s  
economy  was  successful   in  gaining  its  international  position.  For  example,   in  
2002  when   the  AKP   government  was   first   established,   Turkey  was   the   26th  
biggest   economy   in   the   world   and   only   seven   years   later   in   2009   Turkey  
became   the  16th  biggest  economy666.  This  was  even  during  a   time  of  global  
economic  crisis.    
                                                                                                              
662  Hayati  Yazıcı,  “Turkey-­EU  relations  and  the  Customs  Union:  Expectations  Versus  the  
Reality,”  Turkish  Policy  Quarterly  11,  no.  1  (2012):  25-­37.      
663  Ibid,  34.    
664  Erdal  Tanas  Karagol,  “The  Turkish  Economy  during  the  Justice  and  Development  Party  
decade,”  insight  Turkey  15,  no.  4,  (2013):  125.    
665  Ibid.    
666  World  Bulletin,  “Turkish  economy  16th  biggest,  Greece  ranked  35,  IMF  report  says,”  
accessed  January  12,  2016,  http://www.worldbulletin.net/news/58497/turkish-­economy-­16th-­
biggest-­greece-­ranked-­35-­imf-­report-­says.    
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   Part   of   AKP’s   economic   success   was   the   recognition   to   build   new  
platforms  for  better  economic  relations  with  its  neighbouring  Middle  East.  Along  
with   the   Zero-­Problems   with   Neighbours   foreign   policy,   comes   economic  
relations  and  interdependence,  as  manifested  in  Davutoglu’s  work  and  writings  
pushing   for   further   regional   engagement667.   Economic   interdependence  was  
one   of   the   most   influential   concepts   represented   by   Davutoglu.   Economic  
interdependence   is   recognized  as  one  of   the  most   important  components  of  
Turkish   foreign   policy   particularly   with   its   neighbours668.   According   to  Murat  
Yesiltas   and   Ali   Balci   (2013)   the   AKP   push   for   economic   interdependence  
represent  “a  move  from  a  security-­based  foreign  policy  to  one  in  which  political  
and   economic   tools   are   highlighted,   and   which   is   based   on   economic  
interdependence   among   neighbouring   countries669.   Therefore,   since   2002,  
economic   relations   between   Turkey   and   Middle   Eastern   states   have  















                                                                                                              
667  Joshua  W.  Walker,  “The  sources  of  Turkish  Grand  Strategy-­‘Strategic  Depth’and  ‘Zero-­
Problems’  in  Context,”  in  Turkey's  Global  Strategy,  ed.,    Nicholas  Kitchen  (LSE  IDEAS,2011),  
6-­12.    
668  Murat  Yasiltas  and  Ali  Balci,  “A  dictionary  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  in  the  AK  Party  era:  A  
conceptual  map,”  Centre  for  Strategic  Research  (SAM),  no.  7  (2013):  20.    
669  Ibid.    
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Figure  2.  Turkey:  Trade  with  Arab  Countries  1990  -­  2008670    
  
Figure  2  above  illustrates  the  level  of  trade  growth  between  Turkey  and  
the  Arab  states  between  1990  and  2008.  It  clearly  shows  how  since  2002  the  
level  of  both  imports  and  exports  have  significantly  increased  reaching  around  
10.5  billion  dollars’  worth  of  imports  and  25  billion  dollars  of  exports.  This  shows  
how  Turkey  during  the  first   two  terms  of  AKP  government  enjoyed  a  healthy  
trade   surplus.   Furthermore,   this   demonstrates   that   the   AKP   has   significant  
economic  interests  in  the  Middle  East  and  the  Turkish  commitment  to  keeping  







                                                                                                              
670  Nader  Habibi  and  Joshua  W.  Walker,  “What  Is  Driving  Turkey’s  Reengagement  with  the  
Arab  World?,”  Crown  Centre  for  Middle  East  Studies,  no.  49  (2011):  2.    
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Figure  3.  Turkey:  Trade  balance  with   the  Arab  countries  and  with   the  entire  
world  1990  –  2008671    
  
The   graph   above   also   gives   us   important   insights   to   understand   the  
significance  of  Turkish  trade  with  the  Arab  countries  in  comparison  to  the  rest  
of   the   world.   For   example,   Turkey’s   largest   export  market   in   2008   was   the  
United  Arab  Emirates  (UAE)672.  Turkish  products  particularly  industrial  supplies  
became  heavily   present   in  Arab  markets   especially  with   products   like   steel,  
different   types   of   metal,   and   wooden   products.   However,   we   have   to  
understand  that  Turkish  exports  and  trade  in  general  went  through  fluctuations  
and  were  not  increasing  all  the  time.  For  example,  regarding  the  exports  to  the  
UAE,   the  2009   financial   crisis   in  Dubai   resulted   in   a  major   setback   in   trade  
relations  between  Turkey  and  the  UAE673.  However,  Turkish  exports  remained  
high  in  the  Middle  East  in  general.    
                                                                                                              
671  Ibid,  3.    
672  Ibid.    
673  Ibid.    
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   Turkey  managed   to   develop   a   number   of   free   trade   agreements  with  
countries  like  Egypt,  Syria,  Morocco,  Tunisia  and  many  others,  which  led  to  the  
significant  increase  of  both  economic  and  social  relations674.  Other  agreements  
included  the  abandonment  of  visa  requirements  for  entry  between  Turkey  and  
other  Arab  countries  that  enhanced  free  movement  of  citizens  and  paved  way  
for  more   tourism   in  Turkey  at   the   same   time675.  What   is  more,   a  number  of  
important  energy  (oil  and  gas)  regional  projects  were  developed.  This  included  
the   building   of   oil   and   gas   pipelines   linking   Turkey   and   other   major   Arab  
countries  to  European  markets  one  of  the  most  important  known  as  the  Euro-­
Arab  Mashreq  Gas  Market  Project,  aiming  to  develop  the  integration  of  regional  
energy   markets676.   Interestingly,   Turkey   also   managed   to   develop   energy  
agreements  and  plans  with  Iran  and  a  number  of  Turkish  companies  worked  in  
Iran  on  projects  of  both  construction  and  infrastructure677.  Therefore,  a  number  
of   scholars   saw   this   as   a   determining   factor   shaping   their   relations.   For  
instance,   some   stated   that   the   Turkish-­Iranian   economic   cooperation   on  
different  fields  have  played  an  important  role  in  Turkey’s  positive  behaviour  and  
welcoming  of  the  2009  Iranian  re-­election  of  President  Mahmoud  Ahmedinejad  
and  Turkish  vote  against  economic  sanctions   in  UN  security  Council  against  
Iran678.  The  AKP  government  aimed  at  strengthening  regional  cooperation  and  
                                                                                                              
674  European  Commission,  “Trade”,  accessed  January  12,  2016,  
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-­and-­regions/countries/turkey/.      
675  Nilgun  Arısan  Eralp,  “Turkey's  Visa  Policy:  Has  Turkey  given  up  its  demand  of  free  




676  Hurriyet,  “EU-­Turkey  agree  on  Arab  gas  pipeline  cooperation,”  Hurriyet.com.tr,  accessed  
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677  Andre  Bank  and  Roy  Karadag,  “The  Political  Economy  of  Regional  Power:  Turkey  under  
the  AKP,”  GIGA  Research  Unit:  Institute  of  Middle  East  Studies,  no.  204  (2012):  12.    
678  Ibid,  12-­13.    
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economic  interdependence  in  order  to  fulfil  its  promises  and  reach  its  goals.  A  
number   of   smaller   states   with   smaller   economies   in   the   Middle   East   have  
benefited   from  such  Turkish  activities  and  push   for  better   regional  economic  
cooperation.  Therefore,  it  can  be  argued  that  economic  authorities  in  the  Middle  
East  have  also  welcomed  Turkey’s  efforts  and  developed  policies  to  increase  
relations   and   economic   cooperation   with   Turkey.   The   AKP   government’s  
keenness   to   improving   Turkish-­Arab   relations   and   particularly   on   economic  
terms  have  been  very  noticeable,  which  to  a  large  extent  drew  a  lot  of  academic  
attention  to  analysing  the  role  of  Turkish  economic  interests  in  the  Middle  East  
that   shaped   Turkey’s   new   foreign   policy   approach   since   and   made   Turkey  
emerge  as  a  “Trading  State”679.  One  of  the  most  relevant  examples  used  in  the  
literature  is  that  Turkish  officials  have  drawn  more  attention  to  the  Middle  East  
compared   to   the  West.   According   to   the  Turkish  Ministry   of   Foreign  Affairs,  
between   the   years   of   2003   and   2011,   Turkish   officials,   most   notably   Mr.  
Erdogan,   have   paid   more   visits   to   Middle   Eastern   countries   compared   to  
European  countries,  for  example680.      
   From  the  interviews  conducted  as  part  of  the  fieldwork  for  this  thesis,  all  
interviewees   seem   to   have   agreed   on   the   importance   of   Turkish   economic  
interests  in  the  Middle  East.  For  example,  Professor  Birol  Akgun,  Chairman  of  
the  Institute  of  Strategic  Thinking  (SDE)  in  Ankara,  explained  that  with  many  of  
AKP  governments’  official  visits  to  the  Middle  East,  the  Prime  Minister  took  with  
him  a  number  of  important  businessmen  and  officials  from  the  financial  sector  
in   order   to   promote   economic   cooperation   and   create   new   business  
                                                                                                              
679  Kemal  Kirisci,  “The  transformation  of  Turkish  foreign  policy:  The  rise  of  the  trading  state,”  
New  Perspectives  on  Turkey,  no.  40  (2009):  29-­57.    
680  Habibi  and  Walker,  “What  Is  Driving  Turkey’s  Reengagement”,  5.    
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opportunities   that   benefit   both   sides681.   He   added,   “The   new   capitalist   and  
Anatolian   bourgeoisie   are  much  more   globalized.   They   helped   explore   new  
markets  in  the  Middle  East  and  other  places.  With  the  experience  of  exploring  
new  markets,   the   confidence  was  boosting  and  AKP  self-­confidence   too”682.  
Professor   Akgun   argued   that   due   to   this   combined   government   and   private  
sector   efforts   in   developing   Turkey’s   economy,   the   AKP   appeared   very  
successful,  the  economy  grew  significantly  and  everyone  in  Turkey  is  benefiting  
from  this  growth.  He  added  “The  total  national  income  and  GNP  have  tripled  in  
10  years  between  2002  and  2010”683.    
However,   Professor   Selcuk   Colakoglu,   Vice   President   at   USAK   the  
‘International  Strategic  Research  Organization’  and   the  director  of   the  USAK  
centre   for   Asia-­Pacific   Studies,   in   his   interview   stated,”   the   AKP   supported  
businessmen,   but   they   mainly   operated   independently.   Businessmen   and  
companies   made   in   many   cases   the   first   step   of   cooperation   with   other  
companies  in  other  countries  including  in  the  Middle  East”684.  Colakoglu  further  
argued  that  most  of  the  Turkish  business  circles  consist  of  small  and  medium  
enterprises,  so  they  acted  independently  including  NGOs  for  aid  purposes.  He  
added,  “Turkey’s  economy  is  a  private  economy,   this  means  that   there  have  
been  business  actors  and  NGO’s   from  Turkey  who  operated   independently”.  
Therefore,  it   is  important  here  to  point  out  that  agreeing  to  the  importance  of  
economic  interests  in  the  Middle  East  does  not  mean  that  Turkish-­Middle  East  
policy  is  only  based  on  economic  interests  and  was  not,  as  mentioned  above,  
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682  Ibid.    
683  Ibid.    684	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completely  directed  by  the  state.  This  will  however  be  further  discussed  with  
reference  to  other  interviewees  as  well  in  the  coming  sections.    
   With  the  emergence  and  development  of  the  popular  Revolutions  (Arab  
Spring)   since   2011,   new   challenges   came  with   it.   Turkey   had   put   so  many  
efforts  to  build  a  sustainable  political  and  economic  relations  and  cooperation  
since  2002.  The  new  AKP  government  applied  the  so  called  “Zero  Problems  
with  Neighbours  policy”  in  order  to  solve  long  standing  conflicts  between  Turkey  
and   its   close   neighbours   as   well   as   other   regional   Middle   Eastern   states.  
However,   this  Arab  Spring   represented  a  new   turning  point   for   the   future  of  
relations   between   Turkey   and   the  Middle   East.   The   AKP   government   have  
increased   economic   ties   and   political   relations   with   many   of   those   ruling  
dictators   for   a   long   time,   disregarding   its   democratic   and   liberal   values   for  
economic  and  political  benefits.  These  efforts  were  highly  affected  in  many  of  
those   turbulent  Arab   states.  As   a   result,   concerned  Arab   states   faced   huge  
economic   problems   and   weaknesses   and   Turkish   trade   volume   to   those  
countries  was  also  affected685.    
According  to  Engin  Sorhun  (2012),  “Arab  Spring  movements  have  bigger  
negative   impacts  on  Turkish  export  market   than  on   imports   from   the  Spring  
countries.  Arab  Spring  has  shrank  the  Turkish  export  demand  by  about  4%  on  
average   and   the   Turkish   import   demand   by   6%   on   average”686.   Turkish  
economic  interests  have  been  dramatically  affected  by  the  development  of  the  
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Arab  Spring  and  therefore   this  raises  many  questions   to  weather  Turkey  will  
remain  highly  interested  in  the  region  or  the  Middle  East  became  to  be  viewed  
as  a  source  of   trouble  again.  Turkey’s  position  at   the  beginning  of   the  Arab  
Spring  was  hesitant  and  was  not  sure  how  to  act  in  response  to  those  uprisings.  
Was  Turkey  quickly  willing  to  go  against   its   interests   in  those  Arab  countries  
that  required  extensive  efforts  and  cooperation?  Or  should  Turkey  support  the  
freedoms  and  liberty  of  those  angry  Arab  citizens?  That  was  a  tough  question  
to  answer  at  the  beginning  of  the  uprisings.  Soon  after,  Turkey  became  more  
in  line  with  supporting  the  demands  of  the  popular  uprisings,  risking  its  relations  
with  many  Arab  governments  particularly  with  those  directly  involved,  such  as  
Libya,  Egypt,  Syria  and  others.  The  Arab  Spring  has  even  affected  Turkey’s  
relations  with  Iran  over  Syria.  The  Egyptian  crisis  and  Turkish  support  for  the  
Muslim  Brotherhood  resulted  in  a  growing  tension  between  Turkey  and  some  
of  the  Gulf  states  particularly  Saudi  Arabia  (an  important  oil  exporting  economy  
and  importer  of  Turkish  products).    
Despite  the  negative  impact  on  Turkish  economy  and  economic  interests  
in  the  Middle  East  brought  about  by  the  Arab  Spring,  Turkey  remained  highly  
involved   in   the  affairs  of   the  Middle  East  and  particularly   in   the  affairs  of   the  
Arab  Spring  playing  a  central  role  in  Syria  for  example.  This  takes  us  back  to  
the   thesis’s   question   and   concern   about   the  main   causes   and  determinants  
behind   Turkish   foreign   policy.   If   Turkish   foreign   policy   change   towards   the  
Middle  East  was  driven  by  economic  interests,  then  what  explains  the  current  
Turkish  deep  foreign  policy  involvement  in  the  Middle  East?  Is  there  actually  a  
single   factor   shaping   Turkish-­Middle   Eastern   foreign   policy?   Or   are   there  
multiple  factors?  These  questions  develop  our  critical  thinking  and  importance  
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of   considering   other   variables  when   analysing  Turkish   foreign   policy.   These  
questions  lie  at  the  heart  of  this  thesis  and  will  therefore  be  reflected  throughout  
this  study  in  order  to  reach  a  solid  conclusion.    
  
1.2	  Economic	  interests	  as	  causes	  behind	  Turkish	  foreign	  policy	  change	  towards	  its	  
Middle	  Eastern	  neighbours	  
  
A   number   of   prominent   scholars   in   the   field   of   Turkish   foreign   policy  
studies  have  been  analysing  the  shift  in  Turkish  foreign  policy  since  2002  from  
an  economic  perspective.  Arguments  highlighting  the  pragmatic  and  materialist  
side  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  were  mostly  based  on  the  neo-­liberal  and  neo-­
liberal   institutionalist   theoretical   interpretations   of   international   relations.   The  
purpose   of   this   section   is   to   analyse   some   of   the   different   explanations  
presented   in   the   literature   supporting   the   role   of   economics   in   determining  
Turkish  foreign  policy  since  2002.  This  is  important  as  it  paves  way  for  us  to  
examine  their  reliability  in  understanding  Turkish  foreign  policy  change  and  to  
be  able  to  test  such  interpretations  through  Process  Tracing  methodology  in  the  
following  section.  Therefore,  the  aim  of  this  section  is  to  understand  the  different  
explanations  based  on  economic  interests  in  this  field  of  study,  by  whom,  and  
based   on  what   evidence   to   support   their   arguments.   It   is   important   to   note  
however   that   I   will   engage   critically   and   examine   these   arguments   in   the  
following  section.    
   Zı̇ya  Onis  (2011)  in  his  work  Multiple  Faces  of  the  “New”  Turkish  Foreign  
Policy:  Underlying  Dynamics  and  a  Critique,  criticized  the  way  in  which  some  
scholars   in   the   literature  based   their   understanding  of  Turkish   foreign  policy  
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shift   towards   its   neighbours   within   an   ideological   and   identity   context687.  
Instead,  Onis  argued  that  it  is  important  to  look  at  the  economic  side  of  Turkish  
foreign  policy  to  better  understand  its  recent  “shift  of  axis”.  The  author  stated,  
“there   are   solid   political   economy   fundamentals   and   legitimate   reasons   for  
Turkey  to  pursue  a  multi-­  dimensional  and  more  assertive  foreign  policy  in  the  
emerging  multi-­polar  world  system”688.  He  argued  that  Turkish  foreign  policy  is  
no   longer   in   the   hands   of   diplomats   and   politicians   only;;   instead   recent  
decisions  have  been   increasingly  driven   from  below  by  key  economic  actors  
and  civil  society689.  Economic  actors  and  key  business  groups  in  Turkey  have  
been  working  very  closely  with  the  AKP  government  as  part  of  the  project  of  
building  a  strong  Turkish  economy.  The  Turkish  government  cannot  work  on  its  
own  to  build  a  strong  economy  to  perform  well  even  during  critical  international  
economic  crisis.  On  the  other  hand,  Onis  argue  that  the  2008-­2009  international  
financial   crisis  also  played  an   important   part   in   “accelerating   the   shift   of   the  
economic  axis  of   the  global   system   from   the   ‘west’   to   the   ‘east’   or   from   the  
‘north’   to   the   ‘south’690.  For  example,  China  and   the  BRIC  countries  became  
much  stronger  as  a  result  of  this  international  crisis691.  As  a  result,  “The  West,  
especially  the  EU,  turned  out  to  be  a  less  attractive  destination  in  terms  of  purely  
economic  benefits  while  the  rising  “East”  or  “South”  appeared  to  be  increasingly  
more  attractive  in  terms  of  future  trade  and  investment”692.  For  Onis,  these  were  
all  contributing  economic  factors  that  accelerated  Turkish  foreign  policy  shift,  
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which   already   started   since   2002.   Overall,   the   author   argues   that   Turkish  
foreign   policy   has   been   affected   by   the   changing   global   economic   context  
paving   the   way   to   the   opening   of   new   global   markets   as   well   as   to   the  
diversification  of  Turkish  economy.    
   Similarly,   Faruq  Ekmekci   and  Abdulkadir  Yildirim   (2012)   in   their  work  
The  AKP  and  the  Eastern  Turn  (?)  of  Turkey:  An  Economic  Analysis,  were  also  
highly  critical  of  the  ideational  claims  in  the  literature  and  argued  that  there  are  
no  pro-­Muslim  and  anti-­Western  trends  driving  Turkish  foreign  policy,  instead  
AKP’s   foreign   policy   has   been   influenced   by   “economic   rationale”693.   They  
added,  “As  a  result  of  increasing  integration  with  the  global  economy,  a  rising  
Anatolian  bourgeoisie  and  middle  class,  a  relative  desecuritization  of  Turkish  
foreign  policy,  Turkey  in  recent  years  have  transformed  into  what  one  scholar  
called,  a  ‘trading  state’.”694.  They  argued  that  Turkey’s  openness  and  increase  
of  relations  with  its  neighbouring  countries  in  the  region  have  been  driven  by  
AKP’s  aim   to  enlarging  and  diversifying  both   the  market   for  external  energy  
supply  and  the  market  for  Turkish  goods695.    
Ekmekci  and  Yildirim  presented  important  statistical  data  illustrating  the  
significant  increase  in  Turkish  trade  relations  with  non-­Western  countries  and  
particularly  the  Middle  East.  They  argued  that  if  we  are  to  take  the  Islamist  and  
anti-­Western  ideology  arguments  into  account,  this  would  mean  that  Turkey’s  
Islamist  government  would  be  more   likely   to   reduce  economic   relations  with  
pro-­US  countries  and  increase  with  anti-­US  countries  for  example.  However,  
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according  to   them,  statistical  evidence  showed  that  Turkey’s  economic   trade  
relations  with  US-­friendly  states  have  drastically   increased  to  454%  between  
the  years  of  2002  and  2010696.  Therefore,  they  stated,  “our  findings  refute  that  
Turkey’s  Eastern  turn  takes  place  at  the  expense  of  relations  with  the  West  and  
lend  support  to  the  argument  that  the  AKP’s  foreign  policy  is  guided  more  by  
an  economic  rationale  than  by  ideology”697.    
   Furthermore,   other   analysts   looked   at   the   role   of   both   political   and  
economic   factors   significantly   contributing   to   each   other   and   increasing  
Turkey’s  overall   global   position.  For  example,   the  work  of  Abdulkadir  Sivan,  
Savas  Genc,  Davut  Taser,  and  Sinem  Atakul  (2013),  titled  The  Effect  of  New  
Turkish   Foreign   Policy   on   International   Trade,   is   particularly   useful.   They  
illustrated  the  important  relationship  between  the  political  and  economic  sides  
of  Turkish  foreign  policy  that  complement  each  other698.  In  other  words,  Turkey  
utilizes  its  economic  strength  in  order  to  fulfil  certain  political  goals.  Particularly,  
their  study  looks  at  the  role  of  Recep  Tayyip  Erdogan’s  foreign  political  visits  in  
influencing  Turkey’s  international  trade.  They  argued  that  the  AKP’s  aim  was  to  
help  recover  the  country’s  economic  crisis  of  2001  and  understood  that  it  would  
not  be  possible  to  do  that  by  relying  on  identity  politics.  Instead,  AKP’s  foreign  
policy   was   shaped   by   economic   rational   goals.      Therefore,   Turkey’s   “zero  
problems  with  neighbours”  foreign  policy  approach  and  unproblematic  relations  
with  neighbouring  states  in  the  region  was  designed  for  economic  benefits699.  
They  stated,  “Turkey  discovers  new  markets  with  the  help  of  the  relationships  
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it  establishes  through  its  Muslim  counterparts;;  and  in  these  new  markets,  it  finds  
new  zones  of  influence  and  bilateral  relations.  International  trade  is  one  of  the  
leading  instruments  of  Turkish  foreign  policy.  This  is  not  merely  an  incidental  
issue;;   it   forms   a   new   platform   that   accelerates   bilateral   relations   on   a   real  
political  field.  Increasing  mutual  dependence  through  trade  has  enabled  Turkey  
to  establish  more  predictable  and  sustainable  relations  with  other  countries”  700.  
The  authors  asserted  that  the  noticeable  increase  in  Turkish  relations  with  the  
Middle  East  and   the  greater   Islamic  world  should  not  be   interpreted  as  shift  
away   from  Turkey’s   traditional   allies   and   pro-­Western   foreign   policy   instead  
Turkey’s  heavy  regional  involvement  and  increased  relations  seek  to  achieve  
better  regional  security  and  stability  that  will  highly  contribute  to  better  economic  
policies.  In  addition,  the  overall  hypothesis  of  the  article  suggests  that  with  more  
political  and  diplomatic  visits  taking  place  between  Turkey  and  any  other  state,  
an  increase  in  trade  relations  is  expected.    
   Moreover,  Mustafa  Kutlay  (2011)  in  his  work  Economy  as  the  ‘Practical  
Hand’  of  ‘New  Turkish  Foreign  Policy’:  A  Political  Economy  Explanation,  looked  
at   Turkish   foreign   policy   from   a   political   economy   point   of   view   particularly  
through   using   the   functionalist   and   interdependence   approaches701.   Kutlay  
argues   that   in   post-­2001   Turkey,   the   internationalization   of   the   ‘Anatolian  
Tigers’   has   been   the   ‘practical   hand’   of   Turkish   foreign   policy702.   Like  many  
scholars   sharing   similar   approach,   the  author   has  been  highly   critical   of   the  
overemphasis   on   “security-­based”   and   “identity-­based”   approaches   in   the  
literature   in   understanding   Turkish   foreign   policy.   Kutlay   stated,   “In   recent  
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foreign   policy   initiatives,   Turkey   seems   to   be   following   the   functionalist  
framework   so   as   to   exploit   economic   opportunities   and   interdependence   in  
further   institutionalizing   its   relations   with   neighbours”703.   He   argued   that   the  
2001  economic   crisis   influenced  all   Turks   and  paved  way   for   important   and  
“radical”   reforms   since   then.  New  Turkish   reformists  were   supported  by   key  
business  associations,  such  as  TUSIAD,  MUSIAD,  and  SIADs704.  Furthermore,  
Kutlay   looked   at   the   important   role   of   pro-­EU   reforms   that   enabled   further  
economic   developments.   In   addition,   he   argued   that   the   increasing   Turkish  
openness  towards  the  Middle  East  and  Central  Asia  was  highly  promoted  by  
the  newly  emerging  Anatolian  bourgeoisie705.  Furthermore,  Turkish  business  
associations   supported   Turkey’s   new   foreign   policy   approach   towards   its  
neighbours.  Kutlay’s  main  argument  is  that  Turkey’s  main  driving  force  for  the  
new   soft-­power   approach   has   been   the   economy   and   trade706.   He   stated,  
“Turkish  finance  capital  has  turned  out  to  be  the  practical  hand  of  Turkish  policy-­
makers  in  the  region”707.    
   In  addition,  another  important  work  that  supports  the  economic  notion  of  
Turkish  foreign  policy  in  the  AKP  era  is  The  Transformation  of  Turkish  Foreign  
Policy:  The  Rise  of  the  Trading  State  (2009)  by  Kemal  Kirisci.  His  work  offered  
a  conceptual  framework  based  on  the  notion  of  the  “trading  state”  by  Richard  
Rosecrance  as  well  as  the  “two-­level  diplomatic  games”  by  Robert  Putnam  to  
emphasize   economic   interests’   effects   on   Turkish   foreign   policy708.   Kirisci  
stated,   “behind  current  Turkish   foreign  policy   lies   the   rise  of  a   trading  state;;  
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bearing  this  in  mind  will  help  analysts  to  understand  Turkish  foreign  policy  better  
in   regard   to   countries   in   its   immediate   neighbourhood   as   well   as   countries  
further  away”709.    He  argued  that  the  emergence  of  Turkey  as  a  trading  state  is  
not  new.  In  fact  this  can  be  traced  back  to  the  era  of  Turgut  Ozal  in  the  1980s.  
This  was   interrupted  and  challenged  by  the  military  establishment.  However,  
the  AKP  managed  to  bring  back  the  trading  state  and  reached  new  levels710.  
On  the  other  hand,  Kirisci  stressed  out  that  the  current  Turkish  trading  state  has  
not  yet  reached  its  goal  and  is  facing  a  number  of  challenges.  Those  challenges  
are   coming   from   both   domestic   and   international   levels.   Domestic   political  
instability  and  tensions  between  the  ruling  party  and  secular  elites  is  seen  as  
one   of   the   main   challenges   to   the   rising   trading   state.   On   the   other   hand,  
international   economic   crises   and   political   conflicts   i.e.   the  Arab  Spring   and  
Syrian  crisis  have  had  a  direct  impact  on  Turkish  trade  and  economic  relations  
with  many   Arab   states   involved   in   these   revolutions.   This   affected   Turkey’s  
economic  performance  and   its   currency   levels   in   the  global   financial  market  
especially   with   the   growing   threat   of   a   “spill   over”   and   growing   numbers   of  
Syrian   refugees.      Therefore,   it   can   be   argued   that   with  more   domestic   and  
international   political   and   economic   stability,   the   trading   state   is   going   to  
survive.    
   Overall,   all   of   the   works   mentioned   above   share   the   idea   that   the  
literature   on   Turkish   foreign   policy   has   paid   inadequate   attention   to   the  
economic  role  in  Turkish  foreign  policy.  Furthermore,  they  all  share  the  fact  that  
economic  considerations  have  represented  a  major  derive  behind  Turkey’s  new  
foreign  policy  approach  under  the  AKP  government.  This  shows  that  there  is  a  
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growing  academic  attention  focusing  on  economic  aspects  of  Turkish  foreign  
policy,   while   at   the   same   time   contributing   further   to   the   current   academic  
theoretical   split   in   the   literature   i.e.   Ideational   vs  Pragmatic   explanations,   or  
realists,  neo-­liberalists,  and  constructivist  theoretical  perspectives.  Although  no  
one   denies   Turkey’s   economic   commitments   and   international   trade,   it   is  
important  to  question  and  examine  the  argument  that  economic  interests  have  
been   the   “main”   deriving   force   shaping   Turkish   foreign   policy   since   2002.  
Therefore,   the   following  section  will  offer  an  examination  of  such  arguments  
and  assess  their  validity  and  plausibility  in  understanding  Turkish  foreign  policy  
towards  the  Middle  East  during  the  AKP  government.    
1.3	  Can	  economic-­‐based	  explanations	  tell	  us	  everything?	  	  
  
Since   the   AKP   took   power   in   2002,   its’   leaders   regularly   emphasized   the  
importance   of   developing   Turkey’s   economy   and   recovering   from   the   crisis.  
Furthermore,   Ahmet   Davutoglu   stressed   the   importance   of   developing  
economic   regional  and   international  cooperation.  Economic   interdependence  
for  example  was  one  of  Davutoglu’s  central  themes  in  his  works.  Therefore,  the  
large  economic  growth,  notably  between  2002  and  2010,  shows   the   level  of  
AKP’s  keenness  in  achieving  their  economic  goals.  On  foreign  policy  terms,  as  
mentioned  above,  there  were  significant  cooperation  and  trading  agreements  
and   efforts   made   to   strengthen   Turkey’s   interdependence   with   its   Middle  
Eastern  neighbours  and  economic  benefits.  Therefore,  No  one  can  deny  AKP’s  
economic  interests  and  their  effect  on  Turkish  foreign  policy  making.  However,  
it  is  important  to  identify  whether  economic  concerns  were  the  only  driving  force  
behind  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  transformation  and  notably  towards  the  Middle  
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East,  as  some  may  have  suggested  in  the  literature.  The  main  question  that  we  
need  consider  is  to  what  extent  did  economic  interests  shape  Turkey’s  foreign  
policy   towards   the  Middle   East?   To   answer   this   question,   it   is   important   to  
examine   the   claims   that   support   such   notions   of   Turkish   foreign   policy   and  
assess  their  comprehensiveness.    Therefore,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  critics  
and  counter  arguments  as  well  as  empirical  evidence  and  interview  data  that  
can  help  us  evaluate  whether  economic  interests  were  the  main  sources  behind  
Turkish  foreign  policy  change  towards  the  Middle  East  since  2002.  
A  large  number  of  the  works  that  looked  at  Turkish  foreign  policy  from  
an  economic  perspective   relied  on   the  neoliberal   theoretical   interpretation  of  
international  relations,  focusing  on  economic  significance  for  states  interests.  
They   also   highlighted   the   role   of   interstate   cooperation   and   “free   market”  
economy   for   economic   benefits   in   shaping   states   behaviour.   The   neoliberal  
approach   also   seems   to   focus   on   the   idea   that   economic   cooperation   is  
important   as   it   will   create   institutions   and   regimes   that   can   also   help   solve  
conflicts711.   However,   this   idea   is   challenged   by   realists   for   example,   who  
instead  view  security   (with  military  accounts)  as   the  most   important  goal   for  
states  that  shape  their  behaviour  and  relations712.  For  example,  scholars  who  
highlight  the  security  dimension  of  Turkish  foreign  policy,  draw  attention  to  the  
growing   regional   security  problems  especially   imposed  by   the  Kurdish   issue  
and   other   conflicts,   arguing   that   they   were   the   central   driving   force   behind  
Turkey’s  “Zero  Problem  with  Neighbours”  approach.  It  can  be  argued  that  the  
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2016,  http://www.globalissues.org/article/39/a-­primer-­on-­neoliberalism.    
712  Emily  Tripp,  “Realism:  The  domination  of  security  studies,”  e-­international  relations  
studies,  2013,  accessed  January  15,  2016,  http://www.e-­ir.info/2013/06/14/realism-­the-­
domination-­of-­security-­studies/.    
305	  	  
work   of   scholars   who   represent   the   realist   understanding   of   foreign   policy  
making,   suggest   that   this   new   foreign   policy   approach   highlighted   Turkey’s  
security   concerns   as   well,   aiming   to   eliminate   long   standing   conflicts   and  
security  threats.  This  highlights  the  fact  that  the  new  AKP  government  also  had  
key  security  concerns  on  their  agenda  and  not  primarily  economic  ones,  which  
will  be   further  analysed   in   the  following  section  of   this  chapter  on  the  role  of  
security  concerns.    
   Moreover,   another   critique   come   from   the   fact   that   neoliberal  
approaches  tend  to  ignore  the  role  of  power  and  its  centrality  in  states  agenda.  
AKP   officials   and   mainly   Ahmet   Davutoglu   asserted   that   Turkey   aims   to  
become  a  regional  and  global  power  and  a  key  international  player713.  Turkey’s  
power  comes  from  a  number  of  aspects  starting  from  its  geo-­strategic  position  
to   its   military   capability.   An   important   element   of   AKP’s   aim   of   building   a  
regional  power  also  stems  from  the  idea  of  regional  influence  and  political  roles  
in  key  events.  Here,  realists  argue  that  power  is  also  a  central  theme  in  Turkish  
foreign  policy  under   the  AKP  government714.  This  was   translated   in  Turkey’s  
opening   of   new   zones   for   influence   in   the   region   as   well   as   its’   leading   in  
mediation  efforts  in  an  attempt  to  increase  its  role  and  position.  On  the  other  
hand,   constructivists   for   example   criticize   this   neoliberal   approach   for   not  
recognizing   the   “structure”  behind  state  behaviours715.  The   roles  of   ideology  
                                                                                                              
713  Republic  of  Turkey  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  “Foreign  Minister  Davutoğlu  stresses  that  
the  mission  of  young  generation  Turkish  diplomats  is  to  transform  Turkey  into  a  global  power,”  
mfa.gov.tr,  2011,  accessed  January  15,  2016,  http://www.mfa.gov.tr/foreign-­minister-­
davutoglu-­stresses-­that-­the-­mission-­of-­young-­generation-­turkish-­diplomats-­is-­to-­transform-­
turkey-­into-­a-­global-­power.en.mfa.      
714  Fevzi  Sarac,  “Turkish  Foreign  Policy  in  Theory  and  Practice,”  The  Washington  Review  of  
Turkish  &  Eurasian  Affairs,  2010,  accessed  January  15,  2016,  
http://www.thewashingtonreview.org/turkey-­foreign-­policy/.      
715  Yucel  Bozdaglioglu,  Turkish  Foreign  Policy  and  Turkish  Identity:  A  Constructivist  Approach  
(Routledge,  2004).    
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and  identity  in  domestic  politics  of  Turkey  are  very  important  to  consider  as  they  
do  have  an  effect  on  foreign  policy  making.  Constructivists  in  this  field  of  study  
emphasize  the  importance  of  national  identity  and  the  ideology  of  the  new  elite  
in  affecting  the  process  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  making716.        
   Apart   from   the   theoretical  debate   in   this   literature,  another   interesting  
fact   that   needs   to   be   considered   is   that   part   of   Turkey’s   assertive   and  
multidimensional   foreign   policy  was   a   noticeable   increase   in   Turkish-­African  
relations,  also  referred  to  as  the  “African  Initiative”717.  Although,  Turkey  tried  to  
develop  economic  ties  with  African  countries,  some  argued  that  a  number  of  
African  countries  that  Turkey  opened  new  embassies  in,  such  as  Somalia  for  
example,  do  not  have  the  basic  economic  platform  to  develop  cooperation  and  
may  in  fact  cost  Turkey  in  aid  and  humanitarian  issues  a  lot.  According  to  World  
Bulletin  (2013),  Ahmet  Davutoglu  stated,  “The  humanitarian  dimension  of  the  
initiatives   launched   by  Turkey   is   as   important   as   the   economic   and   political  
dimensions,"   he   added.   "Today   every   Turkish   embassy   which   is   opened   in  
Africa,   every   businessman,   every   non-­governmental   organization   and   the  
Turkish  Cooperation   and  Coordination  Agency   (TIKA)   have   carried   out   their  
projects  in  terms  of  humanitarian  diplomacy"718.  Davutoglu  also  asserted  that,  
“Turkey  has  not  been  involved  in  Africa  merely  to  develop  its  national  strategies  
and  display   its  economic  and  political  power,  but   rather   to  also  share   in   the  
problems  of  the  African  people”719.  
                                                                                                              
716  Yucel  Bozdaglioglu,  “Modernity,  Identity  and  Turkey's  Foreign  Policy,”  Insight  Turkey  10,  
no.  1  (2008):  55-­76.    
717  Hasan  Kanbolat,  “Turkey’s  African  Initiative,”  Todays  Zaman,  2013,  accessed  January  16,  
2016,  http://www.todayszaman.com/columnists_turkeys-­african-­initiative_304018.html.    
718  World  Bulletin,  “Number  of  Turkish  embassies  in  Africa  reaches  34,”  Worldbulletin.net,  
2013,  accessed  January  16,  2016,  
http://www.worldbulletin.net/servisler/haberYazdir/116850/haber.      
719  Ibid.    
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  In  the  interview  with  Professor  Mesut  Ozcan,  chairman  of  the  Foreign  
Ministry  Diplomacy  Academy   and  Advisor   to   the  Minister   of   Foreign  Affairs,  
stated,   “Turkey  opened  embassies   in  many  countries   that  do  not  offer  much  
economic  benefits  like  the  counties  in  Africa  where  Turkey  is  giving  more  than  
is  receiving  from  those  regions”720.  He  added  “Turkey  wants  to  have  a  say  in  
different  international  issues  and  become  globally  represented”721.  This  gives  
us  the  understanding  that  Turkey  has  a  political   intention  by  its  expansion  of  
diplomatic  representation  and  relations  with  many  countries  around  the  world.  
Prof.   Ozcan   argued   that   such   relations   would   later   potentially   allow  
businessmen   and   companies   to   recognize   each   other   and   build   economic  
ties722.  This  is  also  because  Turkey  is  not  rich  in  terms  of  its  natural  resources.  
Turkey  became  increasingly  known  for  its  intervention  in  Africa  and  particularly  
in  areas  of  humanitarian  crises  and  need  for  aid  and  assistance723.    
On  the  other  hand,  scholars  and  analysts  who  view  Turkish  foreign  policy  
from  an  economic  perspective  seem  to  ignore  the  role  of  different  international  
political  factors  that  may  have  contributed  to  the  development  in  Turkish  foreign  
policy   under   the   AKP   government.   One   of   the   most   important   international  
actors  that  play  a  central  role  in  Turkey’s  foreign  relations  and  policy  particularly  
regarding   the   Middle   East   has   been   the   United   States   of   America.   In   an  
international  Conference  held  in  the  University  of  Oxford  titled  Turkey’s  Foreign  
Policy   in  a  Changing  World:  Old  Alignments  and  New  Neighborhood   (2010),  
                                                                                                              
720  Mesut  Ozcan,  interview  by  author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  March  18,  2014.    
721  Ibid.    
722  Ibid.    
723  Charles  Kagwanja,  “Turkey  in  Somalia:  Building  relations  using  brotherhood,  aid  and  




Omer  Taspinar  in  his  lecture  on  The  US  and  the  New  Turkish  Policy,  argued  
that  Turkey  “enters  the  US’s  field  of  vision  either  when  it  moves  closer  to  the  
Middle  East   or,   when   Turkey   plays   a  more   activist   foreign   policy   in   its   own  
region”724.    
He  added,  since  9/11,  for  example,  The  U.S  had  Turkey  on  its  agenda  
and  had  a  view  that  Turkey  can  play  a  good  democratic  model  for  the  Muslim  
World,  which  according  to  Taspinar  was  in  line  with  Davutoglu’s  and  he  AKP  
vision725.  Furthermore,  the  European  Union  has  been  a  key  international  player  
and  high  in  the  Turkish  agenda  for  a  long  time.  Since  the  AKP  took  power  in  
2002,   government   officials   expressed   their   commitments   to   joining   the  
European   Union   and   fulfilling   the   Copenhagen   Criteria726.   Turkey   received  
increasing  normative  political  pressures  regarding  its  conflict  with  Armenia  and  
affected  Turkish-­Armenian  relations  along  with  other  countries  involved  in  this  
historical   conflict   most   notably   Azerbaijan727.   Furthermore,   Turkey   also  
received   pressure   regarding   its   relations   with   Greece   and   Cyprus   issue728.  
Overall,   it   has   been   widely   shared   that   the   European   Union   has   been   a  
contributing  factor  to  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  transformation.  Professor  Serhat  
Erkemen,  Head  of  Department  of  International  Relations  at  Kırşehir  Ahi  Evran  
University   and   Middle   East   advisor   at   ORSAM   ‘Centre   for   Middle   Eastern  
Strategic  Studies’,  in  his  interview  argued  that  we  cannot  ignore  the  role  of  the  
                                                                                                              
724  Omer  Taspinar,  “The  US  and  the  new  Turkish  policy”,  in  Turkey’s  Foreign  Policy  in  a  
Changing  World:  Old  Alignments  and  New  Neighborhood,  (Oxford  International  Conference,  
April,  30  –  May,  2,  2010),  p.  13,  accessed  January  16,  2016,  
https://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/reportfromtfpconf.pdf    
725  Ibid.    
726  Republic  of  Turkey  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  “Turkey-­EU  relations,”  mfa.gov.tr,  2011,  
accessed  January  16,  2016,  http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-­between-­turkey-­and-­the-­
european-­union.en.mfa.    
727  Ozlem  Terzi,  The  Influence  of  the  European  Union  on  Turkish  Foreign  Policy  (Ashgate  
Publishing,  Ltd.,  2013),  89.    
728  Ibid.    
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EU   as   an   external   actor   influencing   Turkey’s   foreign   policy729.   He   added,   “I  
agree  that  Turkey’s  policy  in  the  Middle  East  has  been  important  to  Turkish-­EU  
relations.   Turkey   is   trying   to   help   improve   its   position   in   Europe   and   its  
accession  process  also  in  its  Middle  East  approach,  especially  in  the  first  two  
terms  of  AKP  government”730.  Other  arguments  in  this  field  of  study  included  
that  there  has  been  a  Europeanization  of  Turkish  Foreign  Policy731,  while  others  
stressed  Turkey’s  Middle  East  approach  as  “Stretching  the  Bow  Towards  the  
East  so  that  the  Arrow  can  hit  the  West”732,  which  will  be  further  analysed  and  
examined  in  the  following  chapter.        
Therefore,  we  cannot  understand  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  transformation  
just   from  an  economic  perspective.  There  are  other   important   domestic  and  
international   factors   that   influenced   Turkey’s   foreign   policy   and   particularly  
towards   the   region.   The   economic   driven   approaches   fail   to   explain   some  
foreign  policy  decisions,  such  as  the  deterioration  of  relations  with  Israel  and  
support  for  Hamas  in  Gaza  and  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  in  Egypt  for  examples.  
Although  economic  interests  have  been  central  to  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  goals,  
as  mentioned  above,  there  are  other  international  factors  and  events  that  highly  
contributed  to  Turkey’s  approach  to  the  Middle  East  as  well.  Therefore,  it  can  
be   argued   that   understanding   Turkey’s   foreign   policy   approach   towards   the  
Middle   East   since   2002   from   an   economic   perspective   is   useful,   but   fail   to  
explain   other   political   and   non-­material   aspects   of   Turkish-­Middle   East  
                                                                                                              
729  Serhat  Erkemen,  interview  by  author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  March  21,  2014.    
730  Ibid.    
731  Meltem  Muftuler-­‐Baç  and  Yaprak  Gursoy,  “Is  There  a  Europeanization  of  Turkish  Foreign  
Policy?  An  Addendum  to  the  Literature  on  EU  Candidates,”  Turkish  Studies  11,  issue.  3  
(2010):  405-­427.    
732  Haoues  Taguia,  “Turkey:  Stretching  the  Bow  Towards  the  East  so  that  the  Arrow  can  hit  
the  West,”  Al-­Jazeera  Centre  for  Studies,  2011,  accessed  January  16,  2016,  
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relations.  Hence,  it  can  be  said  that  some  scholars  have  overemphasized  the  
role  of  economic  interests  and  failed  to  take  into  account  other  factors  in  their  
analysis.  On  the  other  hand,  one  cannot  fully  understand  Turkish  foreign  policy  
under   the  AKP  government  without   including   the   role  of  economic   interests.  
Therefore,  this  contributes  to  recognizing  the  need  for  adopting  a  balanced  and  
holistic  approach  in  this  field  of  study.    
Going  back  to  interviews  and  participants’  ideas  on  the  role  of  economic  
interests  in  Turkish  foreign  policy  change  towards  the  Middle  East,  Dr.  Saban  
Kardas,   President   of   ORSAM   ‘Middle   East   Strategic   Research   Centre’   and  
faculty  member  at  the  department  of  International  Relations  at  TOBB  University  
of  Economics  and  Technology  in  Ankara,  argued  that  economic  interests  have  
always   been   key   to   Turkish   foreign   policy733.   He   stated,   “AKP   support   for  
economic  interdependency  and  trade  with  the  Middle  East  and  other  regions  in  
the  world  also  reflect  the  domestic  economic  transformation  in  Turkey”.  Here  
Dr,  Kardas  is  linking  domestic  economic  developments  with  external  economic  
interests  of   the  state.  However,  he  argued  that  economic   interests   is  not   the  
only  feature  in  Turkish-­Middle  East  relations,  there  are  other  key  elements  that  
contributed  to  Turkey’s  regional  openness,  such  as  the  aim  to  increase  political  
role   and   influence.   Kardas   further   stated,   “Yes   economic   interests   are   very  
important  and  Turkey  wants  to  benefit  from  the  Middle  East,  but  this  is  not  the  
only   cause   to  Turkey’s   regional   re-­engagement   “,   suggesting   that   economic  
interests   represent  one  of   the  main  causes  behind   increased  Turkish-­Middle  
East  relations  and  Turkish  regional  engagement.    
                                                                                                              
733  Saban  Kardas,  interviewed  by  author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  October  13,  2014.    
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Moreover,   Professor   Murat   Yesiltas,   Director   of   Security   Studies   at  
SETA,  a  member  of  ORMER   ‘Centre   for  Middle  Eastern  Studies  at  Sakarya  
University,  and  a  faculty  member  in  the  department  of  International  Relations  
at  Sakarya,  agreed  to  the  importance  of  economic  ties  that  Turkey  built  with  its  
Middle  Eastern  neighbours  and  argued  that  the  AKP  has  adopted  a  “win-­win”  
strategy734.   He   stated,   “With   more   economic   ties,   more   social   and   cultural  
awareness   and   understanding   of   each   other   will   emerge.   And   with   more  
understanding   and   social   connectedness,   more   economic   relations   will   be  
favored   in  return.”  Yasiltas  argued  that   the  AKP  came  at  a   time  where  there  
was  major  economic  crisis  and  aimed  at  fixing  this  problem.  Therefore,  a  key  
objective   in   their   approach   was   to   increase   economic   interdependency   and  
benefits  with  “everyone”.  However,  Yasiltas  also  recognizes  the  role  of  other  
non-­economic  factors  behind  Turkish  foreign  policy  change.  For  example,  he  
highlighted  the  central   role  of  Professor  Ahmet  Davutoglu  (the  current  Prime  
Minister)  and  argued  that  Davutoglu  is  a  very  interesting  figure  in  the  making  of  
Turkey’s  new  foreign  policy  approaches  towards  the  Middle  East  and  the  world  
in  general.  He  added,   “The  principles   introduced  by  Davutoglu   reflect  AKP’s  
core  thinking  and  foreign  policy  aims”.  Suggesting  that  Davutoglu’s  role  as  a  
key  individual  decision  maker  has  been  very  influential  and  played  a  critical  role  
in  transforming  this  new  Turkish  foreign  policy  approach.    
Similarly,   Dr   Mehmet   Ozkan,   Advisor   and   Researcher   to   SETA  
specialized   in  Political  Science  and   International  Relations  and  an  editor   for  
“Insight  Turkey”  at  SETA,  argued  that  Turkish  economic  relations  in  the  Middle  
East  help  benefit  other  political  and  social  aspects  between  the  two  sides735.  
                                                                                                              
734  Murat  Yasiltas,  interviewed  by  author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  October  14,  2014.  	  
735  Mehmet  Ozkan,  Interviewed  by  Author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  March  17,  2014.    
312	  	  
He  stated,  “You  mainly  know  people  by  trading  with  them.  While  knowing  them,  
you  create  a  social  bound  that  is  beneficial  for  both  sides  for  a  long  term”.    He  
added,   “There  were   different   levels   of   economic   relations   depending   on   the  
country.   For   example,   countries   like   Egypt,   Sudan,   Syria,   and   Iraq   Turkey  
aimed   at   increasing   its   trade   to   those   countries   more   than   expecting   their  
investments  in  Turkey  like  the  Gulf.  However,  when  asked  about  the  emphasis  
on  the  economic  role  as  a  cause  of   foreign  policy  change,  he  replied  “Every  
country  maintain   some   economic   aims   and   external   trade.   However,   in   the  
Turkish  case,  although  economic  factors  take  a  big  share,  they  cannot  tell  us  
everything   on   their   own”.   He   gave   an   example   of   the   Turkish   diplomatic  
mediation   efforts   and   argued   that   economic   factors   cannot   give   a   sufficient  
enough  explanation  of  such  foreign  policy  behaviour  without  considering  other  
political  domestic  and  external  factors  along  with  economic  ones.    
In   addition,   Dr.   Yahya   ibn   Junaid,   Secretary-­General   of   King   Faisal  
Centre  for  Research  and  Islamic  Studies,  argued  that  Turkish-­Middle  Eastern  
relations   and   particularly   with   Saudi   Arabia   has   several   economic,   political,  
social,  and  cultural  dimensions736.  He  stated,  “I  don’t  believe  that  Turkey’s  re-­
engagement  with  the  Middle  East  is  mainly  based  on  Economic  interests”.  This  
is  a  very  important  statement  because  Dr.  Yahya  made  such  statement  after  
practically   working   with   the   Turkish   side   on   many   other   levels   other   than  
business.   On   the   Cultural   side,   Dr.   Yahya   stated,   “Turkey   and   Turkish  
representatives   have   been   quite   serious   about   exchanging   and   developing  
cultural  ties  with  us.  For  example,  President  Erdogan  attended  the  opening  of  
                                                                                                              
736  Yahya  Mahmoud  ibn  Junaid,  interviewed  by  author,  Riyadh,  Saudi  Arabia,  June  24,  2014.    	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the  “Jerusalem  Gallery”  in  Riyadh,  Dr.  Davutoglu  also  visited  the  centre  and  he  
gave   a   speech   and   a   debate.   There   were   many   Arabic   books   that   were  
requested   by   them   that   we   sent   and  we  were   able   to   open   two   libraries   in  
Turkey  as  well”.    
From   the   evaluative   steps   conducted   above   by   examining   empirical  
evidence  and  interview  data,  the  results  show  that  the  economic  explanation  
seems  to  pass  a  Hoop  Test.  In  order  to  remain  under  consideration  in  this  study,  
the   explanation   must   “jump   through   the   hoop”.   This   means   that   economic  
factors   are  necessary  but   not   sufficient   to   understand  Turkish   foreign  policy  
change   since   2002.   Necessary   in   the   sense   that   we   cannot   eliminate   such  
explanation  due  to  its  importance  because  without  it,  our  analysis  will  certainly  
be  incomplete,  but  at  the  same  time  not  a  sufficient  explanation  because  it  does  
not   fully   explain   all   causes   as   it   ignores   a   number   of   other   factors   as  
demonstrated   by   empirical   evidence   and   interview   data.   Overall,   passing   a  
Hoop  Test  affirms  relevance  and  failing  would  have  eliminated  it  from  this  study.  
The  implication  of  passing  the  Hoop  Test  somewhat  weakens  rival  explanations  
in  the  study,  but  does  not  eliminate  them.  Similar   to  the  Identity  explanation,  
The  Hoop  Test   is  used  here  for  the  economic  explanation  because  evidence  
seem  to  set  a  more  demanding  standard  compared  to  the  evidence  used  in  the  
Straw  in   the  Wind  Test   for  other  rival  explanations,  such  as  the  Islamist  and  
neo-­Ottomanist  explanations  analysed  in  previous  chapters.  To  further  simplify  
and  clarify   this  process  of   the  examination,   the  below   table  summarizes   the  




Figure  4.  Assessment  of  the  economic  explanation  in  Process  Tracing  
Explanation  4:    
   -­‐‑   Turkish  economic  interests  and  goal  of  becoming  a  global  economic  
power  led  Turkey  to  open  up  towards  its  Middle  Eastern  neighbours  
in  the  search  for  new  economic  opportunities.    
  
Evidence  constituting  this  explanation:    -­‐‑   Facts  and  figures  suggest  that  there  is  a  growing  economic  Turkish  
interest  and  commitments  to  develop  its  economic  relations  with  
Middle  Eastern  States.  -­‐‑   Key  economic  actors  and  business  elites  have  been  highly  influential  
in  the  process  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  making.    -­‐‑   Increasing  global  economic  integration  and  Turkish  transformation  
into  a  “trading  state”.  -­‐‑   An  increasing  relationship  and  integration  between  Turkey’s  political  
goals  and  economic  gains  (Political  Economy).    
  
Process  of  examining  empirical  evidence  and  interview  data:  
   -­‐‑   Evidence  suggest  that  Turkish  economic  ties  and  trade  figures  
represent  a  key  feature  of  its  relations  with  its  Middle  Eastern  
neighbours  and  foreign  policy.  -­‐‑   Interviewees  highlighted  the  important  role  of  the  rising  business  
elites  and  the  so-­called  “Anatolian  Tigers”  in  influencing  Turkish  
foreign  policy  direction.  -­‐‑   Interviewees  also  mentioned  that  there  are  other  factors  that  we  
should  include  along  with  economic  factors  and  we  cannot  totally  
understand  the  causes  of  change  from  solely  an  economic  
perspective.  There  are  other  non-­economic  factors  i.e.  political  
ideology,  regional  environment  and  security,  and  identity  politics.    -­‐‑   Evidence  illustrated  that  Turkish  foreign  policy  openness  has  not  
mainly  been  a  result  of  economic  factors  i.e.  Turkish  increased  
relations  with  poorer  countries  that  Turkey  supported  financially  in  
Asia  and  Africa.    
Results:  -­‐‑   Evidence  set  a  more  demanding  standard  compared  to  Islamist  and  
neo-­Ottoman  explanations,  similar  to  identity  explanation.    -­‐‑   Highly  visible  feature  of  Turkish-­Middle  Eastern  relations.    -­‐‑   One  of  the  most  prevailing  explanations  in  the  literature.    -­‐‑   Necessary  but  not  sufficient  to  establish  causation  (Necessary  as  
economic  relations  has  been  a  growing  necessary  feature  in  
international  relations.  Facts  and  figures  demonstrated  the  
significance  of  Turkish-­Middle  Eastern  economic  relations.  Therefore,  
we  cannot  build  an  understanding  without  taking  into  account  
economic  elements  of  Turkish  foreign  policy.  However,  it  has  failed  to  
represent  a  sufficient  explanation  of  the  whole  picture  on  its  own).  -­‐‑   More  need  for  a  wider  approach  that  is  also  inclusive  of  economic  
factors.  
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-­‐‑   Therefore,  Passes  a  Hoop  Test.  




2.	  The	  security	  dimension	  of	  Turkish	  foreign	  policy	  
  
Going  back  to  Ahmet  Davutoglu’s  work  “Strategic  Depth”,  a  central  theme  that  
he  highlighted  was  Turkey’s  potential  to  becoming  a  central  country  and  a  key  
international   player737.   Therefore,   Davutoglu’s   strategic   vision   suggests   that  
Turkey  should  solve  its  conflicts  with  all  neighbouring  countries  and  eliminating  
security  threats.  One  of  the  most  important  methods  presented  to  the  Turkish  
foreign  policy  level  was  his  “Zero-­Problems  with  Neighbours”  policy  for  the  aim  
to   solve   these   problems   as   they   represented   major   challenges   to   Turkey’s  
security  and  role  in  the  international  arena.  Furthermore,  Davutoglu  argued  that  
Turkey  should  change   the   image   that   is   surrounded  by  enemies738.   Instead,  
Turkey  should  start  a  new  cooperative  and  peaceful  environment   that  would  
pave  way   for   Turkey   to   become   a   positively   contributing   country   and   a   key  
global   player.   Although   Davutoglu   support   the   idea   of   eliminating   security  
threats,   he   insists   that   Turkey   should   at   the   same   time   balance   between  
security   and   freedom739.   In   other   words,   implementing   necessary   security  
                                                                                                              
737  loannis  N.  Grigoriadis,    “The  Davutoglu  Doctrine  and  Turkish  Foreign  Policy,”  Hellenic  
Foundation  for  European  and  Foreign  Policy  (ELIAMEP),  no.  8  (2010),  accessed  January  16,  
2016,  http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-­content/uploads/2010/05/ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟ-­ΕΡΓΑΣΙΑΣ-­
8_2010_IoGrigoriadis1.pdf.      
738  Ekrem  Eddy  Guzeldere,  “Turkish  Foreign  Policy:  From  ‘Surrounded  by  Enemies’  to  ‘Zero  
Problems’,”  C·A·P  Policy  Analysis,  no.  1  (2009):  14-­19,  accessed  January  17,  2016,  
http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ESDP/104878/ichaptersection_singledocument/db
0c1f35-­b755-­4721-­90ee-­05c064769dca/en/2.pdf.    
739  Ahmet  Davutoglu,    “Principles  of  Turkish  Foreign  Policy  and  Regional  Political  Structuring,”  
Turkey  Policy  Brief  Series  (tepav),  2012,  accessed  January  17,  2016,  
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/site_media/html/bakanmakale_tepev.pdf.      
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measures   domestically   and   on   an   international   level   should   not   be   on   the  
expense   of   people’s   freedoms.   Taking   into   account   the   instable   and   highly  
complicated  nature  of  regional  politics  in  the  Middle  East,  the  “Zero  Problems”  
policy  was  significantly  challenged.  Security  concerns  have  always  dominated  
Turkish  domestic  and  foreign  politics  to  the  extent  that  it  emerged  to  be  known  
as  a  “hard  power”  state  for  a  long  time740.    
However,  since  the  AKP  took  power  in  2002,  Turkey’s  security  approach  
became  changed,  replacing  “hard-­power”  politics  with  “soft-­power”  and  “rhetoric  
diplomacy”   in   solving   regional   conflicts   and   security   issues741.   The   Kurdish  
issue   has   been   one   of   the   central   themes   characterizing   Turkey’s   security  
problems.   Prior   to   2003,   the   Kurdish   question   was   mainly   regarded   as   a  
domestic   and   regional   issue.   But   since   the   American   invasion   of   Iraq,   the  
Kurdish   question   became   highly   internationalized   drawing   significant  
international  attention.  The  Kurdish  issue  has  been  a  central  security  problem  
for  Turkey  for  a  very  long  time  particularly  regarding  the  PKK  (Kurdish  Workers’  
Party)  and  its  military  activities  in  Turkey.  Therefore,  the  new  AKP  government  
aims  to  establish  new  measures  along  with  military  based  security  ones.  Those  
new  measures  marked  a  new  era  for  Turkey  in  dealing  with  its  domestic  and  
regional  security  problems  and  conflicts.      
   There  have  been  a  number  of  important  scholars  who  looked  at  Turkey’s  
foreign  policy  towards  the  Middle  East  from  a  security  dimension.  These  include  
the   nature   of   relations   with   Iran,   Syria,   and   Iraq742.   Such   studies   will   be  
                                                                                                              
740  Meliha  Benli  Altunisik,  “The  Possibilities  and  Limits  of  Turkey’s  Soft  Power  in  the  Middle  
East,”  Insight  Turkey  10,  no.  2  (2008):  41-­54.    
741  Ibid.    
742  Robert  Hatem  and  Mark  Dohrmann,  “Turkey's  Fix  for  the  ‘Kurdish  Problem’  
Ankara's  Challenges,”  Middle  East  Quarterly  20,  no.  4  (2013):  49-­58.    
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discussed   further   below   and   must   be   examined   to   understand   the   level   of  
security  role  in  shaping  Turkey’s  relations  and  foreign  policy  in  the  Middle  East.    
The  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  analyse  the  role  of  security  concerns  in  
shaping  Turkey’s   foreign  policy  and  relations  with   the  Middle  East  under   the  
AKP  government  and  most  importantly  since  the  American  invasion  of  Iraq  in  
2003.  The  aim   is   to   examine   the   validity   and  plausibility   of   this   approach   in  
understanding  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  change  towards  its  neighbouring  Middle  
East  since  2002.  In  order  to  do  so,  this  section  of  the  chapter  will  be  divided  
into   three  main  parts.  The   first   part,  will   analyse  Turkey’s   security  approach  
prior   and   after   the   AKP   government.   This   includes   the   discussion   over   the  
transformation   from  a   “hard  power”   to  a   “soft  power”  state.  The  second  part  
aims   to   illustrate   and   analyse   the   main   security-­based   arguments   and  
explanations   found   in   the   literature   and   their   evidence   to   support   such  
approach.   The   third   section  will   be   a   critical   one   examining   and   testing   the  
comprehensiveness   of   a   security-­based   approach   through   applying   it   to   the  
Process   Tracing   theory   testing   method.   This   will   incorporate   the   use   of  
empirical  evidence,  critics  and  counter  arguments  that  may  suggest  otherwise,  
as  well  as  the  use  of  primary  interview  data.    
2.1.	  Security	  dilemma	  and	  its	  effects	  on	  Turkish	  foreign	  policy	  
  
Turkey’s  unique  position  and  geo-­political  location  in  the  global  map  contributes  
to  its  significance.  However,  this  comes  with  the  expense  of  being  located  at  
the  centre  of  an  instable  region  connecting  to  the  Balkans,  Caucasia,  and  the  
Middle  East.  Turkey’s  security  politics  have  been  regarded  as  one  that  has  been  
highly   challenged.   However,   such   security   priorities   have   drastically  
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transformed   during   the   twenty   first   century.   The   AKP   government   played   a  
major  role  in  the  transforming  Turkey’s  approach  from  a  “win-­lose  approach”  or  
“zero-­sum”   to  a   “win-­win  approach”743.   In  other  words,  security  has  changed  
from   being   mainly   based   on   military   and   hard   power   measures   to      being  
represented  in  other  forms  of  diplomacy  and  soft  power.    
2.1.1	  Turkish	  security	  approach	  prior	  to	  AKP	  government	  	  	  
  
Since  the  establishment  of  the  Republic  by  Ataturk  in  1923,  Turkey’s  security  
and   survival   was   a   top   priority.   Coming   out   of   the   collapse   of   the  Ottoman  
Empire,  the  new  Turkish  Nationalist-­Secular  elites  were  seen  to  be  distrustful  
of   both   European   Powers   and   neighbouring   countries,   especially   the   newly  
emerging   Middle   East744.   The   priority   of   survival   characterized   Turkey’s  
behaviour   for   a   long   time.   Turkey   was   bounded   with   complex   and   tough  
conflicts   in   the  Middle   East,   the   Balkans,   and  Caucasia.   At   the   same   time,  
Turkey  witnessed  an  increasing  security  challenge  by  the  violent  ethnic  conflict  
with  the  Kurdish  populations.  Therefore,  the  new  Turkish  Republic  had  to  face  
tough  times  and  deal  with  violent  conflicts.  This  in  return  had  a  string  impact  on  
Turkish  foreign  policy  and  Turkey’s  hard  power  military  and  security  approach.    
The  Cold  War  was  another  phase  that  affected  Turkey  and  paved  way  
for  a  major  security  achievement   in  gaining  membership   in  the  NATO  (North  
Atlantic  Treaty  Organisation)  in  1952745.  Turkey  successfully  joined  the  NATO  
after  its  participation  in  the  Korean  War.  Turkey  sent  a  brigade  to  serve  under  
                                                                                                              
743  Volker  Perthes,  “Turkey’s  role  in  the  Middle  East,”  Insight  Turkey  12,  no.  4  (2010):  7.    
744Sedat  Laciner,  "From  Kemalism  to  Ozalism:  the  ideological  evolution  of  Turkish  foreign  
policy,"  (PhD  thesis,  University  of  London,  2001),  116.    
745  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization,  “Turkey:  60  Year  in  NATO”,  nato.int,  2012,  accessed  
January  17,  2016,  http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/80056.htm.    
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the   United   Nations’   command   in   early   1950s746.   This   marked   an   important  
development  in  Turkish-­Western  relations  in  general  especially  with  offering  its  
military  commitments.  Turkey  was  able  to  increase  its  security  by  allying  with  
the   Western   Block   and   protect   the   country   from   the   Soviet   threat   and  
expansionism  after  the  Second  World  War.    According  to  Yasemin  Celik  (1999),  
Ankara’s   role   in   containing   the   Soviet   Union   had   affected   its   foreign   policy  
direction  and  behaviour747.  Conflicts   remained  during   the  course  of   the  Cold  
War   and  were   not   solved   i.e.   conflict  with  Greece  and   the  Cyprus   problem,  
which  affected  Turkish-­US  relations748.  Another  major  event  shaping  Turkey’s  
security  foreign  policy  at  that  time  was  the  ‘Cuban  Missiles  Crisis’  during  1960s.  
This  brought  Turkey  to  the  middle  of  Cold  War  affairs.  The  mid-­ranged  atomic  
warhead   Jupiter   missiles   given   to   Turkey   in   exchange   for   the   removal   of  
missiles  placed   in  Cuba749.  This  was  an   important  point   in  history  of  Turkish  
Foreign  Policy.  Overall,  it  can  be  said  that,  “During  the  Cold  War,  most  strategic  
analysts  saw  military  threats  as  the  primary  source  to  states;;  therefore,  it  was  
understandable   that   they   also   considered   the   use   of   force   as   the   primary  
response”750.    
Turkey’s  relations  with  the  Middle  East  and  the  Muslim  World  remained  
low  and  supported  Western-­Middle  East  policies.  For  example,  in  1958  Turkey  
                                                                                                              
746  Bruce  Steele,  “Korea:  Gallant  allies:  The  Story  of  the  Turkish  Brigade,”  University  Times  
32,  issue.  21  (2000),  accessed  January  17,  2016,  http://www.utimes.pitt.edu/?p=3015.    
747  Yasemin  Celik,  Contemporary  Turkish  Foreign  Policy  (Greenwood  Publishing  Group,  
1999).    
748  Ali  L.  Karaosmanoglu,  "Turkish  security  culture:  Evolutionary  or  carved  in  stone,"  
Perceptions  and  Misperceptions  in  the  EU  and  Turkey,  (2009):  30,  accessed  January  17,  
2016,  http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-­Library/Publications/Detail/?lang=en&id=109334.    
749  Jim  Hershberg,  “The  Cuban  Missile  Crisis,  1962:  The  4oth  Anniversary,”  The  George  
Washington  University:The  National  Security  Archive,  issue.  5  (1995),  accessed  January  18,  
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supported  the  British   intervention   in  Jordan  and  the  American   intervention   in  
Lebanon751.   Another   example   was   Turkey’s   support   for   France   during   the  
Algerian  Independence  War752.  These  are  some  of  the  examples  that  show  the  
extent   of   Turkish   Western-­Oriented   foreign   policy   during   that   time.   This  
demonstrated  the  way  in  which  Kemalism  has  influenced  Turkish  foreign  policy  
even  long  after  Kemal  Ataturk’s  death.    
With   the   Soviet   invasion   of   Afghanistan   and   the   Iranian   Revolution,  
tensions  between  great  powers  increased  and  Turkey  allied  itself  with  the  West.  
As   a   result   Turkey   was   able   to   sign   in   1980   a   Defence   and   Economic  
Cooperation  Agreement  with  the  U.S.753  Regarding  Middle  East  affairs,  Turkey  
was  not  willing  to  directly  involve  in  one  of  the  longest  wars  in  the  history  of  the  
Middle  East  between  Iraq  and  Iran  (1980-­88)  also  known  as  the  First  Gulf  War.  
Instead,  Turkey  kept  a  careful  watch  on  its  borders  and  stayed  neutral754.  On  
the   other   hand,   Turkey   condemned   the   Soviet   invasion   of   Afghanistan   and  
allowed  Afghani  refugees  to  enter  the  country755.  The  Soviet  Union  appeared  
weak  and  faced  major  internal  instability  and  its  collapse  and  end  of  the  Cold  
War  in  1989  meant  that  Turkey  was  no  longer  threatened  and  is  now  allied  with  
the  greatest  power  in  the  World  entering  a  New  World  Order.  
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Turkey   in   post-­Cold   War   era   remained   highly   influenced   by   its   hard  
power  approach  and  emerged  as  a  “post-­Cold  War  warrior”756.  Turkey  during  
the   1990s   was   seen   to   be   a   country   that   is   ready   to   use   force   and   using  
“confrontational”  tools  of  foreign  policy757.  Furthermore,  Turkey  maintained  its  
worldview  and  foreign  policy  from  a  ‘national  security’  perspective  and  one  that  
is  ready  to  use  force  in  its  bilateral  relations  particularly  regarding  Greece  and  
Syria758.  Turkey  after   the  end  of   the  Cold  War  was  viewed  by  scholars  as  a  
“coercive   power”759.   The   collapse   of   the   former   Soviet   Union   and   the  
emergence  of  violent  ethnic  conflicts  in  the  Balkans  and  Caucasus  as  well  as  
the   major   changes   in   the   landscape   of   Eastern   Europe,   created   new  
opportunities  and  new  challenges  at  the  same  time.  Therefore,  Turkey  sought  
to   adopt   a   more   active   foreign   policy   and   take   advantage   of   those   new  
opportunities  as  well  as  tackling  new  regional  challenges  that  affects   its  own  
security  and  sovereignty.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  important  to  understand  that  
the  intensified  Kurdish  problem  has  been  a  major  factor  that  further  developed  
the  challenges  Turkey  had  to  deal  with,  which  had  a  direct  effect  on  its  foreign  
policies.   For   example,   Turkey   needed   to   rethink   about   its   regional   strategic  
partnership  and  particularly  with  Iran,  Iraq,  and  Syria  in  order  to  be  able  to  deal  
with  the  Kurdish  issue  and  the  security  threat  of  the  PKK.  Therefore,  such  new  
risks,   challenges,   and   opportunities   posed   by   the   new   post-­Cold   War   era  
helped  Turkey  pursue  new   foreign  policy   strategies,  while   at   the   same   time  
keeping  security  at  the  top  of  its  foreign  policy  agenda.  
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The  map  above  demonstrates   the  Kurdish   inhabited  areas   that   join   together  
and  include  four  main  states;;  Turkey,  Iran,  Syria,  and  Iraq.  Those  Kurdish  areas  
have  been  viewed  as  one  of  the  most  instable  areas  in  the  region  contributing  
and   spilling   over   into   those   countries   domestic   politics   and   threat   to   their  
national  security.  Turkey  has  been  the  most  famous  out  of  all  with  its  struggle  
and   hard   power   military   approach   to   the   Kurdish   problem   and   mainly   the  
Kurdistan  Workers’  Party  PKK.  Such  geographical  complex  that  involves  four  
different   states   has   certainly   affected   Turkey’s   approach   to   its   southern  
bordering  neighbours.  Turkey’s  efforts  in  dealing  with  such  challenges  were  not  
full  of  positive  and  smooth  relations  and  cooperation  with   those  Arab  states.  
There   were   some   ups   and   downs   and   disagreements   over   the   Kurdish  
autonomy  and  political   demands.  For  example,  Turkey’s   relations  with  Syria  
regarding   the   Kurdish   problem   and   the   PKK   were   full   of   tensions   and  
confrontation.  Since  the  creation  and  establishment  of  the  PKK  in  Lebanon  in  
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1978   in   Beqa   Valley   that   was   occupied   by   Syria,   relations   with   Syria  
deteriorated   as   the   Al-­Assad   government   sheltered   the   PKK   and   its   leader  
Abdullah  Ocalan761.  Since   then,   the  PKK  militia   undertook   and   sponsored  a  
number  of  terrorist  attacks  on  Turkish  borders  and  in  Turkey.  However,  in  1998  
both  governments  signed  the  Adana  Protocol  with  Syrian  assurance  to  stop  its  
support  for  the  PKK762.  The  Syrian  government  threw  Abdullah  Ocalan  out  of  
Syria  and  relations  with  Turkey  were  gradually  improving.  Due  to  the  complex  
nature  of  this  issue,  Turkey  had  to  engage  with  Syria  Iran,  and  Iraq  to  try  and  
deal  with   this  problem.  However,   this  problem  was  not  solved  and  remained  
highly  within  a  security  dimension.        
On   the   other   hand,   Turkey   maintained   its  Western   alliance   and   was  
playing  a  new  important  regional  role  for  the  West  and  particularly  the  United  
States.  Turgut  Ozal  was  a  leading  figure  who  believed  that  Turkey  could  play  a  
new  positive   role   in   the   region  and  present  Turkey  as  an   important   regional  
player.  The  1990  Gulf  War  and  Turkey’s   full  support   for   the  coalition  against  
Saddam  Hussein  was  a  good  example763.  Furthermore,  by  the  end  of  1990s,  
the  capturing  of  Abdullah  Ocalan  (the  leader  of  the  PKK)  marked  a  new  turning  
point   in   Kurdish   conflict.   Hamid   Unver   in   his   lecture   on   Regional   Security  
Complex   Theory   and   Turkish   Foreign   Policy:   NATO   Missile   Shield   and  
Eurasian   Energy   Policy,   argued   that   since   the   capture   of   Abdullah   Ocalan,  
Turkey  witnessed  a  transformation  in  its  approach  towards  the  Kurdish  issue,  
                                                                                                              
761  Soner  Cagaptay,  “Syria  and  Turkey:  The  PKK  Dimension,”  The  Washington  Institute.org,  
April  5,  2012,  accessed  January  10,  2016,  http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-­
analysis/view/syria-­and-­turkey-­the-­pkk-­dimension.      
762  Ibid.    
763  Sharon  Otterman,  “IRAQ:  U.S.-­Turkey  Relations,”  Council  on  Foreign  Relations,  March  21,  
2003,  accessed  January  12,  2016,  http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-­us-­turkey-­relations/p7795.    
324	  	  
from  a  security  and  military  based  conflict  to  a  politicized  one764.  On  the  other  
hand,   the   conflict   with   Greece   was   also   changing   especially   after   the  
earthquakes  events  both  in  Greece  and  Turkey  and  the  solidarity  and  support  
that  they  both  gave  to  each  other765.  These  events  helped  pave  way  for  a  new  
page  of  communication  and  the  gradual  desecuritization  of  conflicts  along  with  
Turgut  Ozal’s  successful  new  foreign  policy  approach.    
   What’s  more,  the  European  recognition  of  Turkey’s  full  membership  
candidacy  in  1999  brought  about  a  new  positive  attitude  towards  the  European  
Union   and   Turkish   commitment   to   prove   that   it   is   a   country   eligible   for  
membership.   It  has  been  argued  that   the  European  Union  has  been  a  major  
deriving  force  in  the  transformation  of  Turkish  foreign  policy766.  Turkey’s  foreign  
policy   gradually   transformed   form   a   primarily   security   and  military   one   with  
“hard  power”  image  to  one  that  is  based  on  other  forms  of  diplomacy  building  a  
new  “soft-­power”   image767.  Scholars  also   regarded  such   transformation  as  a  
shift   from   the   “Americanization”   of   foreign   policy   to   an   “Europeanization”   of  
foreign  policy768.  This  also  meant  a  change  to  the  traditional  Kemalist/military  
establishment   and   elites  who   have   been   highly   influential   in   Turkish   foreign  
policy  making  since  the  creation  of  the  republic.  For  example,  this  was  evident  
during  the  Kosovo  war  when  Turkey  showed  a  hesitant  position  and  cautious  
policy   towards   joining   NATO’s   strikes   against   the   Federal   Republic   of  
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Yugoslavia  in  1999769,    instead  Turkey  favoured  diplomatic  efforts  and  greater  
international  organizational  role  in  this  conflict770.    
Along  with  this  transformation  taking  place,  Turkey’s  economy  was  also  
entering   a  major   crisis.   The   economic   crisis   of   2001   resulted   in   anger   and  
frustration   among   citizens   sparking   demonstrations   and   riots771.   The  military  
Kemalist   establishment   became   heavily   under   pressure   and   criticism.   The  
economic  crisis  marked  a  new  era  in  Turkish  foreign  policy  priorities  and  top  
agendas   balancing   security   interests   with   economic   concerns.   Such   drastic  
changes  paved  way  for  the  newly  established  Justice  and  Development  Party  
(AKP)  to  emerge  strongly  giving  hope  and  aspiration  for  the  Turkish  people.        
2.1.2	  Turkish	  security	  approach	  during	  the	  AKP	  government	  	  
  
With  the  establishment  and  victory  of  the  AKP  in  2002,  Turkey  entered  a  new  
phase  in  its  history.  The  new  government  promised  to  lead  Turkey  to  a  better  
place  and  become  a  leading  country  both  politically  and  economically.  The  AKP  
established   a   new   foreign   policy   outlook   and   gradually   adopted   a  
“multidimensional”   foreign   policy   based   on   diplomacy   and   cooperation  
promoting   its  soft-­power   image  to  the  world.  The  security-­centered  approach  
became  very  much  challenged  by  the  new  government  that  aimed  to  change  
Turkey’s   historically   known   confrontational   foreign   policy.   Such   new   outlook  
was  first  evident  in  2003  when  the  Turkish  parliament  refused  to  give  American  
                                                                                                              
769  Sylvie  Gangloff,  “Turkish  policy  towards  the  conflict  in  Kosovo:  the  preeminence  of  national  
political  interests,”  Balkanologie  VIII,  no.  1  (2004),  accessed  January  14,  2016,  
http://balkanologie.revues.org/517.      
770  Ibid.    
771  Amberin  Zaman  in  Ankara,  “Violent  protests  grip  Turkey  as  economy  dives,”  The  




troops   the   advantage   to   use   Turkish   territories   in   its   war   against   Iraq772.  
Although   this   decision   affected   Turkish-­US   relations,   it   highlighted   Turkey’s  
willingness  to  make  its  own  decisions.  This  was  a  great  advantage  for  Turkey  
to   prove   to   the   Arab   world   and   Europe   that   it   is   not   a   “Trojan   Horse”   for  
American  interests773.  On  the  other  hand,  this  event  demonstrated  that  Turkey  
was  truly  entering  a  new  stage  in  its  history  where  traditional  military  elites  and  
old   foreign   policy   establishment   are   being   challenged   and   their   influence  
significantly  reduced  since  then.    
The  Iraq  war  however  still  brought  fears  among  Turkish  officials  towards  
the  Kurdish  issue.  The  main  concern,  which  still  remains  today,  is  that  the  PKK  
might  have  the  advantage  to  strengthen  its  presence  as  well  as  the  fear  of  an  
emerging   Kurdish   state774.   Regardless   of   this   fear,   the   AKP   government  
adopted  a  fairly  liberal  approach  compared  to  previous  Turkish  governments775.  
The  new  Kurdish  approach  transformed  from  merely  based  on  security  to  one  
that  included  important  diplomatic,  social,  and  economic  aspects  as  well.  The  
new   AKP   approach   was   trying   to   demonstrate   that   conflicts   and   security  
problems  should  not  be  dealt  with  by   force  because   it  will  never  end,  but  by  
using  diplomacy  and  cooperation,   they  can  be  effectively  dealt  with776.  As  a  
result  of  this  AKP  new  approach,  the  Kurds  in  Turkey  were  granted  more  rights,  
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despite  continuing  growing  demands  for  deeper  socio-­economic  solutions,  and  
the  Kurdish  PKK  problem  was  getting  demilitarized777.  For  example,  there  was  
a   new   phase   of   dialogue   and   diplomacy   as   well   as   openness   towards   the  
Kurdish   problem   without   mainly   observing   it   through   military   lenses778.  
Moreover,  the  AKP  policy  towards  the  fight  against  PKK  was  entering  a  new  
phase  and  adopted  a  different  discourse  asserting  the  need  for  democracy  to  
solve  this  problem779.  It  reached  to  a  level  that  political  opposition  to  the  AKP  
accused  the  government  of  “legitimizing”  the  unlawful  demands  of  this  terrorist  
group780.    
   The   new   Turkish   policy   towards   the   Kurdish   problem   was  
characterized   by   a   new   cooperative   approach.   Another   good   example   that  
represented   Turkey’s   new   approach   and   commitment   was   its   behaviour  
towards   the  Cyprus   issue.   The   AKP   government   supported   the   decision   by  
Turkish-­Cypriots  to  take  the  Annan  Plan  that  was  announced  in  2002  by  the  UN  
for  unifying  the  island781.  This  decision  to  support  the  unification  of  the  island  
marked   a   significant   change   of   Turkish   behaviour   towards   this   conflict   and  
demonstrated  a  new  image  of  Turkey  to  the  international  community.  
In   addition,   the   transformation   in   Turkey’s   foreign   policy   towards  
Caucasia   under   the  AKP  government  was   another  major   development.   The  
AKP  government  and  officials  mainly  represented  by  Ahmet  Davutoglu’s  ideas,  
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represent   Caucasia   as   a   region   of   opportunities   and   important   zone   for  
influence782.   This   was   particularly   translated   into   Turkey’s   new   approach  
towards  Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  and  Georgia.  According  to  Bulent  Aras  and  Pinar  
Akpinar   (2011),   “while  security,  perception  of   threat  and  competition  are  still  
valid  concepts  in  the  formation  of  foreign  policy  in  the  Caucasus,  Turkey  views  
the  region  as  a  land  of  opportunity  and  influence”783.  Regardless  of  the  struggle  
between  Turkey  and  Armenia   to   resolve   their  problems,  Turkey  was  able   to  
build  multiple  economic  and  diplomatic  cooperation  efforts  with  Georgia  and  
Azerbaijan.    
   AKP’s   adoption   of   the   “zero   problems   with   neighbours”   policy  
represented  a  totally  opposite  approach  to  the  traditional  security  and  military  
hard  power  policy.  This  was  heavily  evident  with  regards  to  Turkey’s  approach  
to  its  Middle  Eastern  neighbours  as  well.  Turkey  was  viewed  to  have  entered  a  
“desecuritization”   process   in   its   relations   with   Syria   and   Iran784.   This   was  
evident   in   particular   through   the   development   of   cooperation   at   different  
economic  and  political  levels,  including  cooperation  in  dealing  with  the  Kurdish  
problem   and   the   PKK.   Previously,   Turkey   has   had   some   problems   in   its  
relations  with  both  countries  particularly  in  dealing  with  Kurdish  separatism  and  
the  PKK.  Turkey  was  against  the  Iranian  and  Syrian  support  and  aid  for  Kurdish  
separatists   in   the  past785.  However,  AKP’s  new  outlook  paved  way  for  better  
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relations  and  cooperation  in  dealing  with  different  security  issues  including  the  
Kurdish  problem.    
   It  was  Turkey’s  chance  to  show  the  world  that   it   is   leading  a  good  
and  friendly  neighbourhood  policy.  This  was  also  very  beneficial   for  Turkey’s  
EU   membership   process.   Some   scholars   have   argued   that   such   Turkish  
behaviour  and  adoption  of  new  approach  was  to  promote  its  membership  to  the  
European  Union  especially  since  the  accession  negotiations  of  2005786.  Tt  the  
same  time,  others  characterized  this  change  as  marking  a  transformation  from  
a  previously  “Americanized”  foreign  policy  to  a  “Europeanized”  foreign  policy787.  
As  a  result,  Turkey  emerged  as  a  new  soft  power  that  promotes  regional  peace  
and   stability   and   one   that   plays   an   important   diplomatic  meditational   role   in  
solving   regional   and   international   conflicts.   This   was   evident   with   Turkey’s  
mediation  efforts  between  the  Sunnis  and  Shiites  in  Iraq,  between  Pakistan  and  
Afghanistan,   between   Syria   and   Israel,   and   between   Iran   and   the   United  
States788.   In   addition,   Turkey’s   emergence   as   an   important   “energy   hub”  
country  came  to  replace  its  security  and  military  based  image.  Turkey’s  location  
between  the  Caspian  region  on  the  East  and  the  European  Union  on  the  West  
paved  way   for  Turkey   to  play  a  key   role  as  an  energy  hub  or  energy   transit  
country  linking  between  the  oil  and  gas  wealthy  countries  and  Europe789.  This  
to  a  large  extent  increased  Turkey’s  importance  to  Europe  and  contributed  to  
its  EU  accession  process.    
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On  the  other  hand,  Turkey’s  relations  with  the  Middle  East  and  its  Arab  
neighbours   drastically   increased   and   entered   a   new   phase   of   political   and  
economic  cooperation.  As  mentioned  previously  in  the  economic  section,  trade  
relations  and  economic   interdependency  with   the  Middle  East   increased  and  
major   efforts   were  made   to   develop   and  maintain   such   relations.   This   was  
accompanied   by   a   noticeable   decline   in   the   traditional   security   and  military  
priorities  of  the  country  at  the  same  time.  The  effects  of  security  concerns  and  
threats  in  shaping  Turkey’s  behaviour  and  foreign  policy  incredibly  decreased.  
Turkey   during   the   AKP   government   also   showed   strong   tendencies   of  
independent  foreign  policy  and  self-­confidence,  which  was  also  evident   in   its  
opening  to  Africa,  Latin  America,  and  Central  Asia790.  At  the  same  time,  Turkish-­
US  relations  were  deteriorating  over  Turkey’s  policies  in  the  Middle  East  that  
did  not  coincide  with  the  American  administration’s  interests.  On  the  other  hand,  
Turkey’s  support  for  Hamas  and  involvement  in  the  Palestinian  conflict  led  to  
increasing  tensions  with  its  traditional  regional  ally  Israel.  This  was  particularly  
evident  after  Israel’s  war  on  Gaza  and  the  Flotilla  crisis  in  2009-­2010791.  Turkey  
and  particularly  Erdogan  became  popular  in  the  Middle  East  and  appeared  as  
a  new  “Arab  hero”792.    
   A  key  element  in  the  decrease  of  security  and  military  based  foreign  
policy   was   AKP’s   success   in   challenging   the   domestic   traditional   military  
establishment’s  influence  over  foreign  policy  and  their  efforts  in  changing  the  
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civil-­military   relations793.   The   major   problem   with   the   traditional   military  
establishment   and   elites   is   that   they   view   international   relations   and   foreign  
policy  from  a  security  based  mind  set.  This  was  one  of  the  main  reasons  why  
Turkey  failed  for  a  long  time  to  solve  many  of  its  domestic  and  external  conflicts  
as  well  as  fixing  its  economic  problems.  
Turkey’s   “zero  problem”  policy  and  new  regional  approach  was  highly  
successful   for   a   number   of   years,   until   the   so-­called   “Arab  Spring”   erupted.  
Since  2011,  Turkey  had   to   face  a  number  of   regional  challenges   that  had  a  
direct   impact   on  Turkey’s   economy  and   security.   The   long   economic   efforts  
made  with   some  Arab   governments   involved   in   these   uprisings  were   highly  
affected.  Trade  and  export  figures  decreased  as  the  conflict  intensified  due  to  
the  unstable  environment  that  affected  the  flow  of  trade794.  On  the  other  hand,  
security  threats  rose  once  again,  particularly  with  the  development  of  the  Syrian  
crisis.  The  increasing  flow  of  Syrian  refugees  and  increase  of  terrorist  activities  
near  Turkish  borders  along  with  further  complicating  the  Kurdish  conflict  placed  
Turkey   in  an  unpleasant  position.  Security  concerns   in  Turkish  foreign  policy  
making  were  increasing  since  then.  The  Arab  Spring  challenged  Turkey’s  soft  
power   approach   and   this   was   evident   when   Turkey   took   part   in   the   NATO  
operations  in  Libya  against  the  Gaddafi  government  for  example795.  However,  
the  main   security   threat   comes   from   its  Syrian   bordering   neighbour.   Turkey  
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faces  a  threat  of  political  and  military  conflict  spill  over,  which  influence  Turkey’s  
behaviour   regarding   this   conflict.   Tough   security   measures   and   powerful  
military  presence  on  both  Syrian  and  Iraqi  borders  were  necessary  in  dealing  
with  this  crisis  as  well  as  dealing  with  the  threatening  expansion  of  the  emerging  
terrorist  organisation  ISIS  (Islamic  State  of  Iraq  and  Syria).    
   Turkey   was   able   to   get   NATO   support   to   enhance   Turkey’s   defence  
capabilities.  Since  2013,  NATO  members  have  aided  Turkey  with  a  number  of  
Patriot  Missiles  for  an  agreed  period  of  time796.  The  United  States  and  Germany  
alone  have  deployed  two  Patriot  batteries  since  2013797.  Turkey  hosts  over  700  
NATO   troops   for   the   patriot   deployment798.   This   led   to,   what   Hamid   Unver  
(2012)   regarded  as,  a   “re-­Americanization”  of  Turkish   foreign  policy  and   the  
United  States  gradually  returning  as  Turkey’s  ally  in  dealing  with  the  regional  
security  instability  and  Syrian  crisis799.  Turkey  has  been  conducting  a  number  
of  military  exercises  and  activities  along  the  Syrian  border  since  2011800.  This  
demonstrates   a   sharp   rise   again   of   security   concerns   on   the   top   of   Turkish  
foreign  policy  agenda,  but  this  time  it  is  more  influenced  by  external  forces  and  
events   instead  of  domestic  military  elites’   ideology   like  before.  Although,   this  
thesis  does  not  intend  to  engage  with  the  very  latest  developments  of  the  Arab  
Spring,  it   is  necessary  to  highlight  here  the  significant  impact  of  some  recent  
developments  in  the  Syrian  crisis  specifically  with  the  increase  of  ISIS  activities  
close  to  Turkey’s  borders,  the  Iranian  and  Syrian  support  for  the  Kurdish  militant  
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groups,  and  the  recent  Russian  military  intervention.  These  are  all  significant  
contributing   factors   that   have   again   placed   Turkish   security   concerns   and  
national  security  interests  very  high  in  its  foreign  policy  agenda.  Turkey’s  image  
as  a  hard  power  was  re-­emerging  due  to  such  instable  regional  environment.  
Turkey’s  use  of  military  force  became  inevitable  with  its  recent  strikes  against  
ISIS,  Kurdish  groups,  and  the  latest  shooting  down  of  Russian  air  fighter  jets  
after  the  alleged  multiple  violations  of  Turkish  air  space801.      
2.2	  The	  significance	  of	  security-­‐based	  explanations	  in	  understanding	  Turkish-­‐
Middle	  East	  policy	  change	  
  
This   section   aims   to   illustrate   the   nature   of   this   approach   and   its   main  
theoretical   explanations   in   the   literature   presented   by   different   scholars   and  
their  and  analysing  evidence  to  identify  their  possible  strengths.  In  other  words,  
the  aim  of  this  section  is  to  give  a  clear  idea  of  the  security  explanation  before  
going  on  to  assess  its  significance  in  the  following  sections.  
There   have   been   a   number   of   scholars   who   attempted   to   explain  
Turkey’s   transformation  towards  the  Middle  East  since  2002  onwards  from  a  
security   based   approach.   Such   approach   can   be   traced   back   to   the   realist  
theoretical   interpretation  of   international   relations   that  highly  emphasizes   the  
role   of   national   security   in   determining   states’   behaviour802.   Turkey   being  
located  next  to  highly  unstable  regions  along  with  facing  major  challenges  from  
the   Kurdish   problem  makes   national   security   a   high   priority   all   the   time   for  
Turkish   policy   makers.   However,   these   needs   to   be   further   analysed   and  
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examined   in   order   to   know   the   significance   of   using   such   approach   in  
understanding   Turkey’s   foreign   policy   towards   its   Middle   East   neighbours.  
Therefore,  this  section  aims  to  illustrate  some  of  the  works  in  the  literature  that  
tend   to   focus   on   the   role   of   security   in   understanding   Turkey’s   regional  
behaviour  since  2002  under   the  AKP  government.  This  will  be  followed  by  a  
critical  examination  of  this  security-­based  approach  and  testing  its  plausibility  
in  explaining  Turkish  foreign  policy  change  towards  the  Middle  East.    
   An   interesting   article   by   Stephen   Larrabee   (2007)   titled   Turkey  
Rediscovers  the  Middle  East,  argued  that  Turkey’s  new  approach  and  role  in  
the  Middle  East  is  a  “response  to  structural  changes  in  its  security  environments  
since  the  end  of  the  Cold  War”803.  For  example,  the  2003  American  invasion  of  
Iraq   is   seen   to   be   an   event   that   drew   Turkey   into   the   Middle   East   affairs.  
According  to  Larrabee,  Saddam  Hussein  for  a  long  time  has  provided  stability  
for  Turkish  Southern  border  with  Iraq.  The  overthrow  of  Saddam  Hussein  leads  
to  huge  security  problems   for  Turkey  and  primarily   from  Kurds.  The  Turkish  
government  realized  the  potential  of  a  growing  Kurdish  nationalism  and  derives  
for  autonomy.  Therefore,  Turkey  sought  to  build  ties  with  Iran  and  Syria  to  be  
able   to   cooperate   in   solving   such   threat   and   complex   security   problem.  For  
example,  Turkey  was  able  to  sign  a  number  of  agreements  with  Iran  including  
an   important   security   agreement   that   recognizes   the   PKK   as   a   terrorist  
organization804.    
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In  addition,  Syrian-­Turkish  relations  have  also  entered  a  new  phase  and  
developed  cooperation  efforts  on  a  number  of  different  fields.  Larrabee  argued  
that   the   Syrian   government  was   also   concerned   about   the   growing   Kurdish  
nationalism  and  had  a  common  goal  with  Turkey  to  work  on.  Turkey’s  improved  
relations  with  Syria  were  not  warmly  welcomed  in  the  United  States  especially  
during  the  Bush  administration.  Larrbee  stated,  “Turkey’s  greater  engagement  
in  the  Middle  East  is  part  of  the  gradual  diversification  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  
since  the  end  of  the  Cold  War”805.  He  argued  that  Turkey’s  new  engagement  
and  activism  in  the  Middle  East  could  be  seen  as  a  “return  to  a  more  traditional  
pattern”806.  Larrabee  has  mainly  focused  his  study  on  Turkey’s  relations  with  
Syria,  Iraq,  and  Iran,  which  is  understandable,  especially  in  relations  to  dealing  
with  the  Kurdish  issue.  
Similarly,  Sonmez  Atesoglu  (2011)  in  his  work,  Security  of  Turkey  with  
Respect   to   the   Middle   East,   looks   at   the   important   role   of   Turkish   security  
concerns  in  shaping  its  relations  with  and  behaviour  towards  the  Middle  East807.  
The  study  particularly  focused  on  Turkey’s  relations  with  Syria,  Iraq,  and  Iran,  
whom   they   share   borders   with,   with   regards   to   common   security   concerns  
mainly  the  Kurdish  issue  and  the  PKK.  Atesoglu  stated,  “There  was  a  shift  in  
the  alliance  structure  of  the  Middle  East.  In  recent  years  Syria,  Iraq,  and  Iran  
are  pursuing  accommodative  policies  towards  Turkey’s  objective  of  eliminating  
the  PKK.  This  has  led  Turkey  to  move  away  from  the  alliance  with  Israel  and  
closer  to  its  southern  neighbours”808.  The  author  argued  that  Turkish  security  
                                                                                                              
805  Ibid,  111.    
806  Ibid.    
807  Sonmez  Atesoglu,  “Security  of  Turkey  with  Respect  to  the  Middle  East,”  PERCEPTIONS  
XVI,  no.  2  (2011):  99-­110.    
808  Ibid,  99.    
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concerns  and  threats  posed  by  the  PKK  changed  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  priority  
towards  these  states  in  the  expense  of  its  relation  with  Israel.  Atesoglu  added,  
“The  cooperation  of  Syria,  Iraq,  and  Iran  against  the  PKK  appears  to  be  more  
beneficial   to   Turkey   compared   to   sacrifices   of   political   support   and  military-­  
technology-­intelligence   benefits   they   were   getting   from   Israel   while   being  
allies”809.  Moreover,  the  author  demonstrated  the  level  of  military  capability  of  
Turkey  in  relation  to  its  three  Middle  Eastern  neighbours  arguing  that  Turkey  is  
in  a  much  better  position.  However,  there  are  still  some  security  concerns  and  
threats  that  determined  Turkey’s  behaviour  with  these  states  mainly  the  Kurdish  
issue  and  the  PKK,  and  the  potential  security  vacuum  in  Iraq  with  the  departure  
of  American  troops.    
   A  similar  approach  was  demonstrated  by  one  of  the  most  influential  neo-­
realist   scholars   John  Mearsheimer   (2012).   In   his   lecture  on  Turkish  Foreign  
Policy:   A   Realist’s   Assessment   at   the   Turkish  Ministry   of   Foreign   Affairs   in  
Ankara,  Mearsheimer  argued  that  security  concerns  has   largely  been  on  the  
top  priorities  of  most  Turks  simply  because  the  neighbourhood  does  not  give  
them  much  choice810.  He  demonstrated  Turkey’s   relative  power  components  
mainly  geographic,  human,  military,  and  economic  aspects.  Mersheimer  argued  
that  within   the   anarchic   system   that  we   operate   in  with   no   higher   authority,  
states  develop  two  main  goals.  The  first  is  to  maximize  relative  power  in  order  
to   ensure   that   neighbouring   states   would   not   potentially   threaten   Turkey’s  
security  and  survival.  He  suggested  that  the  “ideal  situation”  for  Turkey  was  to  
                                                                                                              
809  Ibid,  100.    
810  John  Mearsheimer,  “Turkish  Foreign  Policy:  A  Realist’s  Assessment,”  youtube.com,  
October  9,  2012,  accessed  January  22,  2016,  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=geC1vNBj2Yk.    
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dominate  the  region  and  become  a  regional  hegemonic  power811,  considering  
that  the  American  example  being  the  only  regional  hegemony  dominating  the  
Western  hemisphere  in  modern  history.  The  second  goal  is  to  promote  a  “smart  
foreign   policy”   to   be   able   to   deal  with   the   threat   environment.   For   example,  
Turkey  has  to  deal  with  the  problem  of  the  PKK  in  a  way  that  does  not  “blow  
back”   into   Turkey’s   domestic   politics.   For   Mersheimer   operating   in   such   a  
hostile   region   and   threat   environment,   Turkey   had   to   develop   strategies   to  
combat  these  problems.  However,  he  insists  that  the  best  way  is  to  maximize  
relative   power   and   become   a   regional   hegemonic   power,   which   is   far   from  
reach812.    
   On  the  other  hand,  Hamid  Akin  Unver  (2012)  argued  that  Turkish  foreign  
policy  under  the  rule  of  the  AKP  has  shifted  towards  becoming  more  “British”  
meaning  British  school  of   thought813.  Unver  argued  that   identity  has  become  
much  more  pronounced  shaping  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  approach  and  patterns  
of  cooperation  and  conflict814.  He  presented  three  main  case  studies  including  
its   NATO   role,   being   an   “energy   hub   state”,   and   the   recent   deployment   of  
missile  defence  shield   in  Turkey.  Unver  argued  that  Turkey’s  traditional  hard  
power  has  considerably  decreased  and  replaced  by  soft  power  approach  and  
cooperation  in  dealing  with  its  neighbours.  He  used  important  terminologies  in  
explaining   Turkish   foreign   policy   shifts   since   2002.   Arguing   that   Turkey  
traditionally  followed  an  “Americanized”  foreign  policy  based  on  hard  power  and  
military   approach   and   this   recently   changed   and   Turkey   employed   a  
“Europeanized”  foreign  policy.  In  other  words,  Turkish  foreign  policy  underwent  
                                                                                                              
811  Ibid.    
812  Ibid.    
813  Unver,  “Regional  Security  Complex  Theory”.  
814  Ibid.    
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a   transformation   from   the   “Americanization   of   foreign   policy”   to   the  
“Europeanization  of  foreign  policy”815.    However,  he  stated  that  since  the  Arab  
Spring  the  development  of  the  Syrian  refugee  crisis,  Turkey’s  soft  power  was  
challenged  and  showed  its   limitation.  Therefore,  Unver  argued  that  since  the  
Arab   Spring,   Turkey’s   foreign   policy   went   through   a   “re-­Americanization”   of  
foreign  policy816.    
Overall,  he  argued  in  the  same  lecture  that  whenever  Turkey  is  facing  a  
major   security   threat,   it   returns   to   its   traditional   security-­Kemalist   influenced  
approach   and   vice   versa.   Therefore,   we   can   see   here   that   Unver   has  
demonstrated  that  security  priorities  in  understanding  Turkish  foreign  policy  and  
particularly  towards  the  Middle  East  have  actually  ‘fluctuated’  also  depending  
on   the   security   issue   at   stake.   Turkey   went   through   a   process   from   an  
Americanized   hard   power   prior   to   AKP   government   to   a   Europeanized   soft  
power  during  the  AKP  rule  to  re-­Americanized  hard  power  once  again  since  the  
Arab   Spring   and   still   under   the   same   AKP   government.   Although,   Unver  
presents  an  interesting  argument,  I  believe  that  Turkey’s  case  and  particularly  
foreign   policy   is  much  more   complex   than   simply   depending   it   on   only   two  
external  actors  either  Europe  or  America,  despite  their  great  influences.    
   Moreover,  Cengiz  Dinc  (2011)  in  his  article,  Turkey  as  a  New  Security  
Actor  in  the  Middle  East:  Beyond  the  Slogans,  shares  some  ideas  with  Hamid  
Unver’s  hypothesis  and  argue  that  Turkish   foreign  policy  has  moved  beyond  
“slogans”   in   the   sense   that  Turkey  under   the  AKP  government   has  become  
more   “relaxed”   and   “flexible”817.      Similar   to   Hamid   Unver’s   approach,   Dinc  
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817  Cengiz  Dinc,  “Turkey  as  a  New  Security  Actor,”  PERCEPTIONS  XVI,  no.  2  (2011):  61-­80.    
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argued  that  Turkey  has  adopted  a  soft  power  approach  making  it  much  closer  
to  the  European  strategy.  Turkey  is  viewed  to  be  matured  and  is  able  to  develop  
new  different  strategies  to  deal  with  security  concerns.   In  addition,  he  stated  
that   the   domestic   transformation,   democratization   process,   and   economic  
development   have   been   key   factors   behind   such   foreign   policy  
transformation818.  Here  the  author  confirms  that  the  Turkish  openness  and  new  
approach  to  the  Middle  East  has  been  shaped  by  different  domestic  reasons.  It  
is  important  to  understand  therefore  that  the  traditional  security  approach  does  
not  apply  here.  In  other  words,  Turkey’s  new  regional  foreign  policy  approach  
has  not  been  primarily  shaped  by  its  national  security  concerns  and  that  there  
are   a   number   of   other   factors   that   needs   to   be   considered.   The   impact   of  
changes  in  Turkey’s  security  approach  from  hard  power  politics  to  using  soft  
power  and  diplomacy  has  been  very  visible.  Turkey  was  able  to  settle  a  number  
of  critical   issues  and  conflicts  with  some  of   its  neighbours  as  well  as  dealing  
with   the   Kurdish   issue   more   effectively   in   negotiations   and   other   forms   of  
diplomacy.    
2.3.	  Testing	  the	  plausibility	  of	  security-­‐based	  explanations	  
  
Having  looked  at  some  of  the  examples  of  security  approach  in  understanding  
Turkish  foreign  policy  transformation  and  change  towards  the  Middle  East  since  
2002,   it   is   important   to   assess   if   such   theoretical   interpretation   is   valid.  
Therefore,   the  purpose  of   this   section   is   to   test   the  plausibility   and  possible  
limitation   of   the   security   approach   in   understanding   Turkish   foreign   policy  
change  towards  the  Middle  East  under  the  AKP  government.  This  will  be  done  
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by   using   the   Process   Tracing   method   of   theory   testing   through   applying  
empirical   evidence,   scholarly   available   contrary   arguments   and   critics,   and  
most  importantly  examining  interview  data.    
It  has  been  evident  that  Turkish  foreign  policy  underwent  a  number  of  
stages  in  its  modern  history.  The  traditional  secular  military  establishment  has  
been  highly  influential  in  Turkish  foreign  policy  making  for  a  long  time.  Turkey  
became  to  be  seen  as  a  hard-­power  state  that  is  ready  to  use  force  at  any  time  
to   solve   its   security   and   conflict   disputes  with   its   neighbours.  As  mentioned  
above,  since  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  the  new  world  order  and  international  
system   presented   a   number   of   opportunities   for   Turkey   and   paved   way   for  
foreign  policy  change  and  transformation.  The  European  Union  has  also  seen  
to   be   a   leading   force   behind   Turkey’s   foreign   policy   transformation.   A  
“Europeanization”   of   Turkish   foreign   policy,   as  mentioned   by   Hamid   Unver,  
meant  a  departure  away  from  its  hard  power  politics  to  a  soft  power  image.    It  
was   however   evident   that   the   most   important   security   issue   that   strongly  
remained  at  the  top  of  Turkey’s  priorities  was  the  Kurdish  problem.  The  AKP  
government  was  able  to  adopt  new  strategies  to  deal  with  this  security  problem.  
A   new   soft   power   approach   characterized   by   rhetoric   diplomacy   and  
cooperation  was  becoming  the  new  Turkish  foreign  policy  approach.    
However,   when   trying   to   understand   Turkey’s   openness   to   its   Arab  
neighbours  and  the  greater  Middle  East,  one  must  ask;;  were  security  concerns  
for   Turkey   the  main   driving   force   behind   its   re-­engagement  with   the  Middle  
East?   It   has   been   clear   that   Turkey’s   transformational   relations   with   its  
neighbours   Syria,   Iraq,   and   Iran   to   a   large   extent   had   a   direct   relation  with  
Turkey’s   security   concerns   over   the   Kurdish   issue   and   the   PKK.   However,  
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Turkey’s  openness  and   regional  activity  went   far  beyond   those   three  states.  
Turkey  was   able   to   develop   important   relations  with   the  Gulf   region,   Egypt,  
North  African  states  and  many  more.  These  relations  were  based  not  only  on  
political  levels,  but  also  largely  on  economic  and  cultural  levels  as  well.  A  major  
problem   that  we  come   to  see   is   that   the  security  approach  presented   in   the  
literature   fails   to  explain  a  number  of  other   issues  not   related   to   the  Kurdish  
problem  or  other  direct  security  threats  for  Turkey.  For  example,  Ersel  Aydinli,  
a  professor  of   International  Relations  at  Bilkent  University  and  the  Executive  
Director  of  Fulbright  Commission,  in  his  interview,  argued  that  the  Kurdish  issue  
has  been  a  key  factor  contributing  to  Turkish  foreign  policy  for  a  long  time  and  
during   the   AKP   government,   but   using   this   security   based   approach   to  
understand   the  whole  case   is  misleading819.  He  stated,   “even   if  we   take   this  
argument   into   consideration,   the   Kurdish   issue   does   not   directly   deal   with  
countries  in  the  Gulf,  Africa,  and  East  Asia  for  example”820.  Therefore,  this  does  
not  cover  the  full  picture,  it  can  explain  Turkey’s  relations  and  cooperation  with  
only  neighbours  who  share  borders  with  the  Kurds  and  are  directly  linked  in  this  
issue  who  represent  an  important  part  of  the  Middle  East,  but  certainly  not  all  
of  it.    
Furthermore,  in  my  interview  with  Serhat  Erkemen,  Head  of  Department  
of   International   Relations   at   Kırşehir   Ahi   Evran   University,   and  Middle   East  
advisor   at   ORSAM   (Centre   for   Middle   Eastern   Strategic   Studies),   similarly  
argued  that  the  Kurdish  security  problem  has  been  key  to  Turkish  relations  with  
Syria,  Iraq,  and  Iran821.  However,  he  argued  that  the  traditional  military  based  
                                                                                                              
819  Ersel  Aydinli,  interviewed  by  author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  March  18,  2014.    
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821  Serhat  Erkemen,  interviewed  by  author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  March  21,  2014.  
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approach   has   been   changed   under   the   AKP   government.   A   new   solution  
process  took  place  with  the  adoption  of  the  so-­called  “democratic  opening”822.  
Erkemen  agreed  that  the  AKP  government  had  to  engage  with  Syria,  Iraq,  and  
Iran   to   try  and  minimize   its   security   threats,  but  he  also  stated   that  with   the  
development   of   the   diplomatic   and   soft   power   approach   with   the   Kurds,  
Turkey’s   confidence   boosted   and   its   reliance   on   these   states   became   less  
great823.      With   the   increase   of   political   instability   and   problems   in   these  
neighbouring  countries  particularly  in  Iraq  and  Syria  recently,  Turkey  had  to  act  
more  independently  in  dealing  with  this  issue.  Here  Erkemen  is  suggesting  that  
such   security   issue   has   determined   Turkey’s   behaviour   towards   these  
countries,  but  managed  overtime  with  its  successful  adoption  of  diplomacy  and  
negotiations  to  rely  less  on  their  governments.    Therefore,  it  can  be  understood  
that  security  concerns  were  valid  factors  behind  Turkey’s  relations  with  those  
countries,  but  only  for  the  first  few  years  of  AKP  government.    
   Therefore,  Securitizing  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  has  been  less  favoured  
by  the  AKP  government  and  was  not  seen  as  a  successful  method.  Instead,  
there  has  been  a  shift  towards  a  softer  approach  based  on  common  interests,  
diplomacy,   economic   benefits,   cultural   similarities,   and  many   others.   Bulent  
Aras  and  Rabia  Karakaya  Polat  (2008),  argued  that  there  has  been  a  noticeable  
“softening”  of  Turkey’s  approach  towards  its  neighbours.  They  stated  that  such  
change   has   been   highly   driven   by   the   domestic   democratic   and  
“desecuritization  process”  that  was  taking  place  in  Turkey824.  They  added  that  
this   was   also   a   product   of   the   European   Union   accession   process   and   its  
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824  Aras  and  Polat,  “From  Conflict  to  Cooperation”.    
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democratic  commitments825.  They  stated,  “formerly  securitized  and  dramatized  
issues  have  begun  to  be  perceived  as  normal  political  issues”826.    
Moreover,  Enver  Gulseven  (2010)  in  his  PhD  thesis  Identity  Security  and  
Turkish   Foreign  Policy   in   the  Post-­Cold  War  Period:  Relations  with   the  EU,  
Greece  and  the  Middle  East,  argued  that  the  AKP  focused  on  the  social  and  
economic  aspects  of  the  Kurdish  issue  rather  than  its  security  aspect  followed  
traditionally827.  The  author  added  that  the  new  AKP  government  adopted  a  new  
strategy  in  dealing  with  the  PKK.  The  AKP  government  led  by  Erdogan  started  
to   realize   that   this  needs   to  settled  and   therefore  pursued  more  cooperative  
methods   towards   the   Kurds   and   particularly   with   Northern   areas   of   Iraq  
dominated  by  Kurds828.  Although  Gulseven  have  merged  the  Kurdish  issue  and  
the  Middle  East  in  one  section  under  one  title  “The  Kurdish  issue  and  Turkey’s  
Middle  East  Policy”,  he  seems  to  have  separated  the  two  in  his  analysis.  First,  
he   illustrated   the  nature  of   the  Kurdish   issue  and   the  way   in  which  Turkey’s  
Kurdish  approach  has   changed  and  particularly   during   the  AKP  period.  The  
section  following  that  went  on  to  discuss  Turkey’s  business  ties  with  the  Middle  
East  drifting  away  from  the  Kurdish  issue.  This  is  not  in  any  way  a  weakness  in  
his   thesis’   analysis,   but   one   that   demonstrate   that   there   is   not   direct   link  
between   the   Kurdish   issue   that   involves   Turkey,   Iraq,   Iran,   and   Syria   with  
Turkey’s  policy  to  the  rest  of  the  Middle  East,  where  other  economic,  political,  
and  cultural  aspects  seem  to  dominate  over  security  concerns.    
   Going  back   to   interview  data  collected  as  part  of   this   thesis,  all  of  my  
interviewers  from  both  Turkish  academic  experts  and  politicians  agreed  that  the  
                                                                                                              
825  Ibid.  
826  Ibid,  495.    
827  Enver  Gulseven,  “Identity  Security  and  Turkish  Foreign  Policy”,  186.    
828  Ibid,  188.    
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Kurdish  issue  was  mainly  perceived  from  a  security  dimension.  However,  they  
also  similarly  suggested  that  the  AKP  government  managed  to  some  extent  to  
transform  this   issue   into  a  social  and  democratic  one.  For   instance,  Mehmet  
Ozkan,  a  researcher  and  editor  to  the  Foundation  for  Political,  Economic,  and  
Social   Research   (SETA)   specialized   in   Political   Science   and   International  
Relations,  in  his  interview  argued  that  there  have  been  major  accomplishments  
and  Kurds  gained  many  of  their  rights,  such  as  speaking  in  their  language,  have  
their   own   schools,   Kurdish   TV   channels,   radio   broadcasting,   and   many  
others829.  However,  Ozkan  also  stated  that  along  with  such  softening  of  Turkish  
approach  towards  the  Kurds,  Turkey  became  less  dependent  on  countries  like  
Syria,  Iraq,  and  Iran  to  deal  with  this  issue.  In  addition,  Ozkan  agrees  that  this  
Kurdish  question  in  general  does  not  directly  link  to  Turkey’s  relations  with  the  
rest  of  the  Middle  East,  but  believes  that  the  opening  towards  the  Middle  East  
has  been  in  large  related  to  Turkey’s  new  soft  power  and  cooperative  approach.    
Moreover,  Mesut  Ozcan,  chairman  of  the  Foreign  Ministry’s  Diplomacy  
Academy  and  Advisor  to  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  in  his  interview  stated  
that   the  AKP  government   has   been   the  most   successful   in   dealing  with   the  
Kurdish  issue830.  According  to  Ozcan,  there  are  airlines  flying  from  Ankara  and  
Istanbul  to  Erbil  and  other  Kurdish  cities.  There  is  a  Kurdish  channel  in  Turkey,  
and  many  others,  which  were  unthinkable  5  or  10  years  ago.  He  stated  that  as  
an  evidence  for  this,  Turkey’s  trade  with  Iraq  recently  reached  around  15  billion  
USD  worth  of  trade,  but  70%  of  it  is  with  Kurdish  companies831.  This  shows  that  
even   in   Turkish-­Kurdish   relations   alone,   other   forms   of   cooperation   have  
                                                                                                              
829  Mehmet  Ozkan,  interviewed  by  author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  March  17,  2014.    
830  Mesut  Ozcan,  interviewed  by  author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  March  18,  2014.    
831  Ibid.	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emerged  replacing  the  totally  securitized  approach.  Therefore,  the  realist  and  
neo-­realist   theoretical   approach   highlighting   the   role   of   security   in  
understanding   states   behaviour   and   international   relations   in   this   particular  
study   becomes   very  much   less   significant.   In   addition,  Dr.   Fayez  Al-­Shehri,  
President   of   Saudi-­Turkish   Parliamentary   Friendship   at   Shoura   Council   of  
Saudi   Arabia,   argued   that   there   were   not   direct   major   security   threats   or  
common   security   concerns   between  Saudi  Arabia   and  Turkey   to   act   up   on.  
However,   the  Turkish  government  and   the  Saudi  administration  are  certainly  
cooperating   on   “indirect”   security   aspects,   particularly   regarding   counter-­
terrorism832.  He  stated,  “from  my  own  experience  and  direct  cooperation  with  
our  Turkish  counterpart,  most  of  our  work  has  been  based  on  developing  mutual  
interests,   regional   peace   and   stability,   and   eliminating   obstacles   for   better  
relationship”.  Dr.  Fayez   illustrated  that  Turkish  security   threats  and  concerns  
were  not  the  main  themes  shaping  Saudi-­Turkish  relations.  Therefore,  trying  to  
understand  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  change  towards  the  Gulf  region  for  example  
through  a  security  approach  analysis  will  be  misleading.      
Therefore,   security   explanations   fail   to   explain   the   development   in  
relations   with   Middle   Eastern   states   and   Turkish   role   in   countries   beyond  
Turkeys  southern  and  southeast  borders.  Syria,   Iraq,  and   Iran  are   important  
Middle   Eastern   states,   but   when   it   comes   to   analysing   Turkish-­Middle   East  
relations,   many   other   countries   are   included.   Furthermore,   the   security  
explanations   in   the   literature   fail   to   explain   the   economic   role   in   shaping  
Turkey’s  relations  with  Middle  Eastern  states  for  example.  Since  scholars  and  
analysts  have  confirmed  Turkey’s  softening  approach  and  de-­securitization  of  
                                                                                                              
832  Fayz  Al-­Shehri,  interviewed  by  author,  Riyadh,  Saudi  Arabia,  June  13  2014.    
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foreign   policy   along   with   favouring   diplomacy,   cooperation,   and   economics,  
security  based  approaches  do  not  offer  a  comprehensive  explanation  so  far  that  
tells  us  about  the  underlying  causes  behind  Turkey’s  opening  up  and  change  
of   relations   with   the   Middle   East.   However,   we   cannot   deny   that   with   the  
increase  of  security  threats  to  Turkey,  its  foreign  policy  and  approach  returns  to  
its  traditional  image.  This  is  particularly  evident  with  the  recent  developments  
in  the  Syrian  crisis  where  Turkey  used  force  and  showed  had  power  tendencies  
in  dealing  with  different  security  issues.    
   Overall,  it  can  be  argued  that  there  has  been  a  fluctuation  in  the  role  and  
influence   of   security   over   foreign   policy   in   Turkish   history.   Since   the  
establishment   of   the   Turkish   Republic,   hard   power   military   and   security  
approach  dominated  Turkish  foreign  policy.  However,  by  the  end  of  the  Cold  
War  and  particularly  during   the   late  1990s  and  after,  Turkey  went   through  a  
transformational  process  of  de-­securitizing  its  foreign  policy  replacing  it  with  soft  
power  approach.  Since  the  Arab  uprisings  and  the  development  of  the  Syrian  
crisis,  we  see  one  again  a  rise  in  security  threats  and  a  Turkish  return  of  hard  
power  approach  in  dealing  with  them.    
From   empirical   evidence   and   interview   data   examined   in   the   above  
sections,  it  is  clear  that  security  explanations  in  understanding  Turkey’s  foreign  
policy  change  towards  the  Middle  East  have  had  major  weaknesses  in  giving  a  
comprehensive  explanation  of  the  new  Turkish-­Middle  East  approach.  Although  
the  Kurdish  issue  has  been  part  of  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  priorities  particularly  
in  relations  with  Syria,  Iraq,  and  Iran,  it  only  covers  one  aspect  of  Turkish-­Middle  
East   foreign   policy.   It   is   therefore,   inaccurate   to   claim   that   Turkey’s   re-­
engagement  with  the  Middle  East  and  cooperative  approach  has  been  shaped  
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by  security  concerns  and  especially  the  Kurdish  security  issue.  With  the  above  
analysis   of   empirical   evidence   and   primary   interview   data,   the   security  
theoretical  approach  in  this  case  study  seem  to  fail  a  Straw  in  the  Wind  Test  
because  it  shows  that  it  is  neither  sufficient  nor  necessary  for  affirming  causal  
inference.   In   other   words   the   security   approach   in   understanding   Turkish  
foreign  policy  change  towards  the  Middle  East  since  2002  is  a  weak  explanation  
and   one   that   does   not   explain   much   “on   its   own”.   Just   like   the   Islamist  
explanation  examined  in  chapter  4,  the  security  explanation  tend  to  represent  
a  similar  low  demanding  standard  for  it  to  establish  causation.  As  a  result,  failing  
this  test  reduces  its  relevance  and  cannot  be  used  as  a  plausible  explanation.  
However,   it   is   important   to  note   that   failing   this   test  does  not  eliminate   it.  As  
long   as   Turkey   has   to   deal   with   certain   security   issues   and   especially   the  
endless   Kurdish   problem,   security   explanations   can   give   us   insights   to  
understanding  specific  policies  directly  related  to  security  threats.  We  cannot  
eliminate  it  because  security  concerns  has  actually  been  a  contributing  factor  
in  Turkey’s   foreign  policy   towards   some  of   its  Middle  Eastern  neighbours   in  
some   periods.   Therefore,   it   can   be   argued   that   the   security   theoretical  
hypothesis  in  this  specific  case  study  can  only  explain  “part”  of  the  cause  behind  
Turkey’s  foreign  policy  re-­engagement  with  the  Middle  East.  The  implication  of  
failing  this  test  is  that  it  slightly  strengthens  other  competing  explanations  in  the  
study.   To   further   simplify   this   process   of   the   examination,   the   below   table  
summarizes  the  main  points  of  the  security  based  explanation  and  its  value  in  




Figure  6.  Assessment  of  the  security  explanation  in  Process  Tracing  
Explanation  5:  -­‐‑   The  increasing  security  threats  posed  by  the  growing  instability  in  
Turkey’s  Middle  Eastern  neighbors  pushed  Turkey  to  re-­engage  and  
develop  cooperation  particularly  in  dealing  with  the  Kurdish  problem  
and  the  PKK  threat.    
Evidence  constituting  this  explanation:    -­‐‑   Kurdish  problem  has  been  a  long  term  issue  affecting  Turkey’s  
security  and  domestic  stability.    -­‐‑   Since  the  Iraq  war  in  2003,  Turkey’s  security  concerns  reached  its  
peak,  especially  with  instable  borders  with  Iraq.    -­‐‑   Turkey  made  intensive  efforts  to  improve  its  relations  with  its  
neighbors,  particularly  with  Iraq,  Iran,  and  Syria  (the  border  sharing  
states).  -­‐‑   Noticeable  cooperation  and  efforts  to  deal  with  common  security  
threats  and  particularly  the  PKK.  
Process  of  examining  empirical  evidence  and  interview  data:  -­‐‑   The  Kurdish  problem  is  one  of  Turkey’s  security  concerns.    -­‐‑   Turkey  is  also  worried  about  spill  over  as  a  result  of  the  growing  
political  regional  instability.    -­‐‑   The  AKP  government  managed  to  change  Turkey’s  approach  
towards  the  Kurdish  problem  from  a  security  based  one  to  a  
diplomatic  and  soft-­power  approach.    -­‐‑   The  AKP  successfully  “de-­securitized”  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  and  
worked  on  changing  its  long  known  hard  power  military  image.    -­‐‑   If  Turkey’s  openness  towards  the  Middle  East  was  caused  by  its  
security  concerns,  then  why  did  Turkish  foreign  policy  undergo  a  de-­
securitization  process?    -­‐‑   Interviewees  agreed  that  security  is  one  of  the  elements  of  Turkey’s  
regional  approach,  but  Turkey  under  the  AKP  went  far  beyond  its  
bordering  neighbors’  and  the  Kurdish  related  areas.  -­‐‑     Evidence  suggests  that  the  AKP,  particularly  since  the  second  term,  
have  adopted  a  soft-­power  approach  and  applied  ‘rhetoric  
diplomacy’.  -­‐‑   Interviewees  agree  that  security  has  been  a  key  feature  of  Turkish  
politics  and  foreign  policy  in  the  past,  but  it  has  considerably  
decreased  under  the  AKP  rule.  -­‐‑   Interviewees  illustrated  that  although  security  is  important,  it  is  weak  
to  suggest  it  as  the  cause  behind  Turkish  foreign  policy  change.  
Results:  -­‐‑   Less  demanding  standard  compared  to  identity  and  economic  
explanations,  similar  to  the  Islamist  explanation.    -­‐‑   Evidence  are  weak  and  does  not  either  rule  this  explanation  in  or  out  
of  the  study  (explains  a  minimal  part  of  the  case).  -­‐‑   Since  Turkey  went  through  a  de-­securitization  process  in  its  foreign  
policy  it  makes  it  Neither  Necessary  nor  sufficient  to  establish  
causation  (Not  necessary  as  evidence  suggest  that  Turkish  foreign  
policy  has  undergone  a  major  ‘de-­securitization  process’  prior  to  
2002  and  was  further  de-­securitized  by  the  AKP  government  
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replacing  it  with  other  soft-­power  elements.  Not  sufficient  as  it  fails  to  
explain  Turkey’s  increased  relations  and  openness  to  countries  
beyond  its  direct  security  threat  zones  near  its  borders  i.e.  the  Gulf  
states  and  others).          -­‐‑   Therefore,  fail  a  Straw  in  the  Wind  Test.  




The  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  critically  examine  the  “pragmatic”  and  “material”  
side   of   Turkish   foreign   policy,  mainly   focusing   on   the   role   of   economic   and  
security  factors  in  affecting  Turkish  foreign  policy  towards  the  Middle  East  since  
2002.  A  large  number  of  scholars  have  chosen  each  of  them  on  their  own  as  
an  explanation  also  influenced  by  the  neo-­realist  and  neo-­liberalist  theoretical  
interpretations   of   international   relations.   However,   the   key   question   of   this  
chapter   is   whether   the   economic   or   security   explanations   represent   a   valid  
cause  behind  Turkish  foreign  policy  change  towards  the  Middle  East.  In  other  
words,  can  we  solely  understand  such  foreign  policy  change  through  economic  
or   security   perspectives?  What   are   the   strengths   and  weaknesses   of   those  
explanations   presented   in   the   literature?   The   answer   to   these   questions  
requires  an  examination  and  test  of  their  necessity  and  sufficiency  as  causes  
behind  this  change.      
   In  the  economic  section,  we  came  to  understand  that  Turkish  economic  
interests   are   highly   important   to   the   AKP   government.   Since   the   AKP   took  
power   in  2002,   the  Turkish  economy  has  been  at   the   top  of   the  government  
agendas.  The  AKP  came  to  power  at  a   time  of  economic  crisis  witnessed   in  
2001  and   this  gave  a  great  need   for   the  coming  government   to   recover   the  
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economy  and  push  for  new  solutions.  AKP  officials  have  regularly  stressed  out  
their  economic  goals  and  motivation  to  fix  the  economy  and  transform  Turkey  
into  a   leading  global  economy.  Therefore,  one  of   the  greatest  achievements  
attributed  to  the  AKP  government  was  its  economic  success.  Turkey  was  able  
to  establish  new  zones  for  trade  with  many  regions  and  most  notably  the  Middle  
East.  Turkey  became  a  leading  exporting  country  and  an  economy  that  reached  
top  20  with  a  government  ambition  to  reaching  top  10  by  2023,  celebrating  One  
Hundred  Years  anniversary  of  the  birth  of  the  Turkish  Republic.    
   A  number  of  scholars  in  the  literature  have  chosen  to  emphasize  their  
analysis   of   Turkish   foreign   policy   transformation   towards   the   Middle   East  
through   a   solid   economic   approach.   This   type   of   approach   has   been   highly  
beneficial  to  our  understanding  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  and  most  importantly  
the  AKP  government’s  foreign  policy  principles.  The  studies  were  successful  in  
explaining   the   growing   Turkish-­Middle   East   trade   relations   and  
interdependence  containing  highly  important  facts  and  statistics.  However,  due  
to   the  competing   theoretical  nature   in   the   literature,   the  economic/pragmatic  
approach   seems   to   help   explore  only   one   side  of   the   story.  Throughout   the  
study,  evidence  show  that  the  economic  explanations  in  the  literature  seem  to  
overemphasize   the   role   of   economic   interests   in   understanding   the   overall  
Turkish   foreign   policy   transformation   towards   the   Middle   East.   Such  
explanations  fail  to  explain  the  security-­based  policies  as  a  result  of  the  Kurdish  
issue   that  has  a  direct   link  with   the  governments  of   Iran,  Syria,  and   Iraq   for  
example.   Furthermore,   the   roles   of   key   international   actors   like   the   United  
States   and   the   European  Union   in   affecting   Turkey’s   approach   towards   the  
Middle  East  have  also  been  overlooked.  On   the  other  hand,  such  economic  
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pragmatic  approach  has  been  challenged  by  the  ideological  and  identity  based  
explanations  in  understanding  Turkish-­Middle  East  relations  for  the  last  decade  
or   so,   which   also   represent   another   important   side   that   contribute   to   our  
understanding  of  this  case  study.  In  addition,  since  the  rise  of  the  Arab  Spring  
in   2011,   Turkish   economic   trade   relations   and   exports   in   troubled   countries  
have   been   affected.   However,   the   AKP   government   chose   to   support   the  
popular  uprisings  in  those  countries  calling  for  democratic  transitions.  If  Turkish  
foreign  policy  chiefly  relied  on  its  economic  interests  in  the  Middle  East,  it  would  
have  been  very  logical  for  the  Turkish  government  to  support  the  Arab  regimes  
and  the  stability  of  those  countries  in  an  attempt  protect  its  economic  interests.    
   Overall,  in  applying  economic  explanations  to  the  process  tracing  theory-­
testing  method,  it  was  evident  that  such  explanations  managed  to  pass  a  Hoop  
Test.  Choosing  the  type  of  test  these  explanations  pass  or  fail  depends  on  the  
evidence   provided.   Therefore,   passing   a   Hoop   Test  means   that   economic  
explanations  seem  to  have  great  relevance  in  explaining  Turkish  foreign  policy  
and   particularly   towards   the   Middle   East.   However,   passing   this   test   only  
“affirms”  relevance  and  does  not  “confirm”  it.  In  other  words,  it  helps  explain  an  
important  part  of  Turkish  foreign  policy,  but  does  not  explain  all  parts.  Therefore,  
the  economic  approach  has  been  strengthened  in  this  study  so  far  somewhat  
weakening  other  rival  explanations.  It  is  therefore  one  of  the  key  elements  of  
understanding  Turkish  foreign  policy  that  this  study  holds  on  to.  This  leads  us  
to  carry  on  in  this   investigation  and  consider  other  explanations  presented  in  
the  literature  that  we  have  not  looked  at  so  far.      
   On   the   other   hand,   the   security-­based   explanations   presented   in   the  
literature   to  understanding   this   foreign  policy   change  have  only  managed   to  
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cover  a  minor  part.  The  security  explanations  were  helpful  in  explaining  certain  
Turkish  foreign  policies  and  relations  with  states  like  Syria,  Iraq,  and  Iran  who  
share  borders  with  Turkey  and  are  directly  involved  in  the  Kurdish  issue.  The  
hard  power  security  and  military  approach  in  Turkish  foreign  policy  has  been  a  
central   theme   in  previous  governments.  Since   the  end  of   the  Cold  War  and  
particularly   by   the   end   of   1990s,   Turkey   went   through   a   process   of   de-­
securitization  as  it  was  getting  closer  the  European  Union.  However,  since  the  
AKP  took  power,  this  de-­securitization  process  was  heavily  implemented.  This  
in   itself  weakens  the  security  outlook   in  understanding  Turkish   foreign  policy  
towards  the  Middle  East.   It   is   therefore,   inaccurate  to  claim  that  Turkey’s  re-­
engagement  with  the  Middle  East  on  all  political,  economic,  and  cultural  levels  
have  been  shaped  by   security   concerns  and  especially   the  Kurdish   security  
problem.   Such   approach   fails   to   explain   the   Turkish   reach   to   zones   and  
countries  in  the  Middle  East  beyond  its  bordering  neighbours.  Turkey  was  able  
to   develop   important   relations  with   the  Gulf   States   as  well   as  North  African  
states  for  example;;  countries  that  not  share  much  common  security  concerns  
and   threats   compared   to   Turkey’s   Southern   bordering   neighbours.   Security  
theoretical  explanations  in  this  case  study  seem  to  fail  a  Straw  in  the  Wind  Test  
because  it  shows  that  it  is  neither  sufficient  nor  necessary  for  affirming  causal  
inference.  It  can  be  argued  that  the  security  approach  in  understanding  Turkish  
foreign  policy  change  towards  the  Middle  East  since  2002  is  a  weak  explanation  
and  one  that  does  not  explain  much  “on  its  own”.  Failing  this  test  minimizes  its  
importance  and  cannot  be  used  as  a  plausible  and  comprehensive  explanation.  
However,   it   is   important   to  note   that   failing   this   test  does  not  eliminate   it.  As  
long   as   Turkey   has   to   deal   with   certain   security   issues   and   especially   the  
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endless   Kurdish   problem,   security   explanations   can   give   us   insights   to  
understanding  specific  policies  directly  related  to  security  threats.  We  cannot  
eliminate  it  because  security  concerns  have  actually  been  a  contributing  factor  
in  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  towards  some  parts  of  its  Middle  Eastern  neighbours  
in  some  periods.    
   Overall,  both  economic  and  security  explanations  offer  useful  insights  to  
our   understandings   of   this   case   study.   However,   both   have   been   weak   in  
providing   a   complete   and  whole   picture   of   Turkish-­Middle   East   policy   since  
2002.  Although  both  are  not  necessary  and  sufficient  in  establishing  causation,  
it  has  to  be  noted  that  the  economic  explanation  appears  to  be  much  stronger  
and  reliable  compared  to  the  security  explanation.  Another  similarity  between  
the   two   is   that  we   cannot   eliminate   them   so   far   in   the   study   because   each  
seems  to  present  an  explanation  to  some  elements  of  the  case  study.  Turkey,  
as  mentioned  at  the  opening  of  this  thesis,  is  a  highly  complex  country  operating  
in   a   highly   complex   region.   This   reminds   us,   as  we   go   along   in   testing   the  
different  theoretical  hypotheses  provided  in  the  literature,  that  it   is  very  much  
difficult  to  explain  Turkey’s  regional  political,  economic,  and  cultural  openness  


















Another  term  usually  used  in  the  literature  when  analysing  the  de-­securitization  
process,   as   discussed   in   the   previous   chapter,   is   also   referred   to   as   the  
“Europeanization”  of  Turkish  foreign  policy.  Turkey  has  been  working  towards  
becoming  a  European  Union  member   for  a   long   time.   It  was  able   to   join   the  
European   Council,   the   Organization   for   Economic   Cooperation   and   the  
Development,   and   Security   and   Cooperation   in   Europe.   Despite   all   these  
efforts,   Turkey   was   still   unable   to   gain   full   membership   compared   to   less  
credible  countries   that  were  able   to  do  so,  such  as  Bulgaria.  Recently,   there  
has  been  increasing  academic  attention  to  Turkish-­EU  relations  and  particularly  
to  the  way  in  which  this  had  an  impact  on  both  Turkish  domestic  and  foreign  
policy   inspired   by   some   international   relations   theories,   particularly   neo-­
liberalism  and  neo-­liberal  institutionalism833.  The  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  assess  
and  evaluate   the  plausibility  and  validity  of   the  EU  explanation  as   the  cause  
behind   Turkish   foreign   policy   change   towards   the  Middle   East.   This   will   be  
tested  through  the  use  of  process  tracing  theory-­testing  methodology  in  order  
to   evaluate   EU   explanations’   strengths   and   weaknesses.   The   test   will   go  
through   analysis   of   some   critics   to   such   approach   in   the   literature,   in   the  
empirical  evidence,  and   in   the   interview  data  collected  as  part  of   this   thesis’  
fieldwork.    
                                                                                                              
833  Arthur  A.  Stein,  “Neoliberal  Institutionalism,”  in  The  Oxford  handbook  of  international  
relations,  eds.,  Christian  Reus-­Smit  and  Duncan  Snidal  (Oxford  University  Press,  2008),  201-­
221.    
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   The  structure  of  this  chapter  will  be  divided  into  three  main  sections.  The  
first  section  will  analyse  the  nature  of  Turkish-­EU  relations  and  its  effects  on  
Turkish  domestic  politics  and   foreign  policy.  This   includes  Turkey’s   relations  
with  the  EU  prior  and  during  the  AKP  government’s  rule  and  its  membership  
process.   The   second   section   aims   at   analysing   the   different   theoretical  
hypotheses  and  explanations  presented  by  different  scholars  and  analysts  in  
this  field  of  study  who  support  the  role  of  the  EU  in  influencing  Turkish  foreign  
policy   change   in   particular   towards   the  Middle  East.   The   importance   of   this  
section  stems  from  the  fact  that  by  analysing  and  exploring  EU  explanations,  it  
will  then  be  much  easier  to  test  their  plausibility.  This  is  where  the  third  and  final  
section  comes  into  play.  The  purpose  of  the  third  section  is  to  examine  and  test  
the   validity   and   strengths   of   the   EU-­based   explanations   in   understanding  
Turkish   foreign   policy   change   and   whether   they   represent   necessary   and  
sufficient   evidence.   This   will   include   critically   assessing   and   evaluating  
strengths  and  weaknesses  of  those  explanations  by  analysing  critics  presented  
by   other   scholars   who   might   not   have   supported   and   greed   with   such  
explanations,  empirical  evidence,  and  collected  interview  data.      
The  results  of  this  chapter  will  show  that  the  EU  approach  is  useful   in  
explaining   key  domestic   changes   i.e.   democratization,   de-­securitization,   and  
change  in  civil-­military  relations.  On  a  foreign  policy  level,  explanations  relying  
on  the  role  and  influence  of  EU  on  Turkish-­Middle  East  relations  are  useful  in  
explaining  some  aspects,  but  not  all.  For  example,  Turkey’s  new  approach  to  
the   Kurdish   issue   and   the   PKK   as   well   as   its   relations   with   its   southern  
neighbours   can  be  understood  as  part   of  Turkey’s  de-­securitization  with   the  
purpose  of  becoming  an  EU  member.  This  includes  Turkey’s  new  approach  to  
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the  issue  of  Cyprus  and  relations  with  Greece  and  Armenia.  However,  when  it  
comes  to  explaining  Turkey’s  openness  to  and   involvement   in  countries  way  
beyond  its  southern  neighbours,  the  role  of  the  EU  becomes  less  significant.  
EU  explanations  in  the  literature  fail  to  explain  some  important  aspects  that  are  
fundamental   to   consider,   such  as   the   rise  of   a  new  elite   and  bourgeoisie   in  
Turkey,  the  role  and  influence  of  identity  politics  over  decision  making  and  the  
way  Turkey  perceive  its  Middle  Eastern  neighbours,  as  well  as  the  crucial  role  
that  Amet  Davutoglu  played   in   re-­shaping  Turkey’s   foreign  policy  and  vision  
towards  the  Middle  East  through  both  his  works  and  official  positions.  Although  
the   EU   has   been   a   highly   important   institution   for   Turkey   and   very   much  
influential,  it  would  be  inaccurate  to  try  and  explain  such  Turkish  foreign  policy  
transformation  towards  the  Middle  East  simply  and  merely  through  an  external  
actor,  such  as  European  Union.    
Process  tracing  test  results  will  show  how  the  EU  can  be  regarded  as  
one   of   the   important   sources   and   factors   behind   Turkish   foreign   policy  
transformation   and   change   towards   the  Middle   East,   but   not   the  main   one.  
Therefore,   EU   explanations   seem   to   pass   a  Hoop   Test.  This   is   very   much  
similar   to   the   Economic   approach   discussed   in   the   previous   chapter  
demonstrating  parallel  value.  Passing  a  Hoop  Test  means  that  EU  explanations  
will  remain  under  consideration  and  will  not  be  eliminated  due  to  its  strengths  
in  explaining  certain  Turkish  foreign  policy  elements.  This  also  means  that  the  
role  of  the  EU  is  necessary  but  not  sufficient  for  establishing  causation.  Passing  
a  Hoop  Test  affirms   relevance  and   failing  would  have  eliminated   it   from   this  
study.   The   implication   of   passing   the   Hoop   Test   somewhat   weakens   rival  
explanations  in  the  study,  but  does  not  eliminate  them.  The  Hoop  Test  is  used  
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here   because   we   have   evidence   that   set   a   more   demanding   standard  
compared   to   the  evidence  used   in   the  Straw   in   the  Wind  Test   for  other   rival  
explanations,  but  not  strong  enough  to  pass  a  Smoking  Gun  or  Doubly  Decisive  
tests  that  can  confirm  a  given  hypothesis  and  eliminate  other  rival  ones.  This  
shows  that  there  is  a  growing  demand  in  the  literature  and  this  study  to  adopt  a  
more  comprehensive  and  inclusive  approach  that  can  take  on  board  more  than  
one  cause  or  factor  that  can  better  explain  such  foreign  policy  change,  which  
will  be  discussed  further  in  the  coming  chapter.      
1.	  The	  Dynamics	  of	  Turkish-­‐EU	  relations:	  its	  effects	  on	  Turkish	  foreign	  policy	  	  
  
The  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  analyse  the  nature  of  Turkish-­EU  relations  both  
before  and  after  2002.  This  includes  giving  close  attention  to  the  way  in  which  
Turkey’s  commitments  have  led  to  making  it  re-­organize  itself  as  a  state  in  both  
domestic  and  external  terms.  On  the  other  hand,  this  includes  an  analysis  of  
the  way  in  which  the  European  Union  as  an  institution  and  its  member  states  
viewed  and  related  to  Turkey.  However,  no  one  can  deny  the  effects  both  sides  
had  on  each  other  and  influence  on  certain  foreign  policy  decisions  throughout  
history.  With  Turkey  moving  closer  to  its  European  neighbour  and  away  from  
its  traditional  American  ally,  a  noticeable  transformation  took  place  in  Turkish  
domestic  politics  and  foreign  policy.  This  chapter  aims  at  investigating  further  
is   the   level  of   influence   the  European  Union  had  over  Turkish   foreign  policy  
making,  specifically  towards  its  neighbouring  Middle  East.  Therefore,  this  part  
of  the  chapter  will  be  divided  into  two  main  sections.  The  first  section  will  explore  
the  nature  of  Turkish-­EU  relations  prior  2002,  drawing  attention  to  the  historical  
relations  and  communications  the  two  have  had  and  their  impact.  The  second  
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section   will   analyse   these   relations   since   the   AKP   government   won   the  
elections  of  2002  and  the  developments  that  took  place.    
1.1	  The	  nature	  of	  Turkish-­‐EU	  relations	  prior	  to	  2002	  
  
The  history  of  Turkish-­European  relations  can  be  traced  back  to  the  Ottoman  
era.   The   most   significant   elements   of   their   relations   were   shaped   by   the  
Ottoman  control  over  some  territories  of  both  East  and  South  Europe  as  well  
as  being  a  “trade  partner”  for  Europeans834.  However,  in  modern  history  after  
the  creation  of   the  Turkish  Republic  and  the  European  Union,   the  first  major  
step  was  evident  in  1963  and  known  as  Ankara  Agreement835.  This  agreement  
led  to  the  establishment  of  an  association  between  Turkey  and  the  European  
Economic  Community  (EEC).  According  to  the  Turkish  foreign  ministry  (2011),  
this  agreement  planned  for  a  three  stage  process  for  Turkish  integration  with  
the  EU836.  These  were  a   “preparatory   stage,  a   transitional   stage  and  a   final  
stage”837.  This  was  followed  by  other  agreements  in  1970  and  1973  having  the  
purpose   of   putting   them   into   effect838.   The   most   significant   aspect   of   this  
agreement  is  its  clear  emphasis  on  the  fact  that  this  partnership  regime  would  
pave   way   for   Turkish   membership   into   the   European   Union839.      Most  
interestingly,  the  European  Commission  President  at  that  time  Walter  Hallstein  
stated,  “Turkey  was  part  of  Europe”840.  However,  according  to  Ziya  Onis  (2001),  
                                                                                                              
834  Justin  Mccarthy,  The  Ottoman  Turks:  An  Introductory  History  to  1923  (Routledge,  2014).    
835  Elena  Katselli,  “The  Ankara  Agreement,  Turkey,  and  the  EU,”  The  International  and  
Comparative  Law  Quarterly  55,  no.  3  (2006):  705-­  717.    
836  Republic  of  Turkey  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  “Turkey-­EU  relations,”  mfa.gov.tr,  2011,  
accessed  January  18,  2016,  http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-­between-­turkey-­and-­the-­
european-­union.en.mfa.      
837  Ibid.    
838  Ibid.    
839  Ibid.    
840  Amanda  Akcakoca,  “EU-­Turkey  relations  43  years  on:  
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the  European  Community’s  behaviour  towards  Turkey’s  full  membership  was  
negative   and   unwelcoming   particularly   due   to   its   size   and   dominant   Islamic  
identity841.  
   It  was  not  an  easy  process  for  Turkey  as  there  was  a  negative  attitude  
towards   its  accession.  Ziya  Önis  and  Suhnaz  Yilmaz   (2005)  stated,   “For   the  
EC/EU  in  the  1980s  and  the  1990s,  Turkey,  rather  than  being  a  ‘natural  insider’,  
was  an  ‘important  outsider’  with  whom  relations  ought  to  be  developed  on  an  
arm’s   length  basis  barring   full   integration”842.  The  Customs  Union   is  another  
important  stage  that  took  place  in  1996843.  This  came  after  the  transitional  stage  
and  was   important   in   the   sense   that   it   paved   the  way   for   further   integration  
between  Turkey  and  other  EU  members.  However,  the  Customs  Union  was  not  
only  a  temporary  stage  it  was  a  continuous  one  that  ensures  the  smooth  flow  
of  goods  across  borders  without  restrictions.  The  free  trade  zone  was  and  still  
is   highly   beneficial   for   Turkey’s   economy  and  Turkish-­EU   trade  as   a  whole.  
Although  it  was  a  stage  part  of  Turkey’s  accession  process,  it  was  mainly  for  
economic   benefits.   Likewise,   the   EU   managed   to   develop   similar   trade  
agreements  with  states  that  are  far   from  Europe  such  as  Canada  and  South  
Korea844.   However,   Turkey   is   regarded   as   one   of   the  most   important   trade  
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partners   for   the   EU.   Turkey   sees   the   growing   economic   partnership   as   an  
important  theme  that  should  accelerate  Turkey’s  accession  process845.  
   The   European   Union   gave   more   interest   and   enthusiasm   to   giving  
membership  to  countries  from  Eastern  Europe  that  were  under  the  Soviet  rule,  
such  as  Hungary  and  Poland846.  These  states  may  have  been  less  difficult  to  
accept   due   to   their   less   complicated   situations.   It   was   not   only   Turkey’s  
dominant  Islamic  identity  issue  there  were  other  conflicts  that  turkey  had  to  deal  
with  that  were  seen  as  problematic  to  the  EU.  For  example,  the  problem  over  
Cyprus  and  the  Turkish  military  intervention  posed  major  problems  and  affected  
Turkey’s  relations  with  the  European  countries847.  Instead,  Greece  was  much  
closer   to   Europe   and   became   a   member   that   stood   against   Turkey’s  
membership  for  a  long  time848.  With  Turkey’s  domestic  political  instability  and  
increasing  militant  Kurdish  Nationalism  as  well  as  Political  Islam,  it  was  difficult  
for  Turkey  to  catch  up  with  the  European  democratic  developments.  Turkey  was  
still  mainly  pursuing  hard  power  security  military  foreign  policy  that  was  rather  
confrontational.  This  was  not  very  much  in  line  with  what  the  European  Union  
looked  for   in   its  potential  members  especially   if   they  were  highly   likely  to  get  
drawn  into  military  conflicts.    
On  the  other  hand,  relations  with  the  Middle  East  were  not  deep.  Instead,  
Turkey   relied   more   on   light   economic   relations   and   trade   agreements,  
compared   to   the   EU,   particularly   during   Turgut   Ozal’s   rule.   However,   an  
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important   and   historic   step   was   taken   in   1999   when   Turkey   was   given   a  
candidate  status  at  the  Helsinki  Summit849.  This  meant  that  the  EU  would  view  
and  relate   to  Turkey   in  a  similar  way   to   the  ex-­Communist  countries850.  This  
change  in  EU  view  towards  Turkey  was  a  result  of  the  change  that  took  place  
in  Germany,  where  the  government  that  long  rejected  Turkey’s  accession  left;;  
and   the   unexpected   change   of   relations   and   attitude   between   Greece   and  
Turkey  after  the  1999  earthquakes851.  Never  the  less,  EU  member  states  still  
insisted  that  Turkey  was  not  yet  ready  for  immediate  accession  negotiations852.  
This  was  however  seen  as  a  victory  for  Turkey  and  very  successful  step  forward  
towards  the  EU  dream.  Moreover,  the  1999  candidacy  status  had  major  effect  
on   Turkish   foreign   policy   and   approach   towards   its   neighbours.   Since   the  
establishment  of   the  Republic,  Turkey  used   to   follow  a  classical  hard  power  
foreign   policy   with   a   reactive   mood.   However,   such   traditional   approach  
changed  since  1999  and  Turkey  was  gradually  adopting  softer  elements  and  
democratic  tools  in  its  foreign  policy  approach853.  
   There  was  a  developing  transformation  in  Europe  that  gradually  changed  
views   and   attitude   towards   Turkey’s   membership.   However,   such  
transformation  was  also  driven  by  some  important  factors.  Apart  from  the  ones  
mentioned  above,  Ziya  Onis  and  Suhnaz  Yilmaz  (2005)  argued  that  this  change  
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of   attitude   also   came   as   a   result   of   the   American   influence   over   social  
democracy   in   Europe,   Greece’s   democratization   process   after   accession  
reflected  an  attempt  to  solve  the  issue  with  Turkey  peacefully,  and  the  influence  
of  Turkish  business  communities  most  notably  TUSIAD854.  Such  developments  
paved  way  for  Turkey  to  work  harder  to  implement  the  Copenhagen  criteria  and  
transform  into  a  truly  European  state.  This  was  seen  in  the  number  of  reforms  
that  took  place  and  particularly  since  2000855.  Turkey  was  truly  entering  a  new  
phase  in  its  relations  with  the  European  Union,  which  brought  about  a  sense  of  
hope  and  motivation  for  Turks  for  their  future  accession.    
Unfortunately,  by  the  end  of  2000  and  beginning  of  2001,  Turkey  had  to  
deal  with  one  of   the  most  significant  economic  crises   in   its  history,  since  the  
creation  of  the  Republic856.  This  represented  a  major  challenge  that  could  lead  
to  further  instability  in  the  country.  There  were  a  number  of  critical  weaknesses  
emerging   including;;   high   inflation,   large   public   debt,   high   interest   rates,   the  
Turkish  lira  lost  nearly  half  of  its  value,  and  very  high  unemployment  rates857.  
This  crisis   led   to  a  number  of  public  demonstrations  and   riots  demanding   to  
solve  these  problems858.  The  government  appeared  weak  and  people  were  not  
satisfied,  which  created  a  gap  between  the  government  and   its  citizens.  The  
coalition   government   led   by   the   Democratic   Left   Party   (DSP)   Bulent   Ecevit  
failed,  which  led  to  major  disagreements  between  politicians.  Therefore,  in  2002  
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new  general  elections  were  held  and  the  country  was   looking   forward   for  an  
alternative  that  could  save  the  country859.    
1.2	  Turkish-­‐EU	  relations	  under	  the	  AKP	  government	  	  
  
In  2002,  after  the  historical  victory  of  the  AKP,  which  was  a  new  political  party  
formed  only  one  year  prior  to  election,  the  new  government  promised  to  solve  
the  country’s  economic  and  political  problems  with  a  new  outlook.  Since   the  
AKP  took  power,  Turkey  entered  a  new  phase  in  its  history  to  reach  new  political  
and  economic  levels  never  imagined  before.  The  new  AKP  government  led  by  
Erdogan  was  committed  to  change  Turkey  and  develop  democratic  principles.  
Therefore,   a  number  of   political   reforms   took  place  as  well   as   constitutional  
amendments.   These   were   heavily   seen   as   a   reaction   to   the   accession  
requirements.   Furthermore,   Turkey   was   seen   to   be   entering   a   new  
“Europeanization  process”  both  in  its  domestic  and  foreign  policy.  Domestically,  
there  was  a  noticeable  democratization  transformation  taking  place,  which  led  
to   giving   more   rights   to   minorities860.   Turkey   under   the   AKP   government  
improved  its  democratic  position  and  became  much  closer  to  the  EU  especially  
in   the  AKP’s   first   term   of   government.   According   to   Leila   Piran   in   her   book  
Institutional  Change   in  Turkey:  The   impact   of  European  Reforms  on  human  
rights  and  policing  (2013),  democratization  and  improvements  in  human  rights  
records  have  been  to  a  large  extent  affected  by  the  European  Union  and  added  
that   the   AKP   commitment   for   democratization   was   driven   by   “Turkey’s   EU  
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membership  bid”  861.  Therefore,  Turkey  emerged  as  a  new  regional  democratic  
model  and  a  successful  Muslim  democracy  that  inspires  the  rest  of  the  Islamic  
World  and  particularly   the  Middle  East.  This   transition  highly   challenged   the  
military  establishment  and  paved  way  for  change  to  the  traditional  and  basic  
institutional   structure.  With   the   development   of   reforms   issued   by   the   AKP,  
Turkey   entered   a   new   era   in   its   civil-­military   relations.   The   military  
establishment   was   highly   challenged   and   its   power   reduced.   The   National  
Security  Council   (NSC)  was   facing   problems  and   pressure,  which   led   to   an  
increase  of  civilian  power  over  the  military  budget  for  example862.  The  position  
of   the  NSC   leader  was   changed   to   being   non-­military   official,   but   instead   a  
civilian   nominated   by   the   Prime   Minister863.   Erdogan   stated   that   the  
Copenhagen   Criteria   would   be   changed   to   the   name   of   “Ankara   Criteria”  
adopted  in  Turkey  regardless  of  EU  membership864.  The  military  establishment  
was   restricted   to   military   roles   only   and   no   longer   was   able   to   interfere   in  
domestic  politics  and  policy  making  compared  to  the  past.  This  can  be  regarded  
as  one  of  the  main  advantages  that  the  AKP  brought  about  in  Turkey  that  no  
previous  government  was  able  to  do.    
On  the  other  hand,  on  a   foreign  policy   level,   the  first  major  event   that  
took  place  was  the  2003  American  war  against  Iraq.  As  mentioned  previously,  
the   Turkish   parliament   rejected   the   American   demand   to   use   the   northern  
borders  of  Turkey  in  its  war  against  Iraq.  Turkey’s  decision  to  reject  US  military  
to  use  Turkish   territories   in   its  war  was  seen  as  a  new  move  away   from  the  
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traditional  US  alliance.  The  decision  affected  Turkish-­US  relations,  while  at  the  
same   time,   showed   a   closer   Turkish-­EU   outlook   for   some   observers.   Such  
foreign  policy  change  was  viewed  as  a  transformation  from  an  “Americanized”  
Turkish  foreign  policy  to  a  “Europeanized”  one865.  Turkey  came  to  be  seen  as  
an   actor   who   wants   to   promote   regional   peace   and   stability.   Furthermore,  
Turkey’s   attitude   towards   the   Cyprus   conflict   was   another   turning   point   in  
Turkish-­EU  relations.  Turkey’s  attitude  towards  Cyprus  changed  and  this  led  to  
EU  members  viewing  Turkey  differently  as  well.  Turkey  was  no  longer  seen  as  
America’s  “Trojan  Horse”  in  Europe866.  Moreover,  Turkey’s  approach  towards  
the   Kurdish   problem   also   entered   a   new   phase   and   the   AKP   government  
promoted  negotiations  and  further  diplomatic  efforts.   It  was  seen  that  Turkey  
was   entering   a   new   “de-­securitization”   process   and   adoption   of   alternative  
softer  tools  to  solve  conflicts.  The  seriousness  and  commitment  showed  by  the  
AKP  government  on  both  domestic  and  foreign  policy  levels  led  to  change  in  
EU   attitude   towards   Turkey.   Therefore,   the   2005   accession   negotiations  
marked   a   new   step   forward   for   Turkey   and   increased   the   possibility   for  
membership867.   The  AKP  government  was   one   of   the  most  who  pushed   for  
Turkish-­EU  membership  compared  to  previous  Turkish  governments.  However,  
it   is   important  to  note  that  this  was  not  an  easy  task  for  Turkey  as  some  EU  
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members,  such  as  Cyprus,  Germany,  and  France  blocked  the  negotiations868.  
Generally,  Turkish-­EU  accession  negotiations  and  relations  witnessed  ups  and  
downs  and  Turkey  tried  to  show  a  new  image  to  convince  Europe.    
   Turkish-­Middle  East  relations  also  entered  a  new  stage  since  the  AKP  
victory.  Turkey  was  able  to  re-­engage  and  deepen  its  relations  with  its  Middle  
Eastern  neighbours  after  a  long  history  of  disengagement.  It  has  been  argued  
that   Turkey’s   soft   power   approach   towards   its   Southern   and   Eastern  
neighbours  was  influenced  by  the  AKP  commitment  to  move  closer  and  adopt  
EU  norms869.  Turkey  was  able  to  open  new  page  of  relations  with  countries  that  
have  previously  had  tensions  with,  such  as  Syria,  Iran,  and  Iraq.  Turkey  under  
the  AKP  was  also  able  to  go  beyond  that  reaching  to  the  rest  of  the  Middle  East  
and   deepening   its   relations   as   well   as   political   and   economic   cooperation.  
Turkey   adopted   the   so-­called   “Kurdish   initiative”   or   “democratic   opening”  
marking  Turkey’s  new  democratic  approach   towards  conflicts  with   the  Kurds  
and   the   PKK   and   neighbouring   countries870.   Turkey  was   able   to   reach   new  
agreements  with  the  Kurdish  side  as  well  as  central  governments  in  Iraq,  Syria,  
and  Iran.    
   On   the   other   hand,   economically,   the   AKP   government   adopted   a  
number  of  important  economic  reforms  and  was  able  to  gradually  recover  the  
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economy871.   Turkey   opened   its   gates   to   the   Middle   East   and   was   able   to  
develop  numerous  economic  agreements.  Turkey  became  an  important  trade  
partner  and  exporter   to  Middle  Eastern  states.  The  AKP  did  not  only  rely  on  
Turkey’s  economic  ties  with  the  EU,  instead,  followed  a  multilevel  approach  to  
maximize  its  economic  benefits.  Therefore,  Turkey  was  able  to  emerge  as  an  
important   economic   power   both   regionally   and   globally.  Moreover,   the   AKP  
government   was   able   to   use   its   geo-­strategic   position   and   emerge   as   an  
“Energy  hub  state”.  Turkey  being  positioned  between  the  Caspian  Region  and  
the  Middle  East  to  the  East  and  the  European  Union  to  the  West  gave  great  
opportunities872.    The  Middle  East  and  the  Caspian  region  contain  around  75%  
of  global  gas  resources  and  oil  and  Europe  is  one  of  the  biggest  consumers  of  
those  resources873.  Therefore,  the  AKP  saw  this  opportunity  to  further  increase  
Turkey’s  role  as  a  country  “bridging  supply  and  demand”874.  This  gives  Turkey  
significant  importance  to  Europe  by  becoming  a  European  energy  hub,  which  
increases  Turkey’s  position  in  the  EU.    
   However,  Turkish-­EU  relations  were  not  in  its  best  conditions,  especially  
with   the   emergence  of   right  wing  governments   in  Europe.  For   example,   the  
French   president   Nikolas   Sarkozy   showed   direct   rejection   for   Turkey’s  
accession875.  Turkey’s  domestic  instability  and  fears  for  a  possible  coup  was  a  
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major  problem.  Therefore,  a  large  and  wide  scale  arrests  took  place  in  Turkey  
against  top  military  officials  and  others  from  other  institutions  after  suspensions  
for  an  organized  plan  for  a  coup  to  overthrow  the  AKP  government876.  With  the  
continuous   rejectionist  behaviour  by  EU  members,  Turkey’s  attitude   towards  
the  EU  was  not  as  positive  as  it  used  to  be  and  particularly  during  the  second  
term   of   AKP   government.   Therefore,   since   2007,   it   is   argued   that   Turkey  
adopted  an  independent  foreign  policy  away  from  allying  with  particular  global  
actors877.  The  AKP  showed  increasing  confidence  in  its  foreign  policies  as  its  
political   and   economic   power   increased.   In   addition,   the   negative   attitudes  
towards   Turkish   membership,   particularly   by   France   and   Germany,   led   to  
increasing  of  EU’s  unpopularity  among  Turkish  citizens878.  There  was  a  growing  
European  agreement   that  Turkey   is  not   ready   to  become  a   full  member  and  
should  be  maintained  as  a  “privileged  partner”879.  
   Turkey  lost  a  lot  of  its  positive  outlook  and  motivation  towards  the  EU.  
Relations   with   the   EU   decreased   as   anti-­European   sentiments   grew   in  
Turkey880.   Turkey   lost   its   inspiration   and   this   affected   both   political   and  
economic   relations   between   the   two.   While   relations   with   the   EU   were  
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decreasing,  Turkey  had  to  face  another  major  problem  in  the  Middle  East  posed  
by  the  Arab  Spring.  The  popular  uprising  in  the  Middle  East  presented  Turkey  
with  great  challenges  particularly   to   its   “zero  problems”  policy  and  economic  
relations.   Although   Turkey   emerged   as   a   good   “democratic   model”   for   the  
Middle  East,  it  was  very  difficult  to  maintain  peace  and  stability.  Meliha  Altunisik  
(2011)   in   her   work  Challenges   to   Turkey’s   Soft   Power   in   the   Middle   East,  
argued  that  Turkey’s  reaction  towards  its  Middle  Eastern  neighbours  becomes  
increasingly  complicated  as  Turkish  interests  became  threatened881.  Turkey’s  
soft  power  approach  and  economic  interdependence  was  highly  challenged  as  
the  uprisings  grew  to  affect  more  states.  In  addition,  not  only  Turkey’s  interests  
were   at   stake,   but   also   it   had   to   deal  with  major   security   threats.   The  Arab  
Spring   grew   to   pose   direct   security   threats   for   Turkey,   particularly   with   the  
development  of  the  Syrian  crisis.  Despite  these  challenges,  Turkey  supported  
democratic   transformations   in   the   region   supporting   the   popular   demands  
against   their  national  governments882.  Furthermore,   the  Arab  Spring  gave  an  
opportunity   and   discussions   over   Turkey’s   potential   regional   role   as   a  
democratic  leader  and  one  that  could  be  followed  as  a  model883.    
On  the  other  hand,  the  EU’s  reaction  to  the  Arab  Spring  was  seen  to  be  
slow  and  ineffective884.  The  EU  became  highly  criticized  for  lacking  a  sufficient  
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response  and  strategy  to  deal  with  this  problem885.  For  example,  in  the  case  of  
Egypt,  the  EU  was  very  hesitant  and  did  not  speak  against  the  Mubarak  regime  
at  the  beginning886.  The  EU  was  more  in  favour  of  a  peaceful  transition  under  
supervision  in  the  form  of  negotiations  and  dialogue887.  However,  with  the  case  
of  Syria,  the  EU  was  more  aggressive  and  dealt  with  the  Assad  regime  directly.  
For   example,   the   EU   stopped   the   bilateral   cooperation   program   as   well   as  
applying  more   restricting  measures888.   The   EU   generally   appeared   weak   in  
dealing   with   its   troubled   Southern   neighbourhood   lacking   a   clear   plan   or  
strategy.  The  EU  appeared  less  active  and  engaged  compared  to  Turkey  who  
came   to  play  a   leading   role  both   in  Egypt   and  Syria   for   example.  However,  
Nilufer  Karacasulu  and  Irem  Askar  Karakir  (2014)  were  able  to  highlight   four  
main  distinctions  between  the  Turkish  and  EU  approaches  to  the  Arab  Spring.  
First  of  all,  the  EU  is  looking  to  build  regional  partnership  and  cooperation,  while  
Turkey   tries   to  play  a   leading   regional   role.  Secondly,  Turkey  has  combined  
both   hard   power   and   soft   power   in   its   Arab  Spring   approach,  while   the   EU  
supports  norms  and  values.  The  third  factor  is  that  their  attitudes  towards  Egypt  
and   Syria   were   not   the   same.   The   fourth   is   Turkey’s   willingness   to   host  
refugees,  while  the  EU  was  more  careful  and  wanted  to  limit  refugees  and  limit  
illegal  immigration889.    
Generally,   Turkish-­EU   relations   witnessed   both   ups   and   downs.  
However,   it   is   important   to   emphasize   that   the  EU  has   been   a  major   factor  
behind  Turkey’s  democratization  process  and  change  in  traditional  institutional  
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structures.  In  terms  of  foreign  policy  making,  the  question  of  whether  the  EU  
was  the  cause  behind  Turkey’s  openness  and  re-­engagement  with  the  Middle  
East   remains.   This   will   be   dealt   with   in   greater   details   as   we   explore   the  
literature  further.    
2.	  The	  EU	  as	  ‘the	  cause’	  behind	  Turkish	  foreign	  policy	  change	  towards	  the	  
Middle	  East	  	  
  
The  aim  of  this  section  of  the  chapter  is  to  analyse  the  available  explanations  
that  support  the  EU  notion  and  being  a  cause  to  Turkish  foreign  policy  change  
and   particularly   towards   the  Middle   East.   This   analysis   will   pave   way   for   a  
critical   engagement  with   the   literature   and   examination   of   their   validity.   The  
literature   on   Turkish-­EU   relations   has   produced   a   number   of   different  
explanations   to   EU’s   effects   on   Turkish   foreign   policy   and   Middle   East  
approach.  One  of  the  most  important  themes  in  the  literature  is  the  so-­called  
“Europeanization”  of  Turkish  foreign  policy.  According  to  Juliette  Tolay  (2011),  
“Europeanization  is  usually  understood  as  the  process  through  which  domestic  
political  practices  are  affected  by  Europe”890.  The  author  argued  that  one  of  the  
major  problems  with  the  term  “Europeanization”  in  the  literature  is  that  there  is  
no  consensus  among  scholars  to  its  definition891.  For  example,  scholars  viewed  
the  EU  effects  differently;;  some   looked  more  at   the  social   levels  and   the  so  
called  “Societal  Europeanization”;;  others  focused  on  “policy  Europeanization”  
analysing  the  effects  on  domestic  public  policies;;  while  others  emphasized  the  
“political  Europeanization”  in  the  way  how  the  EU  has  transformed  the  broader  
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political   system   in   Turkey892.   Therefore,   it   can   be   seen   that   there   is   no  
consensus  on  a  definition  of  the  term  as  well  as  a  wide  and  complex  literature  
on  the  ways  in  which  the  EU  has  been  affecting  the  Turkish  republic.  The  author  
agreed  that  Europeanization  is  a  complex  process  that  cannot  be  viewed  from  
one  perspective  or  even  easily  defined  (p.  197-­200).    
   Regarding   Turkish-­Middle   East   policy   and   its   relations   to   the   EU,  
interestingly,   Juliette   Tolay   (2011)   in   her   same   work,   argued   that   the   AKP  
government  is  actually  pushing  for  “the  European  Union,  despite  the  European  
Union”893.   Tolay   emphasized   that   it   is   important   to   realize   that  
“Europeanization”   is   taking   place   in   Turkey,  while   at   the   same   time   the  EU  
accession  process  is  slowing  down894.  This  shows  that  the  AKP  government  is  
eager   to   adopt  EU  principles   and   norms   regardless   of   its  membership.   The  
author   argued   that   Turkish   foreign   policy   witnessed   changes   towards   the  
Kurdish  issue  and  others  at  a  time  when  Turkey  was  facing  challenges  in  its  
accession   process895.   It   is   argued   that   the   Turkish   government   is   pursuing  
changes   that   appear   to   be   more   in   line   with   the   European   Union   despite  
accession896.  Tolay  quoted  Prime  Minister  Erdogan  stating  “  I  don’t  want  to  rely  
on  the  accession  process  and  all  these  reforms  should  not  be  done  for  the  sake  
of  becoming  a  member  state.  These  are  things  that  Turkey  really  needs  and  
things  that  should  be  done”897.    
   On  the  other  hand,  other  scholars  have  instead  argued  that  the  Turkish  
re-­engagement   with   the   Middle   East   and   its   new   policies   under   the   AKP  
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government  is  an  “asset”  for  the  EU.  They  explained  that  Turkey  is  promoting  
its  membership  and  importance  to  the  EU  through  its  policies  in  the  Middle  East  
representing  an  important  “Eastern  gate”  for  Europe.  In  a  number  of  occasions,  
Davutoglu  argued  that  Turkey’s  position  and  regional  activities  both  politically  
and  economically   is  “an  asset   for   the  EU”898.  Furthermore,  he   illustrated  that  
Turkey  can  contribute  to  the  European  Union  in  a  number  of  ways  and  a  “EU  
rejection  of  Turkey  is  in  fact  will  be  a  rejection  to  future  global  integration”899.  
Sinan  Ulgen  (2009)  in  his  work  Turkey’s  Route  to  the  EU  maybe  via  the  Middle  
East,  argued  that  Turkey’s  proactive  policies  in  the  Middle  East  and  diplomatic  
efforts  as  well  as  mediations  would  attract  the  European  Union900.  Ulgen  stated,  
“Turkish  accession  would  not,  as  European  federalists  like  to  argue,  lead  to  a  
weaker  Europe.  On  the  contrary,  Turkey’s  membership  would  make  Europe  a  
more   influential  and  capable  world  power”901.  For  Ulgen  and  other  optimists,  
the  Turkish  engagement  and  influence  in  the  Middle  East  actually  increase  its  
asset  value  for  Europe.  Furthermore,  such  regional  activities  with  a  soft  power  
image  do  not  go  against  EU  norms.  Instead,  they  seem  to  be  more  in  line  with  
EU’s  regional  objectives  and  approach.  Moreover,  in  an  essay  by  Steven  Everts  
(2004)  entitled,  An  asset  but  not  a  model:  Turkey,  the  EU,  and  the  wider  Middle  
East,  argued  that  Turkey’s  Middle  East  approach  is  an  asset  for  the  EU,  but  not  
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a  democratic  model  for  the  Middle  East902.  Everts  argued  that  Turkey  could  play  
an   important   role   in   influencing   EU-­Middle   East   policy.   The   author   added,  
“Turkey’s   accession   will   increase   the   salience   of   the   Middle   East,   and  
accelerate   the   Union’s   already   deepening   involvement   in   the   region”903.   He  
argued   that   Turkey   adopted   EU   “style”   of   approach   using   multilateral  
mechanisms  as  well  as  institutional  integration904.  He  added,  “Turkey  has  quite  
a  lot  to  offer  to  the  EU.  It  can  contribute  expertise  and  knowledge  of  the  Middle  
East  region.  While  Turkey  has  fewer  Arabic  speakers  than  one  might  expect  
the  country’s  network  of  contacts,  combined  with  the  political  capital  of  the  AKP  
government  and  the  burgeoning  economic  ties  will  be  assets  for  the  EU”905.    
   There   has   been   a   wide   range   of   approaches   explaining   EU   role   in  
Turkish  foreign  policy.  For  example,  Ziya  Oni  (2010)  argued  that  the  EU  has  
been  important  to  Turkey  only  on  “rhetoric”,  but  in  “reality”,  Turkey  seems  to  act  
independently  serving  its  regional  interests906.  Svante  Cornell  (2012)  in  his  work  
What  drives  Turkish  Foreign  Policy:  Changes  in  Turkey,  argued  that  as  long  as  
Turkey  is  in  line  with  EU,  there  will  be  increasing  alignment  between  Turkish  
and   EU   foreign   policies907.   Another   different   approach   in   the   literature   was  
presented   by   Ziya   Onis   and   Suhnaz   Yilmaz   (2009)   in   their   work   Between  
Europeanization  and  Euro-­Asianism:  Foreign  Policy  Activism  in  Turkey  during  
                                                                                                              
902  Steven  Everts,  “An  asset  but  not  a  model:  Turkey,  the  EU,  and  the  wider  Middle  East,”  
Centre  for  European  reform  (2004):  2,  accessed  January  23,  2016,  
http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/essay_turk_everts-­
2173.pdf.    
903  Ibid.    
904  Ibid,  4.    
905  Ibid.    
906  Ziya  Onis,  “Multiple  Faces  of  the  New  Turkish  Foreign  Policy:  Underlying  Dynamics  and  a  
Critique,”  Center  for  Globalization  and  Democratic  Governance  Working  Paper  Series,  2010,  
accessed  January  23,  2016,  http://glodem.ku.edu.tr/10_004.pdf.    
907  Cornell  Svante,  “What  drives  Turkish  Foreign  Policy:  Changes  in  Turkey,”  Middle  East  
Quarterly,  (2012):  13-­24,  accessed  January  23,  2016,  http://www.meforum.org/.    
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the  AKP  era908.  They  argued  that  Turkey  has  lost  many  of  its  commitments  to  
the   West   and   instead   adopted   “Soft   Euro-­Asianism”909.   They   added   that  
Turkey’s  regional   foreign  policy  activism  has   increasingly  been  moving  away  
from  the  EU910.    
   On   the   other   hand,   other   scholars   and   analysts   have   made   greater  
emphasis  on  the  role  of  the  EU  on  affecting  Turkey’s  domestic  politics.  They  
seem  to  have  seen  a  greater  effect  of   the  EU  on  Turkey  domestically   rather  
than  on  foreign  policy  level.  In  an  interesting  book  by  Liela  Piran  (2013)  entitled  
Institutional   change   in   Turkey:   The   Impact   of   European   Union   Reforms   on  
Human  Rights  and  Policing,  argued  that   there  has  been  significant  domestic  
changes  in  Turkey  during  the  AKP  government911.  For  her,  the  EU  has  been  a  
major   source   for   Turkish   democratization   process.   Piran   highlighted   the  
noticeable  shift  in  civil-­military  relations  in  Turkey  and  the  government  efforts  to  
giving  more  rights  for  the  Kurdish  minorities  for  example.  Furthermore,  Kemal  
Kirisci   (2005)   stated   that   with   the   closing   up   of   Turkey   and   the   EU,   more  
democratic  reforms  were  taking  place912.  He  added  there  are  both  “Europhiles”  
and  “Euroskeptics”.  With  closer  EU  efforts   to  Turkey’s  accession,  Europhiles  
the  chance  for  more  influence  over  reforms  and  change.    
Moreover,  Meltem  Muftuler  Bac   (2005)   in  his  article  Turkey’s  Political  
Reforms  and  the  Impact  of  the  European  Union,  argued  that  the  EU  has  been  
a   major   source   behind   political   transformation   and   democratic   reforms   in  
                                                                                                              
908  Ziya  Onis  and  Suhnaz  Yilmaz,  “Between  Europeanization  and  Euro-­Asianism:  Foreign  
Policy  Activism  in  Turkey  during  the  AKP  Era,”  Turkish  Studies  10,  no.  1  (2009):  7-­24.    
909  Ibid,  8.    
910  Ibid,  13.    
911  Liela  Piran,  Institutional  change  in  Turkey:  The  Impact  of  European  Union  Reforms  on  
Human  Rights  and  Policing  (United  States:  Palgrave  Macmillan,  2013).    
912  Kemal  Kirisci,  "Turkey  and  the  European  Union:  the  domestic  politics  of  negotiating  pre-­
accession,"  Macalester  International  15,  no.  1  (2005):  10.  	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Turkish  history913.  The  author  further  stated,  “the  EU  has  increasingly  been  the  
main   motor   behind   the   Europeanization   process   in   Turkey   as   the   EU  
membership  perspective  became  clearer  for  Turkey  and  as  it  became  obvious  
that  accession  negotiations  with  the  EU  could  not  begin  unless  Turkey  fulfilled  
the  political  conditions  for  EU  accession”914.  For  Meltem,  although  the  EU  has  
been  a  major  source  behind  democratization  in  Turkey,  she  believes  that  it  was  
not  the  only  one.  In  addition,  EU’s  effect  over  Turkish  domestic  politics  has  also  
been  looked  at  from  a  different  dimension.  For  example,  in  an  interesting  article  
entitled  Unpacking  the  Compliance  Puzzle:  The  case  of  Turkey’s  AKP  under  
EU   Conditionality   by   Beken   Saatçioğlu   (2010)   argued   that   the   AKP’s  
commitment   to   adopt   new   democratic   reforms   was   not   motivated   by   EU  
membership,  Instead,  the  author  believes  that  reforms  were  made  for  two  main  
reasons;;  first,  to  attract  pro-­EU  Turks  along  with  conservatives  to  become  more  
popular  and  for  electoral  purposes;;  and  second,  to  challenge  and  weaken  the  
military  secular  establishment  that  has  long  been  dominating  Turkish  politics915.  
It  is  argued  that  the  main  purpose  is  to  survive  as  a  party  with  “Islamist”  roots  
in  Turkey.  Saatcioglu  stated,  “AKP’s  adoption  of  an  EU  agenda  (though  with  a  
slow-­down   in   reforms   after   2005)   is   explained   by   neither   a   belief   in   the  
possibility   of   membership   via   democratization   (credible   conditionality)   nor  
liberal   identity.   Rather,   AKP’s   compliance   with   the   EU’s   political   criteria   is  
instrumentally  induced”916.  She  argued  that  despite  the  decline  in  Turkish-­EU  
                                                                                                              
913Meltem  Muftuler  Bac,  "Turkey's  political  reforms  and  the  impact  of  the  European  Union,"  
South  European  Society  and  Politics  10,  no.  1  (2005):  16-­30.  
914  Ibid,  17.    
915  Beken  Saatçioglu,  “Unpacking  the  compliance  puzzle-­The  case  of  Turkey‘s  AKP  under  EU  
conditionality,”  Free  University  Berlin  KFG  working  papers,  no.14  (2010),  accessed  January  
25,  2016,  http://userpage.fu-­berlin.de/kfgeu/kfgwp/wpseries/WorkingPaperKFG_14.pdf.    
916  Ibid,  1.    
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relations  and  enthusiasm  for  accession,  the  AKP  government  continued  with  its  
reform  efforts,  which  suggests  that  there  are  other  domestic  reasons  for  such  
reforms  and  change  than  purely  for  accession  purposes  as  highlighted  in  the  
literature.    
   In  addition,  other  scholars  have  argued  that  Turkey’s  multidimensional  
approach  and  re-­engagement  with  the  Middle  East  has  been  a  result  of  EU’s  
rejectionist  behaviour  pushing  Turkey  to  find  alternatives.  For  example,  Selcen  
Oner  (2010)  stated,  “Turkey’s  slow  integration  process  to  the  EU  because  of  
the  reluctance  by  the  EU’s  political  elites  to  admit  Turkey  and  the  Cyprus  issue  
have  influenced  Turkey’s  multidimensional  approach  to  foreign  policy”917.  Oner  
argued  that  the  stagnation  in  Turkish-­EU  accession  and  relations  paved  way  
for   Turkey   to   look   for   other   options918.  However,  Oner   believes   that   the  EU  
should   stay   as   the   primacy   of   Turkish   foreign   policy   in   the   future   and   that  
Turkey’s   relations   with   the   Middle   East   should   not   replace   the   EU919.   As  
mentioned  above,  Onis  and  Yilmaz  (2009)  argued  that  Turkey  is  moving  closer  
towards   “Euro-­Asianism”,   compared   to   Europeanization,   particularly   when  
relations  with  the  EU  are  weakened920.  They  stated,  “The  retreat  to  soft  Euro-­
asianism  certainly  does  not  signify   the  abandonment  of   the  Europeanization  
project  altogether.  What  it  means,  however,  is  that  the  EU  will  no  longer  be  at  
the  centre-­stage  of  Turkey’s  external  relations  or  foreign  policy  efforts”921.    
                                                                                                              
917  Selcen  Oner,  “The  Place  of  the  EU  in  Multi-­Dimensional  Turkish  Foreign  Policy,”  in  History,  
Politics  and  Foreign  Policy  in  Turkey,  eds.,  Kilic  Bugra  Kanat  et  al.  (The  SETA  Foundation,  
2011),  176.    
918  Ibid,  188.    
919  Ibid,  189.    
920  Onis  and  Yilmaz  “Between  Europeanization  and  Euro-­Asianism”,  14-­16.    
921  Ibid,  25.	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   Overall,   the   literature   on   Turkish-­EU   relations   and   impact   of   EU   on  
Turkish   foreign   policy   has   been   very   colourful.   Scholars   and   analysts   have  
attempted   to   explain   such   impact   from  a  wide   range  of   perspectives.  Some  
looked  at   it   from  a  bottom-­up  and  top-­down  affects,  while  others  preferred  to  
view  it  from  either  a  European  point  of  view  (Turkey’s  preference  of  Middle  East  
and   the  axis  shift)  or  Turkish  point  of  view   (being  part  of  a  multidimensional  
approach  and  an  asset  for  EU).  However,  this  leads  us  to  critically  examine  the  
usefulness  of  understanding  Turkish-­Middle  East  relations  from  a  EU  approach.  
The  main  question  to  consider  is;;  to  what  extent  has  the  EU  can  be  regarded  
as  the  cause  behind  Turkey’s  proactive  Middle  East  policy  and  approach?    
3.	  To	  what	  extent	  are	  EU-­‐based	  explanations	  plausible?	  	  
  
Following  the  review  of  EU  explanations  in  understanding  Turkish  foreign  policy  
towards  the  Middle  East,  it  is  critical  to  try  and  evaluate  their  significance.  The  
purpose  of  this  section  is  to  test  those  explanations  in  order  to  uncover  their  
true   value.  As   followed   in   this   thesis,   this  will   be  done   through  applying   the  
process  tracing  theory  test  method.  The  testing  method  will  include  the  use  of  
relevant  critics  and  opposite  explanations  that  may  challenge  such  approach,  
empirical  evidence  available   to  help  expand  our  analysis,  and   interview  data  
conducted  with  experts  in  this  field.  The  results  will  show  that  the  EU  notion  in  
understanding  Turkish  foreign  policy  transformation  is  actually  useful,  but  when  
it   comes   to   understanding   Turkish-­Middle   East   policy   particularly,   it   only  
manages  to  explain  some  aspects  not  all.  The  EU  explanations  have  proven  to  
be  as  strong  as  the  economic  explanations  analysed  in  the  previous  chapter.  
However,   both   seem   to   explain   some   important   elements   in   Turkish   foreign  
policy  in  the  Middle  East,  but  certainly  do  not  explain  everything.  The  section  
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below   will   attempt   to   unfold   the   EU   approaches   and   critically   assess   their  
necessity  and  sufficiency  in  understanding  the  EU  as  a  cause  behind  Turkish  
foreign   policy   change   towards   the   Middle   East   since   2002   under   the   AKP  
government.    
First  of  all,  the  literature  has  clearly  shown  a  lack  of  consensus  on  the  
definition  of  “Europeanization”.  Some  scholars  tried  to  define  and  understand  
the  process  of  Europeanization  in  the  Turkish  case  from  a  societal  perspective  
focusing  on  the  social  level  and  the  notion  of  European  identity.  Others  looked  
at  it  more  from  a  policy  perspective  emphasizing  on  the  development  of  public  
policies.  While  others  chose  to  define  it  from  a  political  perspective  analysing  
the  political   transformation  of   the   republic  and   the  way   in  which   the  EU  has  
managed   to   change   the   Turkish   political   system.  What   is  more,   this   is   also  
accompanied  by  a  lack  of  consensus  over  the  affects  and  influence  of  the  EU  
in  Turkish  foreign  policy  and  particularly  towards  the  Middle  East.    
   Although  the  de-­securitization  process  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  has  been  
heavily   attributed   to   the   EU,   it   still   does   not   explain   the   Turkish   openness  
towards  states  that  are  not  directly  involved  in  any  Turkish  security  problems  or  
conflicts.   The   de-­securitization   can   successfully   explain   Turkey’s   new   soft  
power   and   diplomatic   approach   to   the   Kurdish   problem,   Cyprus   issue   and  
conflict  with  Greece  and  Armenia  for  examples.  However,  it  fails  to  explain  the  
improved   relations   with   the  Gulf   region   on   the   other   hand.   There   are   other  
explanations  that  would  present  stronger  arguments  regarding  the  Turkish-­Gulf  
relations,   such   as   Turkey’s   economic   interests   and   aim   to   build   economic  
interdependencies.  Therefore,   it  can  be  argued   that   the  EU  approach  can   in  
fact  explain  some  foreign  policy  issues,  but  certainly  not  all  of  them.    
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   Furthermore,  another  weakness  in  this  approach  stems  from  the  fact  that  
there   have   been   a   number   of   different   and   in   some   cases   contradictory  
explanation   of   the  way   in  which   the  EU   has   affected   or   influenced  Turkish-­
Middle   East   foreign   policy.   Such   explanations   include;;   1)   That   Turkish   new  
approach   to   the   Middle   East   and   re-­engagement   is   beneficial   and   can   be  
viewed  as  an  asset  for  Turkey’s  membership.  This  includes  Turkey’s  efforts  to  
show  that  it  can  be  an  important  “Eastern  gate”  for  the  EU  that  can  promote  EU  
norms  and  values  as  well  as  contribute  to  peace  and  stability  in  the  region.  2)  
That  Turkey’s  regional   re-­engagement  and  new  approach   is  a  result  of  EU’s  
rejectionist   behaviour,   which   pushed   Turkey   to   look   for   other   sources   of  
interests  and  alternatives.  This  was  highly  emphasized  particularly  since  2005  
after  the  blockage  by  some  members  for  Turkey’s  accession.  3)  Other  scholars  
seem   to   have   focused  mainly   on   the   Turkish   domestic   level.   Even   on  EU’s  
influence   on   Turkish   domestic   politics   witnessed   some   contradictory  
explanations.   For   example,   some   have   been   enthusiastic   and   argued   that  
Turkey   has   successfully  managed   to   adopt   EU   norms   and   democratization,  
making  it  also  a  good  democratic  model  for  the  region.  While  others  have  been  
sceptic   and   argued   that   the   AKP   have   used   EU’s   criteria   and   democratic  
reforms  mainly  to  challenge  and  weaken  the  secular  and  military  establishment  
to   avoid   the   consequence   of   being   overthrown   similar   to   previous   Islamist  
parties.      Therefore,   such   colourful   and   multiple   theoretical   analyses   in   the  
literature  on  EU-­Turkish  relations  and  EU’s  influence  over  Turkish  politics  and  
foreign   policy   can   be   misleading   and   confusing.   Although   having   multiple  
theoretical  hypotheses  is  academically  healthy,  it  demonstrates  a  weakness  of  
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consensus  among  scholars  who   focus  on   the   role  of   the  European  Union   in  
general  and  in  Turkish-­Middle  East  relations  in  particular.    
   Looking  at  some  of  the  critics  and  explanations  provided  in  the  literature,  
we  come  to  find  out  that  the  EU  approach  cannot  wholly  explain  all  aspects  of  
Turkey’s   foreign   policy   change   towards   its   neighbouring   Middle   East.   For  
example,   Selcen   Oner   (2011)   in   his   work   on   The   Place   of   the   EU   in  
Multidimensional   Turkish   Foreign   Policy   also   emphasized   other   factors  
contributing   to   Turkey’s   new   foreign   policy   approach.   He   stated,   “Several  
domestic   and   external   factors   have   been   influential   on   increasing   multi-­
dimensional  approach  in  Turkish  foreign  policy”922.  Oner  argued  that  there  are  
some  domestic  economic  and  political  factors  that  led  to  such  multidimensional  
approach.  The  EU  explanation  does  not  precisely  explain  the  rise  of  the  new  
elites  in  Turkey  and  particularly  the  conservative  business  elites  that  was  taking  
place   since   Turgut   Ozal   was   in   office.   These   new   conservative   elites   have  
increasingly  become  influential  in  Turkish  foreign  policy  making.  Furthermore,  
the   EU   explanation   fails   to   explain   and   consider   the   role   of   the   Turkish  
economic   crisis   in   2001.   The   economic   crisis   pushed   Turkey   to   expand   its  
economic  relations  and  look  for  new  markets  to  be  able  to  recover  and  survive  
in  an  increasingly  competitive  world  economy.  Therefore,  it  can  be  argued  that  
EU  explanations  in  understanding  Turkish  foreign  policy  change  seem  to  have  
overlooked  the  role  of  some  domestic  factors.    
   On  the  other  hand,  the  EU  approach  does  not  explain  the  roles  of  some  
key   and   influential   policy   makers   i.e.   Ahmet   Davutoglu.   As   discussed   in  
previous  chapters  and  particularly  in  chapter  five,  Davutoglu  is  seen  to  be  one  
                                                                                                              
922  Selcen  Oner,  “The  Place  of  the  EU  in  Multi-­Dimensional  Turkish  Foreign  Policy”,  176.    
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of   the   most   influential   figures   in   Turkey   for   the   last   decade   or   so.   He   is   a  
professor  in  Politics  and  international  relations  who  managed  to  publish  a  large  
number  of  academic  articles  and  books  that  have  been  very  influential.  One  of  
his  most   important  works  known  as   the   “Strategic  Depth”   (2001)  highlighted  
Turkish  foreign  policy  and  potential  role  and  influence  in  the  Balkans,  Caucasia,  
and   the   Middle   East923.   Davutoglu’s   ideas   were   very   influential   to   the   AKP  
government.  For   example,  Turkish  new   foreign  policy  approach  adopted  his  
ideas   of   “Zero-­Problems   with   neighbours”,   “Rhetoric   Diplomacy”,   “Balance  
between   Security   and   Freedom”,   “Multidimensional   Approach”,   and   many  
others.  These  ideas  all  contributed  to  Turkey’s  new  foreign  policy  image  and  
approach  towards  its  neighbours.  Davutoglu  was  appointed  as  Chief  Advisor  to  
PM  Erdogan  and  worked  closely  with  him  for  a  number  of  years  before  he  was  
appointed  as  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  in  2009.  Davutoglu  is  widely  viewed  by  
scholars  as  the  “architect  of  Turkish  foreign  policy”924.  Finally,  he  was  elected  
Prime  Minister  of  Turkey  in  2014.  Davutoglu  has  been  a  key  figure  operating  at  
the  heart  of  the  Turkish  government  for  more  than  thirteen  years.  He  is  currently  
the  leader  of  the  Justice  and  Development  Party  and  Prime  Minister  for  the  next  
few  years  to  come.    
   In  my  interview  with  Professor  Serhat  Erkemen,  Head  of  Department  of  
International  Relations  at  Kırşehir  Ahi  Evran  University  and  Middle  East  advisor  
at  ORSAM  ‘Centre  for  Middle  Eastern  Strategic  Studies’,  argued  that  we  cannot  
ignore   the   role   of   the   EU   as   an   external   actor   influencing   Turkey’s   foreign  
                                                                                                              
923  Ahmet  Davutoglu,  Strategic  Depth:  Turkey’s  International  Position  (Kure  publishes,  2001).  
924  MEE,  “Davutoglu:  Architect  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  to  be  new  PM,”  Middle  East  Eye,  
August  21,  2014,  accessed  January  25,  2016,  http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/davutoglu-­
architect-­turkish-­foreign-­policy-­be-­new-­pm-­2142298220.    
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policy925.  He  added,  “I  agree  that  Turkey’s  policy  in  the  Middle  East  has  been  
important  to  Turkish-­EU  relations.  Turkey  is  trying  to  help  improve  its  position  
in  Europe  and  its  accession  process  also  in  its  Middle  East  approach,  especially  
in  the  first  two  terms  of  AKP  government”926.  Professor  Erkemen  suggested  that  
the  EU  has  been  influencing  Turkish-­Middle  East  relations  and  Turkey  exploits  
its  Middle  East  policies  to  support  its  EU  membership.  However,  as  mentioned  
in  chapter  5,  he  also  showed  positive  attitude  and  lenience  towards  the  neo-­
Ottomanist   explanation,   which   seems   to   show   some   contradictions   in   his  
answers.  This  could  mean  that  he  views  the  AKP  government  as  one  that  uses  
Turkey’s  Ottoman  past   to   influence   the  Middle  East,  while  at   the  same   time  
serve  its  European  interests  and  its  EU  membership  process  at  the  same  time.  
Either  way,  his  views  clearly  demonstrate   that   there   is  more   than  one   factor  
causing  Turkish  foreign  policy  change  under  the  AKP  government.    
On   the   other   hand,  Professor  Mesut  Ozcan,   chairman  of   the  Foreign  
Ministry’s  Diplomacy  Academy  and  advisor  to  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  
did  not  show  a  similar  view  and  stated  that  his  PhD  thesis  was  about  this  subject  
(Turkish-­EU-­Middle   East   relations).   He   argued,   “Turkey’s   development   of  
relations  with   the  Middle  East  was  not  a   reaction   from   its  problems  with   the  
EU”927.  He  gave  an  example  that  as  while  Turkey  negotiated  its  accession  with  
the  EU  in  2005,   it   increased  its  relations  with  Syria  at   the  same  time.  Ozcan  
insisted   that   Turkey  was   not   trying   to   search   for   alternatives   to   the  EU.  He  
stated  that  40%  of  Turkey’s  foreign  trade  is  with  the  EU,  but  at  the  same  time,  
“the  centre  drive  of  the  global  economy  is  moving  from  the  West  to  the  East”.  
                                                                                                              
925  Serhat  Erkemen,  interview  by  author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  March  21,  2014.    
926  Ibid.  
927  Mesut  Ozcan,  interview  by  author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  March  18,  2014.    
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He  added,  why  shouldn’t  Turkey  benefit  from  this  economic  transformation?  “It  
is  not  wise  for  us  to  place  all  of  our  eggs  in  one  basket”.  He  added,  “thanks  to  
our   development   of   economic   relations   with   other   regions,   we   managed   to  
reduce  our  economic  dependence  with  Europe   from  52%  to  40%”928.  Ozcan  
illustrated   that   the  openness   towards   the  Middle  East   is  purely   to  serve  and  
enhance  Turkish  interests,  regardless  of  the  EU.  Therefore,  for  Ozcan,  it  would  
be  misleading  to  try  and  understand  Turkish-­Middle  East  relations  through  the  
European  Union  or  Turkish-­EU  relations.      
   Similarly,  in  his  interview,  Prof.  Birol  Akgun,  Chairman  of  the  Institute  of  
Strategic  Thinking  SDE,  stated,  “I  don’t  believe  that  the  EU  has  a  direct  affect,  
I  believe  that  it  is  Turkey’s  search  for  interest  and  benefits  instead”929.  Akgun  
stressed  that  although  there  are  some  linking  elements  in  Turkish  foreign  policy  
position  between  Europe  and  the  Middle  East,  it  would  be  much  more  useful  to  
treat  them  separately  and  then  find  possible  linkages,  not  the  way  around.  He  
stated,  “if  we  are  to  analyse  the  development  of  Turkish  foreign  policy   in  the  
Middle   East   in   relations   to   Turkey’s   position   in   the   EU,   we   would   find   that  
despite  the  problems  occurring  regarding  Turkey’s  membership  in  the  EU,  the  
flow  of  Turkish-­Middle  East  relations  and  regional  engagement  persist”930.    
   Moreover,   Prof.   Mehmet   Ozkan,   Advisor   and   Researcher   to   SETA  
Foundation  and  specialized  in  Political  Science  and  International  Relations  and  
an  editor  for  “Insight  Turkey”  Journal,  in  his  interview,  agreed  that  the  EU  has  
had  major  effects  on  Turkey  on  many  different  levels.  He  stated,  “The  EU  has  
been  very   important   to   the  development  of  Turkish  politics.   It  has  had  major  
                                                                                                              
928  Ibid.	  	  
929  Birol  Akgun,  Interview  by  author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  March  20,  2014.    
930  Ibid.    
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effects  on  the  development  of  democratization  and  the  reforming  of  the  role  of  
military  for  example”.  “It  has  been  extremely  helpful”931.  Ozkan  stated,  “I  am  not  
sure   if   the   EU   sees   Turkey’s   position   in   the  Middle   East   as   an   advantage.  
However   they   should   see   this   positive   potential”932.   He   added,   “Eventually  
Europe   will   see   Turkey’s   opening   to   the   Middle   East   as   an   advantage   to  
them”933.   However,   Ozkan   believes   that   there   are   bigger   fin   his   actors   that  
should  be  viewed  as  causes  behind  Turkey’s  change  of  foreign  policy,  not  just  
towards   the   Middle   East,   but   in   general.   He   argued,   “when   thinking   about  
Turkey’s   changing   position   in   international   politics   after   1999,   with   the  
emergence  of  economic  crisis  as  well,  Turkey  realized  that  there  is  a  change  in  
all  global  politics;;  International  Economic  Politics  has  been  changing;;  and  they  
came  to  an  understanding  that   if  you  don’t   relocate  yourself   in   this  changing  
global  power  struggle  both  economically  and  politically,  you  will  have  no  place  
and  that’s  why  Turkey  took  an  initiative  and  decided  to  reorient  itself  according  
to  this  changing  global  structure”934.      
   Dr.   Saban   Kardas,   President   of   ORSAM   ‘Middle   East   Strategic  
Research   Centre’   and   faculty   member   at   the   department   of   International  
Relations  at  TOBB  University  of  Economics  and  Technology  in  Ankara,  in  his  
interview  stated,  “In  my  paper  Re-­drawing  the  Middle  East  map  or  building  sand  
castles?  (2010)  I  argued  that  Turkey’s  ‘strategic  approach’  is  compatible  with  
the  Europeanization  module”935.  He  argued,   “It   is   not   as   simple  as  because  
Turkey  is  being  rejected  in  the  West  and  therefore  it  is  moving  to  the  East.  The  
                                                                                                              
931  Mehmet  Ozkan,  Interviewed  by  Author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  March  17,  2014.    
932  Ibid.    
933  Ibid.	  	  
934  Ibid.    
935  Saban  Kardash,  interviewed  by  author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  October  13,  2014.    
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opening   to   the   East   has   its   own   meaning”936.   Kardas   argued   that   many  
observers   of   Turkish   foreign   policy   seem   to   miss   the   meaning   of   Turkish  
transformation  in  the  East  and  redefining  its  position  in  the  West  at  the  same  
time.   He   stated,   “It   is   more   of   a   self-­motivated   reason   and   that   is   where  
constructivism  comes  to  play  looking  at  the  strategic  identity  and  understanding  
the  importance  of  reconnecting  with  the  past  and  Middle  East  civilization”937.  He  
added,  “Turkey  has  its  own  of  what  I  call  ‘strategic  autonomy’  but  it  is  not  100%  
independent.  Turkey  lives  in  an  interconnected  world  as  well  as  in  a  system  and  
is   subject   to   different   systemic   influences”938.   Here   Kardas,   along   with  
interviewees  mentioned  above,  seems  to  point  out  that  many  observers  have  
overemphasized  the  role  of  the  EU  on  Turkish  foreign  policy  transformation.  For  
him,   the   transformation   in  Turkish-­Middle  East   relations   is  subject   to  several  
different  factors  and  certainly  not  merely  the  EU.    
   In  addition,  Professor  Yasin  Aktay,  the  Foreign  Affairs  Deputy  Chairman  
and  one  of  the  founding  members  of  the  AKP,  illustrated  that  the  AKP  has  been  
strongly  pushing  and  still  is  for  full  EU  membership939.  He  stated,  “I  believe  this  
is  good  for  Turkey’s  democratization  process,  but  this  at  the  same  time  does  
not  mean  that  we  should  ignore  our  Middle  Eastern  neighbours  or  other  regions  
of  the  world”.  He  believes  that  Turkey  wants  to  benefit  from  all  sides  and  this  
will  also  benefit  other  regions  at  the  same  time.  He  added,  “much  of  Turkey’s  
democratic  development  is  attributed  to  Turkey’s  EU  commitments  and  the  AKP  
believes  that  the  Europe  is  a  neighbour  that  share  a  lot  in  common”.  However,  
he  argued  that  the  AKP  government  adopted  a  multilateral  approach  and  aims  
                                                                                                              
936  Ibid.  
937  Ibid.  	  
938  Ibid.    
939  Yasin  Aktay,  interviewed  by  author,  Ankara,  Turkey,  March  19,  2014.    
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to  build  good  relations  with  other  regions  at  the  same  time.  Therefore,  we  can  
see  the  level  of  importance  the  EU  has  on  Turkish  agenda,  but  evidence  show  
that  the  EU  does  not  always  have  a  “direct  link”  with  all  Turkish  Middle  Eastern  
policies  and  therefore  cannot  be  the  only  cause.    
     So  far,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  role  of  the  EU  in  Turkish  democratization  
process  and  domestic  transformation  has  been  significant.  On  the  other  hand,  
the  EU  has  also  played  an   important   role   in   the  de-­securitization  of  Turkish  
foreign  policy  mainly  towards  the  Kurdish   issue,   Iran,  Syria,  and  Iraq  who  all  
share   border   with   Turkey.   However,   according   to   studies   presented   in   the  
literature   and   other   empirical   data   as   well   as   interview   data,   we   came   to  
understand   that   the   influence   of   the   EU   on   Turkish   foreign   policy   change  
towards  the  Middle  East  explains  some  aspects  of  this  transformation.  The  EU  
approach  fail  to  look  at  some  important  factors  including  domestic  change  and  
rise  of  a  new  elite,   the  economic  crisis  of  2001  and  Turkey’s  aim  to  develop  
regional  economic  cooperation  and  trade,  the  role  of  the  “architect  of  Turkish  
foreign  policy”  Ahmet  Davutoglu  and  his  ideas,  the  political  and  economic  global  
transformations  and  changes   in   the   international  system,  and  several  others  
presented  by  other  scholars  in  the  literature.  The  EU  has  been  a  major  force  
behind  Turkey’s  new  approach  towards  the  conflicts  over  Cyprus  with  Greece,  
conflict  with  Armenia,  and  the  Kurdish  problem.  These  were  all  major  problems  
for  Turkey’s  EU  membership  and  had  to  readjust  its  approach  and  transform  its  
image  into  a  soft  power  state.  However,  when  it  comes  to  the  Middle  East  and  
particularly   beyond   Turkey’s   southern   bordering   states,   a   number   of   other  
factors   need   to   be   considered   to   better   understand   Turkish   foreign   policy  
change  towards  the  Middle  East  since  2002.    
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Therefore,   the   results   show   that   when   applying   the   EU   approach   as  
cause   behind   Turkish   foreign   policy   change   towards   the  Middle  East   to   the  
process  tracing  theory-­testing  methodology,  it  seems  to  pass  a  Hoop  Test.  The  
validity  and  plausibility  of  the  EU  explanation  is  very  much  similar  to  the  validity  
of  the  economic  approach  mentioned  in  the  previous  chapter.  This  means  that  
the  EU  explanation  will  remain  under  consideration  and  will  not  be  eliminated  
due   to   its  strengths   in  explaining  certain  Turkish   foreign  policy  elements.  As  
analysed  above,  the  EU  explanation  tend  to  highlight  a  few  elements  of  Turkish  
foreign  policy  and  mainly   through   its  effects  on  Turkish-­Middle  Eastern  Soft-­
Power   approach   away   from   its   traditional   hard   power   image.   However,  
evidence   show   that   EU   explanation   cannot   on   its   own   represent   a  
comprehensive  answer  and  explain  all   factors  behind   the   causes  of  Turkish  
foreign  policy  change  towards  the  Middle  East.    
  Passing  a  Hoop  Test,  as  mentioned  in  the  methodology  chapter  of  this  
thesis,   means   that   the   evidence   used   for   this   explanation   represents   a  
necessary  but  not  sufficient  criterion  for  establishing  causation.  It  is  necessary  
because  we  cannot  eliminate  such  explanation  due  to  its  importance  because  
without  it,  our  analysis  will  certainly  be  incomplete,  as  the  EU  has  proven  to  be  
influential   to   our   understanding.   However,   it   is   not   a   sufficient   explanation  
because  it  does  not  fully  explain  all  aspects  causing  this  change  as  it  ignores  a  
number   of   other   factors   discussed   above.   This   hypothesis   set   a   more  
demanding  standard  compared  to  Straw  in  the  Wind  test  for  example.  Overall,  
passing  a  Hoop  Test  affirms  relevance  and  failing  would  have  eliminated  it  from  
this  study.  The  implication  of  passing  the  Hoop  Test  is  much  stronger  compared  
to   Straw   in   the   Wind   test.   Passing   a   Hoop   test   somewhat   weakens   the  
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plausibility  of  rival  explanations  in  the  study,  but  does  not  eliminate  them.  The  
Hoop  Test  is  used  here  because  we  have  evidence  that  set  a  more  demanding  
standard  compared  to  the  evidence  used  in  the  Straw  in  the  Wind  Test  for  other  
rival  explanations,  but  not  strong  enough   to  pass  a  Smoking  Gun  or  Doubly  
Decisive  that  can  confirm  a  given  hypothesis.  To  further  clarify  this  process  of  
examination,  the  below  table  summarizes  the  main  points  of  the  EU  explanation  
and  its  value  in  the  thesis  so  far.    
Figure  1.  Assessment  of  the  EU  explanation  in  Process  Tracing  
Hoop  Test  
Explanation  6:  -­‐‑   Turkish  foreign  policy  change  towards  the  Middle  East  has  been  
influenced  by  Turkish-­EU  relations  and  EU  membership  process.    
Evidence  constituting  this  explanation:    -­‐‑   Turkish-­EU  relations  has  been  one  of  the  most  important  elements  of  
Turkish  foreign  policy.    -­‐‑   The  EU  has  influenced  major  changes  in  Turkish  politics,  particularly  
in  the  democratic  transformation  and  the  de-­securitization  project.    -­‐‑   Evidence  suggest  that  Turkey’s  soft-­power  approach  has  much  in  
common  with  EU’s  regional  policies  =  a  “Europeanization  of  foreign  
policy”  as  opposed  to  an  “Americanization  of  foreign  policy”.  -­‐‑   Turkey’s  adoption  of  multilateral  foreign  policy  approach  and  support  
of  institutional  integration  in  the  region  are  found  to  be  European  
originated.    
Process  of  examining  empirical  evidence  and  interview  data:  -­‐‑   There  is  a  noticeable  disagreement  over  the  nature  of  influence  the  
EU  has  on  Turkish  foreign  policy  i.e.  some  argued  that  Turkey  saw  
the  opportunity  to  represent  itself  as  an  important  “Eastern  gate”  to  
Europe,  one  that  can  contribute  positively  and  to  the  stability  of  the  
region.  On  the  other  hand,  others  saw  Turkey’s  re-­engagement  with  
the  Middle  East  as  a  reaction  to  EU’s  rejectionist  behaviour  and  
Turkey  finds  the  Middle  East  an  alternative  regional  sphere  of  
influence.    -­‐‑   Interviewees  illustrated  that  there  is  not  direct  link  between  Turkey’s  
openness  to  the  Middle  East  and  the  EU.  -­‐‑   Interviewees  agree  that  Turkey’s  autonomy  has  been  growing  away  
from  Western  powers  =  “strategic  autonomy”.    -­‐‑   Evidence  and  interview  data  advocate  that  the  EU  mostly  influenced  
and  effected  Turkey’s  ‘domestic  politics’  i.e.  democratic  reforms  and  
change  of  balance  in  the  military-­civilian  relations,  which  in  turn  had  
an  effect  on  the  process  of  foreign  policy  making  in  Turkey.    
Results:  
390	  	  
-­‐‑     Evidence  set  a  more  demanding  standard  compared  to  Islamist  and  
neo-­Ottoman  explanations,  similar  to  identity  and  economic  
explanations.    -­‐‑   Strong  evidence  suggesting  EU  influence  (direct  and  indirect).      -­‐‑   One  of  the  most  popular  explanations  in  the  literature.    -­‐‑   Necessary  but  not  sufficient  to  establish  causation  (Necessary  as  the  
EU  has  been  and  still  is  a  critical  part  of  Turkey’s  geographical,  
political,  economic,  and  even  social  dimensions.  One  cannot  draw  a  
full  picture  of  Turkish  politics  and  foreign  policy  without  considering  
Turkish-­EU  relations  and  its  impact.  However,  regardless  of  its  
necessity,  the  EU  explanation,  on  its  own,  does  not  seem  to  explain  
all  elements  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  change  towards  its  Middle  
Eastern  neighbors.  Therefore,  similarly  to  some  other  explanations,  it  
tends  to  explain  an  important  part  of  the  picture,  but  not  the  whole  
picture).    -­‐‑   More  need  for  a  wider  approach  that  is  also  inclusive  of  all  EU,  
economic,  and  domestic  factors  as  demonstrated  so  far  in  this  study.  -­‐‑   Therefore,  EU  explanation  Passes  a  Hoop  Test.  






The  European  Union  has  been  one  of  the  most  important  international  actors  
for  Turkey  for  a  long  time.  Since  the  creation  of  the  republic  by  Kemal  Ataturk,  
Turkey   pursued   a   Western   oriented   foreign   policy.   The   Turkish   interest   in  
Europe  became  evident  since  1963  Ankara  agreement  that  paved  way  for  the  
stages  of  Turkish  membership  process.  Since  then,  Turkey  has  been  working  
closely  and  with  Europe  on  a  number  of  issues.  The  EU  influence  was  evident  
on  Turkey’s  new  approach  towards  Greece  and  the  Cyprus  issue,  and  Armenia.  
Such  changes  came  as  a  result  of  European  pressure  demanding  Turkey   to  
solve   its   conflicts  with   these   states.   Turkey  was   able   to   reach   a   number   of  
important  agreements  with  the  European  Community  and  the  European  Union  
especially   on   economic   levels.   However,   Turkey   still   faced   challenges   and  
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struggled   to  gain  membership  due   to   the   rejectionist   behaviour   of   some  EU  
member   states.  Regardless  of   this   negative  behaviour,  Turkey   still   engaged  
positively  with  the  EU  and  was  trying  to  get  closer  by  adopting  EU  norms  and  
following  the  Copenhagen  Criteria.  Therefore,  Turkey  became  to  be  seen  as  a  
new  soft  power  state   that  moved  away   from   its  classical  hard  power   image.  
During  the  AKP  government,  Turkey  entered  a  new  turning  point  in  its  history.  
The  AKP  was  one  of  the  most  if  not  the  most  government  seeking  to  gain  EU  
membership.  Turkey  was  able   to  adopt  European  democratic  principles  and  
entered   a   critical   domestic   democratization   process.   This   led   to   the  
transformation  and  change   in   the  balance  of   civil-­military   relation  as  well   as  
transforming  Turkish  elite  structures.  Part  of  this  Turkish-­EU  closeness,  Turkey  
moved  away   from   its   traditional  security  hard  power   foreign  policy  approach  
and  went   through   a   de-­securitization   process.   This  was   evident   in   Turkey’s  
change  of  behaviour  and  approach  towards  the  Kurdish  problem  and  the  PKK  
seeking  peaceful  and  diplomatic  negotiations  and  efforts,  and  attempts  to  solve  
its  conflicts  with  Greece  over  the  Cyprus  issue  as  well  as  Armenia.  An  important  
part   of   this   new   foreign   policy   approach   was   evident   in   Turkey’s   efforts   to  
improve  relations  and  cooperation  with  its  southern  neighbours  particularly  Iran,  
Syria,   and   Iraq   especially   that   all   of   the   three   are   directly   involved  with   the  
Kurdish  problem.  Turkey  even  went  further  into  the  Middle  East  and  was  able  
to  increase  its  relations  and  role  in  many  other  countries  including  North  African  
states,  Egypt,  and  the  Gulf  States  as  well.  However,  the  Arab  Spring  came  to  
challenge   this  new  approach   to   the  Middle  East  and  presented  a  number  of  
obstacles  especially  to  its  “Zero  Problems  with  Neighbours”  approach.  Turkey’s  
position  against  some  of  the  Arab  governments  involved  in  the  uprisings  and  
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support  for  the  popular  demands  highly  affected  Turkey’s  long  efforts  to  develop  
good  relations  with  those  governments.  However,  Turkey  emerged  as  a  Muslim  
majority   democratic   state   that   can   play   a   model   role   for   the   Middle   East.  
Although  relations  with  some  Arab  states  deteriorated,  Turkey  is  still  interested  
in  the  Middle  East  and  is  very  much  involved  in  different  events.  This  was  seen  
in  Turkey’s  involvements  and  support  of  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  in  Egypt  and  
other  North  African  countries,  which  led  to  some  tensions  with  other  Arab  states  
and  mainly  with   the  Gulf   led   by  Saudi   Arabia.  With   the   development   of   the  
Syrian  crisis,  Turkey  had  to  deal  with  a  number  of  security  problems  including  
war   against   terrorism   and   ISIS,   the   rise   if   the   Kurdish   issue   as   a   security  
problem  again  and   the   threat   of   the  PKK,  and   the   increasing   flow  of  Syrian  
refugees.  Turkey   is   faced  with  no  choice  but   to  develop   its  regional  role  and  
regain  its  positive  position  in  the  Middle  East  to  push  for  more  cooperation  and  
efforts  in  dealing  with  such  problems  that  represent  a  direct  threat  to  Turkey’s  
national  security.    
   Looking  back  to  the  main  cause  behind  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  change  
towards  the  Middle  East  since  2002  and  becoming  a  country  highly  involved  in  
the  region,  the  EU  approach  presented  in  the  literature  and  discussed  above,  
give   us   some   useful   insights.   It   explains   the   democratic   transformation   and  
change  of  civil-­military  relations  during  the  AKP  government.  Furthermore,  on  
foreign  policy  level,  the  EU  was  able  to  influence  Turkey’s  approach  to  critical  
security  problems  and  conflicts  with  its  neighbours.  However,  it  seems  to  play  
a  less  significant  role  in  Turkey’s  openness  and  re-­engagement  with  countries  
way  beyond  its  bordering  neighbours  where  other  factors,  such  as  economic  
interests,  seeking  regional  influence  and  power,  and  the  new  influential  ideas  
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presented   by   Ahmet   Davutoglu,  may   play   a   greater   role   in   explaining   such  
developments.  After  analysing  the  EU  theoretical  approach  and  applying  critics,  
empirical  evidence,  and  interview  data,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  EU  approach  
explains  some  important  aspects  of  Turkish  new  foreign  policy  approach  that  
we   cannot   ignore,   but   at   the   same   time,   does   not   offer   a   comprehensive  
explanation.  As  a   result,  having  passed  a  Hoop  Test,  affirms   relevance  and  
therefore  cannot  be  eliminated  from  the  study,  but  it  does  not  confirm  it  at  the  
same  time.    
   Having  not  “confirmed”  any  explanations  or  hypotheses  examined  in  this  
thesis  so  far  is  challenging.  This  is  because  it  demands  further  investigation  to  
understand   what   really   triggered   Turkish   foreign   policy   change   towards   the  
Middle   East   since   2002   and   what   the   valid   causes   that   can   explain   it   are.  
However,  one  of  the  main  advantages  of  the  results  of  this  thesis  so  far  is  that  
the  results  show  that  there  is  a  need  for  a  more  inclusive  and  holistic  approach  
that  can  explain  the  complex  and  multilateral  nature  of  this  study.  Having  weak  
and  strong  explanations  in  the  literature  represents  a  problem  when  having  a  
singular  theoretical  approach.  A  singular  or  one-­sided  theoretical  approach  can  
explain  and  answer  some  specific  cases  of  history  and  issues  like  decisions  of  
war  or  peace  for  example.  However,  when  it  comes  to  dealing  with  a  complex  
case  like  Turkey  that  is  located  in  a  critical  geo-­strategic  position  and  is  facing  
many  issues  from  both  of  its  East  and  Western  neighbours,  including  domestic  
complex   identity  and   ideological  nature,  a  broader  and  more  comprehensive  
approach   is   highly   needed.   However,   this   does   not   certainly   mean   that   an  
inclusive   approach   that   combine   different   factors   or   causes   will   definitely  
answer  the  question,   instead  it  may  lead  us  closer  to  reality  and  represent  a  
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more  solid  conclusion  for  others  to  consider,  evaluate,  and  certainly  criticize.  
Therefore,   the   need   for   and   validity   of   using   a   more   inclusive   and  
comprehensive   theoretical   approach   or   explanation   will   be   discussed   and  
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In  the  previous  chapters,  the  results  have  shown  that  there  have  been  a  large  
number   of   studies   and   explanations   regarding   Turkish   foreign   policy  
transformation   and   change.   These   studies   mainly   offered single   factor  
explanations  or  foreign  policy  theories.  The  existence  of  multiple  explanations  
and,  in  some  cases,  competing  ones  contribute  to  the  theoretical  debate  that  
can  drive  the  observer  away  from  understanding  the  case  in  a  holistic  manner.  
This  suggests  that  there  is  a  growing  need  for  a  more  inclusive  explanation  that  
has  the  ability  to  analyse  the  different  sources  affecting  Turkish  foreign  policy.    
The  aim   is   to  analyse  how   the  different   theoretical  explanations  have  
helped  explore  the  wide  range  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  sources.  This  includes  
a  re-­visit  of  the  theoretical  introductory  section  in  chapter  one  on  foreign  policy  
analysis  to  understand  how  different  foreign  policy  and  international  relations’  
theoretical   interpretations  can  help  understand  Turkish   foreign  policy  and   its  
recent  developments.  The  chapter  summarises  the  overall  research  test  results  
and  argument  highlighting  the  necessity  of  applying  a  wider  approach   in   this  
field  of  study   that  analyse   the   role  of   the  multiple  sources   in  Turkish   foreign  
policy   in   order   to   achieve   a   comprehensive   explanation.   This   includes   the  
importance   of   recognising   the   effective   roles   of   international   and   domestic  
political,  economic,  and  ideational  sources  as  well  as  the  role  of  influential  policy  
makers. 
The  contribution  of   this  thesis   lies  within   its  analysis  bringing  the  wide  
range   of   theoretical   explanations   in   the   literature   together,   exploring   and  
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summarizing   the   vast   number   of   data   in   a   more   simplified   manner,   and  
examining  the  value  and  plausibility  of  the  competing  explanations  to  try  and  
arrive   at   the  most   comprehensive   explanation,   all   under   one   piece   of  work.  
Therefore,  this  thesis  establishes  a  useful  foundation  for  researchers  to  adopt  
and  take  forward  in  future  studies.  
The   findings   suggest   that   there   are   a   number   of   existing   theoretical  
explanations  presented  in  the  literature  that  offer  great  insights  very  important  
when   answering   this   research   question.   The   literature   has   mainly   been  
characterised   by   a   noticeable   diversity   among   scholars   who   in   their   work  
presented  different  answers  and  in  some  cases  even  contradictory  ones.  For  
example,  some  chose  to  focus  on  the  role  of  political  Islam,  Islamism,  and  neo-­
Ottomanism  in  understanding  Turkey’s  recent  foreign  policy  breakaway  from  its  
traditional  line  moving  it  away  from  the  West,  while  others  linked  it  directly  to  
the   Turkish-­European   integration   process   and   membership   to   improve   its  
potential  role  as  a  key  eastern  gate  for  the  EU.  On  the  other  hand,  a  number  of  
experts  chosen   to   focus  on   the   roles  of   identity  politics  and   ideology   in   their  
work   in  analysing   this   foreign  policy   transformation,  while  others   favoured   to  
look  at   the  pragmatic  and  materialist  side  of  Turkish   foreign  policy  using   the  
notion  national  security  and  economic  interests  as  the  key  motivating  factors  
behind  Turkey’s  recent  change  of  approach  to  the  Middle  East.  
The   presence   of   such   multiple   arguments   in   the   literature   created   a  
sense,  at   least   from  a  personal  perspective,   that   there   is  an  existing  debate  
over   the   sources   behind   Turkey’s   recent   foreign   policy   transformation   and  
change   towards   the   Middle   East   under   the   AKP   government   since   2002.  
Therefore,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  debate  in  the  literature  is  divided  into  two  
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mainstream  theoretical  positions.  The  first  theoretical  position  tends  to  rely  and  
base  its  analyses  on  the  so-­called  “ideational”  approach  mainly  looking  at  the  
roles  of   identity  politics  and   ideology   in  understanding  Turkish   foreign  policy  
behaviour.  This  can  be  found  within  the  constructivist  theoretical  interpretation  
in   this   field   of   study   that   tend   to   favour   the   role   of   ideational   non-­material  
sources  of   foreign  policy.  On   the  other  hand,   the  second   theoretical  position  
primarily   focuses  on  the  “pragmatic”  or   “materialist”  sources  of   foreign  policy  
influenced  by  theories  of  realism  as  well  as  rationalism  and  liberalism  by  looking  
at  the  roles  of  the  European  Union,  Turkish  economic  interests,  and  national  
security,  as  important  sources  shaping  Turkey’s  relations  with  its  neighbouring  
Middle   East.   Therefore,   it   can   be   argued   that   the   theoretical   explanations  
examined   in   previous   chapters   can   be   located   within   the   main   theoretical  
interpretations   from   the   fields   of   foreign   policy   analysis   and   international  
relations,  such  as  rationalism,  realism,  liberalism,  and  constructivism.    
This  heightened   theoretical  debate   in   the   literature  on  Turkish   foreign  
policy  is  sign  of  a  healthy  academic  environment.  However,  when  it  comes  to  
having   numerous   answers   for   one   specific   question,   it   can   be   misleading.  
Therefore,  having  a  number  of  different  answers  to  pick  and  choose  from  can  
also  lead  to  confusion,  which  is  one  of  the  problems  that  the  researcher  faced  
when  dealing  with   this   literature.  Furthermore,  a   large  number  of  works  and  
arguments   in   the   literature   have   been   represented   in   a   single   factor   based  
manner   and   in   some   cases   they   were   critics   against   others’   theoretical  
hypotheses.   Therefore,  the  purpose  of  this  thesis  was  to  critically  analyse  and  
examine  the  most  important  theoretical  hypotheses  and  analyses  in  an  attempt  
to  arrive  at  the  most  possible  plausible  and  comprehensive  answer.  So  far  this  
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has  been  a  very  difficult  task  due  to  the  complex  nature  of  the  case  study  itself  
where   a   country   like   Turkey   needs   a   much   wider   approach   and   a  
comprehensive  analysis  to  understand  the  unique  context  of  this  state  and  its  
foreign   policy   dynamics.   Therefore,   the   thesis   chose   to   focus   on   six   main  
theoretical  explanations  presented  in  the  literature  as  key  sources  of  Turkish  
foreign   policy.   Those   explanations   include:   1-­   Islamism   and   Islamist   AKP  
ideology,   2-­   the   role   of   identity   politics   and   change   of   elite   structures   as  
domestic   sources,   3-­   the   concept   of   neo-­Ottomanism  and   its   influence   over  
AKP’s  foreign  policy  agenda,  4-­  the  role  of  economic  interests  and  the  building  
up  of  a  powerful  global  economy,  5-­  the  role  of  security  concerns  and  national  
security   interests,  and  6-­   the   influence  of   the  European  Union,  and  Turkish-­
European  integration  process  as  external  source  leading  to  the  transformation  
in  Turkish  foreign  policy.    
The   thesis  so   far  has  shown   that  when   trying   to  understand   the  main  
sources  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  since  the  AKP  took  power  in  2002,  one  would  
arrive  at  a  highly  complex   literature.  This   is  a   result  of   the  multiple  scholarly  
works   that   offer   different   and   in   some   cases   contradictory   theoretical  
explanations  in  this  field  of  study.  In  chapters  5,  6,  7  and  8  the  results  showed  
that  the  validity  and  plausibility  of  those  selected  explanations  actually  vary  and  
are  fluctuating.  Some  were  highly  valuable  and  offer  plausible  arguments,  but  
do  not  cover  all  elements  of  Turkish  foreign  policy.  On  the  other  hand,  others  
were  much  weaker  that  failed  to  explain  or  take  into  account  other   important  
factors   that   have   been   proven   to   be   important   and   affect   the   foreign   policy  
decision-­making  process,  but  they  cannot  be  totally  disregarded  or  eliminated  
from   the   study   due   to   their   relevance   as   well.   This   further   highlighted   the  
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complex  nature  of  this  case  and  the  importance  of  having  similar  study  in  the  
future  that  can  help  assess  such  complexities.   
As  demonstrated  in  previous  chapters,  some  explanations  were  highly  driven  
by  the  constructivist  theoretical  interpretation  that  highlights  the  role  of  ideology  
and  identity  in  shaping  states’  foreign  policies.  For  example,  some  suggested  
that  this  foreign  policy  change  was  a  break  away  from  its  traditional  Western  
allies  and  a  move  closer  to  the  authoritarian  regimes  of  the  Middle  East  (shift  of  
axis)  mainly  driven  by  Islamism.  They  focused  on  the  roles  of  political  Islam  and  
the  acclaimed  AKP  “Islamist  ideology”.  This  included  the  argument  that  Turkey  
under   the   AKP   is   turning   away   from   its   traditional   secular   and   democratic  
nature.  Other  scholars  saw  this  move  closer  to  the  Middle  East  as  a  revival  of  
the   Ottoman   past   and   a   result   of   neo-­Ottomanism.   Moreover,   a   number   of  
scholars  focused  more  on  the  domestic  sources  of  foreign  policy  in  particular  
the   roles   of   identity   politics   and   the   transformations   in   the   elite   structures,  
including   the   later   changes   in   the   balance   of   civil-­military   relations   and   the  
increasing  civilian  role   in  the  Turkish  foreign  policy  decision-­making  process.  
These  were  proved  to  be  highly  valuable  in  understanding  this  case,  especially  
that  foreign  policy  decision  making  processes  witnessed  an  increasing  role  of  
civilian  elected  officials  replacing  those  of  the  military.    
On   the   other   hand,   other   scholars   were   more   influenced   by   other  
notions,   such   as   “pragmatism”   and   “materialism”   found   in   the   realist   and  
rationalist   theoretical   interpretations.   They   focused   on   the   roles   of   Turkish  
economic   interests   and   national   security   concerns   as   factors   that  motivated  
Turkey  to  re-­engage  with  the  Middle  East  region.  In  terms  of  economic  interests,  
it  has  been  argued  that  Turkey’s  openness  towards  the  Middle  East  was  part  of  
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Turkey’s  project  of  building  a  strong  economic  power  that  can  contribute  to  the  
highly   competitive   global   economy.   This   includes   Turkey’s   aim   of   being   an  
influential   regional   power   and   key   international   player.   In   terms   of   national  
security   concerns,   some   scholars   have   emphasized   Turkey’s   risky  
geographical  position,  being  very  close  to  a  highly  unstable  region,  as  well  as  
its   long  war  with   the   PKK   and   struggle  with   the   Kurdish   problem,   as   a   key  
reason  behind  Turkey’s  new  approach  towards  its  neighbours  and  particularly  
Syria,  Iraq,  and  Iran.  However,  although  the  test  results  of  these  explanations  
show  strong  tendencies,  they  seem  to  only  cover  some  parts  of  the  picture  and  
ignore  other  important  parts  highlighted  by  their  contestant  explanations  in  the  
literature.    
Another   critical   contributing   factor   in   this   literature   was   the   role   of  
external  sources  in  affecting  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  making.  Some  explanations  
focused  on  the  role  of  external  actors,  most  notably  the  United  States  and  The  
European  Union.  They  emphasized   the   important   role  of  such   internationally  
powerful  actors  in  affecting  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  and  especially  towards  the  
Middle   East.   Such   studies   even   used   new   terminologies,   such   as   the  
“Americanization  of  Turkish  foreign  policy”  and  the  “Europeanization  of  Turkish  
foreign  policy”,  highlighting  the  strong  attachments  of  those  external  actors  to  
Turkish   foreign   policy   making.   This   includes   the   development   of   Turkish-­
European  relations  and  EU  membership  process.  The  study  so  far  has  shown  
that  although  it   is   important   to  understand  the  role  of  such  external  actors,   it  
would  be  misleading  to  primarily  focus  on  them  without  taking  into  account  other  
factors  that  affect  Turkey’s  foreign  policy.    
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Therefore,   it   can   be   argued   that   the   literature   presents   some   useful  
explanations   that   are   reflected   through   foreign   policy   analysis   theories.   The  
outcome   of   these   explanations   and   debate   in   the   literature   illustrates   that  
Turkish   foreign   policy   during   the   AKP   rule   since   2002   has   witnessed   a  
“departure”   away   from   its   traditional   foreign   policy   line.   However,   the   main  
problem  here  is  that  each  explanation  offers  a  different  argument  in  explaining  
this  “departure”  and  represent  it  as  “the  answer”  to  this  puzzle,  making  it  difficult  
and   challenging   for   researchers   to   determine   which   of   these   to   accept.  
However,   a  much  more   useful   analysis   can   be   found   in  Bill   Park's  work   on  
Modern  Turkey:  People,  State  and  Foreign  Policy  in  a  Globalized  World  (2011)  
who  presented  a  unique  analysis.  Unlike  many  scholars  who  are  divided  over  
pragmatic  and  ideational  sources  of  foreign  policy,  Park  looked  at  the  Turkish  
case   from  a  different   perspective.  The   importance  of   his  work   lies  within   its  
analysis  of   the   role   that  globalization  play   in   the   foreign  policy  of  states  and  
particularly   that  of  Turkey940.  Park  argued   that  globalization  has  enabled   the  
flow  of  key  issues  over  many  states  that  affect  their  foreign  policies,  issues  such  
as   terrorism,   economy,   Islam   and   others.   His   work   is   much  more   inclusive  
compared  to  many  others  in  this  field.  His  work  covered  a  number  of  important  
themes  including  historical  development,  challenges  and  opportunity  since  the  
end   of   the   cold   war,   Religion,   identity,   politics,   economy,   Turkic   world,   the  
European  Union,  Kemalism.  Park's  main  argument  is  that  "Turkey's  evolution  
over  the  past  few  decades  has  been  the  story  of  a  tussle  between  on  the  one  
hand   the   controlling   and   autarkic   inclinations   of   the   republican   system  
established  in  1923,  and  on  the  other  the  encroachment  of  forces  unleashed  by  
                                                                                                              
940  Bill  Park,  Modern  Turkey:  People,  State,  and  Foreign  Policy  in  a  Globalized  World,  
(Routledge,  2011).    
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the  pressures  of  globalization  and   transnationalism"941.  Such  works  highlight  
the  importance  of  considering  the  different  sources  that  have  influenced  Turkish  
politics  and   foreign  policy.  Therefore,   the  adoption  of  an   inclusive  and  wider  
approach  is  very  much  needed  in  order  to  successfully  explain  Turkish  foreign  
policy  change  during  the  last  decade  towards  the  Middle  East.        
According  to  the  results  of  this  thesis,  it  can  be  argued  that  there  is  no  
one  single  factor  on  its  own  that  can  fully  explain  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  change.  
Therefore,   this   suggests   that   there   is   a   growing   demand   for   a   more  
comprehensive  and  inclusive  approach  that  can  offer  a  much  wider  analysis  in  
an  attempt  to  arrive  at  a  better  explanation.  This  requires  a  recognition  of  the  
different  foreign  policy  analysis  theories  that  enable  researchers  to  understand  
the  multiple  sources  of  Turkish  foreign  policy,  which  help  form  a  clearer  picture.  
In  other  words,  the  Turkish  case  study  can  be  regarded  as  a  “Jigsaw  Puzzle”  
where  one  would  need  to  bring  together  and  rearrange  the  different  available  
pieces  to  form  the  final  and  complete  picture.  Therefore,  the  results  of  this  thesis  
demonstrate   that   the  best  way   to  understand   the  sources  of  Turkish   foreign  
policy  change  towards  the  Middle  East  within  the  last  decade  is  by  adopting  an  
inclusive  approach  that  takes  into  account  the  different  foreign  policy  analysis  
theories,  particularly   those  discussed  in  the  foreign  policy  analysis  section   in  














1.	  Summary	  of	  research	  discussion	  and	  results	  	  
  
The  purpose  of  this  thesis  was  to  critically  analyse  the  theoretical  discussion  
and  debate  in  the  literature  over  explaining  the  sources  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  
change  since  2002  under  the  AKP  government  particularly  towards  the  Middle  
East.  The  aim  was  to  assess  the  significance  of  those  theoretical  hypotheses  
and  explanations  that  are  inclined  with  foreign  policy  analysis  and  international  
relations’  theories.  The  thesis  engaged  in  the  literature  on  Turkish  foreign  policy  
and  answered   the   initial   research  question   investigating   the  main  sources  of  
Turkish   foreign   policy.   This   was   carried   out   through   developing   a   critical  
assessment  that  helped  identify  which  of  the  multiple  competing  explanations  
offered  in  the  literature  represent  the  most  valid  and  comprehensive  answer.  
The  thesis  offered  an  analysis  of  the  literature  on  Turkish  foreign  policy,  testing  
the  plausibility  of  the  such  wide  range  of  theoretical  hypotheses  offered.  Central  
to   this   thesis’s  analysis  and  examination  was  Process  Tracing  methodology,  
which  enabled  the  researcher  to  closely  test  and  evaluate  the  explanatory  value  
of  the  different  competing  explanations  through  specific  examination  tools  and  
tests.   Furthermore,   the   thesis   was   able   to   identify   the  most   comprehensive  
explanation  in  the  literature  so  far  and  build  a  foundation  for  researchers  to  build  
on   and   develop.   Therefore,   this   thesis   offers   a   critical   assessment   that  
researchers  can  benefit   from  and  adopt   in   their   future  research   in  explaining  
certain  Turkish  foreign  policy  outcomes.    
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The  study  mainly  focused  on  six  major  theoretical  explanations  from  the  
literature   on   Turkish   foreign   policy   that   have   been   argued   to   be   the   main  
sources  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  change  towards  the  Middle  East.  They  include;;  
1-­   the  role  of  political   Islam  and  Islamism  in  shaping  Turkey’s  new  approach  
towards  the  Middle  East,  2-­  the  role  of  Neo-­Ottoman  ideology  and  ambition  to  
revive  Turkey’s  regional  imperial  past,  3-­  the  role  of  identity  politics  and  national  
identity  as  domestic  sources  behind  this  new  Turkish  foreign  policy,  4-­  the  role  
of  economic  interests  and  regional  opportunities  as  a  critical  part  of  Turkey’s  
goal   to   becoming   a   global   economic   power,   5-­   the   role   of   regional   security  
concerns  to  avoid  spill  over  and  national  security   in  dealing  with   the  Kurdish  
issue  and  the  PKK,  and    6-­  the  role  of  the  European  Union  as  one  of  the  main  
external  sources   influencing  Turkey’s   foreign  policy  decision  making  and   the  
membership  process.    
   The  results  demonstrate  that   the  value  and  plausibility  of   the  selected  
explanations  vary.  Some  proved  to  consist  of  strong  valuable  evidence,  while  
others   had   much   less   value   and   significance.   Most   explanations   were   not  
eliminated  and  remain  to  have  some  value  in  the  literature.  Only  one  hypothesis  
failed   to   survive   the   test   and   had   to   be   eliminated.   The   test   results   are  
summarized   below   to   make   it   easier   for   the   reader   to   review.   This   will   be  






Figure  1.  Process  Tracing  test  results  of  sources  behind  Turkish  foreign  
policy  change  towards  the  Middle  East.  
  
The  above   table   summarises   the  Process  Tracing   test   results   for   the  
explanations   examined   in   this   study.   The   process   tracing   tests   have   shown  
some  similar  results.  For  example,  two  hypotheses,  particularly  Islamism  and  
Security   explanations,   have   both   failed   a  Straw   in   the  wind  Test   showing   a  
weakness   and   least   demanding   standard   of   evidence   strengthening   the  
relevance   of   other   rival   explanations.   On   the   other   hand,   three   other  
explanations,   such   as   identity,   economic,   and   EU   explanations,   all   have  
successfully   passed   a   Hoop   Test   affirming   their   relevance   setting   a   more  
demanding   standard   compared   to   Straw   in   the   Wind   Tests,   somewhat  
weakening  their  rival  ones.  This  interestingly  suggests  that  these  explanations  
carry  a  highly  similar  value.  They  each  tell  us  an   important  part  of   the  story.  
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Therefore,  this  further  demonstrates  the  importance  of  adopting  an  approach  
inclusive   of   these   factors.   It   is   important   to   note   here   that   none   of   the  
explanations   tested   in   this   study   were   strong   enough   to   representing   both  
necessary  and  sufficient  evidence  for  establishing  causation  to  pass  a  Doubly  
decisive  Test.  Passing  a  Doubly  decisive  Test  would  confirm  a  given  hypothesis  
and   eliminates   all   others,   which   is   extremely   difficult   to   achieve   in   social  
science.    
   The  final  results  of  this  study  have  demonstrated  that  it  is  necessary  to  
understand  the  role  of  different  international,  domestic,  and  individual  factors  in  
shaping   Turkish   foreign   policy,   which   other   studies   have   looked   at  
independently.  Foreign  policy  analysis  theories  are  highly  influential  in  shaping  
researchers   and   analysts’   understanding   of   this   case.   Theories   including  
rationalism,  realism,  liberalism  and  constructivism  offer  important  insights  when  
analysing  Turkish   foreign  policy.  Such  dominant   theories  help  us   look  at   the  
Turkish   case   through   different   lenses.   However,   the   results   of   this   thesis  
suggest  that  in  order  to  better  understand  the  sources  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  
change  towards  the  Middle  East,  one  must  recognise  the  role  of  the  different  
ideational  and  material,  external  and  domestic   factors  demonstrated   through  
foreign  policy  analysis  and  international  relations’  theories.  The  results  show,  
for  example,  that  the  overwhelming  majority  of  interviewees  completely  agreed  
that  there  is  a  need  for  a  holistic  approach  and  that  it  would  be  quite  impossible  
to  explain  this  case  using  single  based  explanations  that  give  more  attention  on  
one   source   of   foreign   policy   over   another.   Moreover,   there   was   a   clear  




2.	  Evaluation	  of	  the	  research:	  Strengths	  and	  Limitations	  	  	  
2.1	  Strengths	  
  
The  research  topic  of  this  PhD  thesis  came  as  a  result  of  the  wide  variety  of  
theoretical   hypotheses   in   the   literature.   The   aim  was   to   explore   this   puzzle  
further  and  try  to  find  out  the  most  plausible  explanation  available  so  far.  One  
of  the  most  important  strengths  of  this  study  was  its  use  of  the  Process  Tracing  
methodology,  which  enabled  the  researcher  to  conduct  close  up  examination  
of  the  most  prominent  explanations  provided  in  this  field  of  study.  Testing  the  
plausibility   and   validity   of   the   explanations   through   a   critical   approach.  
Furthermore,   the   thesis  was  able   to   re-­organize   the  wide   range  of  data   in  a  
more  understandable  manner  under  one  piece  of  work,  which  can  also  be  highly  
valuable   for   researchers   for   future   studies.   This   further   included   a   re-­
arrangement  of  the  competing  explanations  (which  were  provided  by  different  
Turkish   and   international   scholars   in   the   literature)   making   them   easier   to  
observe  and  analyse.    
Another  important  element  in  this  study  that  contributes  to  its  strengths  
is  its  ability  to  critically  analyse  and  summarize  a  very  large  part  of  the  literature,  
which  can  be  of  significant  value  for  observers  and  students  in  this  field  aiming  
to   understand   the   complex   nature   of   this   literature.   In   addition,   the   thesis  
managed  to  explore  and  highlight  the  growing  gap  and  problem  in  the  literature  
on  Turkish  foreign  policy  addressing  the  need  for  further  similar  investigations.  
This  paves  way   for   researchers   to   take   this  step   further  and   follow  a  similar  
investigative   approach   in   an   attempt   to   arrive   at   a   comprehensive   answer.  
Moreover,  the  researcher  was  able  to  identify  that  the  most  suitable  approach  
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to   understanding   this   case   study   is   by   recognising   the   different   theoretical  
interpretations   in   the   field   of   foreign   policy   analysis,   arguing   that   a   more  
inclusive  and  wider  approach  is  very  much  needed  and  necessary.  The  results  
highlighted   that   adopting   single   based   explanations  will   further   contribute   to  
these   theoretical   disagreements   and   move   away   from   achieving   a  
comprehensive  explanation.  This  is  due  to  the  complex  nature  of  the  Turkish  
case.    
One   of   the   important   advantages   in   applying   Process   Tracing   is   its  
contribution   to   having   an   unbiased   and   objective   research.   It   treats   all  
explanations  equally  and  does  not  allow  much  room  for  the  researcher’s  own  
interests.  In  other  words,  Process  Tracing  helps  the  researcher  to  take  steps  in  
an  unbiased  way  and  draw  conclusions  in  the  best  of  researcher’s  ability  without  
interference   of   own   interest.   Furthermore,   Process   Tracing   in   qualitative  
research  and  particularly  in  social  sciences  does  not  give  one  definitive  answer  
that  eliminates  all  others,  but  instead  help  give  the  most  plausible  answer  with  
some   room   for   other   explanations’   value   that   can   be   further   investigated   in  
future  studies.    
Another  major  element  contributing   to   the  originality  and  value  of   this  
study  is  the  fact  that  the  researcher  was  able  to  conduct  a  number  fieldwork  
trips  to  Turkey,  which  enabled  him  to  make  closer  observation  and  investigation  
as  well  as   the  ability   to  collect  significant  data   from  different   institutions  and  
academic   databases.   Through   these   visits,   the   researcher  was   also   able   to  
communicate  with  key  Turkish  experts  and  officials  and  organize  a  number  of  
interviews,   which   highly   contributed   to   the   study’s   investigation   and  




Despite   the   strengths  and  advantages  provided   in   this   thesis,   there  are   few  
possible  limitations  worth  mentioning.  First  of  all,  the  application  of  the  Process  
Tracing  methodology   in  qualitative   research   is  quite  difficult  and   tricky  some  
times.  In  this  research  where  a  large  number  of  variables  and  data  exist,  it  was  
very   difficult   to   know   the   degree   of   freedom   in   the   researchers’   choices   of  
explanations.  In  other  words,  Process  Tracing  does  not  specify  the  number  of  
cases  or  explanations  that  a  researcher  can  use  at  a  time.  For  example,  the  
Turkish   foreign   policy   case   is   a   very   complex   one   with   a   large   number   of  
variables,   data,   and   theoretical   hypotheses   to   consider,   which   makes  
impossible   for   the   researcher   to   cover   and   investigate   all   of   them.   Another  
limitation   with   using   Process   Tracing   in   qualitative   research   is   that   it   is  
extremely  difficult  for  the  researcher  to  arrive  at  a  100%  confirmation  of  a  given  
theory   or   explanation.   It   is   not   like   a   mathematical   calculation   where  
researchers   can   totally   confirm   with   not   doubt   the   answer.   Instead,   it   is  
dependent  on  the  available  data  that  the  researcher  could  get  hold  of  and  stops  
the  investigation  when  the  researcher  is  “satisfied”  with  results  and  is  able  to  
account  for  the  outcome.    
   On  the  other  hand,  another  difficulty  that  the  researcher  faced  was  the  
communication  process  with  interviewees.  Due  to  the  highly  busy  schedule  of  
many   interviewees,   the  planning  of   interviews  was  quite  difficult   to  manage.  
Some  officials  were  not  able  to  meet  after  confirming  a  meeting  appointment  
due  some  government  meetings  and  urgent  official  travelling.  For  example,  one  
of  the  most  important  interviews  scheduled  with  a  key  Turkish  official,  Mevlut  
Cavusoglu,  was  cancelled  in  2014  due  to  his  new  appointment  to  become  the  
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Turkish  Foreign  Minister.   It  would  have  been  a  great  opportunity  to   interview  
him,  as  it  will  also  highly  contribute  to  the  value  of  research  data.  However,  it  is  
important   to   highlight   that   some   Turkish   officials   were   very   welcoming   and  
helpful.  Most  of  the  valuable  critical  discussions  took  place  in  the  interviews  with  
academics   and   leaders   of   different   think   tanks   and   institutions.  Due   to   time  
limits  and  travel  efforts  and  costs  between  the  UK  and  Turkey,  the  number  of  
interviewees  was  not  as  planned.  What’s  more,  some  of   the  visits  coincided  
with  local  and  national  elections  time  when  officials  and  institutions  are  mostly  
busy.  For  example,  one  of  my  visits  was  during  local  elections  in  March  2014,  
which  was  a  critical  time  in  Turkish  politics.  It  would  add  greater  value  to  the  
research  if  more  interviews  were  conducted  in  order  to  accumulate  more  critical  
viewpoints  and  explore  if  there  are  other  different  ideas  to  consider  that  might  
not  have  been  looked  at  yet.      
   Furthermore,  being  a  non-­native  Turkish  speaker  might  have  made  the  
researcher  miss  out  some  opportunities  in  this  research.  Although  a  significant  
number   of   Turkish   experts   publish   their   work   in   English   and   many   are  
translated,   there   are   some   publications   that   were   highly   advised   to   use   in  
Turkish   language.   Therefore,   the   researcher   had   to   use   Turkish   language  
books  mainly  through  using  them  as  secondary  sources  cited  in  other  works  in  
English  language  written  by  Turkish  scholars  and  analysts.  It  would  have  added  
greater   value   to   the   research  analysis   if   the   researcher   knew   fluent  Turkish  
language.  Being  fluent  in  the  language  of  the  country  a  researcher  chooses  to  
focus  on  can  be  a  major  advantage  that  can  ease  possible  language  barriers  
both  in  academic  research  and  fieldwork.      
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   In   addition,   another   possible   improvement   that   could   be  made   in   the  
future  is  on  the  nature  of  the  cases  selected  in  this  research.  The  researcher  
chose  to  focus  on  the  Middle  East  as  whole  and  deal  with  the  issue  from  mainly  
the  Turkish  side,  while  referring  to  some  Middle  Eastern  states  and  events  as  
examples,  which  is  not  a  problem.  However,  some  may  view  that  it  could  have  
been  better   if   the  thesis  had  bigger  sections  or  chapters  that  would  focus  on  
specific   Turkish   bilateral   relations   with   one   or   more   Middle   Easter   states.  
Although   the   thesis   focuses  more   on   the  Turkish   side   and   its   foreign   policy  
change,   the  use  of  specific  cases   in  greater  details  can  contribute   further   in  
future   studies.  Such   specific   bilateral   relations   could   be   further   examined   in  
future   research,   particularly   if   researchers   choose   to   investigate   “certain”  
foreign  policy  decisions  and  relations  with  some  specific  Middle  Eastern  states.    
3.	  Implications	  and	  future	  research	  
  
The   findings  of   this   thesis  show  clearly   that   further   research  with   the  use  of  
wider  and  inclusive  approaches  is  necessary.  Process  Tracing  can  be  one  good  
example  as  illustrated  in  this  study,  which  allows  researchers  to  evaluate  and  
assess  the  credibility  of  the  different  theoretical  hypotheses.  Further  research  
is   needed   to   build   greater   understanding   of   the   complex   nature   of   Turkish  
foreign  policy  transformation  and  particularly  towards  the  Middle  East.  Future  
studies  can  use  more  specific  case  studies  from  the  Middle  East  and  apply  it  to  
Turkish   foreign  policy  approach.  This  could  open  doors   for  new  findings   that  
could  offer  more  to  this  field  of  study.  Researchers  can  use  this  research  as  a  
step  forward  coming  from  a  widely  complex  literature  to  produce  much  stronger  
and  valid  explanations  to  the  existing  ones.    
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   Furthermore,   future   research   can   build   on   this   work   and   take   it   step  
further   by   analysing   more   recent   events.   For   example,   it   would   be   very  
interesting  to  know  how  Turkish  foreign  policy  has  been  affected  by  the  latest  
developments   in   the   Arab   Spring   and   particularly   regarding   Syria   and   the  
Kurdish  problem.  Or  to  investigate  whether  or  not  the  course  of  Turkish  foreign  
policy  has  changed  regarding  the  Middle  East,  particularly  with  recent  regional  
developments  and  their  prediction  of  the  future  Turkish  foreign  policy  direction.  
This  thesis’  main  concern  was  to  explain  the  “initial”  change  of  Turkish  foreign  
policy  since  2002  towards  the  Middle  East,  drawing  particular  attention  to  the  
first  ten  years  of  the  AKP  government.    
   On  the  other  hand,  there  are  some  questions  that  researchers  need  to  
consider  in  future  studies  that  arise  from  this  research,  such  as;;  to  what  extent  
can   a  multiple   factors   approach   really   explain   the  whole   picture?  Can   such  
puzzle  be  totally  fixed  in  the  first  place?  Or  would  it  remain  a  debated  topic?  
Can   a   single   factor   based   approach   explain   much   in   political   science?   Is  
Process  Tracing  the  best  method  to  use  in  this  case  study?  Or  are  there  other  
more   useful   methodological   tools?      These   are   some   critical   questions   that  
researchers  need  to  take  into  account  in  their  future  studies  that  can  be  critically  
analysed.    
The  overall  implication  of  this  study  for  future  research  is  to  identify  and  
avoid  the  consequences  of  having  single  factor  explanations  that  can  only  offer  
a   partial   picture,   which   could   lead   to   incomplete   and   insufficient   accounts.  
Therefore,  future  studies  need  to  apply  wider  and  more  inclusive  approaches  
to  try  and  create  a  comprehensive  account  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  change,  
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